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The Dialogues of Plato
Translated into English with Analyses and Introductions
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In Four Volumes
Volume III
CHARMIDES
AND OTHER DIALOGUES

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CHARMIDES

INTRODUCTION

The subject of the Charmides is Temperance, which may also be rendered Moderation, Modesty, Discretion, Wisdom, without completely exhausting by all these terms the various associations of the word. It may be described as "mens sana in corpore sano," the harmony or due proportion of the higher and lower elements of human nature which "makes a man his own master," according to the definition of the Republic. In the accompanying translation the word has been rendered in different places either Temperance or Wisdom, as the connection seemed to require.

The beautiful youth, Charmides, who is also the most temperate of human beings, is asked by Socrates, "What is Temperance?" He answers characteristically, (1) "Quietness." "But temperance is a fine and noble thing; and quietness in many or most cases is not so fine a thing as quickness." He tries again and says (2) that temperance is modesty. But this again is set aside by a sophistical application of Homer: for temperance is good as well as noble, and Homer has declared that "modesty is not good for a needy man." (3) Once more Charmides makes the attempt. This time he gives a definition which he has heard, and of which he insinuates that Critias is the author: "Temperance is doing one's own business." But the artisan who makes another man's shoes may be temperate, and yet he is not doing his own business. How is this riddle to be explained?

Critias, who takes the place of Charmides, distinguishes in his answer between "making" and "doing," and with the help of a misapplied quotation from Hesiod assigns to the words "doing" and "work" an exclusively good sense: temperance is doing one's own business; — (4) is doing good.

Still an element of knowledge is wanting which Critias is
readily induced to admit at the suggestion of Socrates; and, in the spirit of Socrates and of Greek life generally, proposes as a fifth definition, (5) Temperance is self-knowledge. But all sciences have a subject: number is the subject of arithmetic, health of medicine—what is the subject of temperance or wisdom? The answer is that (6) Temperance is the knowledge of what a man knows and of what he does not know. But this is contrary to analogy; there is no vision of vision, but only of visible things; no love of loves, but only of beautiful things; how then can there be a knowledge of knowledge? That which is older, heavier, lighter, is older, heavier, and lighter than something else, not than itself, and this seems to be true of all relative notions—the object of relation is outside of them; at any rate they can only have relation to themselves in the form of that object. Whether there are any such cases of reflex relation or not, and whether that sort of knowledge which we term Temperance is of this reflex nature, has yet to be determined by the great metaphysician. But even if knowledge can know itself, how does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what we do not know? Besides this, knowledge is an abstraction only, and will not inform us of any particular subject, such as medicine, building, and the like. It may tell us that we or other men know something, but can never tell what we know.

But admitting further that there is such a knowledge of what we know and do not know, which would supply a rule and measure of all things, still there would be no good in this. For temperance is a good, and the knowledge which temperance gives must be of a kind which will do us good. But this universal knowledge does not tend to our happiness or good: the only kind of knowledge which brings happiness is the knowledge of good and evil. To this Critias replies that the science or knowledge of good and evil, and all the other sciences, are regulated by the higher science or knowledge of knowledge. Socrates replies by again dividing the abstract from the concrete, and asks how this knowledge conduces to happiness in the same definite way that medicine conduces to health.

And now, after making all these concessions, which are really inadmissible, we are still as far as ever from ascertaining the nature of temperance, which Charmides has already discovered, and had therefore better rest in the knowledge that the more temperate he is the happier he will be, and not trouble himself with the speculations of Socrates.
In this Dialogue may be noted (1) the Greek ideal of beauty and goodness, the vision of the fair soul in the fair body, realized in the beautiful Charmides; (2) The true conception of medicine as a science of the whole as well as the parts, and of the mind as well as the body, which is playfully intimated in the story of the Thracian; (3) The tendency of the age to verbal distinctions, which here, as in the Protagoras and Cratylus, are ascribed to the ingenuity of Prodicus; also the interpretations or rather parodies of Homer and Hesiod, which are eminently characteristic of Plato and of his age; (4) The germ of an ethical principle contained in the notion that temperance is "doing one's own business," which in the Republic (such is the shifting character of the Platonic philosophy) is given as the definition, not of temperance, but of justice; (5) The beginnings of logic and metaphysics implied in the two questions, whether there can be a science of science? and whether the knowledge of what you know is the same as the knowledge of what you do not know? also in the distinction between "what you know," and "that you know;" here arises the first conception of an absolute self-determined science (the claims of which, however, are set aside by Socrates); as well as the first suggestion of the difficulty of the abstract and concrete, and one of the earliest anticipations of the relation of subject and object, and of the subjective element in knowledge; (6) The conception of a science of good and evil also first occurs here, and may be regarded as an anticipation of the Philebus and Republic, as well as of moral philosophy in later ages.

The dramatic interest of the Dialogue chiefly centres in the youth Charmides, with whom Socrates talks in the kindly spirit of an elder. Some contrast appears to be intended between his youthful simplicity and ingenuousness and the dialectical and rhetorical arts of Critias, who is the grown-up man of the world, not without a tincture of philosophy. But neither in this nor in any other of the dialogues of Plato is that most hated of Athenians displayed in his true character. He is simply a cultivated person who, like his kinsman Plato, is ennobled by the connection of his family with Solon, and had been the follower, if not the disciple, both of Socrates and of the Sophists. In the argument he is not unfair, if allowance is made for a slight rhetorical tendency, and for some desire to save his reputation with the company; in some respects he is nearer the truth than Socrates. Nothing in his language or behavior is unbecoming the guardian of the beautiful Charmides. His love of reputation,
which is characteristically Greek, contrasts with the utter absence of this quality and profession of ignorance on the part of Socrates.

The definitions of temperance proceed in regular order from the popular to the philosophical. The first two are simple enough and partially true, like the first thoughts of an intelligent youth; the third, which is a real contribution to ethical philosophy, is perverted by the ingenuity of Socrates, and hardly rescued by an equal perversion on the part of Critias. The remaining definitions have a higher aim, which is to introduce the element of knowledge, and at last to unite good and truth in a single science. But the time has not yet arrived for the realization of this vision of metaphysical philosophy. Hence we see with surprise that Plato, who in his other writings identifies good and knowledge, here opposes them, and asks, almost in the spirit of Aristotle, how can there be a knowledge of knowledge, and even if attainable, how can such a knowledge be of any use?

The relations of knowledge and virtue are again brought forward in the companion Dialogues of the Lysis and Laches; and also in the Protagoras and Euthydemus.
CHARMIDES, OR TEMPERANCE

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE

Socrates, who is the narrator.
Chaerephon.

Charmides.
Critias.

Scene: — The Palaestra of Taureas, which is near the Porch of the King Archon.

Yesterday evening I returned from the army at Potidaea, and having been a good while away, I thought that I would go and look at my old haunts. So I went into the palaestra of Taureas, which is over against the temple adjoining the porch of the King Archon, and there I found a number of persons, most of whom I knew, but not all. My visit was unexpected, and no sooner did they see me entering than they saluted me from afar on all sides; and Chaerephon, who is a kind of madman, started up and ran to me, seizing my hand, and saying, How did you escape, Socrates? — (I should explain that an engagement had taken place at Potidaea not long before we came away, the news of which had only just reached Athens.)

You see, I replied, that here I am.

There was a report, he said, that the engagement was very severe, and that many of our acquaintance had fallen.

That, I replied, was not far from the truth.
I suppose, he said, that you were present.
I was.
Then sit down, and tell us the whole story, which as yet we have only heard imperfectly.

I took the place which he assigned to me, by the side of Critias the son of Callaeschrus, and when I had saluted him and the rest of the company, I told them the news from the army, and answered their several inquiries.

Then, when there had been enough of this, I, in my turn, began to make inquiries about matters at home — about the present state of philosophy, and about the youth. I asked whether any of them were remarkable for beauty or sense, or both. Critias, glancing at the door, invited my attention to some youths who were coming in, and talking noisily to one another, followed by a crowd. Of the beauties, Socrates, he said, I fancy that you will soon be able to form a judgment. For those who are just entering are the advanced guard of the great beauty of the day, and he is likely to be not far off himself.

Who is he, I said; and who is his father?

Charmides, he replied, is his name; he is my cousin, and the son of my uncle Glaucon: I rather think that you know him, although he was not grown up at the time of your departure.

Certainly, I know him, I said, for he was remarkable even then when he was still a child, and now I should imagine that he must be almost a young man.

You will see, he said, in a moment what progress he has made and what he is like. He had scarcely said the word, when Charmides entered.

Now you know, my friend, that I can not measure anything, and of the beautiful, I am simply such a measure as a white line is of chalk; for almost all young persons are alike beautiful in my eyes. But at that moment, when I saw him coming in, I must admit that I was quite astonished at his beauty and
stature; all the world seemed to be enamored of him; amazement and confusion reigned when he entered; and a troop of lovers followed him. That grown-up men like ourselves should have been affected in this way was not surprising, but I observed that there was the same feeling among the boys; all of them, down to the very least child, turned and looked at him as if he had been a statue.

Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates? Has he not a beautiful face?
That he has, indeed, I said.
But you would think nothing of his face, he replied, if you could see his naked form: he is absolutely perfect.
And to this they all agreed.
By Heracles, I said, there never was such a para-
gon, if he has only one other slight addition.
What is that? said Critias.
If he has a noble soul; and being of your house, Critias, he may be expected to have this.
He is as fair and good within, as he is without, replied Critias.
Shall we ask him then, I said, to show us, not his body, but his soul, naked and undisguised? he is just of an age at which he will like to talk.
That he will, said Critias, and I can tell you that he is a philosopher already, and also a considerable poet, not in his own opinion only, but in that of others.
That, my dear Critias, I replied, is a distinction which has long been in your family, and is inherited by you from Solon. But why don’t you call him, and show him to us? for even if he were younger than he is, there could be no impropriety in his talking to us in the presence of you, who are his guardian and cousin.
Very well, he said; then I will call him; and turn-
ing to the attendant, he said, Call Charmides, and tell him that I want him to come and see a physician about the illness of which he spoke to me the day before yesterday. Then again addressing me, he added: He has been complaining lately of having a headache when he rises in the morning: now why should you not make believe to him that you know a cure for the headache?

There will be no difficulty about that, I said, if he comes.

He will be sure to come, he replied.

He came as he was bidden, and sat down between Critias and me. Great amusement was occasioned by every one pushing with might and main at his neighbor in order to make a place for him next to them, until at the two ends of the row one had to get up and the other was rolled over sideways. Now I, my friend, was beginning to feel awkward; my former bold belief in my powers of conversing with him had vanished. And when Critias told him that I was the person who had the cure, he looked at me in such an indescribable manner, and was about to ask a question; and then all the people in the palaestra crowded about us, and, O rare! I caught a sight of the inwards of his garment, and took the flame. Then I could no longer contain myself. I though how well Cydias understood the nature of love, when, in speaking of a fair youth, he warns some one “not to bring the fawn in the sight of the lion lest he devour him,” for I felt that I had been overcome by a sort of wild-beast appetite. But I controlled myself, and when he asked me if I knew the cure of the headache, I answered, but with an effort, that I did know.

And what is it? he said.

I replied that it was a kind of leaf, which required to be accompanied by a charm, and if a person would
repeat the charm at the same time that he used the cure, he would be made whole; but that without the charm the leaf would be of no avail.

Then I will write out the charm from your dictation, he said.

With my good will? I said, or without my good will?

With your good will, Socrates, he said, laughing.

Very good, I said; and are you quite sure that you know my name?

I ought to know you, he replied, for there is a great deal said about you among my companions; and I remember when I was a child seeing you in company with my cousin Critias.

That is very good of you, I said; and will make me more at home with you in explaining the nature of the charm; I was thinking that I might have a difficulty about this. For the charm will do more, Charmides, than only cure the headache. I dare say that you may have heard eminent physicians say to a patient who comes to them with bad eyes, that they can not cure his eyes by themselves, but that if his eyes are to be cured, his head must be treated; and then again they say that to think of curing the head alone, and not the rest of the body also, is the height of folly. And arguing in this way they apply their methods to the whole body, and try to treat and heal the whole and the part together. Did you ever observe that this is what they say?

Yes, he said.

And they are right, and you would agree with them?

Yes, he said, certainly I should.

His approving answers reassured me, and I began by degrees to regain confidence, and the vital heat returned. Such, Charmides, I said, is the nature of
the charm. Now I learned it when serving with the army, of one of the physicians of the Thracian king, Zamolxis. He was one of those who are said to give immortality. This Thracian told me that the Greek physicians are quite right in these notions of theirs, which I was mentioning, as far as they go; but Zamolxis, he added, our king, who is also a god, says further, "that as you ought not to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the eyes, so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the soul; and this," he said, "is the reason why the cure of many diseases is unknown to the physicians of Hellas, because they are ignorant of the whole, which ought to be studied also; for the part can never be well unless the whole is well." For all good and evil, whether in the body or in human nature, originates, as he declared, in the soul, and overflows from thence, as from the head into the eyes. And therefore if the head and the body are to be well, you must begin by curing the soul; that is the first thing. And the cure, my dear youth, has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and these charms are fair words; and by them temperance is implanted in the soul, and where temperance is, there health is speedily imparted, not only to the head, but to the whole body. And he who taught me the cure and the charm added a special direction; "Let no one," he said, "persuade you to cure the head, until he has first given you his soul to be cured by the charm. For this," he said, "is the great error of our day in the treatment of the human body, that physicians separate the soul from the body." And he added with emphasis, at the same time making me swear to his words, "let no one, however rich, or noble, or fair, persuade you to give him the cure, without the charm." Now I have sworn, and I must keep my oath, and therefore if you will
allow me to apply the Thracian charm first to your soul, as the stranger directed, I will afterwards proceed to apply the cure to your head. But if not, I do not know what I am to do with you, my dear Charmides.

Critias, when he heard this, said: The headache will be an unexpected benefit to my young relation, if the pain in his head compels him to improve his mind: and I can tell you, Socrates, that Charmides is not only preëminent in beauty among his equals, but also in that quality which is given by the charm; and this, as you say, is temperance, is it not?

Yes, I said.

Then let me tell you that he is the most temperate of human beings, and for his age inferior to none in any quality.

Yes, I said, Charmides; and indeed I think that you ought to excel others in all good qualities; for if I am not mistaken there is no one present who could easily point out two Athenian houses, the alliance of which was likely to produce a better or nobler son than the two from which you are sprung. There is your father's house, which is descended from Critias the son of Dropidas, whose family has been commemo-rated in the panegyrical verses of Anacreon, Solon, and many other poets, as famous for beauty and virtue and all other high fortune: and your mother's house is equally distinguished; for your maternal uncle, Pyrilampes, never met with his equal in Persia at the court of the great king, or on the whole continent in all the places to which he went as ambassador, for stature and beauty; that whole family is not a whit inferior to the other. Having such ancestors you ought to be first in all things, and as far as I can see, sweet son of Glaucon, your outward form is no dishonor to them. And if you have temperance as well
as beauty, as Critias declares, then blessed art thou, dear Charmides, in being the son of thy mother. And this is the question: if this gift of temperance is already yours, as Critias declares, and you are temperate enough, in that case you have no need of any charms, whether of Zamolxis, or of Abaris the Hyperborean, and I may as well give you the cure of the head at once; but if you are wanting in these qualities, I must use the charm before I give you the medicine. Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit the truth of what Critias has been saying about your gift of temperance, or are you wanting in this particular?

Charmides blushed, and the blush heightened his beauty, for modesty is becoming in youth; he then said very ingenuously, that he really could not say at once, either yes, or no, in answer to the question which I had asked: For, said he, if I affirm that I am not temperate, that would be a strange thing to say of myself, and also I should have to give the lie to Critias, and many others, who think that I am temperate, as he tells you: but, on the other hand, if I say that I am, I shall have to praise myself, which would be ill manners; and therefore I have no answer to make to you.

I said to him: That is a natural reply, Charmides, and I think that you and I may as well inquire together whether you have this quality about which I am asking or not; and then you will not be compelled to say what you do not like; neither shall I be a rash practitioner of medicine: therefore, if you please, I will join with you in the inquiry, but I will not press you if you would rather not.

There is nothing which I should like better, he said; and as far as I am concerned you may proceed in the way which you think best.
I think, I said, that I had better begin by asking you, What is Temperance? for you must have an opinion about this: if temperance abides in you, she must give some intimation of her nature and qualities, which may enable you to form some notion of her. Is not that true?

Yes, he said, that I think is true.

And as you speak Greek, I said, you can surely describe what this appears to be, which you have within you.

Certainly, he said.

In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is Temperance?

At first he hesitated, and was very unwilling to answer: then he said that he thought temperance was doing things orderly and quietly, such things for example as walking in the streets, and talking, or anything else of that nature. In a word, he said, I should answer that, in my opinion, temperance is quietness.

Are you right, Charmides? I said. No doubt the opinion is held that the quiet are the temperate; but let us see whether they are right who say this; and first tell me whether you would not acknowledge temperance to be of the class of the honorable and good?

Yes.

But which is best when you are at the writing-master's, to write the same letters quickly or quietly?

Quickly.

And to read quickly or slowly?

Quickly again.

And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or cleverness are far better than quietness and slowness?

Yes.

And the same holds in boxing and the pancratium?
Certainly.
And in leaping and running, and bodily exercises generally, quickness and agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad?
That is evident.
Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest agility and quickness, is noblest and best?
Yes, certainly.
And is temperance a good?
Yes.
Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good?
True, he said.
And which, I said, is better — facility in learning, or difficulty in learning?
Facility.
Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning slowly and slowly?
True.
And is it not better to teach one another quickly and energetically, rather than quietly and slowly?
Yes.
And to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily — that is also better than to remember quietly and slowly?
Yes.
And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not a quietness?
True.
And is it not best to understand what is said, whether at the writing-master's or the music-master's, or anywhere else, not as quietly as possible, but as quickly as possible?
Yes.
And when the soul inquires, and in deliberations, not the quietest, as I imagine, and he who with difficulty deliberates and discovers, is thought worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and quickly?
That is true, he said.
And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are clearly better than slowness and quietness?
That, he said, is the inference.
Then temperance is not quietness, nor is the temperate life quiet, upon this view; for the life which is temperate is supposed to be the good. And of two things, one is true, — either never, or very seldom, do the quiet actions in life appear to be better than the quick and energetic ones; or, granting ever so much that of the nobler sort of actions, there are as many quiet, as quick and vehement ones: still, even if we admit this, temperance will not be acting quietly any more than acting quickly and vehemently, either in walking, talking, or anything else; nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet, seeing that temperance is reckoned by us in the class of good and honorable, and the quick have been shown to be as good as the quiet.
I think, he said, Socrates, that you are right in saying that.
Then once more, Charmides, I said, fix your attention, and look within; consider the effect which temperance has upon yourself, and the nature of that which has the effect. Think over that, and, like a brave youth, tell me — What is temperance?
After a moment's pause, in which he made a real manly effort to think, he said: My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed or modest, and that temperance is the same as modesty.
Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is honorable?
Yes, certainly, he said.
And the temperate are also good?
Yes.
And can that be good which does not make men good?
Certainly not.
And you would infer that temperance is not only honorable, but also good?
That is my opinion.
Well, I said; and surely you would agree with Homer when he says,

"Modesty is not good for a needy man"?

Yes, he said; I agree to that.
Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good?
That is plain.
But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always good?
That appears to me to be as you say.
Then the inference is, that temperance can not be modesty — if temperance is a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good?
All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true; but I should like to know what you think about another definition of temperance, which I just now remember to have heard from some one, who said, "That temperance is doing our own business." Was he right who affirmed that?
You young monster! I said; this is what Critias, or some philosopher has told you.
Some one else, then, said Critias; for certainly I have not.
But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this?
No matter at all, I replied; for the point is not who said the words, but whether they are true or not.

There you are in the right, Socrates, he replied. To be sure, I said; yet I doubt whether we shall ever be able to discover their truth or falsehood; for they are a riddle.

What makes you think that? he said. Because, I said, he who uttered them seems to me to have meant one thing, and said another. Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing nothing when he reads or writes?

I should rather think that he was doing something. And does the scribe write or read, or teach you boys to write or read, your own names only, or did you write your enemies' names as well as your own and your friends'?

As much one as the other. And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this?

Certainly not. And yet, if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what was not your own business?

But they are the same as doing. And the healing art, my friend, and building, and weaving, and doing anything whatever which is done by art, all come under the head of doing?

Certainly. And do you think that a state would be well ordered by a law which compelled every man to weave and wash his own coat, and make his own shoes, and his own flask and strigil, and other implements, on this principle of every one doing and performing his own, and abstaining from what is not his own?

I think not, he said.
But, I said, a temperate state will be a well-ordered state.

Of course, he replied.

Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one's own business; at least not in this way, or not doing these sort of things?

Clearly not.

Then, as I was just now saying, he who declared that temperance is a man doing his own business had another and a hidden meaning; for I don't think that he could have been such a fool as to mean this. Was he a fool who told you, Charmides?

Nay, he replied, I certainly thought him a very wise man.

Then I am quite certain that he put forth this as a riddle: he meant to say that there was a difficulty in a man knowing what is his own business.

I dare say, he replied.

And what, then, is the meaning of a man doing his own business? Can you tell me?

Indeed, I can not, he said; and I shouldn't wonder if he who said this had no notion of his own meaning. And in saying this he laughed slyly, and looked at Critias.

Critias had long been showing uneasiness, for he felt that he had a reputation to maintain with Charmides and the rest of the company. He had, however, hitherto managed to restrain himself; but now he could no longer forbear, and his eagerness satisfied me of the truth of my suspicion, that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias. And Charmides, who did not want to answer himself, but to make Critias answer, tried to stir him up. He went on pointing out that he had been refuted, and at this Critias got angry, and, as I thought, was rather inclined to quarrel with him; just as a poet might
quarrel with an actor who spoiled his poems in repeating them; so he looked hard at him and said —

Do you imagine, Charmides, that the author of the definition of temperance did not understand the meaning of his own words, because you don't understand them?

Why, at his age, I said, most excellent Critias, he can hardly be expected to understand; but you, who are older, and have studied, may well be assumed to know the meaning of them; and therefore, if you agree with him, and accept his definition of temperance, I would much rather argue with you than with him about the truth or falsehood of the definition.

I entirely agree, said Critias, and accept the definition.

Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question — Do you admit, as I was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something.

I do.

And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also?

They make that of others also.

And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or their own business only?

Why not? he said.

No objection on my part, I said, but there may be a difficulty on his who proposes as a definition of temperance, "doing one's own business," and then says that there is no reason why those who do the business of others should not be temperate.

Nay, said he; did I ever acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? I said, those who make, not those who do.

What! I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same?
No more, he replied, than making or working are
the same: that I have learned from Hesiod, who says
that "work is no disgrace." Now do you imagine
that if he had meant by working such things as you
were describing, he would have said that there was
no disgrace in them? in making shoes, for example,
or in selling pickles, or sitting for hire in a house of
ill fame. That, Socrates, is not to be supposed: but,
as I imagine, he distinguished making from action
and work; and, while admitting that the making any-
thing might sometimes become a disgrace, when the
employment was not honorable, thought that work
was never any disgrace at all. For things nobly and
usefully made he called works; and such makings he
called workings, and doings; and he must be sup-
posed to have called such things only man's proper
business, and what is hurtful, not his business: and
in that sense Hesiod, and any other wise man, may
be reasonably supposed to call him wise who does his
own work.

O Critias, I said, no sooner had you opened your
mouth, than I pretty well knew that you would call
that which is proper to a man, and that which is his
own, good; and that the making of the good you
would call doings, for I have heard Prodicus drawing
endless distinctions about names. Now I have no
objection to your giving names any sense that you
please, if you will only tell me what you mean by
them. Please then to begin again, and be a little
plainer. Do you not mean that this doing or making,
or whatever is the word which you would use, of good
actions, is temperance?

I do, he said.

Then not he who does evil, but he who does good,
is temperate?

Yes, he said; and you would agree to that.
Never mind whether I agree or not; as yet we are only concerned with your meaning.

Well, he answered; I mean to say, that he who does evil, and not good, is not temperate; and that he is temperate who does good, and not evil: for temperance I define in plain words to be the doing of good actions.

And you may be very likely right in that, I said; but I am curious to know whether you imagine that temperate men are ignorant of their own temperance?

I do not imagine that, he said.

And yet were you not saying, not so very long ago, that craftsmen might be temperate in doing another's work, as well as their own?

Yes, I was, he replied; but why do you refer to that?

I have no particular reason, but I wish you would tell me whether a physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another also?

I think that he may.

And he who does this does his duty. And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely?

Yes, he acts wisely.

But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to prove beneficial, and when not? or must the craftsman necessarily know when he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the work which he is doing?

I suppose not.

Then, I said, he may sometimes do good or harm, and not know what he is himself doing, and yet, in doing good, as you say, he has done temperately or wisely. Was not that your statement?

Yes.

Then, as would seem, in doing good, he may act
wisely or temperately, and be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance?

But that, Socrates, he said, is impossible; and therefore if that is, as you imply, the necessary consequence of any of my previous admissions, I would rather withdraw them, and not be ashamed to confess that I was mistaken, than admit that a man can be temperate or wise, who does not know himself. For self-knowledge would certainly be maintained by me to be the very essence of knowledge, and in this I agree with him who dedicated the inscription, "Know thyself!" at Delphi. That word, if I am not mistaken, is put there as a sort of salutation which the god addresses to those who enter the temple; as much as to say that the ordinary salutation of "Hail!" is not right, and that the exhortation "Be temperate!" would be a far better way of saluting one another. The notion of him who dedicated the inscription was, as I believe, that the god speaks to those who enter his temple not as men speak; but, when a worshipper enters, the first word which he hears is "Be temperate!" This, however, like a prophet he expresses in a sort of riddle, for "Know thyself!" and "Be temperate!" are the same, as I maintain, and as the writing implies, and yet they may be easily misunderstood; and succeeding sages who added "Never too much," or "Give a pledge, and evil is nigh at hand," would appear to have misunderstood them; for they imagined that "Know thyself!" was a piece of advice which the god gave, and not his salutation of the worshippers at their first coming in; and they wrote their inscription under the idea that they would give equally useful pieces of advice. Shall I tell you, Socrates, why I say all this? My object is to leave the previous discussion (in which I know not whether you or I are more right, but, at any rate, no clear result was at-
tained), and to raise a new one in which I will attempt to prove, if you deny, that temperance is self-knowledge.

Yes, I said, Critias; but you come to me as though I professed to know about the questions which I ask, and as though I could, if only I would, agree with you. Whereas the fact is that I am, as you are, an inquirer into the truth of your proposition; and when I have inquired, I will say whether I agree with you or not. Please then to allow me time to reflect.

Reflect, he said.

I am reflecting, I replied, and discover that temperance, or wisdom, if implying a knowledge of anything, must be a science, and a science of something.

Yes, he said; the science of itself.

And is not medicine, I said, the science of health?

True.

And suppose, I said, that I were asked by you what is the use or effect of medicine, which is this science of health, I should answer that medicine is of very great use in producing health, which, as you will admit, is an excellent effect.

Granted.

And if you were to ask me, what is the result or effect of architecture, which is the science of building, I should say, houses, and so of other arts, which all have their different results. Now I want you, Critias, to answer a similar question about temperance, or wisdom, to which you ought to know the answer, if, as you say, wisdom or temperance is the science of itself. Admitting this, I ask, what good work, worthy of the name, does wisdom effect? Answer me that.

That is not the true way of pursuing the inquiry, Socrates, he said; for wisdom is not like the other sciences, any more than they are like one another: but you proceed as if they were alike. For tell me,
he said, what result is there of computation or geometry, in the same sense as a house is the result of building, or a garment of weaving, or any other work of any other art? Can you show me any such result of them? You can not.

That is true, I said; but still each of these sciences has a subject which is different from the science. I can show you that the art of computation has to do with odd and even numbers in their numerical relations to themselves and to each other. Is not that true?

Yes, he said.

And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation?

They are not.

The art of weighing, again, has to do with lighter and heavier; but the art of weighing is one thing, and the heavy and the light another. Do you admit that?

Yes.

Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom is the science?

That is precisely the old error, Socrates, he said. You come asking in what wisdom differs from the other sciences; and then you carry on the inquiry, as if they were alike: but that is not the case, for all the other sciences are of something else, and not of themselves; but that alone is a science of other sciences, and of itself. And of this, as I believe, you are very well aware; and that you are only doing what you denied that you were doing just now, leaving the argument and trying to refute me.

