1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the
violation of covert activities of the USSR and Communist China and the
movements, parties and groups dominated by them (hereinafter collectively referred to as "International Communism") to discredit
and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other
powers of the free world, determined, as set forth in NSC Directives
10/2 and 10/5, that, in the interests of world peace and U. S.
national security, the covert foreign activities of the U. S. Gov-
ernment should be supplemented by covert operations.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency had already been charged
by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and
counter-espionage operations abroad. It therefore seemed desirable,
for operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert oper-
ations, but, subject to directives from the NSC, to place the respon-
sibility for them on the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate
them with espionage and counter-espionage operations under the over-
all control of the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. The NSC has determined that such covert operations shall
be conducted to the greatest extent practicable, in the light of U. S. and Soviet
capabilities and taking into account the risk of war, be designed to:

   a. Create and exploit troublesomeness problems for Internation-
      al Communism, impair relations between the USSR and Communist
      China and between them and their satellites, complicate control
      within the USSR, Communist China and their satellites, and re-
      tard the growth of the military and economic potential of the
      Soviet bloc.

   b. Discredit the prestige and ideology of International
      Communism, and reduce the strength of its parties and other
      elements.

   c. Counter any threat of a party or individuals either directly
      or indirectly responsive to Communist control to achieve domi-
      nant power in a free world country.

   d. Reduce International Communist control over any areas
      of the world.

   e. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of
      the peoples and nations of the free world, accentuate, whenever
      possible, the identity of interest between such peoples and
nations and the United States as well as favoring, where appropriate, those groups genuinely advocating or fighting in the advancement of such national interests, and increase the capacity and will of such peoples and nations to resist International Communism.

2. In accordance with established policies and to the extent practical in areas endangered or threatened by International Communism, develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations and ensure availability of these forces in the event of war, including wherever practicable provision of a base upon which the military may expand these forces in time of war within active theaters of operations as well as provision for stay-behind assets and escape and evasion facilities.

4. Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:

a. Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with United States foreign and military policies and with covert activities, and consulting with and obtaining advice from the Planning Coordination Group of the Operations Coordinating Board and other departments or agencies as appropriate.

b. Informing, through appropriate channels and as a need-to-know basis, agencies of the U. S. Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives), of such operations as will affect them.

5. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 4, the following provisions shall apply to wartime covert operations:

a. Plans for covert operations to be conducted in active theaters of war and any other areas in which U. S. forces are engaged in combat operations will be drawn up with the assistance of the Department of Defense and will be in consonance with and complementary to approved war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Covert operations in active theaters of war and any other areas in which U. S. forces are engaged in combat operations will be conducted under such command and control relationships as have been or may in the future be approved by the Department of Defense.

6. As used in this directive, "covert operations" shall be understood to be all activities conducted pursuant to this directive which are not planned and executed by any U. S. Government
responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and
that if uncovered the U. S. Government can plausibly disclaim any
responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall in-
clude any covert activities related to: propaganda, political ac-
tion, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage,
anti-sabotage, de-industrialization, escape and evasion and evasion measures;
subversion against hostile states or groups; intelligence against
foreign states, or groups including assistance to
underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation
groups; support of indigenous and anti-communist elements in threat-
ened countries of the free world; deception plans and operations; and
call activities compatible with this directive necessary to accomplish
the foregoing. Such operations shall not include armed conflict by
recognized military forces, espionage and counter-espionage, nor cover
and deception for military operations.

7. This directive supersedes and rescinds NCC 10/2, NCC 10/5,
and NCC 5412. Subparagraphs "a" and "b" under the heading "Additional
Functions of the Operations Coordinating Board" on page 1 of the Pres-
ident's memorandum for the Executive Secretary, National Security
Council, supplementing Executive Order 10483, are superseded by the
following provisions:

a. Except as the President otherwise directs, the regular
members of the Planning Coordination Group shall hereafter be
advised in advance of major covert programs initiated by the
Central Intelligence Agency under this policy or as otherwise
directed, and shall be the normal channel for giving policy
approval for such programs as well as for securing coordina-
tion of support therefor among the Departments of State and
Defence and the Central Intelligence Agency.

b. The designated representatives of the Secretaries of
State and Defence referred to in paragraph 4-a above shall
keep the members of the Planning Coordination Group from their
respective departments advised as to matters on which they are
consulted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and which
have been or are to be referred to the Planning Coordination
Group.