And what if I am refuting you? How can you think that I have any other motive in this but what I should have in examining into myself? which motive would be just a fear of my unconsciously fancying that I knew something of which I was ignorant.
And at this moment I pursue the inquiry chiefly for my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also for the sake of my other friends. For is not the discovery of things as they truly are a common good to all mankind?

Yes, certainly, Socrates, he said.

Then, I said, be of good cheer, sweet sir, and give your opinion in answer to the question which I asked, without minding whether Critias or Socrates is the person refuted; attend only to the argument, and see what will come of the refutation.

I think that you are right, he replied; and I will do as you say.

Tell me, then, I said, what you mean to affirm about wisdom.

I mean, he said, that wisdom is the only science which is the science of itself and of the other sciences as well.

But the science of science, I said, will also be the science of the absence of science.

Very true, he said.

Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know himself, and be able to examine what he knows or does not know, and see what others know, and think that they know and do really know; and what they do not know, and fancy that they know, when they do not. No other person will be able to do this. And this is the state and virtue of wisdom, or temperance, and self-knowledge, which is just knowing what a man knows, and what he does not know. That is your view?

Yes, he said.

Now then, I said, making an offering of the third or last argument to Zeus the Savior, let us once more begin, and ask, in the first place, whether this knowledge that you know and do not know what you know
and do not know is possible; and in the second place, whether, even if quite possible, such knowledge is of any use.

That is what we must consider, he said.

And here, Critias, I said, I hope that you will find a way out of a difficulty into which I have got myself. Shall I tell you the difficulty?

By all means, he replied.

Does not what you have been saying, if true, amount to this: that there must be a science which is wholly a science of itself, and also of other sciences, and that the same is also the science of the absence of science?

True.

But consider how monstrous this is, my friend: in any parallel case, the impossibility will be transparent to you.

How is that? and in what cases do you mean?

In such cases as this: Suppose that there is a kind of vision which is not like ordinary vision, but a vision of itself and of other sorts of vision, and of the defect of them, which in seeing sees no color, but only itself and other sorts of vision. Do you think that there is such a kind of vision?

Certainly not.

Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them?

There is not.

Or take all the senses: can you imagine that there is any sense of itself and of other senses, but which is incapable of perceiving the objects of the senses?

I think not.

Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of itself, and of all other desires?

Certainly not.
Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself and all other wishes?
I should answer, No.
Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but of itself and of other loves?
I should not.
Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but has no object of fear?
I never did, he said.
Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general?
Certainly not.
But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no subject-matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences; for that is what is affirmed. Now this is strange, if true: however, we must not as yet absolutely deny the possibility of such a science; let us rather consider the matter.
You are quite right.
Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of something, and is of a nature to be a science of something?
Yes.
Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something?¹
Yes.
Which is less, if the other is to be conceived as greater?
To be sure.
And if we could find something which is at once greater than self, and greater than other great things,

¹ Socrates is intending to show that science differs from the object of science, as any other relative differs from the object of relation. A relation to self as well as to other things involves in the case of comparison of magnitudes an absolute contradiction; and in other cases, as in the case of the senses, is hardly conceivable.
but not greater than those things in comparison of which the others are greater, then that thing would have the property of being greater and also less than itself?

That, Socrates, he said, is the inevitable inference.

Or if there be a double which is double of other doubles and of itself, they will be halves; for the half is relative to the double?

That is true.

And that which is greater than itself will also be less, and that which is heavier will also be lighter, and that which is older will also be younger: and the same of other things; that which has a nature relative to self will retain also the nature of its object. I mean to say, for example, that hearing is, as we say, of sound or voice. Is that true?

Yes.

Then if hearing hears itself, it must hear a voice; for there is no other way of hearing.

Certainly.

And sight also, my excellent friend, if it sees itself must see a color, for sight can not see that which has no color.

No.

Then do you see, Critias, that in several of the examples which have been recited the notion of a relation to self is altogether inadmissible, and in other cases hardly credible — inadmissible, for example, in the case of magnitudes, numbers, and the like.

Very true.

But in the case of hearing, and the power of self-motion, and the power of heat to burn, this relation to self will be regarded as incredible by some, but perhaps not by others. And some great man, my friend, is wanted, who will satisfactorily determine for us, whether there is nothing which has an inherent
property of relation to self, or some things only and not others; and whether in this latter class, if there be such a class, that science which is called wisdom or temperance is included. I altogether distrust my own power of determining this: I am not certain whether there is such a science of science at all; and even if there be, I should not acknowledge this to be wisdom or temperance, until I can also see whether such a knowledge would or would not do us any good; for I have an impression that temperance is a benefit and a good. And therefore, O son of Callaeschrus, as you maintain that temperance or wisdom is a science of science, and also of the absence of science, I will request you to show in the first place, as I was saying before, the possibility, and in the second place, the advantage, of such a science; and then perhaps you may satisfy me that you are right in your view of temperance.

Critias heard me say this, and saw that I was in a difficulty; and as one person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of yawning from him, so did he seem to be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty. But as he had a reputation to maintain, he was ashamed to admit before the company that he could not answer my challenge or decide the question at issue; and he made an unintelligible attempt to hide his perplexity. In order that the argument might proceed, I said to him, Well then, Critias, if you like, let us assume that there may be this science of science; whether the assumption is right or wrong may be hereafter investigated. But fully admitting this, will you tell me how such a science enables us to distinguish what we know or do not know, which, as we were saying, is self-knowledge or wisdom. That is what we were saying?

Yes, Socrates, he said; and that I think is certainly
true: for he who has that science or knowledge which knows itself will become like that knowledge which he has, in the same way that he who has swiftness will be swift, and he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know. In the same way he who has that knowledge which is the knowledge of itself, will know himself.

I do not doubt, I said, that a man will know himself, when he possesses that which has self-knowledge: but what necessity is there that, having this, he should know what he knows and what he does not know?

Because, Socrates, they are the same.

Very likely, I said; but I remain as stupid as ever; for still I fail to comprehend how this knowing what you know and do not know is the same as the knowledge of self.

What do you mean? he said.

This is what I mean, I replied: I will admit that there is a science of science, but can this do more than determine that of two things one is and the other is not science or knowledge?

No, just that.

Then is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of justice?

Certainly not.

The one is medicine, and the other is politics; but that of which we are speaking is knowledge pure and simple.

Very true.

And if a man knows only, and has only knowledge of knowledge, and has no further knowledge of health and justice, the probability is that he will only know that he knows something, and has a certain knowledge, whether concerning himself or other men.

True.
But how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows? Say that he knows health; — not wisdom or temperance, but the art of medicine has taught him that; — and he has learned harmony from the art of music, and building from the art of building, — neither, from wisdom or temperance: and the same of other things.

That is evident.

But how will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building?

That is impossible.

Then he who is ignorant of this will only know that he knows, but not what he knows?

True.

Then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the knowledge of the things which we do or do not know, but only the knowledge that we know and do not know?

That is the inference.

Then he who has this knowledge will not be able to examine whether a pretender knows or does not know that which he says that he knows: he will only know that he has a knowledge of some kind; but wisdom will not show him of what the knowledge is?

Plainly not.

Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in medicine from the true physician, nor between any other true and false possessor of knowledge. Let us consider the matter in this way: If the wise man or any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, what is he to do? He will not talk to him about medicine; and that, as we are saying, is the only thing which the physician understands.

True.
And he certainly knows nothing of science, for this has been assumed to be the province of wisdom.

True.

But then again, if medicine is a science, neither will the physician know anything of medicine.

Exactly.

The wise man will indeed know that the physician has some kind of science or knowledge; but when he wants to discover the nature of this he will ask, What is the subject-matter? For each science is distinguished, not as science, but by the nature of the subject. Is not that true?

Yes; that is quite true.

And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject-matter of health and disease?

Yes.

And he who would inquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the inquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous?

True.

And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in what relates to these?

He will.

He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is right in relation to these?

He will.

But can any one appreciate either without having a knowledge of medicine?

He can not.

Nor any one but the physician, not even the wise man, as appears; for that would require him to be a physician as well as a wise man?

Very true.

Then, assuredly, wisdom or temperance, if only a science of science, and of the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the physi-
cian who knows from one who does not know but pretends or thinks that he knows, or any other professor of anything at all; like any other artist, he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom, and no one else.

That is evident, he said.

But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom? If, indeed, as we were supposing at first, the wise man had been able to distinguish what he knew and did not know, and that he knew the one and did not know the other, and to recognize a similar faculty of discernment in others, there would certainly have been a great advantage in being wise; for then we should never have made a mistake, but have passed through life the unerring guides of ourselves and of those who were under us; and we should not have attempted to do what we did not know, but we should have found out those who knew, and confided in them; nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do anything which they were not likely to do well; and they would be likely to do well just that of which they had knowledge; and the house or state which was ordered or administered under the guidance of wisdom would have been well ordered, and everything else of which wisdom was the lord; for truth guiding, and error having been expelled, in all their doings, men would have done well, and would have been happy. Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom — to know what is known and what is unknown to us?

Very true, he said.

And now you perceive, I said, that no such science is to be found anywhere.

I perceive, he said.

May we assume then, I said, that wisdom, viewed in this new light merely as a knowledge of knowledge
and ignorance, has this advantage: that he who possesses such knowledge will more easily learn anything that he learns; and that everything will be clearer to him, because, in addition to the knowledge of individuals, he sees the science, and this also will better enable him to test the knowledge which others have of what he knows himself; whereas the inquirer who is without this knowledge may be supposed to have a feebler and weaker insight? Are not these, my friend, the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom? And are not we looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her?

That is very likely, he said.

That is very likely, I said; and very likely, too, we have been inquiring to no purpose. I am led to infer this, because I observe that if this is wisdom, some strange consequences would follow. Let us, if you please, assume the possibility of this science of sciences, and further admit and allow, as was originally suggested, that wisdom is the knowledge of what we know and do not know. Assuming all this, still, upon further consideration, I am doubtful, Critias, whether wisdom, if such as this, would do us any good. For I think we were wrong in supposing, as we were saying just now, that such wisdom ordering the government of house or state would be a great benefit.

How is that? he said.

Why, I said, we were far too ready to admit the great benefits which mankind would obtain from their severally doing the things which they knew, and committing to others who knew the things of which they are ignorant.

Were we not right, he said, in making that admission?

I think not, I said.

That is certainly strange, Socrates.
By the dog of Egypt, I said, I am of your opinion about that: and that was in my mind when I said that strange consequences would follow, and that I was afraid we were on the wrong track; for however ready we may be to admit that this is wisdom, I certainly can not make out what good this sort of thing does to us.

What do you mean? he said; I wish that you could make me understand what you mean.

I dare say that what I am saying is nonsense, I replied; and yet if a man has any feeling of what is due to himself, he can not let the thought which comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined.

I like that, he said.

Hear, then, I said, my own dream; whether coming through the horn or the ivory gate, I can not tell. The dream is this: Let us suppose that wisdom is such as we are now defining, and that she has absolute sway over us; then each action will be done according to the arts or sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot when he is not, or any physician or general, or any one else pretending to know matters of which he is ignorant, will deceive or elude us; our health will be improved; our safety at sea, and also in battle, will be assured; our coats and shoes, and all other instruments and implements will be well made, because the workmen will be good and true. Aye, and if you please, you may suppose that prophecy, which is the knowledge of the future, will be under the control of wisdom, and that she will deter deceivers and set up the true prophet in their place as the revealer of the future. Now I quite agree that mankind, thus provided, would live and act according to knowledge, for wisdom would watch and prevent ignorance from intruding on us. But we have not as yet discovered why, because we act according to knowledge, we act well and are happy, my dear Critias.
Yet I think, he replied, that you will hardly find any other end of right action, if you reject knowledge. And of what is this knowledge? I said. Just answer me that small question. Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking?
God forbid.
Or of working in brass?
Certainly not.
Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort?
No, I do not.
Then, I said, we are giving up the doctrine that he who lives according to knowledge is happy, for these live according to knowledge, and yet they are not allowed by you to be happy; but I think that you mean to confine happiness to particular individuals who live according to knowledge, such for example as the prophet, who, as I was saying, knows the future.
Yes, I mean him, but there are others as well.
Yes, I said, some one who knows the past and present as well as the future, and is ignorant of nothing. Let us suppose that there is such a person, and if there is, you will allow that he is the most knowing of all living men.
Certainly he is.
Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy? or do all equally make him happy?
Not all equally, he replied.
But which most tends to make him happy? the knowledge of what past, present, or future thing? May I infer this to be the knowledge of the game of draughts?
Nonsense about the game of draughts.
Or of computation?
No.
Or of health?
That is nearer the truth, he said.
And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said, is the knowledge of what?
The knowledge with which he discerns good and evil.

Monster! I said; you have been carrying me round in a circle, and all this time hiding from me the fact that the life according to knowledge is not that which makes men act rightly and be happy, not even if all the sciences be included, but that this has to do with one science only, that of good and evil. For, let me ask you, Critias, whether, if you take away this science from all the rest, medicine will not equally give health, and shoemaking equally produce shoes, and the art of the weaver clothes?—whether the art of the pilot will not equally save our lives at sea, and the art of the general in war?

Quite so.

And yet, my dear Critias, none of these things will be well or beneficially done, if the science of the good be wanting.

That is true.

But that science is not wisdom or temperance, but a science of human advantage; not a science of other sciences, or of ignorance, but of good and evil: and if this be of use, then wisdom or temperance will not be of use.

And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? For if we really assume that wisdom is a science of sciences, and has a sway over other sciences, surely she will have this particular science of the good under her control, and in this way will benefit us.

And will wisdom give health? I said; is not this rather the effect of medicine? Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts, and do not they do, each of them, their own work? Have we not long ago
assoevered that knowledge is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of nothing else?

That is clear.

Another art is concerned with health.
Another.
The art of health is different.
Yes, different.

Nor does wisdom give advantage, my good friend; for that again we have just now been attributing to another art.

Very true.

How then can wisdom be advantageous, giving no advantage?

That, Socrates, is certainly inconceivable.

You see then, Critias, that I was not far wrong in fearing that I could have no sound notion about wisdom; I was quite right in depreciating myself; for that which is admitted to be the best of all things would never have seemed to us useless, if I had been good for anything at an inquiry. But now I have been utterly defeated, and have failed to discover what that is to which the imposer of names gave this name of temperance or wisdom. And yet many more admissions were made by us than could be really granted; for we admitted that there was a science of science, although the argument said No, and protested against this; and we admitted further, that this science knew the works of the other sciences (although this too was denied by the argument), because we wanted to show that the wise man had knowledge of what he knew and did not know; also we nobly disregarded, and never even considered, the impossibility of a man knowing in a sort of way that which he does not know at all; for our assumption was, that he knows that which he does not know; than which nothing, as I think, can be more irrational. And yet, after finding
us so easy and good-natured, the inquiry is still unable
to discover the truth; but mocks us to a degree, and
has gone out of its way to prove the inutility of that
which we admitted only by a sort of supposition and
fiction to be the true definition of temperance or wis-
dom: which result, as far as I am concerned, is not so
much to be lamented, I said. But for your sake,
Charmides, I am very sorry — that you, having such
beauty and such wisdom and temperance of soul,
should have no profit or good in life from your wis-
dom and temperance. And still more am I grieved
about the charm which I learned with so much pain,
and to so little profit, from the Thracian, for the sake
of a thing which is nothing worth. I think indeed that
there is a mistake, and that I must be a bad inquirer,
for I am persuaded that wisdom or temperance is
really a great good; and happy are you if you possess
that good. And therefore examine yourself, and see
whether you have this gift and can do without the
charm; for if you can, I would rather advise you to
regard me simply as a fool who is never able to reason
out anything; and to rest assured that the more wise
and temperate you are, the happier you will be.

Charmides said: I am sure that I do not know,
Socrates, whether I have or have not this gift of wis-
dom and temperance; for how can I know whether I
have that, the very nature of which even you and
Critias, as you say, are unable to discover? — (not
that I believe you.) And further, I am sure,
Socrates, that I do need the charm, and as far as I am
concerned, I shall be willing to be charmed by you
daily, until you say that I have had enough.

Very good, Charmides, said Critias; if you do this
I shall have a proof of your temperance, that is, if you
allow yourself to be charmed by Socrates, and never
desert him at all.
You may depend on my following and not deserting him, said Charmides: if you who are my guardian command me, I should be very wrong not to obey you. And I do command you, he said.

Then I will do as you say, and begin this very day. You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about? We are not conspiring, said Charmides, we have conspired already.

And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of justice? Yes, I shall use violence, he replied, since he orders me; and therefore you had better consider well.

But the time for consideration has passed, I said, when violence is employed; and you, when you are determined on anything, and in the mood of violence, are irresistible.

Do not you resist me then, he said.
I will not resist you, I replied.
INTRODUCTION

No answer is given in the Lysis to the question, "What is Friendship?" any more than in the Charmides to the question, "What is Temperance?" There are several resemblances in the two Dialogues: the same youthfulness and sense of beauty pervades both of them; they are alike rich in the description of Greek life. The question is again raised of the relation of knowledge to virtue and good, which also recurs in the Laches; and Socrates appears again as the elder friend of the two boys Lysis and Menexenus. In the Charmides, as also in the Laches, he is described as middle-aged; in the Lysis he is advanced in years.

The Dialogue consists of two scenes or conversations which seem to have no relation to each other. The first is a conversation between Socrates and Lysis, who, like Charmides, is an Athenian youth of noble descent and of great beauty, goodness, and intelligence: this is carried on in the absence of Menexenus, who is called away to take part in a sacrifice. Socrates asks Lysis whether his father and mother do not love him very much? "Yes, that they do." "Then of course they allow him to do exactly as he likes." "Of course not: the very slaves have more liberty than he has." "But how is this?" "The reason is that he is not old enough." "No; the real reason is that he is not wise enough." "For are there not some things which he is allowed to do, although he is not allowed to do others?" "Yes, because he knows them, and does not know the others." This leads to the conclusion that all men everywhere will trust him in what he knows, but not in what he does not know; for in such matters he will be unprofitable to them, and do them no good. And no one will love him, if he does them no good; and he can only do them good by knowledge; and as he is still without knowledge, he has no conceit of knowledge. In this manner Socrates reads a lesson to Hippothales, the foolish lover of Lysis, respecting the style of conversation which he should address to his beloved.

After the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the request of Lysis, asks him a new question: "What is friendship? You,
Menexenus, who have a friend already, can tell me, who am always longing to find one, what is the secret of this great blessing."

When one man loves another, which is the friend — he who loves, or he who is loved? or are both friends? From the first of these suppositions they are driven to the second; and from the second to the third; and neither the two boys nor Socrates are satisfied with any of them. Socrates turns to the poets, who affirm that God brings like to like (Homer), and to philosophers (Empedocles), who assert also that like is the friend of like. But the bad are not friends, for they are not even like themselves, and still less are they like one another. And the good have no need of one another, and therefore do not care about one another. Moreover there are others who say that likeness is a cause of aversion, and unlikeness of love and friendship; and they too adduce the authority of poets and philosophers in support of their doctrines; for Hesiod says that "potter is jealous of potter, bard of bard;" and subtle doctors tell us that "moist is the friend of dry, hot of cold," and the like. But neither can their doctrine be maintained; for then the just would be the friend of the unjust, good of evil.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that like is not the friend of like, nor unlike of unlike; and therefore good is not the friend of good, nor evil of evil, nor good of evil, nor evil of good. What remains but that the indifferent, which is neither good nor evil, should be the friend (not of the indifferent, for that would be "like the friend of like," but) of the good?

But why should the indifferent have this attachment to the good? There are circumstances under which such an attachment would be natural. Suppose the indifferent, say the human body, to be desirous of getting rid of some evil, such as disease, which is not essential but only accidental to it (for if the evil were essential the body would cease to be indifferent, and would become evil) — in such a case the indifferent becomes a friend of the good for the sake of getting rid of the evil. In this intermediate "indifferent" position the philosopher or lover of wisdom stands: he is not wise, and yet not unwise, but he has ignorance accidentally clinging to him, and he yearns for wisdom as the cure of the evil.

After this explanation has been received with triumphant accord, a fresh dissatisfaction begins to steal over the mind of Socrates: Must not friendship be for the sake of some ulterior end? and what can that final cause or end of friendship be,
other than the good? But the good is desired by us only as the cure of evil; and therefore if there were no evil there would be no friendship. Some other explanation then has to be devised. May not desire be the source of friendship? And desire is of what a man wants and of what is congenial to him. But then again, the congenial can not be the same as the like; for like can not be the friend of like. Nor can the congenial be explained as the good; for good is not the friend of good, as has been also shown. The problem is unsolved, and the three friends, Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus, are still unable to find out what a friend is.

Thus, as in the Charmides and Laches, and several of the other Dialogues of Plato, no conclusion is arrived at. The dialogue is what would be called in the language of Thrasyllus tentative or inquisitive. The subject is continued in the Phaedrus and Symposium, and treated, with a manifest reference to the Lysis, in the eighth and ninth books of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. As in other writings of Plato (for example, the Republic), there is a progress from unconscious morality, illustrated by the unconscious friendship of the two youths, and also by the sayings of the poets ("who are our fathers in wisdom," and yet only tell us half the truth, and in this particular instance are not much improved upon by the philosophers), to a more comprehensive notion of friendship. This, however, is far from being cleared of its perplexity. Two notions appear to be struggling or balancing in the mind of Socrates: — First, the sense that friendship arises out of human needs and wants; Secondly, that the higher form or ideal of friendship exists only for the sake of the good. That friends are not necessarily either like or unlike, is also a truth confirmed by experience. But the use of the terms "like" or "good" is too strictly limited; Socrates has allowed himself to be carried away by a sort of eristic or illogical logic against which the truest definition of friendship would be unable to stand. The sense of the interdependence of good and evil, and the allusion to the possibility of the non-existence of evil, are very curious.

The dialectical interest is fully sustained by the dramatic accompaniments. Observe, first, the scene, which is a Greek Palaestra, at a time when a sacrifice is going on, and the Hermaca are in course of celebration; secondly, the "accustomed irony" of Socrates, who declares, as in the Symposium, that he is ignorant of all other things, but claims to have a knowledge of the mysteries of love. There are also several contrasts of character;
first of the dry, caustic Ctesippus, of whom Socrates professes a humorous sort of fear, and Hippothales the flighty lover, who murders sleep by bawling out the name of his beloved; also there is a contrast between the false, exaggerated, sentimental love of Hippothales towards Lysis, and the simple and innocent friendship of the boys with one another. Some difference appears to be intended between the characters of the more talkative Menexenus and the reserved and simple Lysis. Socrates draws out the latter by a new sort of irony, which is sometimes adopted in talking to children, and consists in asking a leading question which can only be answered in a sense contrary to the intention of the question: "Your father and mother of course allow you to drive the chariot?" "No they don't." When Menexenus returns, the serious dialectic begins.
LYSIS, OR FRIENDSHIP

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE

Socrates, who is the narrator.  
Menexenus.

Hippothales.  
Lysis.

Ctesippus.

Scene:—A newly-erected Palaestra outside the walls of Athens.

I was going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, intending to take the outer road, which is close under the wall. When I came to the postern gate of the city, which is by the fountain of Panops, I fell in with Hippothales, the son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus the Paeanian, and a company of young men who were standing with them. Hippothales, seeing me approach, asked whence I came and whither I was going.

I am going, I replied, from the Academy straight to the Lyceum.

Then come straight to us, he said, and put in here; you may as well.

Who are you, I said; and where am I to come?

He showed me an enclosed space and an open door over against the wall. And there, he said, is the building at which we all meet: and a goodly company we are.

And what is this building, I asked; and what sort of entertainment have you?

The building, he replied, is a newly-erected Palaestra; and the entertainment is generally conversation, to which you are welcome.
Thank you, I said; and is there any teacher there?
Yes, he said, your old friend and admirer, Miccus. Indeed, I replied; he is a very eminent professor.
Are you disposed, he said, to go with me and see them?
Yes, I said; but I should like to know first, what is expected of me, and who is the favorite among you.
Some persons have one favorite, Socrates, and some another, he said.
And who is yours? I asked: tell me that, Hippothales.
At this he blushed; and I said to him, O Hippothales, thou son of Hieronymus! do not say that you are, or that you are not, in love; the confession is too late; for I see not only that you are in love, but that you are already far gone in your love. Simple and foolish as I am, the Gods have given me the power of understanding these sort of affections.
At this he blushed more and more.
Ctesippus said: I like to see you blushing, Hippothales, and hesitating to tell Socrates the name; when, if he were with you but for a very short time, he would be plagued to death by hearing of nothing else. Indeed, Socrates, he has literally deafened us, and stopped our ears with the praises of Lysis; and if he is a little intoxicated, there is every likelihood that we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of Lysis. His performances in prose are bad enough, but nothing at all in comparison with his verse; and when he drenches us with his poems and other compositions, that is really too bad; and what is even worse, is his manner of singing them to his love; this he does in a voice which is truly appalling, and we can not help hearing him: and now he has a question put to him by you, and lo! he is blushing.
Who is Lysis? I said: I suppose that he must be young; for the name does not recall any one to me.

Why, he said, his father being a very well-known man, he retains his patronymic, and is not as yet commonly called by his own name; but, although you do not know his name, I am sure that you must know his face, for that is quite enough to distinguish him.

But tell me whose son he is, I said.

He is the eldest son of Democrats, of the deme of Aexonè.

Ah, Hippothales, I said; what a noble and really perfect love you have found! I wish that you would favor me with the exhibition which you have been making to the rest of the company, and then I shall be able to judge whether you know what a lover ought to say about his love, either to the youth himself, or to others.

Nay, Socrates, he said; you surely do not attach any weight to what he is saying.

Do you mean, I said, that you disown the love of the person whom he says that you love?

No; but I deny that I make verses or address compositions to him.

He is not in his right mind, said Ctesippus; he is talking nonsense, and is stark mad.

O Hippothales, I said, if you have ever made any verses or songs in honor of your favorite, I do not want to hear them; but I want to know the purport of them, that I may be able to judge of your mode of approaching your fair one.

Ctesippus will be able to tell you, he said; for if, as he avers, I talk to him of nothing else, he must have a very accurate knowledge and recollection of that.

Yes, indeed, said Ctesippus; I know only too well; and very ridiculous the tale is: for although he is a
lover, and very devotedly in love, he has nothing particular to talk about to his beloved which a child might not say. Now is not that ridiculous? He can only speak of the wealth of Democrats, which the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and the other ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses, and their victory at the Pythian games, and at the Isthmus, and at Nemea with four horses and single horses; and these he sings and says, and greater twaddle still. For the day before yesterday he made a poem in which he described how Heracles, who was a connection of the family, was entertained by an ancestor of Lysis as his relation; this ancestor was himself the son of Zeus and the daughter of the founder of the deme. And these are the sort of old wives’ tales which he sings and recites to us, and we are obliged to listen to him.

When I heard this, I said: O ridiculous Hippothales! how can you be making and singing hymns in honor of yourself before you have won?

But my songs and verses, he said, are not in honor of myself, Socrates.

You think not, I said.

But what are they, then? he replied.

Most assuredly, I said, those songs are all in your own honor; for if you win your beautiful love, your discourses and songs will be a glory to you, and may be truly regarded as hymns of praise composed in honor of you who have conquered and won such a love; but if he slips away from you, the more you have praised him, the more ridiculous you will look at having lost this fairest and best of blessings; and this is the reason why the wise lover does not praise his beloved until he has won him, because he is afraid of accidents. There is also another danger; the fair, when any one praises or magnifies them, are filled
with the spirit of pride and vain-glory. Is not that true?

Yes, he said.

And the more vain-glorious they are, the more difficult is the capture of them?

I believe that.

What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his prey, and made the capture of the animals which he is hunting more difficult?

He would be a bad hunter, that is clear.

Yes; and if, instead of soothing them, he were to infuriate them with words and songs, that would show a great want of wit: don’t you agree with me?

Yes.

And now reflect, Hippothales, and see whether you are not guilty of all these errors in writing poetry. For I can hardly suppose that you will affirm a man to be a good poet who injures himself by his poetry.

Assuredly not, he said: I should be a fool if I said that; and this makes me desirous, Socrates, of taking you into my counsels, and I shall be glad of any further advice which you may have to offer. Will you tell me by what words or actions I may become endeared to my love?

That is not easy to determine, I said; but if you will bring your love to me, and will let me talk with him, I may perhaps be able to show you how to converse with him, instead of singing and reciting in the fashion of which you are accused.

There will be no difficulty in bringing him, he replied; if you will only go into the house with Ctesippus, and sit down and talk, he will come of himself; for he is fond of listening, Socrates. And as this is the festival of the Hermæa, there is no separation of young men and boys, but they are all mixed up together. He will be sure to come: but if he does not
come, Ctesippus, with whom he is familiar, and whose relation Menexenus is his great friend, shall call him.

That will be the way, I said. Thereupon I and Ctesippus went towards the Palaestra, and the rest followed.

Upon entering we found that the boys had just been sacrificing; and this part of the festival was nearly come to an end. They were all in white array, and games at dice were going on among them. Most of them were in the outer court amusing themselves; but some were in a corner of the Apodyterium playing at odd and even with a number of dice, which they took out of little wicker baskets. There was also a circle of lookers on, one of whom was Lysis. He was standing among the other boys and youths, having a crown upon his head, like a fair vision, and not less worthy of praise for his goodness than for his beauty. We left them, and went over to the opposite side of the room, where we found a quiet place, and sat down; and then we began to talk. This attracted Lysis, who was constantly turning round to look at us — he was evidently wanting to come to us. For a time he hesitated and had not the courage to come alone; but first of all, his friend Menexenus came in out of the court in the interval of his play, and when he saw Ctesippus and myself, came and sat by us; and then Lysis, seeing him, followed, and sat down with him; and the other boys joined. I should observe that Hippothales, when he saw the crowd, got behind them, where he thought that he would be out of sight of Lysis, lest he should anger him; and there he stood and listened.

I turned to Menexenus, and said: Son of Demophon, which of you two youths is the elder?

That is a matter of dispute between us, he said.

And which is the nobler? Is that a matter of dispute too?
Yes, certainly.
And another disputed point is, which is the fairer?
The two boys laughed.
I sha’n’t ask which is the richer, I said; for you two
are friends, are you not?
Certainly, they replied.
And friends have all things in common, so that one
of you can be no richer than the other, if you say truly
that you are friends.
They assented. I was about to ask which was the
juster of the two, and which was the wiser of the two;
but at this moment Menexenus was called away by
some one who came and said that the gymnastic-
master wanted him. As I imagine, he had to offer
sacrifice. So he went away, and I asked Lysis some
more questions. I dare say, Lysis, I said, that your
father and mother love you very much.
That they do, he said.
And they would wish you to be perfectly happy.
Yes.
But do you think that any one is happy who is in
the condition of a slave, and who can not do what he
likes?
I should think not indeed, he said.
And if your father and mother love you, and desire
that you should be happy, no one can doubt that they
are very ready to promote your happiness.
Certainly, he replied.
And do they then permit you to do what you like,
and never rebuke you or hinder you from doing what
you desire?
Yes, indeed, Socrates; there are a great many
things which they hinder me from doing.
What do you mean? I said. Do they want you to
be happy, and yet hinder you from doing what you
like?—for example, if you want to mount one of
your father’s chariots, and take the reins at a race, they will not allow you to do that; they will prevent you?

Certainly, he said, they will not allow me to do that. Whom then will they allow?

There is a charioteer, whom my father pays for driving.

And do they trust a hireling more than you? and may he do what he likes with the horses? and do they pay him for this?

They do.

But I dare say that you may take the whip and guide the mule-cart if you like; — they will permit that?

Permit me! no they won’t.

Then, I said, may no one use the whip to the mules?

Yes, he said, the muleteer.

And is he a slave or a free man?

A slave, he said.

And do they esteem a slave of more value than you who are their son? And do they entrust their property to him rather than to you? and allow him to do what he likes, when you may not? Answer me now: Are you your own master, or do they not even allow that?

Nay, he said; of course they do not allow that.

Then you have a master?

Yes, my tutor; there he is.

And is he a slave?

To be sure; he is our slave, he replied.

Surely, I said, this is a strange thing, that a free man should be governed by a slave. And what does he do with you?

He takes me to my teachers.

You don’t mean to say that your teachers also rule over you?
Of course they do.

Then I must say that your father is pleased to inflict many lords and masters on you. But at any rate when you go home to your mother, she will let you have your own way, and will not interfere with your happiness; her wool, or the piece of cloth she is weaving, are at your disposal: I am sure that there is nothing to hinder you from touching her wooden spathe, or her comb, or any other of her spinning implements.

Nay, Socrates, he replied, laughing; not only does she hinder me, but I should be beaten, if I were to touch one of them.

Well, I said, that is amazing. And did you ever behave ill to your father or your mother?

No, indeed, he replied.

But why then are they so terribly anxious to prevent you from being happy, and doing as you like? — keeping you all day long in subjection to another, and, in a word, doing nothing which you desire; so that you have no good, as would appear, out of their great possessions, which are under the control of anybody rather than of you, and have no use of your own fair person, which is committed to the care of a shepherd; while you, Lysis, are master of nobody, and can do nothing?

Why, he said, Socrates, the reason is that I am not of age.

I doubt whether that is the real reason, I said; for as far as that goes, I should imagine that your father Democrats, and your mother, do permit you to do many things already, and do not wait until you are of age: for example, if they want anything read or written, you, I presume, would be the first person in the house who is summoned by them.

Very true.
And you would be allowed to write or read the letters in any order which you please, or take up the lyre and tune the notes, and play with the fingers, or strike with the plectrum, exactly as you please, and neither father nor mother would interfere with you.

That is true, he said.

Then what can be the reason, Lysis, I said, why they allow you to do the one and not the other?

I suppose, he said, that the reason is that I understand the one, and not the other.

Yes, my dear youth, I said, the reason is not any deficiency of years, but a deficiency of knowledge; and whenever your father thinks that you are wiser than he is, he will instantly commit himself and his possessions to you.

That I believe.

Aye, I said; and about your neighbor, too, does not the same rule hold as about your father? If he is satisfied that you know more of housekeeping than he does, will he continue to administer his affairs himself, or will he commit them to you?

I think that he will commit them to me.

And will not the Athenian people, too, entrust their affairs to you when they see that you have wisdom enough for his?

Yes.

Now, I said, let me put a case. Suppose the great king to have an eldest son, who is the Prince of Asia; and you and I go to him and establish to his satisfaction that we are better cooks than his son, will he not entrust to us the prerogative of making soup, and putting in anything that we like while the boiling is going on, rather than to the Prince of Asia, who is his son?

To us, clearly.

And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by hand-
fills, whereas the son will not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his fingers?
   Of course.
   Or suppose again that the son has bad eyes, will he allow him, or will he not allow him, to touch his own eyes if he thinks that he has no knowledge of medicine?
   He will not allow him.
   Whereas, if we are supposed to have a knowledge of medicine, he will allow us to open the eyes wide and sprinkle ashes upon them, because he supposes that we know what is best?
   That is true.
   And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or his son he will commit to us?
   That is very true, Socrates, he replied.
   Then now, my dear youth, I said, you perceive that in things which we know every one will trust us,—Hellenes and barbarians, men and women,—and we may do as we please, and no one will like to interfere with us; and we are free, and masters of others; and these things will be really ours, for we shall turn them to our good. But in things of which we have no understanding, no one will trust us to do as seems good to us—they will hinder us as far as they can; and not only strangers, but father and mother, and the friend, if there be one, who is dearer still, will also hinder us; and we shall be subject to others; and these things will not be ours, for we shall turn them to no good. Do you admit that?
   He assented.
   And shall we ever be friends to others? and will any others love us, in as far as we are useless to them?
   Certainly not.
   Neither can your father or mother love you, nor
can anybody love anybody else, in as far as they are useless to them?

No.

And therefore, my boy, if you are wise, all men will be your friends and kindred, for you will be useful and good; but if you are not wise, neither father, nor mother, nor kindred, nor any one else, will be your friends. And not having yet attained to wisdom, can you have high thoughts about that of which you have no thoughts?

How can I? he said.

And you have no wisdom, for you require a teacher?

True.

And you are not conceited, having nothing of which to be conceited?

Indeed, Socrates, I think not.

When I heard him say this, I turned to Hippothales, and was very nearly making a blunder, for I had a mind to say to him: That is the way, Hippothales, in which you should talk to your beloved, humbling and lowering him, and not as you do, puffing him up and spoiling him. But I saw that he was in great excitement and confusion at what had been said; and I remembered that, although he was in the neighborhood, he did not want to be seen by Lysis, so I thought better and refrained.

In the meantime Menexenus came back and sat down in his place by Lysis; and Lysis, in a childish and affectionate manner, whispered privately in my ear, so that Menexenus should not hear: Do, Socrates, tell Menexenus what you have been telling me.

Suppose that you tell him yourself, Lysis, I replied; for I am sure that you were attending.

That I was, he replied.

Try, then, to remember the words, and be as exact
as you can in repeating them to him, and if you have forgotten anything, ask me again the next time that you see me.

I will be sure to do that, Socrates; but go on telling him something new, and let me hear, as long as I am allowed to stay.

I certainly can not refuse, I said, as you ask me; but then, as you know, Menexenus is very pugnacious, and therefore you must come to the rescue if he attempts to upset me.

Yes, indeed, he said; he is very pugnacious, and that is the reason why I want you to argue with him. That I may make a fool of myself?

No, indeed, he said; but that you may put him down.

That is no easy matter, I replied; for he is a terrible fellow—a pupil of Ctesippus. And there is Ctesippus: do you see him?

Never mind, Socrates, you shall argue with him. Well, I suppose I must, I replied.

Hereupon Ctesippus complained that we were talking in secret, and keeping the feast to ourselves. I shall be happy, I said, to let you have a share. Here is Lysis, who does not understand something that I was saying, and wants me to ask Menexenus, who, as he thinks, will be able to answer.

And why don’t you ask him? he said.

Very well, I said, I will ask him; and do you, Menexenus, answer. But first I must tell you that I am one who from my childhood upward have set my heart upon a certain thing. All people have their fancies; some desire horses, and others dogs; and some are fond of gold, and others of honor. Now, I have no violent desire of any of these things; but I have a passion for friends; and I would rather have a good friend than the best cock or quail in the world: I
would even go further, and say than a horse or dog. Yea, by the dog of Egypt, I should greatly prefer a real friend to all the gold of Darius, or even to Darius himself: I am such a lover of friends as that. And when I see you and Lysis, at your early age, so easily possessed of his treasure, and so soon, he of you, and you of him, I am amazed and delighted, seeing that I myself, although I am now advanced in years, am so far from having made a similar acquisition, that I do not even know in what way a friend is acquired. But this is the question which I want to ask you, as you have experience: tell me then, when one loves another, is the lover or the beloved the friend; or may either be the friend?

Either, he said, may be the friend.

Do you mean, I said, that if only one of them loves the other, they are mutual friends?

Yes, he said; that is my meaning.

But what if the lover is not loved in return? That is a possible case.

Yes.

Or is, perhaps, even hated? for that is a fancy which lovers sometimes have. Nothing can exceed their love; and yet they imagine either that they are not loved in return, or that they are hated. Is not that true?

Yes, he said, quite true.

In that case, the one loves, and the other is loved?

Yes.

Then which is the friend of which? Is the lover the friend of the beloved, whether he be loved in return, or hated; or is the beloved the friend; or is there no friendship at all on either side, unless they both love one another?

There would seem to be none at all.

Then that is at variance with our former notion.
That appears to be true.

Then no one is a friend to his friend who does not love in return?

I think not.

Then they are not lovers of horses, whom the horses do not love in return; nor lovers of quails, nor of dogs, nor of wine, nor of gymnastic exercises, who have no return of love; no, nor of wisdom, unless wisdom loves them in return. Or perhaps they do love them, but they are not beloved by them; and the poet was wrong who sings:—

"Happy the man to whom his children are dear, and steeds having single hoofs, and dogs of chase, and the stranger of another land."

I do not think that he was wrong.
Then you think that he is right?

Yes.

Then, Menexenus, the conclusion is, that what is beloved may be dear, whether loving or hating: for example, very young children, too young to love, or even hating their father or mother when they are punished by them, are never dearer to them than at the time when they are hating them.

I think that is true, he said.

Then on this view, not the lover, but the beloved, is the friend or dear one; and the hated one, and not the hater, is the enemy?

That is plain.

Then many men are loved by their enemies, and hated by their friends, and are the friends of their enemies, and the enemies of their friends — that follows if the beloved is dear, and not the lover: but this, my dear friend, is an absurdity, or, I should rather say, an impossibility.

That, Socrates, I believe to be true.
But then, if not the enemy, the lover will be the friend, of that which is loved?

True.

And the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated?

Certainly.

Yet there is no avoiding the admission in this, as in the preceding instance, that a man may love one who is not his friend, or who may be his enemy. There are cases in which a lover loves, and is not loved, or is perhaps hated; and a man may be the enemy of one who is not his enemy, and is even his friend: for example, when he loves that which does not hate him, or even hates that which loves him.

That appears to be true.

But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor both together, what are we to say? Whom are we to call friends to one another? Do any remain?

Indeed, Socrates, I can not find any.

But, O Menexenus! I said, may we not have been altogether wrong in our conclusions?

I am sure that we have been wrong, Socrates, said Lysis. And he blushed at his own words, as if he had not intended to speak, but the words escaped him involuntarily in his eagerness; there was no mistaking his attentive look while he was listening.

I was pleased at the interest which was shown by Lysis, and I wanted to give Menexenus a rest, so I turned to him, and said, I think, Lysis, that what you say is true, and that we, if we had been right, should never have gone so far wrong; let us proceed no further in this direction (for the road seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other in which the poets will be our guide; for they are to us in a manner the fathers and authors of wisdom, and they speak of
friends in no light or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, makes them and draws them to one another; and this they express, if I am not mistaken, in the following words: —

"God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted."

I dare say that you have heard those words.
Yes, he said; I have.
And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say that like must love like? they are the people who go talking and writing about nature and the universe.
That is true, he said.
And are they right in saying that?
They may be.
Perhaps, I said, about half right, or probably altogether right, if their meaning were rightly apprehended by us. For the more a bad man has to do with a bad man, and the more nearly he is brought into contact with him, the more he will be likely to hate him, for he injures him, and injurer and injured can not be friends. Is not that true?
Yes, he said.
Then one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one another?
That is true.
But people really mean, as I suppose, that the good are like one another, and friends to one another; and that the bad, as is often said of them, are never at unity with one another or with themselves, but are passionate and restless: and that which is at variance and enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or harmony with any other thing. Don't you agree to that?
Yes, I do.
Then, my friend, those who say that the like is
friendly to the like mean to intimate, if I do not mis-apprehend, that the good only is the friend of the good, and of him only; but that the evil never attains to any real friendship, either with good or evil. Do you agree?

He nodded assent.

Then now we know how to answer the question “Who are friends?” for the argument supplies the answer, “That the good are friends.”

Yes, he said, that is true.

Yes, I replied; and yet I am not quite satisfied with this. Shall I tell you what I suspect? I will. Assuming that like, inasmuch as he is like, is the friend of like, and useful to him — or rather let me try another way of putting the matter: Can like do any good or harm to like which he could not do to himself, or suffer anything from his like which he would not suffer from himself? And if neither can be of any use to the other, how can they be loved by one another? Can they now?

They can not.

And can he who is not loved be a friend?

Certainly not.

But say that the like is not the friend of the like in as far as he is like; still the good may be the friend of the good in as far as he is good.

True.

But then again, will not the good, in as far as he is good, be sufficient for himself? And he who is sufficient wants nothing — that is implied in the word sufficient?

Of course not.

And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?

He will not.

Neither can he love that which he does not desire?

He can not.
And he who loves not is not a lover or friend?
Clearly not.
What place then is there for friendship, if, when absent, good men have no desire of one another (for when alone they are sufficient for themselves), and when present have no use of one another? How can such persons ever be induced to value one another?
They can not.
And friends they can not be, unless they value one another?
Very true.
But see now, Lysis, how we are being deceived in all this; are we not entirely wrong?
How is that? he said.
Have I not heard some one say, as I just now recollect, that the like is the greatest enemy of the like, the good of the good? — and in fact he quoted the authority of Hesiod, who says, “That potter quarrels with potter, bard with bard, beggar with beggar;” and of all other things he also says “That of necessity the most like are most full of envy, strife, and hatred of one another, and the most unlike of friendship. For the poor man is compelled to be the friend of the rich, and the weak requires the aid of the strong, and the sick man of the physician; every one who knows not has to love and court him who knows.” And indeed he went on to say in grandiloquent language, that the idea of friendship existing between similars is not the truth, but the very reverse of the truth, and that the most opposed are the most friendly; for that everything desires not like but unlike: for example, the dry desires the moist, the cold the hot, the bitter the sweet, the sharp the blunt, the void the full, the full the void, and so of all other things; for the opposite is the food of the opposite, whereas like receives
nothing from like. And I thought that he was a charming man who said this, and that he spoke well. What do the rest of you say?

I should say, at first hearing, that he is right, said Menexenus.

Then are we to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites?

Exactly.

Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer? and will not the all-wise eristics be down upon us in triumph, and ask, fairly enough, whether love is not the very opposite of hate? and what answer shall we make to them? must we not admit that they speak truly?

That we must.

They will ask whether the enemy is the friend of the friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy?

Neither, he replied.

Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of the intemperate, or the good of the bad?

I do not see how that is possible.

And yet, I said, if friendship goes by contraries, the contraries must be friends.

They must.

Then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends.

I suppose not.

And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions of friendship be erroneous? but still may there not be cases in which that which is neither good nor bad is the friend of the good?

How do you mean? he said.

Why really, I said, the truth is that I don't know; but my head is dizzy with thinking of the argument, and therefore I hazard the conjecture, that the beau-
tiful is the friend, as the old proverb says. Beauty is certainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and therefore of a nature which easily slips in and permeates our souls. And I further add that the good is the beautiful. You will agree to that?

Yes.

This I say from a sort of notion that what is neither good nor evil is the friend of the beautiful and the good, and I will tell you why I am inclined to think this: I assume that there are three principles — the good, the bad, and that which is neither good nor bad. What do you say to that?

I agree.

And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil of the evil, nor the good of the evil; — that the preceding argument will not allow; and therefore the only alternative is — if there be such a thing as friendship or love at all — that what is neither good nor evil must be the friend, either of the good, or of that which is neither good nor evil, for nothing can be the friend of the bad.

True.

Nor can like be the friend of like, as we were just now saying.

True.

Then that which is neither good nor evil can have no friend which is neither good nor evil.

That is evident.

Then the good alone is the friend of that only which is neither good nor evil.

That may be assumed to be certain.

And does not this seem to put us in the right way? Just remark, that the body which is in health requires neither medical nor any other aid, but is well enough; and the healthy man has no love of the physician, because he is in health.
He has none.
But the sick loves him, because he is sick?
Certainly.
And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful thing?
Yes.
But the human body, viewed as a body, is neither good nor evil?
True.
And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends of the art of medicine?
Yes.
Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by reason of the presence of evil?
That is the inference.
And clearly this must have happened before that which was neither good nor evil had become altogether corrupted with the element of evil, for then it would not still desire and love the good; for, as we were saying, the evil can not be the friend of the good.
That is impossible.
Further, I must observe that some substances are assimilated when others are present with them; and there are some which are not assimilated: take, for example, the case of an ointment or color which is put on another substance.
Very good.
In such a case, is the substance which is anointed the same as the color or ointment?
What do you mean? he said.
This is what I mean, I said: Suppose that I were to cover your auburn locks with white lead, would they be really white, or would they only appear to be white?
They would only appear to be white, he replied.
And yet whiteness would be present in them. But that would not make them at all the more white, notwithstanding the presence of white in them — they would be neither white nor black.

True.

But when old age superinduces in them the same color, then they become assimilated, and are white by the presence of white.

Certainly.

Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is assimilated by the presence of another substance; or must the presence be after a peculiar sort?

The latter, he said.

Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil, and not be wholly evil, and that has happened before now?

True.

Then when anything is in the presence of evil, but is not as yet evil, the presence of good arouses the desire of good in that thing; but the presence of evil, which makes a thing evil, takes away the desire and friendship of the good; for that which was once both good and evil has now become evil only, and the good had no friendship with the evil?

None.

And therefore we say that those who are already wise, whether Gods or men, are no longer lovers of wisdom; nor can they be lovers of wisdom, who are ignorant to the extent of being evil, for no evil or ignorant person is a lover of wisdom. There remain those who have the misfortune to be ignorant, but are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they know what they do not know: and therefore those who are the lovers of wisdom are as yet neither good nor bad. But the bad do not love wisdom any more than the
good; for, as we have already seen, neither unlike is the friend of unlike, nor like of like. You remember that?

Yes, they both said.

And so, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered the nature of friendship: there can be no doubt of that. Friendship is the love which the neither good nor evil has of the good, when the evil is present, either in the soul, or in the body, or anywhere.

They both agreed and entirely assented, and for a moment I rejoiced and was satisfied like a huntsman whose prey is within his grasp. But then a suspicion came across me, and I fancied unaccountably that the conclusion was untrue, and I felt pained, and said, Alas! Lysis and Menexenus, I am afraid that we have been grasping at a shadow.

Why do you say that? said Menexenus.

I am afraid, I said, that the argument about friendship is false: arguments, like men, are often pretenders.

How is that? he asked.

Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend of some one.

Certainly he is.

And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive and object?

He has a motive and object.

And is the object which makes him a friend dear to him, or neither dear nor hateful to him?

I don’t quite follow you, he said.

I do not wonder at that, I said. But perhaps, if I put the matter in another way, you will be able to follow me, and my own meaning will be clearer to myself. The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friend of the physician — is he not?

Yes.
And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the sake of health?
Yes.
And disease is an evil?
Certainly.
And what of health? I said. Is that good or evil, or neither?
Good, he replied.
And we were saying, I believe, that the body being neither good nor evil, because of disease, that is to say because of evil, is the friend of medicine, and medicine is a good: and medicine has entered into this friendship for the sake of health, and health is a good. True.
And is health a friend, or not a friend?
A friend.
And disease is an enemy?
Yes.
Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good because of the evil and hateful, and for the sake of the good and the friend?
That is clear.
Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of the enemy?
That is to be inferred.
Then at this point, my boys, let us take heed, and be on our guard against deceptions. I will no more say that the friend is the friend of the friend, and the like of the like, which has been declared by us to be an impossibility; but, in order that this new statement may not delude us, let us attentively examine another point, which is this: medicine, as we were saying, is a friend, or dear to us for the sake of health?
Yes.
And health is also dear?
Certainly.
And if dear, then dear for the sake of something?
Yes.
And surely this object must also be dear, as is implied in our previous admissions?
Yes.
And that something dear involves something else dear?
Yes.

But then, proceeding in this way, we shall at last come to an end, and arrive at some first principle of friendship or dearness which is not capable of being referred to any other, for the sake of which, as we maintain, all other things are dear.

Certainly.

My fear is that all those other things, which, as we say, are dear for the sake of that other, are illusions and deceptions only, of which that other is the reality or true principle of friendship. Let me put the matter thus: Suppose the case of a great treasure (this may be a son, who is more precious to his father than all his other treasures); would not the father, who values his son above all things, value other things also for the sake of his son? I mean, for instance, if he knew that his son had drunk hemlock, and the father thought that wine would save him, he would value the wine?

Certainly.

And also the vessel which contains the wine?

Certainly.

But he does not therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen vessel which contains them, equally with his son? Is not this rather the true state of the case? All this anxiety of his has regard not to the means which are provided for the sake of an object, but to the object for the sake of which they are provided. And although we may often say that
gold and silver are highly valued by us, that is not the truth; for the truth is that there is a further object, whatever that may be, which we value most of all, and for the sake of which gold and all our other possessions are acquired by us. Am I not right?

Yes, certainly.
And may not the same be said of the friend? That which is only dear to us for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear, but the truly dear is that in which all these so-called dear friendships terminate.

That, he said, appears to be true.
And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the sake of any other or further dear.
True.
Then the notion is at an end that friendship has not any further object. But are we therefore to infer that the good is the friend?
That is my view.
Then is the good loved for the sake of the evil? Let me put the case in this way: Suppose that of the three principles, good, evil, and that which is neither good nor evil, there remained only the good and the neutral, and that evil went far away, and in no way affected soul or body, nor ever at all that class of things which, as we say, are neither good nor evil in themselves; — would the good be of any use, or other than useless to us? For if there were nothing to hurt us any longer, we should have no need of anything that would do us good. Then would be clearly seen that we did but love and desire the good because of the evil, and as the remedy of the evil, which was the disease; but if there had been no disease, there would have been no need of a remedy. Is not this the nature of the good — to be loved because of the evil, by us who are between the two? but there is no use in the good for its own sake.
I suppose that is true.

Then the final principle of friendship, in which all other friendships which are relative only were supposed by us to terminate, is of another and a different nature from them. For they are called dear because of another dear or friend. But with the true friend or dear, the case is quite the reverse; for that is proved to be dear because of the hated, and if the hated were away, the loved would no longer stay.

That is true, he replied: at least, that is implied in the argument.

But, oh! will you tell me, I said, whether if evil were to perish, we should hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar affection? Or may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain, but not so as to be hurtful? And the same of thirst and the other affections,—that they will remain, but will not be evil because evil has perished? Or shall I say rather, that to ask what either would be or would not be has no meaning, for who can tell? This only we know, that in our present condition hunger may injure us, and may also benefit us. Is not that true?

Yes.

And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good and sometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the other?

To be sure.

But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is not evil should also perish?

None.

Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good nor evil will remain?

That is evident.

And must not a man love that which he desires and affects?
Lysis

He must.
Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of love or friendship?
Yes.
But not, if evil is the cause of friendship: for in that case nothing will be the friend of any other thing after the destruction of evil; for the effect can not remain when the cause is destroyed.
True.
And have we not been saying that the friend loves something for a reason? and the reason was because of the evil which leads the neither good nor evil to love the good?
Very true.
But now our view is changed, and there must be some other cause of friendship?
I suppose that there must.
May not the truth be that, as we were saying, desire is the cause of friendship; for that which desires is dear to that which is desired at the time of desire? and may not the other theory have been just a long story about nothing?
That is possibly true.
But surely, I said, he who desires, desires that of which he is in want?
Yes.
And that of which he is in want is dear to him?
True.
And he is in want of that of which he is deprived?
Certainly.
Then love, and desire, and friendship would appear to be of the natural or congenial. That, Lysis and Menexenus, is the inference.
They assented.
Then if you are friends, you must have natures which are congenial to one another?
Certainly, they both said.

And I say, my boys, that no one who loves or desires another would ever have loved or desired or affected him, if he had not been in some way congenial to him, either in his soul, or in his character, or in his manners, or in his form.

Yes, yes, said Menexenus. But Lysis was silent.

Then, I said, the conclusion is, that what is of a congenial nature must be loved.

That follows, he said.

Then the true lover, and not the counterfeit, must be loved by his love.

Lysis and Menexenus gave a faint assent to this; and Hippothales changed into all manner of colors with delight.

Here, intending to revise the argument, I said: Can we point out any difference between the congenial and the like? For if that is possible, then I think, Lysis and Menexenus, there may be some sense in our argument about friendship. But if the congenial is only the like, how will you get rid of the other argument, of the uselessness of like to like in as far as they are like; for to say that what is useless is dear, would be absurd? Suppose, then, that we agree to distinguish between the congenial and the like—in the intoxication of argument, that may perhaps be allowed.

Very true.

And shall we further say that the good is congenial, and the evil uncongenial to every one? Or again that the evil is congenial to the evil, and the good to the good; or that which is neither good nor evil to that which is neither good nor evil.

They agreed to the latter alternative.

Then, my boys, we have again fallen into the old discarded error; for the unjust will be the friend of
the unjust, and the bad of the bad, as well as the good of the good.

That appears to be true.

But again if we say that the congenial is the same as the good, in that case the good will only be the friend of the good.

True.

But that too was a position of ours which, as you will remember, has been already refuted by ourselves.

We remember.

Then what is to be done? Or rather is there anything to be done? I can only, like the wise men who argue in courts, sum up the arguments. If neither the beloved, nor the lover, nor the like, nor the unlike, nor the good, nor the congenial, nor any other of whom we spoke — for there were such a number of them that I can’t remember them — if, I say, none of these are friends, I know not what remains to be said.

Here I was going to invite the opinion of some older person, when suddenly we were interrupted by the tutors of Lysis and Menexenus, who came upon us like an evil apparition with their brothers, and bade them go home, as it was getting late. At first, we and the bystanders drove them off; but afterwards, as they would not mind, and only went on shouting in their barbarous dialect, and got angry, and kept calling the boys — they appeared to us to have been drinking rather too much at the Hermaea, which made them difficult to manage — we fairly gave way and broke up the company.

I said, however, a few words to the boys at parting: O Menexenus and Lysis, will not the bystanders go away, and say, "Here is a jest; you two boys, and I, an old boy, who would fain be one of you, imagine ourselves to be friends, and we have not as yet been able to discover what is a friend!"
INTRODUCTION

Lysimachus, the son of Aristides the Just, and Melesias, the son of the elder Thucydides, two aged men, who live together, are desirous of educating their sons in the best manner. Their own education, as often happens with the sons of great men, has been neglected; and they are resolved that their children shall have more care taken of them, than they received themselves at the hands of their fathers.

At their request, Nicias and Laches have accompanied them to see a man named Stesilaus fighting in heavy armor. The two fathers ask the two generals what they think of this exhibition, and whether they would advise that their sons should acquire the accomplishment. Nicias and Laches are quite willing to give their opinion; but they suggest that Socrates should be invited to take part in the consultation. He is a stranger to Lysimachus, but is afterwards recognized as the son of his old friend Sophroniscus, with whom "he never had a difference to the hour of his death." Socrates is also known to Nicias, to whom he had introduced the excellent Damon, musician and sophist, as a tutor for his son, and to Laches, who had witnessed his heroic behavior at the battle of Delium.

Socrates, as he is younger than either Nicias or Laches, prefers to wait until they have delivered their opinions, which they give in a characteristic manner. Nicias, the tactician, is very much in favor of the new art, which he describes as the gymnastics of war—useful when the ranks are formed, and still more useful when they are broken; creating a general interest in military studies, and greatly adding to the appearance of the soldier in the field. Laches, the blunt warrior, is of opinion that such an art is not knowledge, and can not be of any value, because the Lacedaemonians, those great masters of arms, neglect it. His own experience in actual service has taught him that these pretenders are useless and ridiculous. This man Stesilaus has been seen by him on board ship making a very sorry exhibition of himself. The possession of the art will make the coward rash, and subject the courageous, if he chance to make a slip, to invidious remarks. And now let Socrates be taken into counsel. As they differ he must decide.
Socrates would rather not decide the question by a plurality of votes: in such a serious matter as the education of a friend's children, he would rather consult the one skilled person who has had masters, and has works to show as evidences of his skill. This is not himself; for he has never been able to pay the sophists for instructing him, and has never had the wit to do or discover anything. But Nicias and Laches are older and richer than he is: they have had teachers, and perhaps have made discoveries; and he would have trusted them entirely, if they had not been diametrically opposed.

Lysimachus here proposes to resign the argument into the hands of the younger part of the company, as he is old, and has a bad memory. He earnestly requests Socrates to remain; — in this showing, as Nicias says, how little he knows the man, who will certainly not go away until he has cross-examined the company about their past lives. Nicias has often submitted to this process; and Laches is quite willing to learn from Socrates, because his actions, in the true Dorian mode, correspond to his words.

Socrates proceeds: We might ask who are our teachers? But a better and more thorough way of examining the question will be to ask, "What is Virtue?" — or rather, to restrict the inquiry to that part of virtue which is concerned with the use of weapons — "What is Courage?" Laches thinks that he knows this:

(1) "He is courageous who remains at his post." But some nations fight flying, after the manner of Aeneas in Homer; or as the heavy-armed Spartans also did at the battle of Plataea.

(2) Socrates wants a more general definition, not only of military courage, but of courage of all sorts, both amid pleasures and pains. Laches replies that this universal courage is endurance. But courage is a good thing, and mere endurance may be hurtful and injurious. Therefore (3) the element of intelligence must be added. But then again unintelligent endurance may often be more courageous than the intelligent — the bad than the good. How is this contradiction to be solved? Socrates and Laches are not set "to the Dorian mode" of words and actions; for their words are all confusion, although their actions are courageous. Still they must "endure" in an argument about endurance. Laches is very willing, and is quite sure that he knows what courage is, if he could only tell.

Nicias is now appealed to; and in reply he offers a definition which he has heard from Socrates himself, to the effect that (1) "Courage is intelligence." Laches derides this; and Socrates
inquires, "What sort of intelligence?" to which Nicias replies, "Intelligence of things terrible." "But every man knows the things to be dreaded in his own art." "No they do not. They may predict results, but can not tell whether they are really terrible; only the courageous man can do that." Laches draws the inference that the courageous man is either a soothsayer or a god.

Again, in Nicias' way of speaking, the term "courageous" must be denied to animals or children, because they do not know the danger. Against this inversion of the ordinary use of language Laches reclaims, but is in some degree mollified by a compliment to his own courage. Still, he does not like to see an Athenian statesman and general descending to sophistries of this sort. Socrates resumes the argument. Courage has been defined to be intelligence or knowledge of the terrible; and courage is not all virtue, but only one of the virtues. The terrible is in the future, and therefore the knowledge of the terrible is a knowledge of the future. But there can be no knowledge of future good or evil separated from a knowledge of the good and evil of the past or present; that is to say, of all good and evil. Courage, therefore, is the knowledge of good and evil generally. But he who has the knowledge of good and evil generally, must not only have courage, but also temperance, justice, and every other virtue. Thus, a single virtue would be the same as all virtues. And after all the two generals, and Socrates, the hero of Delium, are still in ignorance of the nature of courage. They must go to school again, boys, old men and all.

Some points of resemblance, and some points of difference, appear in the Laches when compared with the Charmides and Lysis. There is less of poetical and simple beauty, and more of dramatic interest and power. They are richer in the externals of the scene; the Laches has more play and development of character. In the Lysis and Charmides the youths are the central figures, and frequent allusions are made to the place of meeting, which is a palaestra. Here the place of meeting, which is also a palaestra, is quite forgotten, and the boys play a subordinate part. The séance is of old and elder men, of whom Socrates is the youngest.

First is the aged Lysimachus, who may be compared with Cephalus in the Republic, and, like him, withdraws from the argument. Melesias, who is only his shadow, also subsides into silence. Both of them have been ill-educated, as is shown in a striking manner by the circumstance that Lysimachus, the friend of Sophroniscus, has never heard of the fame of Socrates, his
son; they belong to different circles. The characters of the
two generals, Nicias and Laches, are first indicated by their
opinions on the exhibitions of the man fighting in heavy armor.
The more thoughtful Nicias is quite ready to accept the new art,
which Laches treats in the spirit of ridicule, and seems to think
that this, or any other military question, may be settled by ask-
ing, "What do the Lacedaemonians say to this?" The one
clearly inclines to tactics and arts of fence; the other is an enemy
to innovation, and relies on native courage. It is to be noted
that one of them is supposed to be a hearer of Socrates; the
other is only acquainted with his actions. Laches is the admirer
of the Dorian mode; and into his mouth the remark is put that
there are some persons who, never having been taught, are better
than those who have.

In the discussion of the main thesis of the Dialogue — "What
is Courage?" the antagonism of the two characters is still more
clearly brought out; and in this, as in the preliminary question,
the truth is parted between them. Gradually, and not without
difficulty, Laches is made to pass on from the more popular to
the more philosophical; it has never occurred to him that there
was any other courage than that of the soldier; and only by an
effort of the mind can he frame a general notion at all. No
sooner has this general notion been formed than it evanescs
before the dialectic of Socrates; and Nicias appears from the
other side with the Socratic doctrine, that courage is knowledge.
But to this Socrates himself replies, that knowledge is of past,
present, and future, and such a definition of virtue would make
courage equivalent to all virtue. In this part of the Dialogue
the contrast between the mode of cross-examination which is
practised by Laches and by Socrates, and the manner in which
the definition of Laches is made to approximate to that of Nicias,
are well worthy of attention.

Thus, with some intimation of the connection and unity of
virtue and knowledge, we arrive at no distinct result. The two
aspects of courage are never harmonized. The knowledge which
in the Protagoras is explained as the faculty of estimating plea-
ures and pains is here lost in an unmeaning and transcendental
conception. Yet several true intimations of the nature of courage
are allowed to appear: (1) That courage is moral as well as
physical; (2) That true courage is inseparable from knowledge,
and yet (3) is based on a sort of natural instinct. Laches ex-
hibits one aspect of courage; Nicias the other. The perfect
image and harmony of both is only realized in Socrates himself.
LACHES, OR COURAGE

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

Melesias, son of Thucydides.  Laches.
Their Sons.  Socrates.

Lys. You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armor, Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the reason why my friend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him. I think that we may as well confess this, for we certainly ought not to have any reserve with you. The reason was, that we were intending to ask your advice. Some laugh at the very notion of advising others, and when they are asked will not say what they think. They guess at the wishes of the person who asks them, and answer according to his, and not according to their own, opinion. But as we know that you are good judges, and will say exactly what you think, we have taken you into our counsels. And the matter about which I am making all this preface is just this: Melesias and I have two sons; that is his son, and he is named Thucydides, after his grandfather; and this is mine, who is also called, after his grandfather, Aristides. Now, we are resolved to take the greatest care of the youths, and not to let them run about as they like, which is too often the way with the young, when they are no longer children, but to begin at once and do the utmost that we can for them. And knowing that you have sons of your own, we thought that you were most likely to have attended to their training
and improvement, and, if you have not, we may remind you that you ought to have attended to them, and would invite you to assist us in the fulfilment of a common duty. I will tell you, Nicias and Laches, even at the risk of being tedious, how we came to think of this. Melesias and I live together, and our two sons live with us; and now, as I was saying at first, we are going to confess to you. Both of us often talk to the lads about the many noble deeds which our fathers did in war and peace—in the management of the allies, and also of the affairs of the city; but neither of us has any deeds of his own which he can show. Now we are somewhat ashamed of this contrast being seen by them, and we blame our fathers for letting us be spoiled in the days of our youth, while they were occupied with the concerns of others; and this we point out to the lads, and tell them that they will not grow up to honor if they are rebellious and take no pains about themselves; but that if they take pains they may, perhaps, become worthy of the names which they bear. They, on their part, promise to comply with our wishes; and our care is to discover what studies or pursuits are likely to be most improving to them. Some one told us of this art of using weapons, which, he said, was an excellent accomplishment for a young man to learn; and he praised the man whose exhibition you have seen, and told us to go and see him. And we determined to go, and to get you to accompany us, and if you did not object, we thought that we would take counsel with you about the education of our sons. That is the matter about which we wanted to talk with you; and we hope that you will give us your opinion about this, and about any other studies or pursuits which may or may not be desirable for a young man to learn. Please to say whether you object to our proposal.
Nic. As far as I am concerned, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud your purpose, and will gladly assist you; and I believe that you, Laches, will be equally glad.

La. Certainly, Nicias; and I quite approve of the remark which Lysimachus made about his own father, and the father of Melesias, and which is applicable, not only to them, but to us, and to every one who is occupied with public affairs. As he says, they are too apt to be negligent and careless of their own children and their private concerns. There is much truth in that remark of yours, Lysimachus. But why do you not consult our friend Socrates, instead of consulting us, about the education of the youths? he is of the same deme with you, and is always passing his time in places in which the youth have any noble study or pursuit, such as you are inquiring after.

Lys. Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this sort?

La. Certainly, Lysimachus.

Nic. That I have the means of knowing as well as Laches; for quite lately he supplied me with a teacher of music for my sons,—Damon, the disciple of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way, as well as a musician, and a companion of inestimable value for young men at their age.

Lys. Those who have reached my age, Socrates and Nicias and Laches, fall out of acquaintance with the young, because they are generally detained at home by old age; but I hope that you, O son of Sophroniscus, will let your fellow demesmen have the benefit of any advice which you are able to give them. And I have a claim upon you as an old friend of your father; for I and he were always companions and friends, and to the hour of his death there never was a difference between us; and now it comes back to
me, at the mention of your name, that I have heard these lads talking to one another at home, and often speaking of Socrates in terms of the highest praise; but I have never thought to ask them whether the son of Sophroniscus was the person whom they meant. Tell me, my boy, whether this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken?

Son. Certainly, father, this is he.

Lys. I am delighted to hear, Socrates, that you maintain the name of your father, who was a most excellent man; and I further rejoice at the prospect of our family ties being renewed.

La. Indeed, Lysimachus, you ought not to give him up; for I can assure you that I have seen him maintaining, not only his father's, but also his country's name. He was my companion in the retreat from Delium, and I can tell you that if others had only been like him, the honor of our country would have been maintained, and the great defeat would never have occurred.

Lys. That is very high praise, which is given you, Socrates, by faithful witnesses and for deserts like these. And let me tell you the pleasure which I feel in hearing of your fame; and I hope that you will regard me as one of your best friends; indeed you ought to have visited us long ago, and reckoned us among your friends; but now, from this day forward, as we have at last found one another out, do as I say — come and make acquaintance with me, and with these young men, that I may continue your friend, as I was your father's. I shall expect you to do this, and shall venture to remind you. But what say you of the matter of which I was speaking — the art of fighting in armor? Is that a practice in which the lads may be advantageously instructed?

Soc. I will endeavor to advise you, Lysimachus, as
far as I can in this matter, and also in every way will comply with your wishes; but as I am younger and not so experienced, I think that I ought to hear what my elders have to say first, and to learn of them, and if I have anything to add, then I may venture to give my opinion to them as well as to you. Suppose, Nicias, that one of you speaks first.

*Nic.* I have no objection, Socrates; and my opinion is that the acquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young men. There is an advantage in their being employed during their leisure hours in a way which tends to improve their bodily constitution, and not in the way in which young men are too apt to be employed. No sort of gymnastics could be harder exercise; and this, and the art of riding, are of all arts most befitting to a freeman; for they only who are thus trained in the use of implements of war are trained in the conflict which is set before us, or in that on which the conflict turns. Moreover in actual battle this sort of acquirement will be of some use, when you have to fight in a line with a number of others; and will be of the greatest use when the ranks are broken and you have to fight singly; either in pursuit, when you are attacking some one who is defending himself, or in flight, when you have to defend yourself against an assailant. Certainly he who possessed the art could not meet with any harm at the hands of a single person, or perhaps of several; and in any case he would have a great advantage. Further, this sort of skill inclines a man to other noble lessons; for every man who has learned how to fight in arms will desire to learn the proper arrangement of an army, which is the sequel of the lesson: and when he has learned this, and his ambition is once fired, he will go on to learn the complete art of the general. There is no difficulty in seeing that the knowledge and practice
of other military arts will be useful and valuable to a man; and this lesson may be the beginning of them. Let me add a further advantage, which is by no means a slight one, — that this science will make any man a great deal more valiant and self-possessed in the field. And I will not disdain to mention, what to some may appear to be a small matter, that he will make a better appearance at the right time; that is to say, at the time when his appearance will strike terror into his enemies. My opinion then, Lysimachus, is, as I say, that the youths should be instructed in this art, and for the reasons which I have given. But I shall be very glad to hear Laches, if he has another view.

La. I should not like to say, Nicias, that any kind of knowledge is not to be learned; for all knowledge appears to be a good: and if, as Nicias and as the teachers of it affirm, this art of fence is really a species of knowledge, then it ought to be learned; but if not, and if those who profess it are deceivers only; or if it be knowledge, but not of a valuable sort; then what is the use of learning it? I say this, because I think that if it had been really valuable, the Lacedaemonians, whose whole life is passed in finding out and practising the arts which give them an advantage over other nations in war, would have discovered this one. And even if they had not, still these professors of the art would certainly not have failed to discover that of all the Hellenes the Lacedaemonians have the greatest interest in such matters, and that a master of the art who was honored among them would have been sure to have made his fortune among other nations, just as a tragic poet would who is honored among ourselves; which is the reason why he who fancies that he can write a tragedy does not go on a peregrination into the neighboring states, but rushes hither straight, and exhibits at Athens; and this is natural. Whereas
I perceive that these fighters in armor regard Lace-daemon as a sacred inviolable territory, which they do not touch with the point of their foot; but they make a circuit of the neighboring states, and would rather exhibit to any others than to the Spartans; and particularly to those who would themselves acknowledge that they are by no means first-rate in the arts of war. Further, Lysimachus, I have encountered a good many of these gentlemen in actual service, and have taken their measure, which I can give you at once; for none of these masters of fence has ever been distinguished in war,—there has been a sort of fatality about this: whereas, in all other arts, the men of note have been always those who have practised the art; but these appear to be a most unfortunate exception. For example, this very Stesilaus, whom you and I have just witnessed exhibiting in all that crowd and making such great professions of his powers, I have seen at another time making, in sober truth, an involuntary exhibition of himself, which was a far better spectacle. He was a marine on board a ship, which struck a transport vessel, and was armed with a weapon, half spear, half scythe, the singularity of which was worthy of the singularity of the man. To make a long story short, I will only tell you what happened to this notable invention of the scythe-spear. He was fighting, and the scythe end caught in the rigging of the other ship, and stuck fast; and he tugged, but was unable to get his weapon free. The two ships were passing one another. He first ran along his own ship holding on to the spear; but as the other ship passed by and drew him after as he was holding on, he let the spear slip through his hand until he retained only the end of the handle. The people in the transport clapped their hands, and laughed at his ridiculous figure; and when some one threw a stone,
which fell on the deck at his feet, and he quitted his hold of the scythe-spear, the crew of his own trireme also burst out laughing; they could not refrain when they beheld the weapon waving in the air, suspended from the transport. Now I do not deny that there may be something in such an art, as Nicias asserts: but I tell you my experience, and, as I said at first, my opinion is, that whether this be an art which is of some slight advantage, or not an art at all, but only an imposition; in either case there is no use in such an acquirement. For my opinion is, that if the professor of this art be a coward, he will be likely to become rash, and his character will be only more notorious; or if he be brave, and fail ever so little, other men will be on the watch, and he will be greatly traduced: for there is a jealousy of such pretenders; and unless a man be preëminent in valor, he can not help being ridiculous, if he says that he has this skill in weapons. Such is my judgment, Lysimachus, of the desirableness of this art; but, as I said at first, ask Socrates, and do not let him go until he has given you his opinion of the matter.

Lys. I am going to ask this favor of you, Socrates; as is the more necessary because the two doctors disagree, and some one is needed to decide between them. Had they agreed, this might not have been required. But as Laches has voted one way and Nicias another, I should like to hear with which of our two friends you agree.

Soc. What, Lysimachus, are you for going by the opinion of the majority?

Lys. Why, yes, Socrates; what other way is there?

Soc. And would you agree in that, Melesias? If you were deliberating about the gymnastic training of your son, would you follow the advice of the major-
ity of us, or the opinion of the one who had been trained and exercised under a skilful master?

Mel. I should take the advice of the latter, Socrates; as would be reasonable.

Soc. His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four?

Mel. Certainly.

Soc. And for this reason, as I imagine,—because a good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers?

Mel. To be sure.

Soc. Must we not then first of all ask, whether there is any one of us who has knowledge in that about which we are deliberating? If there is, let us take his advice, though he be one only, and not mind the others; if there is not, let us seek further counsel. Is this a slight matter about which you and Lysimachus are deliberating? Are you not risking the greatest of your possessions? For children are your riches; and upon their turning out well or ill will depend the whole order of their father’s house.

Mel. That is true.

Soc. Great care, then, is required in the matter?

Mel. Certainly.

Soc. Suppose, as I was just now saying, that we were considering, or wanting to consider, who was the best trainer. Should we not decide in his favor who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers?

Mel. I think that we should.

Soc. But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of the art of which we want to find the masters?

Mel. I do not understand.

Soc. Let me try to make my meaning plainer then. I do not think that we have as yet decided what that
is about which we are consulting, when we ask which of us is skilled in that, and which of us has or has not had a teacher of the art.

Nic. Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or ought not to learn the art of fighting in armor?

Soc. Yes, Nicias; but there is also a prior question, which I may illustrate in this way: When a person considers about applying a medicine to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about the medicine or about the eyes?

Nic. About the eyes.

Soc. And when he considers if he shall set a bridle on a horse, he thinks of the horse and not of the bridle?

Nic. True.

Soc. And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of another thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means?

Nic. Certainly.

Soc. And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he is skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view, as well as of the means?

Nic. Most true.

Soc. And at present we have in view some kind of knowledge, the end of which is the soul of youth?

Nic. Yes.

Soc. The question is, Which of us is skilful or successful in the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?

La. Well but Socrates; did you never observe that some persons, who have had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have, in some things?

Soc. Yes, Laches, I have observed that; but you would not be very willing to trust them if they only professed to be masters of their art, unless they could
show some proof of their skill or excellence in one or more works.

La. That is true.

Soc. And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and Melesias, in their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, have asked our advice about them, we too should inform them who our teachers were, if we say that we have any, and prove them to be men of merit and experienced trainers of the minds of youth and really our teachers. Or if any of us says that he has no teacher, but that he has works to show of his own; then he should point out to them, what Athenians or strangers, bond or free, he is generally acknowledged to have improved. But if he can show neither teachers nor works, then they should ask him to look out for others; and not to run the risk of spoiling the children of friends, which is the most formidable accusation that can be brought against any one by his near and dear relations. As for myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I am the first to confess that I have never had a teacher; although I have always from my earliest youth desired to have one. But I am too poor to give money to the Sophists, who are the only professors of moral improvement; and to this day I have never been able to discover the art myself, though I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches may have learned or discovered it; for they are far wealthier than I am, and may therefore have learned of others. And they are older too; so that they have had more time to make the discovery. And I really believe that they are able to educate a man; for unless they had been confident in their own knowledge, they would never have spoken thus decidedly of the pursuits which are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. I repose confidence in both of them; but I do not understand why they differ from one another.
And therefore, Lysimachus, as Laches suggests that you should detain me, and not let me go until I have answered, I in turn earnestly beseech and advise you to detain Laches and Nicias, and question them. I would have you say to them: Socrates says that he has no knowledge of the matter, and that he is unable to decide which of you speaks truly; neither discoverer nor student is he of anything of the kind. But you, Laches and Nicias, should either of you tell us who is the most skilful educator whom you have ever known; and whether you invented the art yourselves, or learned of another; and if you learned, who were your respective teachers, and who were their brothers in the art; and then, if you are too much occupied in politics to teach us yourselves, let us go to them, and present them with gifts, or make interest with them, or both, in the hope that they may be induced to take charge of all our families, in order that they may not grow up inferior, and disgrace their ancestors. But if you are yourselves original discoverers in that field, give us some proof of your skill. Who are they who, having been inferior persons, have become under your care good and noble? For if this is your first attempt at education, there is a danger that you may be trying the experiment, not on the "vile corpus" of a Carian slave, but on your own sons, or the sons of your friend; and as the proverb says, "break the large vessel in learning to make pots." Tell us then, what qualities you claim or do not claim. Make them tell you this, Lysimachus, and do not let them off.

Lys. I very much approve of the words of Socrates, my friends; but you, Nicias and Laches, must determine whether you will be questioned, and give an explanation about matters of this sort. Assuredly, I and Melesias would be greatly pleased
to hear you answer the questions which Socrates asks, if you will: for I began by saying that we took you into our counsels because we thought you would be likely to have attended to the subject, especially as you have children who, like our own, are nearly of an age to be educated. Suppose, then, if you have no objection, that you take Socrates into partnership; and do you and he ask and answer one another’s questions: for, as he has well said, we are deliberating about the most important of our concerns. I hope that you will see fit to comply with our request.

Nic. I see very clearly, Lysimachus, that you have only known Socrates’ father, and have no acquaintance with Socrates himself: at least, you can only have known him when he was a child, and may have met him among his fellow-tribesmen, in company with his father, at a sacrifice, or at some other gathering. You clearly show that you have never known him since he arrived at manhood.

Lys. Why do you say that, Nicias?

Nic. You don’t seem to be aware that any one to whom Socrates has an intellectual affinity is liable to be drawn into an argument with him; and whatever subject may be started by him, he will be continually carried round and round by him, until at last he finds that he has to give an account both of his present and past life; and when he is once entangled, Socrates will not let him go until he has completely and thoroughly sifted him. Now I am used to his ways; and I know that he will certainly do this: and also I know that I myself will be the sufferer; for I am fond of his company, Lysimachus. Neither do I think that there is any harm in being reminded of the evil which we are, or have been, doing: he who does not fly from reproof will be sure to take more heed of his after life; he will wish and desire to learn as long as he
lives, as Solon says, and will not think that old age of itself brings wisdom. To me, to be cross-examined by Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant; indeed, I knew all along that where Socrates was, the argument would soon pass from our sons to ourselves; and therefore, as I say, as far as I am concerned, I am quite willing to discourse with Socrates in his own manner; but you had better ask our friend Laches what his feeling may be.

La. I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two feelings, about discussions. And to some I may seem to be a lover, and to others a hater of discourse; for when I hear a man discoursing of virtue, or of any sort of wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of his theme, I am delighted beyond measure: and I compare the man and his words, and note the harmony and correspondence of them. And such an one I deem to be the true musician, having in himself a fairer harmony than that of the lyre, or any pleasant instrument of music; for truly he has in his own life a harmony of words and deeds arranged, not in the Ionian, or in the Phrygian mode, nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic mode, which is the Dorian, and no other. Such a one makes me merry with the sound of his voice; and when I hear him I am thought to be a lover of discourse; so eager am I in drinking in his words. But when I hear a man of opposite character, I am annoyed; and the better he speaks the more I hate him, and then I seem to be a hater of discourse. As to Socrates, I have no knowledge of his words: but of old, as would seem, I have had experience of his deeds; and his deeds show that free and noble sentiments may be expected from him. And if his words accord, then I am of one mind with him, and shall be delighted to be interrogated by a man such as he is, and shall not be annoyed at having
to learn of him: for I agree with Solon, "that I would fain grow old, learning many things." But I must be allowed to add of the good only. Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the teacher is younger, or not as yet in repute — anything of that sort is of no account with me. And therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you may teach and confute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me anything which I know. Such is the opinion which I have had of you ever since that day on which you were my companion in danger, and gave an unmistakable proof of your valor. Therefore, say whatever you like, and do not mind about the difference of our ages.

Soc. I can not say that either of you show any reluctance to take counsel and advise with me.

Lys. But that is our business, in which I regard you as having a common interest; for I reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and find out from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of the youths, and talk and advise with them: for I am old, and my memory is bad; and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or the answers to them; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost. I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by yourselves; and I will listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your conclusions.

Soc. Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of Lysimachus and Melesias. There would be no harm in asking ourselves the question which was first proposed to us: Who have been our own instructors in this sort of training, and whom we have made better? But the other mode of carrying on the inquiry will bring us to the same point, and will be more
like proceeding from first principles. For if we knew that the addition of something would improve some other thing, and were able to make the addition, then, clearly, we must know how that about which we are advising may be best and most easily attained. Perhaps you do not understand what I mean. Then let me make my meaning plainer in this way. Suppose we know that the addition of sight makes better the eyes which possess this gift, and also were able to impart sight to the eyes, then, clearly, we should know the nature of sight, when asked how this gift of sight may be best and most easily attained; for if we knew neither what sight is, nor what hearing is, we should not be very good medical advisers about the eyes, or the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight and hearing to them.

_La._ That is true, Socrates.

_Soc._ And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very moment inviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted to their sons for the improvement of their minds?

_La._ Very true.

_Soc._ Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how, if we are wholly ignorant of this, can we advise any one about the best mode of attaining it?

_La._ I do not think that we can, Socrates.

_Soc._ Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue?

_La._ Yes.

_Soc._ And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?

_La._ Certainly.

_Soc._ I would not have us begin, my friend, with inquiring about the whole of virtue; for that may be too much for us: let us first consider whether we have
a sufficient knowledge of a part; that will probably be an easier mode of proceeding.

La. Let us do as you say, Socrates.

Soc. Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we not select that to which the use of arms is supposed to conduce? And is not that generally supposed to be courage?

La. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the nature of courage, and in the second place proceed to inquire how the young men may attain this quality of courage, as far as this is to be effected by the help of studies and pursuits. Try, and see whether you can tell me what is courage.

La. Indeed, Socrates, that is soon answered: he is a man of courage who remains at his post, and does not run away, but fights against the enemy; of that you may be very certain.

Soc. That is good, Laches; and yet I fear that I did not express myself clearly; and therefore you have answered not the question which I intended to ask, but another.

La. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I will endeavor to explain; you would call a man courageous, who remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?

La. Certainly I should.

Soc. And so should I; but what would you say of another man, who fights flying, instead of remaining?

La. How flying?

Soc. Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well as pursuing; and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas, that they knew how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither; and he passes an encomium on Aeneas himself, as having a knowledge
of fear or flight, and calls him an author of fear or flight.

_La._ Yes, Socrates, and there _Homer_ is right; for he was speaking of chariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry, who have that way of fighting; but the heavy-armed Greek fights, as I say, remaining in his rank.

_Soc._ And yet, Laches, you must except the Lace-daemonians at Plataea, who, when they came upon the light shields of the Persians, are said not to have been willing to stand and fight, and to have fled; but when the ranks of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them like _cavalry_, and won the battle.

_La._ That is true.

_Soc._ That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in having put my question badly, and that this was the reason of your answering badly. For I meant to ask you not only about the courage of heavy-armed soldiers, but about the courage of cavalry, and every other style of soldier; and not only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous in perils by sea, and who in disease, or poverty, or again in politics, are courageous; and not only who are courageous against pain or fear, but mighty to contend against desires and pleasures, either fixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy. There is this sort of courage, is there not?

_La._ Certainly, Socrates.

_Soc._ And all these are courageous, but some have courage in pleasures, and some in pains; some in desires, and some in fears; and some are cowards under the same conditions, as I should imagine.

_La._ Very true.

_Soc._ Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in general. And I will begin with courage, and
once more ask, What is that common quality, which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage? Do you understand now what I mean?

_La._ Not over well.

_Soc._ I mean this: As I might ask what is that quality which is called quickness, and which is found in running, playing the lyre, speaking, learning, and in many other similar actions, or rather which we possess in nearly every action that can be mentioned of arms or legs, mouth, voice, mind; — would you not apply the term quickness to all of them?

_La._ Quite true.

_Soc._ And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that common quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call quickness? I should say that which accomplishes much in a little time — that I call quickness in running, speaking, and every other sort of action.

_La._ You would be quite correct.

_Soc._ And now, Laches, do you try and tell me, What is that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, and in all the cases which I was just now mentioning?

_La._ I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.

_Soc._ But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question. And yet I can not say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you would consider courage to be a very noble quality.

_La._ Most noble, certainly.

_Soc._ And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?

_La._ Very noble.
Soc. But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?

La. True.

Soc. And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?

La. I ought not to say that, Socrates.

Soc. Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage — for that is not noble, but courage is noble?

La. You are right.

Soc. Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?

La. True.

Soc. But as to the epithet "wise," — wise in what? In all things small as well as great? For example, if a man endures in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will acquire more in the end, do you call him courageous?

La. Assuredly not.

Soc. Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or some patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he may be allowed to eat or drink something, and the other refuses; is that courage?

La. No; that is not courage at all, any more than the last.

Soc. Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is willing to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will help him, and that there will be fewer and inferior men against him than there are with him; and suppose that he has also advantages of position; — would you say of such a one who endures with all this wisdom and preparation, that he, or some man in the opposing army who is in the opposite circumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his post, is the braver?
La. I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver.

Soc. But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the other?

La. That is true.

Soc. And you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as he who endures, having no knowledge of horsemanship?

La. That is my view.

Soc. And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling, or the bow, or any other art, is not so courageous as he who endures, not having such a knowledge?

La. True.

Soc. And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in this or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or the like, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have this knowledge?

La. Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?

Soc. Nothing, if that is what he thinks.

La. But that is what I do think.

Soc. And yet men who thus run risks and endure are but foolish, Laches, in comparison of those who do the same things, having the skill to do them.

La. That is true.

Soc. But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base and hurtful to us.

La. Quite true.

Soc. Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality.

La. True.

Soc. And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish endurance, which was before held in dis-honor, is courage.

La. Very true.
Soc. And are we right in saying that?

La. Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.

Soc. Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; for our deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say that we had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us talking about courage just now.

La. That is most true.

Soc. And is this condition of ours satisfactory?

La. Quite the reverse.

Soc. Suppose, however, that we admit our principle to a certain extent.

La. What principle? And what are we to admit?

Soc. The principle of endurance. Let us too endure and persevere in the inquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faint-heartedness in searching for courage; which after all may, very likely, be endurance.

La. I am ready to go on, Socrates; and yet I am unused to investigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has been aroused in me by what has been said; and I am really grieved at being thus unable to express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know the nature of courage; but, somehow or other, she has slipped away from me, and I can not get hold of her and tell her nature.

Soc. But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the track, and not be lazy?

La. Certainly, he should.

Soc. And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at the sport than we are. What do you say?

La. I should like that.

Soc. Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to
help your friends, who are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp: you see our extremity, and may save us, and also settle your own opinion, if you will tell us what you think about courage.

Nic. I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not defining courage in the right way; for you have forgotten an excellent saying which I have heard from your own lips.

Soc. What is that, Nicias?

Nic. I have often heard you say that “Every man is good in that in which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise.”

Soc. That is certainly true, Nicias.

Nic. And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise.

Soc. Do you hear him, Laches?

La. Yes, I hear him, but I don’t quite understand him.

Soc. I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to mean that courage is a sort of wisdom.

La. What sort of wisdom, Socrates?

Soc. That is a question which you must ask of Nicias.

La. Yes.

Soc. Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you surely do not mean the wisdom which plays on the flute?

Nic. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?

Nic. No.

Soc. But what is this knowledge then, and of what?

La. I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates; and I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or wisdom.

Nic. I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the
knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything.

_La._ How strangely he is talking, Socrates.

_Soc._ What makes you say that, Laches?

_La._ What makes me say that? Why, surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another.

_Soc._ That is just what Nicias denies.

_La._ Yes, that is what he denies in his foolishness.

_Soc._ Shall we enlighten him instead of abusing him?

_Nic._ Laches does not want to enlighten me, Socrates; but having been proved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I have been doing the same.

_La._ Very true, Nicias; and you are talking nonsense, as I shall endeavor to show. Let me ask you a question: Do not physicians know the dangers of disease? or do the courageous know them? or are the physicians the same as the courageous?

_Nic._ Not at all.

_La._ No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry, or other masters of crafts, who have a knowledge of that which inspires them with fear or confidence in their own crafts, and yet they are not courageous a whit the more for that.

_Soc._ What is Laches saying, Nicias; he appears to be saying something.

_Nic._ Yes, he is saying something, but something which is not true.

_Soc._ How is that?

_Nic._ Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge only extends to the nature of health and disease: he can tell the sick man that, and nothing more. Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether health or disease is the more terrible to a man? Had not many a man better never
get up from a sick bed? I should like to know whether you think that life is always better than death. May not death often be the better of the two?

La. Yes, I certainly think that.

Nic. And do you think that the same things are terrible to those to whom to die is better, and to those to whom to live is better?

La. Certainly not.

Nic. And do you suppose that the physician or any other artist knows this, or any one indeed, except he who is skilled in the grounds of fear and hope? And him I call the courageous.

Soc. Do you understand his meaning, Laches?

La. Yes; I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are courageous. For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is better? And yet, Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a soothsayer, or are you neither soothsayer nor courageous?

Nic. What! do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the grounds of hope or fear?

La. Indeed I do: who but he?

Nic. Much rather I should say he of whom I speak; for the soothsayer ought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass, whether death or disease, or loss of property, or victory, or defeat in war, or in any sort of contest; but to whom the suffering or not suffering of these things will be for the best, can no more be decided by the soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer.

La. I can not understand what Nicias would be at, Socrates; for he represents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer, nor a physician, nor in any other character, unless he means to say that he is a god. My opinion is that he does not like honestly to confess that he is talking nonsense, but that he
shuffles up and down in order to conceal the difficulty into which he has got himself. You and I, Socrates, might have practised a similar shuffle just now, if we had only wanted to avoid the appearance of contradiction. And if we had been arguing in a court of law there might have been reason in this; but why should a man deck himself out with vain words at a meeting of friends such as this?

*Soc.* I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not. But perhaps Nicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake of talking. Let us ask him to explain what he means, and if he has reason on his side we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.

*La.* Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I have asked enough.

*Soc.* I don’t see why I should not; and my question will do for both of us.

*La.* Very good.

*Soc.* Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I are partners in the argument: Do you mean to affirm that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear?

*Nic.* I do.

*Soc.* And that is a very special knowledge which is not possessed by the physician or prophet, who will not be courageous unless they superadd this particular knowledge. That is what you were saying?

*Nic.* I was.

*Soc.* Then courage is not a thing which every pig would have, any more than he would have knowledge, as the proverb says?

*Nic.* I think not.

*Soc.* Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian sow would be called by you courageous. And this I say not as a joke, but be-
cause I think that he who assents to your doctrine, that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, can not allow that any wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a leopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has a degree of wisdom which but a few human beings, and these only with difficulty, attain. He who takes your view of courage must affirm that a lion, and a stag, and a bull, and a monkey, have equally little pretensions to courage.

La. Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is truly good. And I hope, Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admit to be courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or whether you will have the boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny their courage.

Nic. Why, Laches, I don't call animals or any other things courageous, which have no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, but fearless and senseless only. Do you think that I should call little children courageous, which fear no dangers because they know none? There is a difference, as I should imagine, between fearlessness and courage. Now I am of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few, but that rashness, and boldness, and fearlessness, which has no forethought, are very common qualities possessed by many men, many women, many children, many animals. And you, and men in general, call by the term "courageous" actions which I call rash, and my courageous actions are wise actions.

La. Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses himself out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honor of courage those whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous.

Nic. Be of good cheer, Laches; for I am quite
willing to say of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians, that you are courageous and therefore wise.

La. I could answer that; but I would not have you cast in my teeth that I am a haughty Aexonian.

Soc. I would not have you answer him, for I fancy, Laches, that you have not discovered whence his wisdom comes; he has got all this from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, of all the Sophists, is considered to be the best taker to pieces of words of this sort.

La. Yes, Socrates; and the examination of such niceties is a much more suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the city chooses to preside over her.

Soc. But still, my sweet friend, a great statesman is just the man to have a great mind. And I think that the view which is implied in Nicias' definition of courage is worthy of examination.

La. Then examine for yourself, Socrates.

Soc. That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Don't, however, suppose that I shall let you out of the partnership; for I shall expect you to apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration of the question.

La. I do not object if you think that I ought.

Soc. Yes, I do; and I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue.

Nic. Very true.

Soc. And you yourself said that this was a part, and that there were many other parts, all of which together are called virtue.

Nic. Certainly.

Soc. Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice, temperance, and the like, are all of
them parts of virtue as well as courage. Would you not say the same?

Nic. Certainly.

Soc. Well then, about that we are agreed. And now let us proceed a step, and see whether we are equally agreed about the fearful and the hopeful. Let me tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set me right: my opinion is that the terrible and the hopeful are the things which do or do not create fear, and that fear is not of the present, nor of the past, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that, Laches?

La. Yes, Socrates, entirely.

Soc. That is my view, Nicias; the terrible things, as I should say, are the evils which are future; and the hopeful are the good or not evil things which are future. Do you or do you not agree in this?

Nic. I agree.

Soc. And the knowledge of these things you call courage?

Nic. Precisely.

Soc. And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself in a third point.

Nic. What is that?

Soc. I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not one knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of what will be and will be best in the future; but that of all three there is one science only: for example, there is one science of medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health equally in all times, present, past, and future; and of husbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of the earth. And as to the general's art, you yourself will be my witnesses, that the general has to think of the future as well as the present; and he considers that he is not to be the
servant of the soothsayer, but his master, because he knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in war: and accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general, and not the general under the soothsayer. Am I not correct, Laches?

_La._ Quite correct.

_Soc._ And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?

_Nic._ Yes, indeed, Socrates; that is my opinion.

_Soc._ And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful?

_Nic._ Yes.

_Soc._ And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future goods and future evils?

_Nic._ True.

_Soc._ And the same science has to do with the same things in the future or at any time?

_Nic._ That is true.

_Soc._ Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the fearful and hopeful, for they are future only; and courage, like the other sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of the present, and past, and of any time?

_Nic._ That, as I suppose, is true.

_Soc._ Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature of courage: and according to your view, that is, according to your present view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time. What do you say to that alteration in your statement?

_Nic._ I agree to that, Socrates.

_Soc._ But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all
good and evil, and how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which were dangers and which were not, and guard against them whether they were supernatural or natural; and he would provide the good, as he would know how to deal with gods or men.

Nic. I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you say.

Soc. But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?

Nic. I suppose that is true.

Soc. But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?

Nic. Yes, that was what we were saying.

Soc. And that is in contradiction with our present view?

Nic. That appears to be the case.

Soc. Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is.

Nic. We have not.

La. And yet, friend Nicias, I imagined that you would have made the discovery, as you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to Socrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been enlightened by the wisdom of Damon.

Nic. I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having displayed your ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to see whether I have not made a similar display; and if we are both equally ignorant of the things which a man who is good for anything should know, that, I suppose, will be of no consequence. You certainly appear to me very like the rest of the world, looking at your neighbor and
not at yourself. I am of opinion that enough has been said on the subject of discussion; and if anything has been imperfectly said, that may be hereafter corrected by the help of Damon, whom you think to deride, although you have never seen him, and with the help of others. And when I am satisfied myself, I will freely impart my satisfaction to you, for I think that you are very much in want of knowledge.

_La._ You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware: nevertheless I would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you and me as advisers about the education of their children; but, as I said at first, they should ask Socrates; and if my sons were old enough, I would have asked him myself.

_Nic._ To that I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take them under his charge. I should not wish for any one else to be the tutor of Niceratus. But I observe that when I mention the matter to him he recommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself. Perhaps he may be more ready to listen to you, Lysimachus.

_Lys._ He ought, Nicias: for certainly I would do things for him which I would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates — will you comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the youths?

_Soc._ Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid in the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation that I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admit that you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but as we are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred to another? I certainly think that no one should; and under these circumstances, let me offer you a piece of advice (and this need not go further than ourselves).
I maintain, my friends, that every one of us should seek out the best teacher whom he can find, first for ourselves, and then for the youth, regardless of expense or anything. But I can not advise that we remain as we are. And if any one laughs at us for going to school at our age, I would quote to them the authority of Homer, who says, that

"Modesty is not good for a needy man."

Let us then, regardless of the remarks which are made upon us, make the education of the youths our own education.

Lys. I like your proposal, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, I am also the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favor of you: come to my house to-morrow at dawn, and we will advise about these matters. For the present, let us make an end of the conversation.

Soc. I will come to you to-morrow, Lysimachus, as you propose, God willing.
INTRODUCTION

The Protagoras, like several of the Dialogues of Plato, is put into the mouth of Socrates, who describes a conversation which had taken place between himself and the great Sophist at the house of Callias—"the man who had spent more upon the Sophists than all the rest of the world, and in which the learned Hippias and the grammarian Prodicus had also shared, as well as Alcibiades and Critias, both of whom said a few words—in the presence of a distinguished company consisting of disciples of Protagoras and of leading Athenians belonging to the Socratic circle. The Dialogue commences with a request on the part of Hippocrates that Socrates would introduce him to the celebrated teacher. He has come before the dawn had risen to testify his zeal. Socrates moderates his excitement and advises him to find out "what Protagoras will make of him," before he becomes his pupil.

They go together to the house of Callias; and Socrates, after explaining the purpose of their visit to Protagoras, asks the question "What he will make of Hippocrates?" Protagoras answers that he will make a better and a wiser man. "But in what will he be better?"—Socrates desires to have a more precise answer. Protagoras replies, "That he will teach him prudence in affairs private and public; in short, the science or knowledge of human life."

This, as Socrates admits, is a noble profession: but he is doubtful—or rather would have been, if Protagoras had not assured him of it—whether such knowledge can be taught. And this for two reasons: (1) Because the Athenian people, who recognize in their assemblies the distinction between the skilled and the unskilled, do not recognize any distinction between the trained politician and the untrained; (2) Because the wisest and best Athenian citizens do not teach their sons political virtue. Will Protagoras explain this anomaly to him?

Protagoras explains his views in the form of an apologue, in which, after Prometheus had given men the arts, Zeus is represented as sending Hermes to them, bearing with him Justice and
Reverence. These are not, like the arts, to be imparted to a few only, but all men are to be partakers of them. Therefore the Athenian people are right in distinguishing between the skilled and unskilled in the arts, and not between skilled and unskilled politicians. (1) For all men have the political virtues to a certain degree, and whether they have them or not are obliged to say that they have them. A man would be thought a madman who professed an art which he did not know; and he would be equally thought a madman if he did not profess a virtue which he had not. (2) And that the political virtues can be taught and acquired, in the opinion of the Athenians, is proved by the fact that they punish evil-doers, with a view to prevention, of course — mere retribution is for beasts, and not for men. (3) Another proof of this is the education of youth, which begins almost as soon as they can speak, and is continued by the state, when they pass out of the control of their parents. (4) Nor is there any inconsistency in wise and good fathers having foolish and worthless sons; for (a) in the first place the young do not learn of their fathers only, but of all the citizens; and (b) this is partly a matter of chance and of natural gifts: the sons of a great statesman are not necessarily great statesmen any more than the sons of a good artist are necessarily good artists. (5) The error of Socrates lies in supposing that there are no teachers, when all men are teachers. Only a few, like Protagoras himself, are somewhat better than others.

Socrates is highly delighted, and quite satisfied with this explanation of Protagoras. But he has still a doubt lingering in his mind. Protagoras has spoken of the virtues: are they many, or one? are they parts of a whole, or different names of the same thing? Protagoras replies that they are parts, like the parts of a face, which have their several functions, and no one part is like any other part. This admission, which has been somewhat hastily made, is now taken up and cross-examined by Socrates:

"Is justice just, and is holiness holy? And are justice and holiness opposed to one another?" — "Then justice is unholy." Protagoras would rather say that justice is different from holiness, and yet in a certain point of view nearly the same. He does not, however, escape in this way from the cunning of Socrates, who entangles him into an admission that everything has but one opposite. Folly, for example, is opposed to wisdom; and folly is also opposed to temperance; and therefore temperance and wisdom are the same. And holiness has been already ad-
mitted to be nearly the same as justice. Temperance, therefore, has now to be compared with justice.

Protagoras, whose temper begins to get a little ruffled at the process to which he has been subjected, is aware that he will soon be compelled by the dialectics of Socrates to admit that the temperate is the just. He therefore defends himself with his favorite weapon; that is to say, he makes a long speech not much to the point, which elicits the applause of the audience.

Here occurs a sort of interlude, which commences with a declaration on the part of Socrates that he can not follow a long speech, and therefore he must beg Protagoras to speak shorter. As Protagoras declines to accommodate him, he rises to depart, but is detained by Callias, who thinks him unreasonable in not allowing Protagoras the liberty which he takes himself of speaking as he likes. But Alcibiades answers that the two cases are not parallel. For Socrates admits his inability to speak long; will Protagoras in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak short?

Counsels of moderation are urged first in a few words by Critias, and then by Prodicus in balanced and sententious language: and Hippias proposes an umpire. But who is to be the umpire? rejoins Socrates; he would rather suggest as a compromise that Protagoras shall ask, and he will answer. To this Protagoras yields a reluctant assent.

Protagoras selects as the thesis of his questions a poem of Simonides of Ceos, in which he professes to find a contradiction. First the poet says,

"Hard is it to become good,"

and then reproaches Pittacus for having said, "Hard is it to be good." How is this to be reconciled? Socrates, who is familiar with the poem, is embarrassed at first, and invokes the aid of Prodicus the Cean, who must come to the help of his countryman, but apparently only with the intention of flattering him into absurdities. First a distinction is drawn between to be, and to become: to become good is difficult; to be good is easy. Then the word difficult or hard is explained to mean "evil" in the Cean dialect. To this Prodicus assents; but when Protagoras reclaims, Socrates slily withdraws Prodicus from the fray, under the pretence that his assent was only intended to test the wits of his adversary. He then proceeds to give another and more elaborate explanation of the whole passage. The explanation is as follows: —
The Lacedaemonians are great philosophers (although this is a fact which is not generally known); and the soul of their philosophy is brevity, which was also the style of primitive antiquity and of the seven sages. Now Pittacus had a saying, "Hard is it to be good:" Simonides was jealous of the fame of this saying, and wrote a poem which was designed to controvert it. No, says he, Pittacus; not "hard to be good," but "hard to become good." Socrates proceeds to argue in a highly impressive manner that the whole composition is intended as an attack upon Pittacus. This, though manifestly absurd, is accepted by the company, and meets with the special approval of Hippias, who has however a favorite interpretation of his own, which he is requested by Alcibiades to defer.

The argument is now resumed, not without some disdainful remarks of Socrates on the practice of introducing the poets, who ought not to be allowed, any more than flute-girls, to come into good society. Men's own thoughts should supply them with the materials for discussion. A few soothing flatteries are addressed to Protagoras by Callias and Socrates, and then the old question is repeated, "Whether the virtues are one or many?" To which Protagoras is now disposed to reply, that four out of the five virtues are in some degree similar; but he still contends that the fifth, courage, is wholly dissimilar. Socrates proceeds to undermine the last stronghold of the adversary, first obtaining from him the admission that all virtue is in the highest degree good:

The courageous are the confident; and the confident are those who know their business or profession: those who have no such knowledge and are still confident are madmen. This is admitted. Then, says Socrates, courage is knowledge — an inference which Protagoras evades by drawing a futile distinction between the courageous and the confident in a fluent speech.

Socrates renews the attack from another side: he would like to know whether pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil? Protagoras seems to doubt the morality or propriety of assenting to this; he would rather say that "some pleasures are good, some pains are evil," which is also the opinion of the generality of mankind. What does he think of knowledge? does he agree with the common opinion about this also, that knowledge is overpowered by passion? or does he hold that knowledge is power? Protagoras agrees that knowledge is certainly a governing power.

This, however, is not the doctrine of men in general, who main-
tain that many who know what is best, act contrary to their knowledge under the influence of pleasure. But this opposition of good and evil is really the opposition of a greater or lesser amount of pleasure. Pleasures are evils because they end in pain, and pains are good because they end in pleasures. Thus pleasure is seen to be the only good; and the only evil is the preference of the lesser pleasure to the greater. But then comes in the illusion of distance. Some art of mensuration is required in order to show us pleasures and pains in their true proportion. This art of mensuration is a kind of knowledge, and knowledge is thus proved once more to be the governing principle of human life, and ignorance the origin of all evil: for no one prefers the less pleasure to the greater, or the greater pain to the less, except from ignorance. The argument is drawn out in an imaginary "dialogue within a dialogue," conducted by Socrates and Protagoras on the one part, and the rest of the world on the other. Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras, admit the soundness of the conclusion.

Socrates then applies this new conclusion to the case of courage—the only virtue which still holds out against the assaults of the Socratic dialectic. No one chooses the evil or refuses the good except through ignorance. This explains why cowards refuse to go to war:—because they form a wrong estimate of good, and honor, and pleasure. And why are the courageous willing to go to war?—because they form a right estimate of pleasures and pains, of things terrible and not terrible. Courage then is knowledge, and cowardice is ignorance. And the five virtues, which were originally maintained to have five different natures, after having been easily reduced to two only, are at last resolved in one. The assent of Protagoras to this last position is extracted with great difficulty.

Socrates concludes by professing his disinterested love of the truth, and remarks on the singular manner in which he and his adversary had changed sides. Protagoras began by asserting, and Socrates by denying, the teachableness of virtue, and now the latter ends by affirming that virtue is knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things, while Protagoras has been striving to show that virtue is not knowledge, and this is almost equivalent to saying that virtue can not be taught. He is not satisfied with the result, and would like to renew the inquiry with the help of Protagoras in a different order, asking (1) What virtue is, and (2) Whether virtue can be taught. Protagoras
declines this offer, but commends Socrates' earnestness and mode of discussion.

The Protagoras is often supposed to be full of difficulties. These are partly imaginary and partly real. The imaginary ones are: (1) Chronological, — which were pointed out in ancient times by Athenaeus, and are noticed by Schleiermacher and others, and relate to the impossibility of all the persons in the Dialogue meeting at any one time, whether in the year 425 B.C., or in any other. But Plato, like other writers of fiction, aims only at the probable, and has shown in other Dialogues (e.g. the Symposium and Republic) an extreme disregard of the historical accuracy which is sometimes demanded of him. (2) The exact place of the Protagoras among the Dialogues, and the date of composition, have also been much disputed. But there are no criteria which afford any real grounds for determining the date of composition; and the affinities of the Dialogues, when they are not indicated by Plato himself, must always to some extent remain uncertain. (3) There is another class of difficulties, which may be ascribed to preconceived notions of commentators, who imagine that Protagoras the Sophist ought always to be in the wrong, and his adversary Socrates in the right; or that in this or that passage — e.g. in the explanation of good as pleasure — Plato is inconsistent with himself; or that the Dialogue fails in unity, and has not a proper "beginning, middle, and ending." They seem to forget that Plato is a dramatic writer who throws his thoughts into both sides of the argument, and certainly does not aim at any unity which is inconsistent with freedom, and with a natural or even wild manner of treating his subject; also that his mode of revealing the truth is by lights and shadows, and far off and opposing points of view, and not by dogmatic statements or definite results.

The real difficulties arise out of the extreme subtlety of the work, which, as Socrates says of the poem of Simonides, is a most perfect piece of art. There are dramatic contrasts and interests, threads of philosophy broken and resumed, satirical reflections on mankind, veils thrown over truths which are lightly suggested, and all woven together in a single design, and moving towards one end.

In the introductory scene Plato raises the expectation that a "great personage" is about to appear on the stage (perhaps with a further view of showing that he is destined to be overthrown by a greater still, who makes no pretensions). Before introducing Hippocrates to him, Socrates thinks proper to warn
the youth of the dangers of "influence," of the invidious nature of which Protagoras is also sensible. Hippocrates readily adopts the suggestion of Socrates that he shall learn the accomplishments which befit an Athenian gentleman of Protagoras, and let alone his "sophistry." There is nothing however in the introduction which leads to the inference that Plato intended to blacken the character of the Sophists; he only makes a little merry at their expense.

The "great personage" is somewhat ostentatious, but frank and honest. He is introduced on a stage which is worthy of him — at the house of the rich Callias, in which are congregated the noblest and wisest of the Athenians. He considers openness to be the best policy, and particularly mentions his own liberal mode of dealing with his pupils, as if in answer to the favorite accusation of the Sophists that they received pay. He is remarkable for the good temper which he exhibits throughout the discussion under the trying and often sophistical cross-examination of Socrates. Although once or twice ruffled, and reluctant to continue the discussion, he parts company on perfectly good terms, and appears to be, as he says of himself, the "least jealous of mankind."

Nor is there anything in the sentiments of Protagoras which impairs this pleasing impression of the grave and weighty old man. His real defect is that he is inferior to Socrates in dialectics. The opposition between him and Socrates is not the opposition of good and bad, true and false, but of the old art of rhetoric and the new science of interrogation and argument; also of the irony of Socrates and the self-assertion of the Sophists. There is quite as much truth on the side of Protagoras as of Socrates; but the truth of Protagoras is based on common sense and common maxims of morality, while that of Socrates is paradoxical or transcendental, and though full of meaning and insight, hardly intelligible to the rest of mankind.

For example: (1) one of the noblest statements to be found in antiquity about the preventive nature of punishment is put into the mouth of Protagoras; (2) he is clearly right also in maintaining that virtue can be taught (which Socrates himself, at the end of the Dialogue, is disposed to concede); and also (3) in his explanation of the phenomenon that good fathers have bad sons; (4) he is right also in observing that the virtues are not like the arts, gifts, or attainments of special individuals, but the common property of all: this, which in all ages has been the strength and weakness of ethics and politics, is deeply seated in
human nature; (5) there is a sort of half truth in the notion that all civilized men are teachers of virtue; and (6) the religious allegory should be noticed, in which the arts are said to be given by Prometheus (who stole them), whereas justice and reverence and the political virtues could only be imparted by Zeus. It is observable also (7) in the latter part of the Dialogue, when Socrates is arguing that "pleasure is the only good," Protagoras deems it more in accordance with his character to maintain that "some pleasures only are good."

There is no reason to suppose that in all this Plato is depicting an imaginary Protagoras; at any rate, he is showing us the teaching of the Sophists under the milder aspect under which he once regarded them. Nor is there any reason to doubt that Socrates is equally an historical character, paradoxical, ironical, tiresome, but seeking for the unity of virtue and knowledge as for a precious treasure; willing to rest this even on a calculation of pleasure, and irresistible here, as everywhere in Plato, in his intellectual superiority.

The aim of Socrates, and of the Dialogue, is to show the unity of virtue. In the determination of this question the identity of virtue and knowledge is found to be involved. But if virtue and knowledge are one, then virtue can be taught; the end of the Dialogue returns to the beginning. Had Protagoras been allowed by Plato to make the Aristotelian distinction, and say that virtue is not knowledge, but is accompanied with knowledge; or to point out with Aristotle that the same quality may have more than one opposite; or with Plato himself in the Phaedo to deny that good is a mere exchange of a greater pleasure for a less — the unity of virtue and the identity of virtue and knowledge would have required to be proved by other arguments.

The victory of Socrates over Protagoras is in every way complete when their minds are fairly brought together. Protagoras falls before him after two or three blows. Socrates partially gains his object in the first part, and completely in the second. Nor does he appear at any disadvantage when subjected to "the question" by Protagoras. He succeeds in making his two "friends," Prodicus and Hippias, ludicrous by the way; he also makes a long speech in defence of the poem of Simonides, after the manner of the Sophists, showing, as Alcibiades says, that he is only pretending to have a bad memory.

Not having the whole of this poem before us, it is impossible for us to answer certainly the question of Protagoras, how the two passages of Simonides are to be reconciled. We can only
follow the indications given by Plato himself. But it seems likely that the reconciliation offered by Socrates is only a caricature of the methods of interpretation which were practised by the Sophists—for the following reasons: (1) The transparent irony of the previous interpretations given by Socrates. (2) The ludicrous opening of the speech in which the Lacedaemonians are described as the true philosophers, and Laconic brevity as the true form of philosophy, evidently with an allusion to Protagoras' long speeches. (3) The manifest futility and absurdity of the explanation of ἐπαλνημι ἄλαθεν, which is hardly consistent with the rational interpretation of the rest of the poem. The opposition of ἐίναι and γενόταται seems also intended to express the rival doctrines of Socrates and Protagoras, and is a sort of facetious commentary on their differences. (4) The general treatment in Plato both of the Poets and the Sophists, who are their interpreters, and whom he delights to identify with them. (5) The depreciating spirit in which Socrates speaks of the introduction of the poets as a substitute for original conversation, which is intended to contrast with Protagoras' exaltation of the study of them—this again is hardly consistent with the serious defence of Simonides. (6) The marked approval of Hippias, who is supposed at once to catch the familiar sound, just as in the previous conversation Prodicus is represented as ready to accept any distinctions of language however absurd. At the same time Hippias is desirous of substituting a new interpretation of his own; as if the words might really be made to mean anything, and were only to be regarded as affording a field for the ingenuity of the interpreter.

This curious passage is, therefore, to be regarded as Plato's satire on the tedious and hypercritical arts of interpretation which prevailed in his own day, and may be compared with his condemnation of the same arts when applied to mythology in the Phaedrus, and with his other parodies, e.g. with the second speech in the Phaedrus and with the Menexenus. Several lesser touches of satire appear in it, e.g. the claim of philosophy advanced for the Lacedaemonians, which is a parody of the claims advanced for the Poets by Protagoras; the mistake of the Laconizing set in supposing that the Lacedaemonians are a great nation because they bruise their ears; the far-fetched notion, which is "really too bad," that Simonides uses the Lesbian (?) word, ἐπαλνημι, because he is addressing a Lesbian. The whole may also be considered as a satire on those who spin pompous theories out of nothing.
All the interests and contrasts of character in a great dramatic work like the Protagoras are not easily exhausted. The impressiveness of the scene should not be lost upon us, or the gradual substitution of Socrates in the second part for Protagoras in the first. There is Alcibiades, who is compelled by the necessity of his nature to be a partisan, lending effectual aid to Socrates; there is Critias assuming the tone of impartiality; Callias there as always inclining to the Sophist, but eager for any intellectual repast; Prodicus, who finds an opportunity for displaying his distinctions of language; Hippias, for exhibiting his vanity and superficial knowledge of natural philosophy. Both of these have been previously a good deal damaged by the mock sublime description of them in the introduction. It may be remarked that Protagoras is consistently presented to us throughout as the teacher of moral and political virtue; there is no allusion to the theories of sensation which are attributed to him elsewhere, or to his denial of the existence of the gods; he is the religious rather than the irreligious teacher in this Dialogue. Also it may be observed that Socrates shows him as much respect as is consistent with his own ironical character.

It remains to be considered in what relation the Protagoras stands to the other Dialogues of Plato. That it is one of the earlier or purely Socratic works — perhaps the last, as it is certainly the greatest of them — is indicated by the absence of all allusion to the doctrine of reminiscence; and also probably by the different attitude assumed towards the teaching and persons of the Sophists in some of the later Dialogues. The Charmides, Laches, Lysis, all touch on the question of the relation of knowledge to virtue, and may be regarded, if not as preliminary studies or sketches of the more important work, at any rate as closely connected with it. The Io and Hippias contain discussions of the Poets, which offer a parallel to the ironical criticism of the verses of Simonides, and are conceived in a similar spirit. The affinity of the Protagoras to the Meno is more doubtful. For there, although the same question is discussed, "whether virtue can be taught," and the relation of Meno to the Sophists is much the same as that of Hippocrates, the answer to the question is supplied out of the doctrine of ideas; the real Socrates is already passing into the Platonic one. At a later stage of the Platonic philosophy we shall find that both the paradox and the solution of it appear to have been retracted. The Phaedo, the Gorgias, and the Philebus offer further corrections of the teaching of the Protagoras; in all of them the doctrine that virtue is pleasure,
or that pleasure is the chief or only good, is distinctly renounced.

Thus after many preparations and oppositions, both of the characters of men and aspects of the truth, especially of the popular and philosophical aspect; and after many interruptions and detentions by the way, which, as Theodorus says in the Theaetetus, are quite as agreeable as the argument, we arrive at the great Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. This is an aspect of the truth which was lost almost as soon as it was found; and yet has to be recovered by every one for himself who would pass the limits of proverbial and popular philosophy. It is not to be regarded only as a passing stage in the history of the human mind, but as an anticipation of the reconcilement of the moral and intellectual elements of human nature.
PROTAGORAS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE

Socrates, who is the narrator of the Dialogue to his Companion.  
Protagoras, Sophists.  
Hippocrates. 
Prodicus. 
Alcibiades. 
Callias, a wealthy Athenian. 
Critias.

Scene:—The House of Callias.

Com. Where do you come from, Socrates? And yet I need hardly ask the question, as I know that you have been in chase of the fair Alcibiades. I saw him the day before yesterday; and he had got a beard like a man, — and he is a man, as I may tell you in your ear. But I thought that he was still very charming. 

Soc. What of his beard? Are you not of Homer’s opinion, who says that

"Youth is most charming when the beard first appears"?

And that is now the charm of Alcibiades.

Com. Well, and how do matters proceed? Have you been visiting him, and was he gracious to you?

Soc. Yes, I thought that he was very gracious; and especially to-day, for I have just come from him, and he has been helping me in an argument. But shall I tell you a strange thing? Although he was present, I never attended to him, and several times he quite passed out of my mind.

Com. What is the meaning of this? Has anything happened between you and him? For surely you can not have discovered a fairer love than he is; certainly not in this city of Athens.
Soc. Yes, much fairer.
Com. What do you mean—a citizen or a foreigner?
Soc. A foreigner.
Com. Of what country?
Soc. Of Abdera.
Com. And is this stranger really in your opinion fairer than the son of Cleiniás?
Soc. And is not the wiser always the fairer, sweet friend?
Com. But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one?
Soc. Yes; I would say rather, with the wisest of all living men, if you are willing to accord that title to Protagoras.
Com. What! Do you mean to say that Protagoras is in Athens?
Soc. Yes; he has been here two days.
Com. And do you just come from an interview with him?
Soc. Yes; and I have heard and said many things.
Com. Then, if you have no engagement, suppose that you sit down and tell me what passed, and my attendant shall give up his place to you.
Soc. To be sure; and I shall be grateful to you for listening.
Com. Thank you, too, for telling us.
Soc. That is thank you twice over. Listen then:—
Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a tremendous thump with his staff at my door; some one opened to him, and he came rushing in and bawled out: Socrates, are you awake or asleep?
I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you? and do you bring any news?
Good news, he said; nothing but good.

Very good, I said; but what news? and why have you come here at this unearthly hour?

He drew nearer to me and said: Protagoras is come.

Yes, I said; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his arrival?

Yes, indeed, he said; I heard yesterday evening.

At the same time he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet, and then he said: I heard yesterday, quite late in the evening, on my return from Oenoe whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave Satyrus — as I was going to have told you if some other matter had not come in the way; — on my return, when we had done supper and were about to retire to rest, my brother said to me: Protagoras is come. And I was going to you at once, if I had not considered that the night was far spent. But when sleep relaxed her hold on me after my toil, I got up and came hither direct.

I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said: What is the matter? has Protagoras robbed you of anything?

He replied, laughing: Yes, indeed he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which he keeps to himself.

But, surely, I said, if you give him money, and make friends with him, he will make you as wise as he is himself.

Would to heaven, he replied, that he would! He might take all that I have, and all that my friends have, if he would. And that is why I have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my behalf; for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him; (when he visited Athens before I was but a child;) and all men praise him, Socrates, as being the most accomplished of speakers. There is no
reason why we should not go to him at once, and then we shall find him at home. He lodges, as I hear, with Callias the son of Hipponicus. Let us start.

I replied: Not yet, my good friend; the hour is too early. But let us rise and take a turn in the court and wait there until daybreak, and when the day breaks, then we will go; for Protagoras is generally at home, and we shall be sure to find him; never fear.

Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that I would make trial of the strength of his resolution. So I examined him and put questions to him. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you are going? and what will he make of you? If you were going to Hippocrates, the Coan, the Asclepiad, and were about to give him your money, and some one said to you: As being what, do you give money to your namesake Hippocrates, O Hippocrates? what would you answer?

I should say, he replied, that I give money to him as a physician.

And what will he make of you?

A physician, he said.

And if you went to Polycleitus the Argive, or Pheidias the Athenian, and intended to give them money, and some one were to ask you: As being what, do you give this money to Polycleitus and Pheidias? what would you answer?

I should answer, as being statuaries.

And what will they make of you?

A statuary, of course.

Well now, I said, you and I are going to Protagoras, and we are ready to pay him money for you. If our own means are sufficient, and we can gain him with these, we shall be too glad; but if not,
then we are to spend your friends’ money as well. Now suppose, that while we are in this intense state of excitement, some one were to say to us: Tell me, Socrates, and you Hippocrates, as being what, are you going to pay money to Protagoras? how should we answer him? I know that Pheidias is a sculptor, and Homer is a poet; but what appellation is given to Protagoras? how is he designated?

They call him a Sophist, Socrates, he replied.

Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist?

Certainly.

But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about yourself? what will Protagoras make you, if you go to see him?

He answered, with a blush upon his face (for the day was just beginning to dawn, so that I could see him): Unless this differs in some way from the former instances, I suppose that he will make a Sophist of me.

And are you not, in sober earnest ashamed, I said, at having to appear before the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist?

Indeed, Socrates, if I am to confess the truth, I am.

But why do you assume, Hippocrates, that the instruction of Protagoras is of this nature? and why may you not learn of him in the same way that you learned the arts of the grammarian, or musician, or trainer, not with the view of making any of them a profession, but only as a part of education, and because a private gentleman and freeman ought to know them?

Just so, he said; and that, in my opinion, is a far truer account of the teaching of Protagoras.

I said: I wonder whether you know what you are doing?
And what am I doing?
You are going to commit your soul to the care of a man whom you call a Sophist. And yet I hardly think that you know what a Sophist is; and if not, then you do not even know whether you are committing your soul to good or evil.
I certainly think that I do know, he replied.
Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is?
I take him to be one who is wise and knowing, he replied, as his name implies.
And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and the carpenter also; are not they, too, wise and knowing? But suppose a person were to ask us: In what are the painters wise? We should answer: In what relates to the making of likenesses, and similarly of other things. And if he were further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what is the manufacture over which he presides? how should we answer him?
How should we answer him, Socrates? What other answer could there be but that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent?
Yes, I replied, that is very likely a true, but not a sufficient answer; for a further question is involved: About what does the Sophist make a man eloquent? The player on the lyre may be supposed to make a man eloquent about that which he makes him understand, that is about playing the lyre. Is not that true?
Yes.
Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent? must not he make him eloquent in that which he understands?
Yes, that may be assumed.
And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know?
Indeed, he said, that I can not tell.

Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the danger which you are incurring? If you were going to commit the body to some one, and there was a risk of your getting good or harm from him, would you not carefully consider and ask the opinion of your friends and kindred, and deliberate many days as to whether you should give him the care of your body? But when the soul is in question, which you hold to be of far more value than the body, and upon the well or ill-being of which depends your all,—about this you never consulted either with your father or with your brother or with any one of us who are your companions. But no sooner does this foreigner appear, than you instantly commit your soul to his keeping. In the evening, as you say, you hear of him, and in the morning you go to him, never deliberating, or taking the opinion of any one as to whether you ought to intrust yourself to him or not;—you have quite made up your mind that you will be a pupil of Protagoras, and are prepared to expend all the property of yourself and of your friends in carrying out at any price this determination, although, as you admit, you do not know him, and have never spoken with him: and you call him a Sophist, but are manifestly ignorant of what a Sophist is; and yet you are going to commit yourself to his keeping.

When he heard me say this he replied: That I suppose, Socrates, is the conclusion which I must draw from your words.

I proceeded: Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or retail in the food of the soul? To me that appears to be the sort of man.

And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul?

Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take care, my friend, that the Sophist
PROTAGORAS

does not deceive us when he praises what he sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body; for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without knowing what are really beneficial or hurtful: neither do their customers know, with the exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy of them. In like manner those who carry about the wares of knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail them to any customer who is in want of them, praise them all alike; and I should not wonder, O my friend, if many of them were really ignorant of their effect upon the soul; and their customers equally ignorant, unless he who buys of them happens to be a physician of the soul. If, therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of any one; but if not then, O my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game of chance. For there is far greater peril in buying knowledge than in buying meat and drink: the one you purchase of the wholesale or retail dealer, and carry them away in other vessels, and before you receive them into the body as food, you may deposit them at home and call in any experienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken, and what not, and how much, and when; and hence the danger of purchasing them is not so great. But when you buy the wares of knowledge you can not carry them away in another vessel; they have been sold to you, and you must take them into the soul and go your way, either greatly harmed or greatly benefited by the lesson: and therefore we should think about this and take counsel with our elders; for we are still young — too young to determine such a matter. And now let us go, as we were intending, and hear Protagoras; and when we have heard what he has to say, we may take counsel
of others; for not only is Protagoras at the house of Callias, but there is Hippias of Elis, and, if I am not mistaken, Prodicus of Ceos, and several other wise men.

To this we agreed, and proceeded on our way until we reached the vestibule of the house; and there we stopped in order to finish a dispute which had arisen as we were going along; and we stood talking in the vestibule until we had finished and come to an understanding. And I think that the door-keeper, who was a eunuch, and who was probably annoyed at the great inroad of the Sophists, must have heard us talking. At any rate, when we knocked at the door, and he opened and saw us, he grumbled: They are Sophists — he is not at home; and instantly gave the door a hearty bang with both his hands. Again we knocked, and he answered without opening: Did you not hear me say that he is not at home, fellows? But, my friend, I said, we are not Sophists, and we are not come to see Callias; fear not, for we want to see Protagoras; and I must request you to announce us. At last, after a good deal of difficulty, the man was persuaded to open the door.

When we entered, we found Protagoras taking a walk in the portico; and next to him, on one side, were walking Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and Paralus, the son of Pericles, who, by the mother's side, is his half-brother, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon. On the other side of him were Xanthippus, the other son of Pericles, Philippides, the son of Philomelus; also Antimoerus of Mende, who of all the disciples of Protagoras is the most famous, and intends to make sophistry his profession. A train of listeners followed him, of whom the greater part appeared to be foreigners, who accompanied Protagoras out of the various cities through which he journeyed.
Now he, like Orpheus, attracted them by his voice, and they followed the attraction. I should mention also that there were some Athenians in the company. Nothing delighted me more than the precision of their movements: they never got into his way at all; but when he and those who were with him turned back, then the band of listeners divided into two parts on either side; he was always in front, and they wheeled round and took their places behind him in perfect order.

After him, as Homer says¹, "I lifted up my eyes and saw" Hippias the Elean sitting in the opposite portico on a chair of state, and around him were seated on benches Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, and Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian, and Andron the son of Androton; and there were strangers whom he had brought with him from his native city of Elis, and some others: they appeared to be asking Hippias certain physical and astronomical questions, and he, *ex cathedrâ*, was determining their several questions to them, and discoursing of them.

Also, "my eyes beheld Tantalus;"² for Prodicus the Cean was at Athens: he had been put into a room which, in the days of Hipponicus, was a storehouse; but, as the house was full, Callias had cleared this out and made the room into a guest-chamber. Now Prodicus was still in bed, wrapped up in sheepskins and bedclothes, of which there seemed to be a great heap; and there were sitting by him on the couches near, Pausanias of the deme of Cerameis, and with Pausanias was a youth quite young, who is certainly remarkable for his good looks, and if I am not mistaken, is also of a fair and gentle nature. I think that I heard him called Agathon, and my suspicion is

¹ Od. xi. 601 foll. ² Od. xi. 582.
that he is the beloved of Pausanias. There was this youth, and also there were the two Adeimantuses, one the son of Cepis, and the other of Leucolophides, and some others. I was very anxious to hear what Prodicus was saying, for he seemed to me to be an extraordinarily wise and divine man; but I was not able to get into the inner circle, and his fine deep voice made an echo in the room which rendered his words inaudible.

No sooner had we entered than there followed us Alcibiades the beautiful, as you say, and I believe you; and also Critias the son of Callaeschrus.

On entering we stopped a little, in order to look about us, and then walked up to Protagoras, and I said: Protagoras, my friend Hippocrates and I have come to see you.

Do you wish, he said, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of others?

That is as you please, I said: you shall determine when you have heard the object of our visit.

And what is that? he said.

I must explain, I said, that my friend Hippocrates is a native Athenian; he is the son of Apollodorus, and of a great and prosperous house, and he is himself in natural ability quite a match for those of his own age. I believe that he aspires to political eminence; and this he thinks that conversation with you is most likely to procure for him: now it is for you to decide whether you would wish to speak to him of these matters alone or in company.

Thank you, Socrates, for your consideration of me. For certainly a stranger finding his way into great cities, and persuading the flower of the youth in them to leave the company of their other kinsmen or acquaintance, and live with him, under the idea that they will be improved by his conversation, ought to
be very cautious; great jealousies are occasioned by his proceedings, and he is the subject of many enmities and conspiracies. I maintain the art of the Sophist to be of ancient date; but that in ancient times the professors of the art, fearing this odium, veiled and disguised themselves under various names, some under that of poets, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, some as hierophants and prophets, as Orpheus and Musaeus, and some, as I observe, even under the name of gymnastic-masters, like Iccus of Tarentum, or the more recently celebrated Herodicus, now of Selymbria and formerly of Megara, who is a first-rate Sophist. Your own Agathocles pretended to be a musician, but was really an eminent Sophist; also Pythocleides the Cean; and there were many others; and all of them, as I was saying, adopted these arts as veils or disguises because they were afraid of the envy of the multitude. But that is not my way, for I do not believe that they effected their purpose, which was to deceive the government, who were not blinded by them; and as to the people, they have no understanding, and only repeat what their rulers are pleased to tell them. Now to run away, and to be caught in running away, is the very height of folly, and also greatly increases the exasperation of mankind; for they regard him who runs away as a rogue, in addition to any other objections which they have to him; and therefore I take an entirely opposite course, and acknowledge myself to be a Sophist and instructor of mankind; such an open acknowledgment appears to me to be a better sort of caution than concealment. Nor do I neglect other precautions, and therefore I hope, as I may say, by the favor of heaven that no harm will come of the acknowledgment that I am a Sophist. And I have been now many years in the profession — for all my years when added
up are many — and there is no one here present of whom I might not be the father. Wherefore I should much prefer conversing with you, if you do not object, in the presence of the company.

As I suspected that he would like to have a little display and glory in the presence of Prodicus and Hippias, and would gladly show us to them in the light of his admirers, I said: But why should we not summon Prodicus and Hippias and their friends to hear us?

Very good, he said.

Suppose, said Callias, that we hold a council in which you may sit and discuss. This was determined, and great delight was felt at the prospect of hearing wise men talk; we ourselves all took the chairs and benches, and arranged them by Hippias, where the other benches had been already placed. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades got up Prodicus and brought in him and his companions.

When we were all seated, Protagoras said: Now that the company are assembled, Socrates, tell me about the young man of whom you were just now speaking.

I replied: I will begin again at the same point, Protagoras, and tell you once more the purport of my visit: this is my friend Hippocrates, who is desirous of making your acquaintance; he wants to know what will happen to him if he associates with you. That is all I have to say.

Protagoras answered: Young man, if you associate with me, on the very first day you will return home a better man than you came, and better on the second day than on the first, and better every day than you were on the day before.

When I heard this, I said: Protagoras, I do not at all wonder at hearing you say this; even at your
age, and with all your wisdom, if any one were to teach you what you did not know before, you would become better no doubt: but please to answer in a different way; I will explain how by an example. Let me suppose that Hippocrates, instead of desiring your acquaintance, wished to become acquainted with the young man Zeuxippus of Heraclea, who has newly come to Athens, and he were to go to him as he has gone to you, and were to hear him say, as he has heard you say, that every day he would grow and become better if he associated with him: and then suppose that he were to ask him, “In what would he be better, and in what would he grow?” Zeuxippus would answer, “In painting.” And suppose that he went to Orthagoras the Theban, and heard him say the same, and asked him “In what would he become better day by day?” he would reply, “In flute-playing.” Now I want you to make the same sort of answer to this young man and to me, who am asking questions on his account. When you say that on the first day on which he associates with you he will return home a better man, and on every day will grow in like manner — in what, Protagoras, will he be better? and about what?

When Protagoras heard me say this, he replied: You ask questions fairly, and I like to answer a question which is fairly put. If Hippocrates comes to me he will not experience the sort of drudgery with which other Sophists are in the habit of insulting their pupils; who, when they have just escaped from the arts, are taken and driven back into them by these teachers, and made to learn calculation, and astronomy, and geometry, and music (he gave a look at Hippias as he said this); but if he comes to me, he will learn that which he comes to learn. And this is prudence in affairs private as well as public; he will learn
to order his own house in the best manner, and he will be best able to speak and act in the affairs of the state.

Do I understand you, I said; and is your meaning that you teach the art of politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens?

That, Socrates, is exactly the profession which I make.

Then, I said, you do indeed possess a noble art, if there is no mistake about this; for I will freely confess to you, Protagoras, that I have a doubt whether this art is capable of being taught, and yet I know not how to disbelieve your assertion. And I ought to tell you why I am of opinion that this art can not be taught or communicated by man to man. I say that the Athenians are an understanding people, as indeed they are esteemed by the other Hellenes. Now I observe that when we are met together in the assembly, and the matter in hand relates to building, the builders are summoned as advisers; when the question is one of ship-building, then the ship-builders; and the like of other arts which they think capable of being taught and learned. And if some person offers to give them advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art, even though he be good-looking, and rich, and noble, they don’t listen to him, but laugh at him, and hoot him, until either he is clamored down and retires of himself; or if he persist, he is dragged away or put out by the constables at the command of the prytanes. This is their way of behaving about the arts which have professors. When, however, the question is an affair of state, then everybody is free to have a say — carpenter, tinker, cobbler, sailor, passenger; rich and poor, high and low — any one who likes gets up, and no one reproaches him, as in the former case, with not having learned, and having no
teacher, and yet giving advice; evidently because they are under the impression that this sort of knowledge can not be taught. And not only is this true of the state, but of individuals; the best and wisest of our citizens are unable to impart their political wisdom to others: as for example, Pericles, the father of these young men, who gave them excellent instruction in all that could be learned from masters, in his own department of politics taught them nothing; nor did he give them teachers, but they were allowed to wander at their own free will in a sort of hope that they would light upon virtue of their own accord. Or take another example: there was Cleinias the younger brother of our friend Alcibiades, of whom this very same Pericles was the guardian; and he being in fact under the apprehension that Cleinias would be corrupted by Alcibiades, took him away, and placed him in the house of Ariphron to be educated; but before six months had elapsed, Ariphron sent him back, not knowing what to do with him. And I could mention numberless other instances of persons who were good themselves, and never yet made any one else good, whether friend or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, when I reflect on all this, am inclined to think that virtue can not be taught. But then again, when I listen to your words, I am disposed to waver; and I believe that there must be something in what you say, because I know that you have great experience, and learning, and invention. And I wish that you would, if possible, show me a little more clearly that virtue can be taught. Will you be so good?

That I will, Socrates, and gladly. But what would you like? Shall I, as an elder, speak to you as younger men in an apologue or myth, or shall I argue the question?
To this several of the company answered that he should choose for himself.

Well, then, he said, I think that the myth will be more interesting.

Once upon a time there were gods only, and no mortal creatures. But when the time came that these also should be created, the gods fashioned them out of earth and fire and various mixtures of both elements in the inward parts of the earth; and when they were about to bring them into the light of day, they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip them, and to distribute to them severally their proper qualities. Epimetheus said to Prometheus: "Let me distribute, and do you inspect." This was agreed, and Epimetheus made the distribution. There were some to whom he gave strength without swiftness, or again swiftness without strength; some he armed, and others he left unarmed; and devised for the latter some other means of preservation, making some large, and having their size as a protection, and others small, whose nature was to fly in the air or burrow in the ground; this was to be their way of escape. Thus did he compensate them with the view of preventing any race from becoming extinct. And when he had provided against their destruction by one another, he contrived also a means of protecting them against the seasons of heaven; clothing them with close hair and thick skins sufficient to defend them against the winter cold and summer heat, and for a natural bed of their own when they wanted to rest; also he furnished them with hoofs and hair and hard and callous skins under their feet. Then he gave them varieties of food, — to some herb of the soil, to others fruits of trees, and to others roots, and to some again he gave other animals as food. And some he made to have few young ones, while those who were their prey were
very prolific; and in this way the race was preserved. Thus did Epimetheus, who, not being very wise, forgot that he had distributed among the brute animals all the qualities that he had to give, — and when he came to man, who was still unprovided, he was terribly perplexed. Now while he was in this perplexity, Prometheus came to inspect the distribution, and he found that the other animals were suitably furnished, but that man alone was naked and shoeless, and had neither bed nor arms of defence. The appointed hour was approaching in which man was to go forth into the light of day; and Prometheus, not knowing how he could devise his salvation, stole the mechanical arts of Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them (they could neither have been acquired nor used without fire), and gave them to man. Thus man had the wisdom necessary to the support of life, but political wisdom he had not; for that was in the keeping of Zeus, and the power of Prometheus did not extend to entering into the castle of heaven, in which Zeus dwelt, who moreover had terrible sentinels; but he did enter by stealth into the common workshop of Athene and Hephaestus, in which they used to pursue their favorite arts, and took away Hephaestus’ art of working by fire, and also the art of Athene, and gave them to man. And in this way man was supplied with the means of life. But Prometheus is said to have been afterwards prosecuted for theft, owing to the blunder of Epimetheus.

Now man, having a share of the divine attributes, was at first the only one of the animals who had any gods, because he alone was of their kindred; and he would raise altars and images of them. He was not long in inventing language and names; and he also constructed houses and clothes and shoes and beds, and drew sustenance from the earth. Thus provided,
mankind at first lived dispersed, and there were no cities. But the consequence was that they were destroyed by the wild beasts, for they were utterly weak in comparison of them, and their art was only sufficient to provide them with the means of life, and would not enable them to carry on war against the animals: food they had, but not as yet any art of government, of which the art of war is a part. After a while the desire of self-preservation gathered them into cities; but when they were gathered together, having no art of government, they evil intreated one another, and were again in process of dispersion and destruction. Zeus feared that the race would be exterminated, and so he sent Hermes to them, bearing reverence and justice to be the ordering principles of cities and the bonds of friendship and conciliation. Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart justice and reverence among men: — should he distribute them as the arts are distributed; that is to say, to a favored few only, — for one skilled individual has enough of medicine, or of any other art, for many unskilled ones? Shall this be the manner in which I distribute justice and reverence among men, or shall I give them to all? To all, said Zeus; I should like them all to have a share; for cities can not exist, if a few only share in the virtues, as in the arts. And further, make a law by my order, that he who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put to death as a plague of the state.

And this is the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and mankind in general, when the question relates to carpentering or any other mechanical art, allow but a few to share in their deliberations; and when any one else interferes, then, as you say, they object, if he be not of the favored few, and that, as I say, is very natural. But when they come to deliberate about
political virtue, which proceeds only by way of justice and wisdom, they are patient enough of any man who speaks of them, as is also natural, because they think that every man ought to share in this sort of virtue, and that states could not exist if this were otherwise. I have explained to you, Socrates, the reason of this phenomenon.

And that you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in thinking that all men regard every man as having a share of justice and every other political virtue, let me give you a further proof, which is this. In other cases, as you are aware, if a man says that he is a good flute-player, or skilful in any other art in which he has no skill, people either laugh at him or are angry with him, and his relations think that he is mad and go and admonish him; but when honesty is in question, or some other political virtue, even if they know that he is dishonest, yet, if the man comes publicly forward and tells the truth about his dishonesty, in this case they deem that to be madness which in the other case was held by them to be good sense. They say that men ought to profess honesty whether they are honest or not, and that a man is mad who does not make such a profession. Their notion is, that a man must have some degree of honesty; and that if he has none at all he ought not to be in the world.

I have been showing that they are right in admitting every man as a counsellor about this sort of virtue, as they are of opinion that every man is a partaker of it. And I will now endeavor further to show that they regard this virtue, not as given by nature, or growing spontaneously, but as capable of being learned and acquired by study. For injustice is punished, whereas no one would instruct, or rebuke, or be angry at those whose calamities they suppose to
come to them either by nature or chance; they do not try to alter them, they do but pity them. Who would be so foolish as to chastise or instruct the ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble? And for this reason; they know, I imagine, that this sort of good and evil comes to them by nature and chance; whereas if a man is wanting in those good qualities which come to men from study and exercise and teaching, and has only the contrary evil qualities, men are angry with him, and punish him and reprove him. And one of those evil qualities is impiety and injustice, and they may be described generally as the opposite of political virtue. When this is the case, any man will be angry with another, and reprimand him,—clearly under the impression that by study and learning the virtue in which he is deficient may be acquired. For if you will think, Socrates, of the effect which punishment has on evil-doers, you will see at once that in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; for no one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong,—only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that way. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong, for that which is done cannot not be undone, but he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again. And he implies that virtue is capable of being taught; as he undoubtedly punishes for the sake of prevention. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon others either privately or publicly. And the Athenians, too, like other men, retaliate on those whom they regard as evil-doers; and this argues them to be of the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Thus far, Socrates, I have shown you clearly enough, if I am not mistaken, that your coun-
trymen are right in admitting the tinker and the cobbler to advise about politics, and also that they deem virtue to be capable of being taught and acquired.

There yet remains one difficulty which has been raised by you about the sons of good men. What is the reason why good men teach their sons the knowledge which is gained from teachers, and make them wise in that, but do nothing towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish themselves? And here, Socrates, I will leave the apologue and take up the argument. Please to consider: Is there or is there not some one quality in which all the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city at all? In the answer to this question is contained the only solution of your difficulty; there is no other. For if there be any such quality, and this quality or unity is not the art of the carpenter, or the smith, or the potter, but justice and temperance and holiness and, in a word, manly virtue — if this is the quality of which all men must be partakers, and which is the very condition of their learning or doing anything else, and if he who is wanting in this, whether he be a child only or a grown-up man or woman, must be taught and punished, until by punishment he becomes better, and he who rebels against instruction and punishment is either exiled or condemned to death under the idea that he is incurable — if, I say, this be true, and nevertheless good men have their sons taught other things and not this, do consider how extraordinary would be their conduct. For we have shown that they think virtue capable of being taught and inculcated both in private and public; and yet, notwithstanding this, they teach their sons lesser matters, ignorance of which does not involve the punishment of death: but those things, the ignorance of which may cause death and exile to those who have no knowledge or training—
aye, and confiscation as well as death, and, in a word, may be the ruin of families — those things, I say, they are supposed not to teach them, — not to take the utmost care that they should learn. That is not likely, Socrates.

Education and admonition commence in the first years of childhood, and last to the very end of life. Mother and nurse and father and tutor are quarrelling about the improvement of the child as soon as ever he is able to understand them: he can not say or do anything without their setting forth to him that this is just and that is unjust; this is honorable, that is dishonorable; this is holy, that is unholy; do this and abstain from that. And if he obeys, well and good; if not, he is straightened by threats and blows, like a piece of warped wood. At a later stage they send him to teachers, and enjoin them to see to his manners even more than to his reading and music; and the teachers do as they are desired. And when the boy has learned his letters and is beginning to understand what is written, as before he understood only what was spoken, they put into his hands the works of great poets, which he reads at school; in these are contained many admonitions, and many tales, and praises, and encomia of ancient famous men, which he is required to learn by heart, in order that he may imitate or emulate them and desire to become like them. Then, again, the teachers of the lyre take similar care that their young disciple is temperate and gets into no mischief; and when they have taught him the use of the lyre, they introduce him to the poems of other excellent poets, who are the lyric poets; and these they set to music, and make their harmonies and rhythms quite familiar to the children, in order that they may learn to be more gentle, and harmonious, and rhythmical, and so more fitted for speech and
action; for the life of man in every part has need of
harmony and rhythm. Then they send them to the
master of gymnastic, in order that their bodies may
better minister to the virtuous mind, and that the
weakness of their bodies may not force them to play
the coward in war or on any other occasion. This is
what is done by those who have the means, and those
who have the means are the rich; their children begin
education soonest and leave off latest. When they
have done with masters, the state again compels them
to learn the laws, and live after the pattern which they
furnish, and not after their own fancies; and just as
in learning to write, the writing-master first draws
lines with a style for the use of the young beginner,
and gives him the tablet and makes him follow the
lines, so the city draws the laws, which were the inven-
tion of good lawgivers who were of old time; these
are given to the young man, in order to guide him in
his conduct whether as ruler or ruled; and he who
transgresses them is to be corrected, or, in other words,
called to account, which is a term used not only in
your country, but also in many others. Now when
there is all this care about virtue private and public,
why, Socrates, do you still wonder and doubt whether
virtue can be taught? Cease to wonder, for the oppo-
site would be far more surprising.

But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn
out ill? Let me explain that,—which is far from
being wonderful, if, as I have been saying, the very
existence of the state implies that virtue is not any
man's private possession. If this be true,—and noth-
ing can be truer,—then I will ask you to imagine,
as an illustration, some other pursuit or branch of
knowledge which may be assumed equally to be the
condition of the existence of a state. Suppose that
there could be no state unless we were all flute-players,
as far as each had the capacity, and everybody was freely teaching everybody the art, both in private and public, and reproving the bad player as freely and openly as every man now teaches justice and the laws, not concealing them as he would conceal the other arts, but imparting them—for all of us have a mutual interest in the justice and virtue of one another, and this is the reason why every one is ready to teach justice and the laws;—suppose, I say, that there were the same readiness and liberality among us in teaching one another flute-playing, do you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad ones? I think not. Would not their sons grow up to be distinguished or undistinguished according to their own natural capacities as flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn out to be a bad one, and the son of a bad player to be a good one, and all flute-players would be good enough in comparison of those who were ignorant and unacquainted with the art of flute-playing? In like manner I would have you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just man and a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who had no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints upon them which compelled them to practise virtue— with the savages, for example, whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on the stage at the last year's Lenaean festival. If you were living among men such as the man-haters in his Chorus, you would be only too glad to meet with Eurybates and Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully desire the rascality of this part of the world. And you, Socrates, are discontented, and why? Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his ability, and you
say that there is no teacher. You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek? For of that too there will not be any teachers found. Or you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which they have learned of their fathers? He and his fellow-workmen have taught them to the best of their ability, — but who will carry them further in their arts? And you would certainly have a difficulty, Socrates, in finding a teacher of them; but there would be no difficulty in finding a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant. And this is true of virtue or of anything; and if a man is better able than we are to promote virtue ever so little, that is as much as we can expect. A teacher of this sort I believe myself to be, and above all other men to have the knowledge which makes a man noble and good; and I give my pupils their money's-worth, and even more, as they themselves confess. And therefore I have introduced the following mode of payment: — When a man has been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no compulsion; and if he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and take an oath of the value of the instructions, and he pays no more than he declares to be their value.

Such is my Apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by which I endeavor to show that virtue may be taught, and that this is the opinion of the Athenians. And I have also attempted to show that you are not to wonder at good fathers having bad sons, or at good sons having bad fathers, as may be seen in the sons of Polycleitus, who are of the same age as our friends Paralus and Xanthippus, and who are very inferior to their father; and this is true of many other artists. But I ought not to say the same as yet of Paralus and Xanthippus themselves, for they are young and there is still hope of them.
Protagoras ended, and in my ear

"So charming left his voice, that I the while
Thought him still speaking; still stood fixed to hear."

At length, when I saw that he had really finished, I gradually recovered consciousness, and looking at Hippocrates, I said to him: O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you for having brought me hither; I would not have missed the speech of Protagoras for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no human care could make men good; but I know better now. Yet I have still one very small difficulty which I am sure that Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already explained so much. For if a man were to go and consult Pericles or any of our great speakers about these matters, he might perhaps hear as fine a discourse; but then if any one has a question to ask of any of them, like books, they can neither answer nor ask; and if any one challenges the least particular of their speech, they go ringing on in a long harangue, like brazen pots, which when they are struck continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them; whereas our friend Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has already shown, but when he is asked a question he can answer briefly; and when he asks he will wait and hear the answer; and this is a very rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, have a little question that I want to ask of you, and if you will only answer me that, I shall be quite satisfied. You were saying that virtue can be taught; — that I will take upon your authority, and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust. But I marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my mind set at rest. You were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to men; and several times while you were speaking justice, and temperance, and holiness, and all these qualities, were described by you as
if together they made up virtue. Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts; or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing: that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind.

There is no difficulty, Socrates, in answering that the qualities of which you are speaking are the parts of virtue which is one.

And are they parts, I said, in the same sense in which mouth, nose, and eyes, and ears, are the parts of a face; or are they like the parts of gold, which differ from the whole and from one another only in being larger or smaller?

I should say that they differed, Socrates, in the first way; as the parts of a face are related to the whole face.

And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue? Or if a man has one part, must he also have all the others?

By no means, he said; for many a man is brave and not just, or just and not wise.

Why then, I said, courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue?

Most undoubtedly, he said; and wisdom is the noblest of the parts.

And they are all different from one another? I said. Yes.

And each of them has a distinct function like the parts of the face; — the eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the same functions; and the other parts are none of them like one another, either in their functions, or in any other way? Now I want to know whether the parts of virtue do not also differ in themselves and in their functions; as that is clearly what the simile would imply.
Yes, Socrates, you are right in that.

Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness?

No, he answered.

Well then, I said, suppose that you and I inquire into their natures. And first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a thing, would you not? That is my opinion, would not that be yours also?

Yes, he said; that is mine also.

And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, O Protagoras, and you Socrates, what about this thing which you just now called justice, is it just or unjust? And I were to answer, just: and you — would you vote for me or against me?

With you, he said.

Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the nature of the just: would not you?

Yes, he said.

And suppose that he went on to say: Well now, is there such a thing as holiness? — we should answer, Yes, if I am not mistaken?

Yes, he said.

And that you acknowledge to be a thing — should we admit that?

He assented.

And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the nature of the unholy? I should be angry at his putting such a question, and should say, Peace, man; nothing can be holy if holiness is not holy. What do you say to that? Would you not answer in the same way?

Certainly, he said.

And then after this suppose that he came and asked
us, What were you saying just now? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly, but you seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as one another. I should reply, You certainly heard that said, but you did not, as you think, hear me say that; for Protagoras gave the answer, and I did but ask the question. And suppose that he turned to you and said, Is this true, Protagoras? and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, and is this your position? how would you answer him?

I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates.

Well then, Protagoras, assuming this, and supposing that he proceeded to say further, Then holiness is not of the nature of justice, nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of unholiness; and holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore of the unjust, and the unjust is unholy; how shall we answer him? I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, and that holiness is just; and I would say in like manner on your behalf also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with holiness, or very nearly the same; and I would most assuredly say that justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice; and I wish that you would tell me whether I may be permitted to give this answer on your behalf, and whether you would agree with me.

He replied, I can not simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be a difference between them. But what matter? if you please I please; and let us assume, if you will, that justice is holy, and that holiness is just.

Pardon me, I said; I do not want this “if you wish” or “if you will” sort of argument to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven; and I mean by
this that the argument will be best proven if there be no "if."

Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness, for there is always some point of view in which everything is like every other thing; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like soft, and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in common; even the parts of the face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, and one of them is like another of them. And you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one another; and yet things which are alike in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike.

And do you think, I said, in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small degree of likeness?

Certainly not, he said; but I do not agree with what I understand to be your view.

Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take another of the examples which you mentioned instead. Do you admit the existence of folly?

I do.

And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly?

That is true, he said.

And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be temperate or moderate?

Yes, he said.

And moderation makes them moderate?

Certainly.

And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in thus acting are not moderate?

I agree to that, he said.
Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting moderately?
He assented.
And foolish actions are done by folly, and moderate or temperate actions by moderation?
He agreed.
And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and weakly which is done by weakness?
He assented.
And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is done with slowness, slowly?
He acknowledged that.
And if anything is done in the same way, that is done by the same; and if anything is done in an opposite way, by the opposite?
He agreed.
Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful?
Yes.
To which the only opposite is the ugly?
There is no other.
And is there anything good?
There is.
To which the only opposite is the evil?
There is no other.
And there is the acute in sound?
True.
To which the only opposite is the grave?
There is no other, he said, but that.
Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more?
He assented.
Then now, I said, let us recapitulate our admissions. First of all we admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one?
To that we assented.
And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by opposites?
Yes.
And that which was done foolishly, as we also admitted, was done in the opposite way to that which was done moderately?
Yes.
And that which was done moderately was done by moderation or temperance, and that which was done foolishly by folly?
He agreed.
And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites?
Yes.
And one thing is done by moderation or temperance, and quite another thing by folly?
Yes.
And those are opposite ways?
Certainly.
And therefore done by opposites. Then folly is the opposite of moderation or temperance?
That is evident.
And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of wisdom?
He assented.
And we said that everything has only one opposite?
Yes.
Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is distinct from temperance or moderation, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they are not only distinct, but unlike, both in themselves and in their functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they do not accord or agree:
for how can they be said to agree if everything is assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly, which is one, has clearly the two opposites—wisdom and temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? I said. What else would you say?

He assented, but with great reluctance.

Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, do not let us be faint-hearted, but let us complete what remains. Do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice?

I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this, which nevertheless many may be found to assert.

And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied.

I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if you will.

Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you are of their opinion or not. My object is to test the validity of the argument; and yet the result may be that I and you who ask and answer may also be put on our trial.

Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument was not encouraging; at length, however, he consented to answer.

Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that some men are moderate or temperate, and yet unjust?

Yes, he said; let that be admitted.

And moderation is good sense?

Yes.

And good sense is good counsel in doing justice?

Granted.

If they succeed, I said, or if they don’t succeed?
If they succeed.
And you would admit the existence of goods?
Yes.
And is the good that which is expedient for man?
Yes, indeed, he said; and there are some things which may be inexpedient, and yet I call them good.
I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded my business and gently said:

When you say, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are good, do you mean inexpedient for man only, or inexpedient altogether? and do you call the latter good?

Certainly not the last, he replied; for I know of many things, meats, drinks, medicines, and ten thousand other things, which are partly expedient for man, and partly inexpedient; and some which are expedient for horses, and not for men; and some for oxen only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for trees; and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as for example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the roots, but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young branches; or I may instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all plants, and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with the exception of man, but beneficial to human hair and to the human body generally; and even in this application (so various and changeable is the nature of the benefit) that which is the greatest good to the outward parts of a man, is a very great evil to his inward parts: and for this reason physicians always forbid their patients the use of oil in their food, except in very small quantities, just sufficient to take away the disagreeable sensation of smell in meats and sauces.
When he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said: Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and when any one makes a long speech to me I never remember what he is talking about. As then, if I had been deaf, and you were going to converse with me, you would have had to raise your voice; so now, having such a bad memory, I will ask you to cut your answers short, if you would take me with you.

What do you mean? he said: how am I to shorten my answers? shall I make them too short?

Certainly not, I said.

But short enough? he said.

Yes, I said.

Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to you to be short enough?

I have heard, I said, that you can speak and teach others to speak about the same things at such length that words never seemed to fail, or with such brevity that no one could use fewer of them. Please therefore, if you talk with me, to adopt the latter or more compendious method.

Socrates, he replied, many a battle of words have I fought, and if I had followed the method of disputa-
tion which my adversaries desired, as you want me to do, I should have been no better than another, and the name of Protagoras would have been no-
where.

I saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he would not play the part of an-
swerer any more if he could help; and I considered that there was no call upon me to continue the conver-
sation; so I said: Protagoras, I don’t wish to force the conversation upon you if you had rather not, but when you are willing to argue with me in such a way that I
can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as is said of you by others and as you say of yourself, are able to have discussions in shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for you are a master of wisdom; but I can not manage these long speeches: I only wish that I could. You, on the other hand, who are capable of either, ought to speak shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see that you are disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent my staying to hear you at length (for I have to be in another place), I will depart; although I should have liked to have heard you.

Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the hand, and in his left hand caught hold of this old cloak of mine. He said: We can not let you go, Socrates, for if you leave us there will be an end of our discussions: I must therefore beg you to remain, as there is nothing in the world that I should like better than to hear you and Protagoras discourse. Do not deny the company this pleasure.

Now I had got up, and was in the act of departure. Son of Hipponicus, I replied, I have always admired, and do now heartily applaud and love your philosophical spirit, and I would gladly comply with your requests, if I could. But the truth is that I can not. And what you ask is as great an impossibility to me, as if you bade me run a race with Crison of Himera, when in his prime, or with some one of the long or day course runners. To that I should reply, that I humbly make the same request to my own legs; and they can’t comply. And therefore if you want to see Crison and me in the same stadium, you must bid him slacken his speed to mine, for I can not run quickly, and he can run slowly. And in like manner if you want to hear me and Protagoras discoursing, you
must ask him to shorten his answers, and keep to the point, as he did at first; if not, how can there be any discussion? For discussion is one thing, and making an oration is quite another, according to my way of thinking.

But you see, Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras may fairly claim to speak in his own way, just as you claim to speak in yours.

Here Alcibiades interposed, and said: That, Callias, is not a fair statement of the case. For our friend Socrates admits that he can not make a speech—in this he yields the palm to Protagoras; but I should be greatly surprised if he yielded to any living man in the power of holding and apprehending an argument. Now if Protagoras will make a similar admission, and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in argumentative skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he claims a superiority in argument as well, let him ask and answer—not, when a question is asked, having recourse to shifts and evasions, and instead of answering, making a speech at such length that most of his hearers forget the question at issue (not that Socrates is likely to forget—I will be bound for that, although he may pretend in fun that he has a bad memory). And Socrates appears to me to be more in the right than Protagoras; that is my opinion, and every man ought to say what he thinks.

When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one—Critias, I believe—went on to say: O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be a partisan of Protagoras. And this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the other side. But we should not be partisans either of Socrates or Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up the discussion.

Prodicus added: That, Critias, seems to me to be
well said, for those who are present at such discussions ought to be impartial hearers of both the speakers; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the same as equality, for both sides should be impartially heard, and yet an equal meed should not be assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a higher meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise. And I as well as Critias would beg you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request, which is, that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for friends argue with friends out of good will, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle. And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this way you, who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and not praise only, among us who are your audience; for esteem is a sincere conviction of the hearers’ souls, but praise is often an insincere expression of men uttering words contrary to their conviction. And thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased; for gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight. Thus spoke Prodicus, and many of the company applauded his words.

Hippias the sage spoke next. He said: All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens, by nature and not by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against nature. How great would be the disgrace then, if we, who know the nature of things, and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and as such are met together in this city, which is the metropolis of wisdom, and in the greatest and most glorious house of this city, should have nothing to show worthy of this height of dignity, but should only quarrel with
one another like the meanest of mankind. I do pray and advise you, Protagoras, and you, Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be your peacemakers. And do not you, Socrates, aim at this precise and extreme brevity in discourse, if Protagoras objects, but loosen and let go the reins of speech, that your words may be grander and become you better. Neither do you, Protagoras, go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into an ocean of words, but let there be a mean observed by both of you. Do as I say. And let me also suggest and suppose further, that you choose an arbiter or overseer or president; he will keep watch over your words and reduce them to their proper length.

This proposal was received by the company with universal approval; and Callias said that he would not let me off, and that I was to choose an arbiter. But I said that to choose an umpire of discourse would be unseemly; for if the person chosen was inferior, then the inferior or worse ought not to preside over the better; or if he was equal, neither would that be well; for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what will be the use of choosing him? And if you say "Let us have a better then," to that I answer that you can not have any one who is wiser than Protagoras. And if you choose another who is not really better, and whom you only say is better, to put another over him as though he were an inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him; not that, as far as I am concerned, any reflection is of much consequence to me. Let me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on as you desire. If Protagoras is not disposed to answer, let him ask and I will answer; and I will endeavor to show at the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to answer: and when I have answered as many ques-
tions as he likes to ask, let him in like manner answer; and if he seems to be not very ready at answering the exact questions, you and I will unite in entreating him, as you entreated me, not to spoil the discussion. And this will require no special arbiter: you shall all of you be arbiters.

This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against his will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions; and when he had put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn those which he was asked in short replies. He began to put his questions as follows:—

I am of opinion, Socrates, he said, that skill in poetry is the principal part of education; and this I conceive to be the power of knowing what compositions of the poet are correct, and what are not, and how they are to be distinguished, and of explaining them when asked. And I propose to transfer the question which you and I have been discussing to the domain of poetry, speaking as before of virtue, but in reference to a passage of a poet. Now Simonides says to Scopas the Son of Creon the Thessalian:—

"Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good; built four-square in hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw."

Do you know the poem? or shall I repeat the whole? There is no need, I said; for I am perfectly well acquainted with the ode, of which I have made a careful study.

Very good, he said. And do you think that the ode is a good composition, and true?

Yes, I said, both good and true.

But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true?

No, not in that case, I replied.

And is there not a contradiction? he asked. Reflect.
Well, my friend, I have reflected.
And does not the poet proceed to say, "I do not agree with the word of Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a wise man; hardly," says he, "can a man be good." Now you will observe that this is said by the same poet.
I know that, I said.
And do you think, he said, that the two sayings are consistent?
Yes, I said, I think they are (at the same time I could not help fearing that there might be something in what he said). And do you think otherwise? I said.
Why, he said, how can he be consistent in saying both? First of all, premising as his own thought, "Hardly can a man become truly good;" and then a little further on in the poem, forgetting, and blaming Pittacus and refusing to agree with him, when he says, "Hardly can a man be good," which is the very same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the same with himself, he blames himself; so that he must be wrong either in his first or his second assertion.
Many of the audience cheered and applauded this. And I felt at first giddy and faint, as if I had received a blow from the expert hand of a boxer, when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering; and to confess the truth, I wanted to get time to think what the meaning of the poet really was. So I turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus, I said, Simonides is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his rescue. I think that I must summon you to my aid, like the river Scamander in Homer, who, when beleaguered by Achilles, asks Simois to aid him, saying:

"Brother dear, let us both together stay the force of the hero."
And I summon you, for I am afraid that Protagoras will make an end of Simonides. Now is the time to rehabilitate Simonides, by the application of your charming philosophy of synonyms, which distinguishes "will" and "wish" and many similar words which you mentioned in your admirable speech. And I should like to know whether you would agree with me; for I am of opinion that there is no contradiction in the words of Simonides. And first of all I wish that you would say whether, in your opinion, Prodicus, "being" is the same as "becoming."

Not the same, certainly, replied Prodicus.

Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that "Hardly can a man become truly good?"

Quite right, said Prodicus.

And then he blames Pittacus, I said, not for saying the same as himself, as Protagoras imagines, but for saying something different; for Pittacus does not say as Simonides says, that hardly can a man become good, but hardly can a man be good: and our friend Prodicus says that being, Protagoras, is not the same as becoming; and if they are not the same, then Simonides is not inconsistent with himself. I dare say that Prodicus and many others would say, as Hesiod says, "Hardly can a man become good, for the gods have placed toil in front of virtue; but when you have reached the goal, then the acquisition of virtue, however difficult, is easy."

Prodicus heard and approved; but Protagoras said: Your correction, Socrates, involves a greater error than is contained in the sentence which you are correcting.

Alas! I said, Protagoras; then I am a sorry physician, and do but aggravate a disorder which I am seeking to cure.
The fact, he said, is as I have stated.
How is that? I asked.
The poet, he replied, could never have made such a mistake as to say that virtue, which in the opinion of all men is the hardest of all things, can be easily acquired.

Well, I said, and how fortunate this is that Prodicus should be of the company, for he has a wisdom, Protagoras, which, as I imagine, is more than human and of very ancient date, and may be as old as Simonides or even older. Learned as you are in many things, you appear to know nothing of this; but I know, for I am a disciple of his. And now, if I am not mistaken, you do not understand the word "hard" in the sense which Simonides intended; and I must correct you, as Prodicius corrects me when I used the word "dreadful" as a term of praise. If I say that Protagoras is a dreadfully wise man, he asks me if I am not ashamed of calling that which is good dreadful; and then he explains to me that the term "dreadful" is always taken in a bad sense, and that no one speaks of being dreadfully healthy or wealthy or wise, but of dreadful war, dreadful poverty, dreadful disease, meaning by the term "dreadful," evil. And I think that Simonides and his countrymen the Cean, when they spoke of "hard" meant "evil," or something which you do not understand. Let us ask Prodicus, for he ought to be able to answer questions about the dialect of Simonides. What did he mean, Prodicus, by the term "hard?"

Evil, said Prodicus.

And therefore, I said, Prodicus, he blames Pittacus for saying, "Hard is the good," just as if that were equivalent to saying, Evil is the good.

Yes, he said, that was certainly his meaning; and he is twitting Pittacus with ignorance of the use of
terms, which in a Lesbian, who has been accustomed
to speak a barbarous language, is natural.

Do you hear, Protagoras, I asked, what our friend
Prodicus is saying? And have you an answer for
him?

You are all wrong, Prodicus, said Protagoras; and
I know very well that Simonides in using the word
"hard" meant what all of us mean, not evil, but that
which is not easy — that which takes a great deal of
trouble. Of this I am positive.

I said: I also incline to think, Protagoras, that this
was the meaning of Simonides, and that our friend
Prodicus was quite aware of this, but he thought that
he would make fun, and try if you could maintain
your thesis; for that Simonides could never have
meant the other is clearly proved by the context, in
which he says that God only has this gift. Now he
can not surely mean to say that to be good is evil,
when he afterwards proceeds to say that God only has
this gift, and that this is the attribute of him and of
no other. For if this be his meaning, Prodicus would
impute to Simonides a character of recklessness which
is very unlike his countrymen. And I should like to
tell you, I said, what I imagine to be the real meaning
of Simonides in this poem, if you will test what, in
your way of speaking, would be called my skill in
poetry; or if you would rather, I will be the listener.

Protagoras hearing me offer this, replied: As you
please; and Hippias, Prodicus, and the others, told
me by all means to do as I proposed.

Then now, I said, I will endeavor to explain to
you my opinion about this poem. There is a very
ancient philosophy which is more cultivated in Crete
and Lacedaemon than in any other part of Hellas, and
there are more philosophers in those countries than
anywhere else in the world. This, however, is a secret
which the Lacedaemonians deny; and they pretend to be ignorant, just because they do not wish to have it thought that they rule the world by wisdom, like the Sophists of whom Protagoras was speaking, and not by valor of arms; considering that if the reason of their superiority were disclosed, all men would be practising their wisdom. And this secret of theirs has never been discovered by the imitators of Lacedaemonian fashions in other cities, who go about with their ears bruised in imitation of them, and have the caestus bound on their arms, and are always in training, and wear short cloaks; for they imagine that these are the practices which have enabled the Lacedaemonians to conquer the other Hellenes. Now when the Lacedaemonians want to unbend and hold free conversation with their wise men, and are no longer satisfied with mere secret intercourse, they drive out all these laconizers, and any other foreigners who may happen to be in their country, and they hold a philosophical séance unknown to the strangers: and they themselves forbid their young men to go out into other cities (in this they are like the Cretans), in order that they may not unlearn the lessons which they have taught them. And in these cities not only men but also women have a pride in their high cultivation. And you may know that I am only speaking the truth in attributing this excellence in philosophy to the Lacedaemonians, by this token: If a man converses with the most ordinary Lacedaemonian, he will find him seldom good for much in general conversation, but at any point in the discourse he will be darting out some notable saying, terse and full of meaning, with unerring aim; and the person with whom he is talking seems to be like a child in his hands. And many of our own age and of former ages have noted that the true Lacedaemonian
type of character has the love of philosophy even stronger than the love of gymnastics; they are conscious that only a perfectly educated man is capable of uttering such expressions. Such were Thales of Miletus, and Pittacus of Mytilene, and Bias of Priene, and our own Solon, and Cleobulus the Lindian, and Myson the Chenian; and seventh in the catalogue of wise men was the Lacedaemonian Chilo. All these were lovers and emulators and disciples of the culture of the Lacedaemonians, and any one may perceive that their wisdom was of this character, consisting of short memorable sentences, which individuals uttered. And they met together and dedicated in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, as the first-fruits of their wisdom, the far-famed inscriptions, which are in all men’s mouths, “Know thyself,” and “Nothing too much.”

Why do I say all this? I am explaining that this Lacedaemonian brevity was the style of primitive philosophy. Now there was a saying of Pittacus which was privately circulated and received the approbation of the good, “Hard to be good.” And Simonides, who was ambitious of the fame of wisdom, was aware that if he could overthrow this saying, then, as if he had won a victory over some famous athlete, he would carry off the palm among his contemporaries. And if I am not mistaken, he composed the entire poem with the secret intention of damaging that saying.

Let us all unite in examining his words, and see whether I am speaking the truth. Simonides must have been a lunatic, if, in the very first words of the poem, wanting to say only that to be good is hard, he inserted μέν, “on the one hand” (on the one hand to become good is hard); there would be no possible reason for the introduction of unless you suppose
him to speak with a hostile reference to the words of Pittacus. Pittacus is saying "Hard to be good," and he says, controverting this, "No, the truly hard thing, Pittacus, is to become good," not joining "truly" with "good," but with "hard." Not the hard thing is to be truly good, as though there were some truly good men, and there were others who were good but not truly good (that would be a very simple observation, and quite unworthy of Simonides); but you must suppose him to make a trajec-
tion of the word (ἄλαθεος), construing the saying of Pittacus thus (and let us imagine Pittacus to be speaking and Simonides answering him): "O my friends," says Pittacus, "hard to be good," and Simonides answers, "In that, Pittacus, you are mis-
taken, the difficulty is not to be good, but on the one hand, to become good, four-square in hands and feet and mind, without a flaw — that is hard truly." This way of reading the passage accounts for the insertion of (μέν) "on the one hand," and for the use of the word "truly," which is rightly placed at the end; and all that follows tends to prove that this is the meaning. A great deal might be said in praise of the details of the poem, which is a charming piece of workmanship, and very finished, but that would be tedious. I should like, however, to point out the general intention of the poem, which is certainly designed in every part to be a refutation of the saying of Pittacus. For he speaks in what follows a little further on as if he meant to argue that although there is a difficulty in becoming good, yet this is possible for a time, and only for a time. But having become good, to remain in a good state and be good, as you, Pittacus, affirm, that is not possible, and is not granted to man; God only has this blessing; "but man can not help being bad when the force of circumstances overpowers him." Now
whom does the force of circumstances overpower in the command of a vessel? — not the private individual, for he is always overpowered; and as one who is already prostrate can not be overthrown, but only he who is standing upright and not he who is prostrate can be laid prostrate, so the force of circumstances can only be said to overpower him who has resources, and not him who is at all times helpless. The descent of a great storm may make the pilot helpless, or the severity of the season the husbandman or the physician; for the good may become bad, as another poet witnesses:

"The good are sometimes good and sometimes bad."

But the bad does not become bad; he is always bad. So that when the force of circumstances overpowers the man of resources and skill and virtue, then he can not help being bad. And you, Pittacus, are saying, "Hard to be good." Now there is a difficulty in becoming good; and yet this is possible: but to be good is an impossibility; "for he who does well is the good man, and he who does ill is the bad." But what sort of doing is good in letters? and what sort of doing makes a man good in letters? Clearly the knowing of them. And what sort of well-doing makes a man a good physician? Clearly the knowing of the art of healing the sick. "But he who does ill is the bad." Now who becomes a bad physician? Clearly he who is in the first place a physician, and in the second place a good physician; for he may become a bad one also: but none of us unskilled individuals can by any amount of doing ill become physicians, any more than we can become carpenters or anything of that sort; and he who by doing ill can not become a physician at all, clearly can not become a bad physician. In like manner the good may become deteriorated by time, or
toil, or disease, or other accident (the only real ill-doing is the deprivation of knowledge), but the bad man will never become bad, for he is always bad; and if he were to become bad, he must previously have been good. Thus the words of the poem tend to show that on the one hand a man can not be continuously good, but that he may become good and may also become bad; and again that “they are the best for the longest time whom the gods love.”

All this relates to Pittacus, as is further proved by the sequel. For he adds: “Therefore I will not throw away my life in searching after the impossible, hoping in vain to find a perfectly faultless man among those who partake of the fruit of the broad-bosomed earth; and when I have found him to tell you of him” (this is the vehement way in which he pursues his attack upon Pittacus throughout the whole poem): “but him who does no evil voluntarily I praise and love; — not even the gods war against necessity.” All this has a similar drift, for Simonides was not so ignorant as to say that he praised those who did no evil voluntarily, as though there were some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise man, as I believe, will allow that any human being errs voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil and dishonorable actions; but they are very well aware that all who do evil and dishonorable things do them against their will. And Simonides never says that he praises him who does no evil voluntarily; the word “voluntarily” applies to himself. For he was under the impression that a good man might often compel himself to love and praise another, and that there might be an involuntary love, such as a man might feel to an ungainly father or mother, or to his country, or something of that sort.

Now bad men, when their parents or country have any defects, rejoice at the sight of them, and expose them
to others, and find fault with them and denounce them under the idea that the rest of mankind will be less likely to take them to task and reproach them when they neglect them; and this makes them exaggerate their defects, in order that the odium which is necessarily incurred by them may be increased: but the good man dissembles his feelings, and constrains himself to praise them; and if they have wronged him and he is angry, he pacifies his anger and is reconciled, and compels himself to love and praise his own flesh and blood. And Simonides, as is probable, considered that he himself had often had to praise and magnify a tyrant or the like, much against his will, and he also wishes to imply to Pittacus that he is not censorious and does not censure him. "For I am satisfied," he says, "when a man is neither bad nor very stupid, and when he knows justice (which is the health of states), and is of sound mind, I will find no fault with him, for I am not given to finding fault, for there are innumerable fools" (implying that if he delighted in censure he might have abundant opportunity of finding fault). "All things are good with which evil is unmingled." In these latter words he does not mean to say that all things are good which have no evil in them, as you might say "All things are white which have no black in them," for that would be ridiculous; but he means to say that he accepts and finds no fault with the moderate or intermediate state. "I do not hope," he says, "to find a perfectly blameless man among those who partake of the fruits of the broad-bosomed earth, and when I have found him to tell you of him; in this sense I praise no man. But he who is moderately good, and does no evil, is good enough for me, who love and approve every one" (and here observe that he uses a Lesbian word, ἐπαλήμφυ, because he is addressing Pittacus,—
“who love and approve every one voluntarily,” says, “who does no evil:” and that the stop should be put after “voluntarily”); but there are some whom I involuntarily praise and love. And you, Pittacus, I would never have blamed, if you had spoken what was moderately good and true; but I do blame you because, wearing the appearance of truth, you are speaking falsely about the greatest matters.” And this, I said, Prodicus and Protagoras, I take to be the true meaning of Simonides in this poem.

Hippias said: I think, Socrates, that you have given a very good explanation of this poem; but I have also an excellent interpretation of my own which I will expound to you, if you will allow me.

Nay, Hippias, said Alcibiades; not now, but another time. At present we must abide by the compact which was made between Socrates and Protagoras, to the effect that as long as Protagoras is willing to ask, Socrates should answer; or that if he would rather answer, then that Socrates should ask.

I said: I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is inclined; but I would rather have done with poems and odes, if you do not object, and come back to the question about which I was asking you at first, Protagoras, and by your help make an end of that. The talk about the poets seems to me like a commonplace entertainment to which a vulgar company have recourse; who, because they are not able to converse or amuse one another, while they are drinking, with the sound of their own voices and conversation by reason of their stupidity, raise the price of flute-girls in the market, hiring for a great sum the voice of a flute instead of their own breath, to be the medium of intercourse among them: but where the company are real gentlemen and men of education, you will see no
flute-girls, nor dancing-girls, nor harp-girls; and they have no nonsense or games but are contented with one another's conversation, of which their own voices are the medium, and which they carry on by turns and in an orderly manner, even though they are very liberal in their potations. And a company like this of ours, and men such as we profess to be, do not require the help of another's voice, or of the poets whom you can not interrogate about the meaning of what they are saying; people who cite them declaring, some that the poet has one meaning, and others that he has another; and there arises a dispute which can never be put to the proof. This sort of entertainment they decline, and prefer to talk with one another, and try one another's mettle in conversation. And these are the sort of models which I desire that you and I should imitate. Leaving the poets, and keeping to ourselves, let us try the mettle of one another and of the truth in conversation. And if you have a mind to ask I am ready to answer; or if you would rather, do you answer, and give me the opportunity of taking up and completing our unfinished argument.

I made these and some similar observations; but Protagoras would not distinctly say which he would do. Thereupon Alcibiades turned to Callias, and said: — Do you think, Callias, that Protagoras is fair in refusing to say whether he will or will not answer? for I certainly think that he is unfair; he ought either to proceed with the argument, or distinctly to refuse to proceed, that we may know his intention; and then Socrates will be able to discourse with some one else, and the rest of the company will be free to talk with one another.

I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of Alcibiades, and when the prayers of Callias and the company were superadded, he was
at last induced to argue, and said that I might ask and he would answer.

So I said: Do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have any other interest in asking questions of you but that of clearing up my own difficulties. For I think that Homer was very right in saying that "When two go together, one sees before the other," for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought; but if a man "sees a thing when he is alone," he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he may show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them. And I would rather hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that no man has a better understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to understand and in particular of virtue. For who is there, but you? — who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many are this, and yet have not the power of making others good. Whereas you are not only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others. Moreover such confidence have you in yourself, that although other Sophists conceal their profession, you proclaim in the face of Hellas that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are the first who demanded pay in return. How then can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and take advice of you? Indeed, I must. And I should like once more to have my memory refreshed by you about the questions which I was asking you at first, and also to have your help in considering them. If I am not mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names of the same thing? or has each of the names a separate underlying essence and corresponding thing having a proper function, no one of them being like any other
of them? And you said that the five names were not the names of the same thing, but that each of them had a separate object, and that all of them were parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts of gold are like each other and the whole of which they are parts, but as the parts of the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another, and have each of them a distinct function. I should like to know whether this is still your opinion; or if not, I will ask you to define your meaning, as I shall not take you to task if you now make a different statement. For I dare say that you may have said what you did only in order to make trial of me.

I answer, Socrates, he said, that all these qualities are parts of virtue, and that four out of the five are to some extent similar, and that the fifth of them, which is courage, is very different from the other four, as I prove in this way: You may observe that many men are utterly unrighteous, unholy, intemperate, igno-rant, who are nevertheless remarkable for their cour-age.

Stop, I said; that requires consideration. When you speak of brave men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature?

Yes, he said; I mean the impetuous, ready to go at that which others are afraid to approach.

In the next place you would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher.

Yes, he said; I should say the best of all things, as I am a sane man.

And is it partly good and partly bad, I said, or wholly good?

Wholly good, and that in the highest degree.

Tell me then; who are they who have confidence in diving into a well?
I should say, the divers.
And the reason of this is that they have knowledge?
Yes, that is the reason.
And who have confidence in fighting on horseback
— the skilled horsemen or the unskilled?
The skilled.
And who in fighting with light shields — the peltasts or the nonpeltasts?
The peltasts. And that is true of all other things, he said, if that is your point: those who have knowledge are more confident than those who have no knowledge, and they are more confident after they have learned than before.
And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant, I said, of these things, and yet confident about them?
Yes, he said, I have seen persons very confident.
And are not these confident persons also courageous?
In that case, he replied, courage would be a base thing, for the men of whom we are speaking are surely madmen.
Then who are the courageous? Are they not the confident?
Yes, he said; and I still maintain that.
And those, I said, who are thus confident without knowledge are really not courageous, but mad; and in that case the wisest are also the most confident, and being the most confident are also the bravest, and upon that view again wisdom will be courage.
Nay, Socrates, he replied, you are mistaken in your remembrance of what was said by me. When you asked me, I certainly did say that the courageous are the confident; but I was not asked whether the confident are the courageous; for if you had asked me that, I should have answered "not all of them:" and what I did answer you have not disproved, although
you proceed to show that those who have knowledge are more courageous than they were before they had knowledge, and more courageous than others who have no knowledge; and this makes you think that courage is the same as wisdom. But in this way of arguing you might come to imagine that strength is wisdom. You might begin by asking whether the strong are able, and I should say "Yes;" and then whether those who know how to wrestle are not more able to wrestle than those who do not know how to wrestle, and more able after than before they had learned, and I should assent. And when I had admitted this, you might use my admissions in such a way as to prove that upon my view wisdom is strength; whereas in that case I should not have admitted, any more than in the other, that the able are strong, although I have admitted that the strong are able. For there is a difference between ability and strength; the former is given by knowledge as well as by madness or rage, but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of the body. And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, that they are not the same; and I argue that the courageous are confident, but not all the confident courageous. For confidence may be given to men by art, and also, like ability, by anger and madness; but courage comes to them from nature and the healthy state of the soul?

I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others ill?

He agreed to this.

And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief?

He does not.

But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, don't you think that in that case he will have lived well?
I do.
Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live un-
pleasantly an evil?
Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honor-
able.
And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some pleasant things evil and some painful things good? — for I am rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort, and in as far as they are painful they are bad.
I do not know, Socrates, he said, whether I can venture to assert in that unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the painful the evil. Having regard not only to my present answer, but also to the rest of my life, I shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and that there are some painful things which are good, and some which are not good, and that there are some which are neither good nor evil.
And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in pleasure or create pleasure?
Certainly, he said.
Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are pleasant they are good; and my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself.
According to your favorite mode of speech, Socrates, let us inquire about this, he said; and if the result of the inquiry is to show that pleasure and good are really the same, then we will agree; but if not, then we will argue.
And would you wish to begin the inquiry? I said; or shall I begin?
You ought to take the lead, he said; for you are the author of the discussion.
May I use this as an illustration? I said. Suppose some one who is inquiring into the health or some other bodily quality of another: — he looks at his face and at the tips of his fingers, and then he says, Uncover your chest and back to me that I may have a better view: — that is the sort of thing which I desire in this speculation. Having seen what you opinion is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you: Uncover your mind to me, Protagoras, and reveal your opinion about knowledge, that I may know whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or of rule, or of command: their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps fear, — just as if knowledge were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now is that your view? or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which can not be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him?

I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras; and not only that, but I, above all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human things.

Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world are of another mind; and that men are commonly supposed to know the things which are best, and not to do them when they might? And most persons of whom I have asked the reason of this have said that those who did thus were overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of those affections which I was just now mentioning.
Yes, Socrates, he replied; and that is not the only point about which mankind are in error.

Suppose, then, that you and I endeavor to instruct and inform them what is the nature of this affection, which is called by them being overcome by pleasure, and which, as they declare, is the reason why they know the better and choose the worse. When we say to them: Friends, you are mistaken, and are saying what is not true, they would reply: Socrates and Protagoras, if this affection of the soul is not to be described as being overcome by pleasure, what is it, and how do you call it? Tell us that.

But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them?

I think, I replied, that their opinion may help us to discover the nature and relation of courage to the other parts of virtue. If you are disposed to abide by our recent agreement, that I should lead in the way in which I think that we shall find the truth best, do you follow; but if you are disinclined, never mind.

You are quite right, he said; and I would have you proceed as you have begun.

Well then, I said, let me suppose that they repeat their question, What account do you give of that which, in our language, is termed being overcome by pleasure? I should answer them thus: Listen, and Protagoras and I will endeavor to show you. When men are overcome by eating and drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they, knowing them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them, is not that what you would call being overcome by pleasure? That they will admit. And suppose that you and I were to go on and ask them again: In what way do you say that they are evil, — in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the moment or because they cause
disease and poverty and other like evils in the future? Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature? Would they not answer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on account of the after consequences — diseases and the like?

I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general would give that answer.

And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? and in causing poverty do they not cause pain; — they would agree to that also, if I am not mistaken?

Protagoras assented.

Then I should say to them, in my name and yours: Do you think them evil for any other reason, except that they end in pain and rob us of other pleasures: — that again they would admit?

We both of us thought that they would.

And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view, and say: Friends, when you speak of goods being painful, do you not mean remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises and military services, and the physician’s use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving? Are these the things which are good but painful? — they would assent to that?

He agreed.

And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate suffering and pain; or because, afterwards, they bring health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states and empires and wealth? — they would agree to that, if I am not mistaken?

He assented.

Are these things good for any other reason except
that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good? — they would acknowledge that they were not?

I think that they would, said Protagoras.

And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and and avoid pain as an evil?

He assented.

Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good: and even pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasures than it gives, or causes greater pain than the pleasures which it has. If, however, you call pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or standard, you will be able to show us that standard. But you have none to show.

I do not think that they have, said Protagoras.

And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives pleasure greater than the pains: for I say that if you have some standard other than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a good, you can show what that is. But you can not.

That is true, said Protagoras.

Suppose, again, I said, that the world says to me: Why do you spend many words and speak in many ways on this subject? Excuse me, friends, I should reply; but in the first place there is a difficulty in explaining the meaning of the expression "overcome by pleasure;" and the whole argument turns upon this. And even now, if you see any possible way in which evil can be explained as other than pain, or good as other than pleasure, you may still retract. But I suppose that you are satisfied at having a life of pleasure which is without pain. And if you are satisfied, and if you are unable to show any good or evil which
does not end in pleasure and pain, hear the consequences: — If this is true, then I say that the argument is absurd which affirms that a man often does evil knowingly, when he might abstain, because he is seduced and amazed by pleasure; or again, when you say that a man knowingly refuses to do what is good because he is overcome at the moment by pleasure. Now that this is ridiculous will be evident if only we give up the use of various names, such as pleasant and painful, and good and evil. As there are two things, let us call them by two names — first, good and evil, and then pleasant and painful. Assuming this, let us go on to say that a man does evil knowing that he does evil. But some one will ask, Why? Because he is overcome, is the first answer. And by what is he overcome? the inquirer will proceed to ask. And we shall not be able to reply “By pleasure,” for the name of pleasure has been exchanged for that of good. In our answer, then, we shall only say that he is overcome. “By what?” he will reiterate. By the good, we shall have to reply; indeed we shall. Nay, but our questioner will rejoin with a laugh, if he be one of the swaggering sort, That is too ridiculous, that a man should do what he knows to be evil when he ought not, because he is overcome by good. Is that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering the evil? And in answer to that we shall clearly reply, Because it was not worthy; for if it had been worthy, then he who, as we say, was overcome by pleasure, would not have been wrong. But how, he will reply, can the good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good? Is not the real explanation that they are out of proportion to one another, either as greater and smaller, or more and fewer? This we can not deny. And when you speak of being overcome — what do you mean, he will say, but that
you choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good? This being the case, let us now substitute the names of pleasure and pain, and say, not as before, that a man does what is evil knowingly, but that he does what is painful knowingly, and because he is overcome by pleasure, which is unworthy to overcome. And what measure is there of the relations of pleasure to pain other than excess and defect, which means that they become greater and smaller, and more and fewer, and differ in degree? For if any one says: "Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future pleasure and pain" — To that I should reply: And do they differ in any other way except by reason of pleasure and pain? There can be no other measure of them. And do you, like a skilful weigher, put into the balance the pleasures and the pains, near and distant, and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the other. If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, you of course take the more and greater; or if you weigh pains against pains, you take the fewer and the less; or if pleasures against pains, then you choose that course of action in which the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near or the near by the distant; and you avoid that course of action in which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would you not admit, my friends, that this is true? I am confident that they can not deny this.

He agreed with me.
Well then, I shall say, if you admit that, be so good as to answer me a question: Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight when near, and smaller when at a distance? They will acknowledge that. And the same folds of thickness and number; also sounds, which are in themselves equal, are greater when near, and lesser when at a distance. They will grant that also. Now supposing that happiness con-
sisted in making and taking large things, what would be the saving principle of human life? Would the art of measuring be the saving principle, or would the power of appearance? Is not the latter that deceiving art which makes us wander up and down and take the things at one time of which we repent at another, both in our actions and in our choice of things great and small? But the art of measurement is that which would do away with the effect of appearances, and, showing the truth, would fain teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth, and would thus save our life. Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes this is the art of measurement?

Yes, he said, the art of measurement.

Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of odd and even, and on the knowledge of when men ought to choose the greater or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other whether near or at a distance; what would be the saving principle of our lives? Would not knowledge?—a knowledge of measuring, when the question is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when the question is of odd and even? The world will acknowledge that, will they not?

Protagoras admitted that they would.

Well then, I say to them, my friends; seeing that the salvation of human life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains,—in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater and the less, and the nearer and remoter, must not this measuring be a consideration of excess and defect and equality in relation to each other?

That is undeniably true.

And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and science?

They will agree to that.
The nature of that art or science will be a matter of future consideration; the demonstration of the existence of such a science is a sufficient answer to the question which you asked of me and Protagoras. At the time when you asked the question, if you remember, both of us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge, and that knowledge, in whatever existing, must have the advantage over pleasure and all other things; and then you said that pleasure often got the advantage even over a man who has knowledge; and we refused to allow this, and you said: O Protagoras and Socrates, if this state is not to be called being overcome by pleasure, tell us what it is; what would you call it? If we had immediately and at the time answered "Ignorance," you would have laughed at us. But now, in laughing at us, you will be laughing at yourselves: for you also admitted that men err in their choice of pleasures and pains; that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted further that they err, not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This, therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure; — ignorance, and that the greatest. And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias declare that they are the physicians of ignorance; but you, who are under the mistaken impression that ignorance is not the cause, neither go yourselves, nor send your children, to the Sophists, who are the teachers of these things — you take care of your money and give them none; and the result is, that you are the worse off both in public and private life: — Let us suppose this to be our answer to the world in general. But I would like now to ask you, Hippias, and
you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for the argument is to be yours as well as ours), whether you think that I am speaking the truth or not?

They all thought that what I said was entirely true.

Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is the good, and the painful evil. And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce his distinction of names, whether he is disposed to say plausurable, delightful, joyful. However and in whatever way he rejoices to name them, I will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer this in my sense.

Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others.

Then, my friends, I said, what do you say to this? Are not all actions, the tendency of which is to make life painless and pleasant, honorable and useful? The honorable work is also useful and good?

This was admitted.

Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a man to himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself is wisdom.

They all assented.

And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about important matters?

To that they also unanimously assented.

Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he might have the less.

All of us agreed to every word of this.

Well, I said, there is a certain thing called fear or terror; and here, Prodicus, I should particularly like
to know whether you would agree with me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil.

Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear and not terror.

Never mind about that, Prodicus, I said; but let me ask whether, if our former assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears when he need not? Would not this be in contradiction to the admission which has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears to be evil; and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he thinks to be evil.

That also was universally admitted.

Then, I said, these, Hippias and Prodicus, are our premisses; and I would beg Protagoras to explain to us how he can be right in what he said at first. I do not mean in what he said quite at first, for his first statement, as you may remember, was that whereas there were five parts of virtue none of them was like any other of them; each of them had a separate function. To this, however, I am not referring, but to the assertion which he afterwards made that of the five virtues four were nearly akin to each other, but that the fifth, which was courage, differed greatly from the others. And of this he gave me the following proof. He said: You will find, Socrates, that some of the most impious, and unrighteous, and intemperate, and ignorant of men are among the most courageous; and that is a proof that courage is very different from the other parts of virtue. I was surprised at his saying this at the time, and I am still more surprised now that I have discussed the matter with you. So I asked him whether by the brave he meant the confident. Yes, he replied, and the impetuous or goers. (You may remember, Protagoras, that this was your answer.)

He acknowledged the truth of this.
Well then, I said, tell us against what are the courageous ready to go — against the same as the cowards?
No, he answered.
Then against something different?
Yes, he said.
Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there is danger?
Yes, Socrates, that is what men say.
That is true, I said. But I want to know against what the courageous are ready to go — against dangers, believing them to be dangers, or not against dangers?
No, said he; that has been proved by you in the previous argument to be impossible.
That, again, I replied, is quite true. And if this has been rightly proven, then no one goes to meet what he thinks to be dangers, since the want of self-control, which makes men rush into dangers, has been shown to be ignorance.
He assented.
And yet the courageous man and the coward alike go to meet that about which they are confident; so that, in this point of view, the cowardly and the courageous go to meet the same things.
And yet, Socrates, said Protagoras, that to which the coward goes is the opposite of that to which the courageous goes; the one, for example, are ready to go to battle, and the others are not ready.
And is going to battle honorable or disgraceful? I said.
Honorable, he replied.
And if honorable, then already admitted by us to be good; for all honorable actions we have admitted to be good.
That is true; and to that opinion I shall always adhere.
True, I said. But which of the two are they who, as you say, are unwilling to go to war, which is a good and honorable thing?

The cowards, he replied.

And yet, I said, that which is good and honorable is also pleasant?

That, he said, was certainly admitted.

And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter, and better?

The admission of that, he replied, would belie our former admissions.

But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and pleasanter, and nobler?

That must be admitted.

And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence?

True, he replied.

And if not base, then honorable?

He admitted this.

And if honorable, then good?

Yes.

But the fear and confidence of the coward or fool-hardy or madman, on the contrary, are base?

He assented.

And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and uninstructedness?

True, he said.

Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call that cowardice or courage?

I should say cowardice, he replied.

And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of dangers?

Assuredly, he said.

And because of that ignorance they are cowards?

He assented.
And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?
He assented.
Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice?
He nodded assent.
But surely courage, I said, is opposed to cowardice?
Yes.
And the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to the ignorance of them?
To that again he nodded assent.
And the ignorance of them is cowardice?
To that he very reluctantly nodded assent.
And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage, and is opposed to the ignorance of these things?
At this point he would no longer nod assent, but was silent.
And why, I said, do you neither assent nor dissent, Protagoras?
Finish the argument by yourself, he said.
I only want to ask one more question, I said. I want to know whether you still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet most courageous?
You seem to have a great ambition to make me answer, Socrates, and therefore I will gratify you, and say, that this appears to me to be impossible consistently with the argument.
My only object, I said, in continuing the discussion, has been the desire to ascertain the relations of virtue and the essential nature of virtue; for if this were clear, I am very sure that the other controversy which has been carried on at great length by both of us—you affirming and I denying that virtue can be taught—would also have become clear. The result of our
discussion appears to me to be singular. For if the argument had a human voice, that voice would be heard laughing at us and saying: Protagoras and Socrates, you are strange beings; there are you who were saying that virtue can not be taught, contradicting yourself now in the attempt to show that all things are knowledge, including justice, and temperance, and courage,—which tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught; for if virtue were other than knowledge, as Protagoras attempted to show, then clearly virtue cannot be taught; but if virtue is entirely knowledge, as you, Socrates, are seeking to show, then I can not but suppose that virtue is capable of being taught. Protagoras, on the other hand, who started by saying that it might be taught, is now eager to show that it is anything rather than knowledge; and if this is true, it must be quite incapable of being taught. Now I, Protagoras, perceiving this terrible confusion of ideas, have a great desire that they should be cleared up. And I should like to carry on the discussion until we ascertain what virtue is, and whether capable of being taught or not, lest haply Epimetheus should trip us up and deceive us in the argument, as he forgot to provide for us in the story; and I prefer your Prometheus to your Epimetheus: of him I make use whenever I am busy about these questions in Promethean care of my own life. And if you have no objection, as I said at first, I should like to have your help in the inquiry.

Protagoras replied: Socrates, I am not of a base nature, and I am the last man in the world to be envious. I can not but applaud your enthusiasm in the conduct of an argument. As I have often said, I admire you above all men whom I know, certainly above all men of your age; and I believe that you will become very eminent in philosophy. Let us come back
to the subject at some future time; at present we had better turn to something else.

By all means, I said, if that is your wish; for I too ought long since to have kept the engagement of which I spoke before, and only tarried because I could not refuse the request of the noble Callias. This finished the conversation, and we went our way.
INTRODUCTION

The Euthydemus is, of all the Dialogues of Plato, that in which he approaches most nearly to the comic poet. The mirth is broader, the irony more sustained, the contrast between Socrates and the two Sophists, although veiled, penetrates deeper than in any other of his writings. Even Thrasymachus, in the Republic, is at last pacified, and becomes a friendly and interested auditor of the great discourse. But in the Euthydemus the mask is never dropped; the accustomed irony of Socrates continues to the end.

Socrates narrates to Crito a remarkable scene in which he has himself taken part, and in which the two brothers, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus are the chief performers. They are natives of Chios, who have been exiled from Thurii, and in former days had appeared at Athens as teachers of rhetoric and of the art of fighting in armor. To this they have now added a new fighting accomplishment—the art of Eristic, or fighting with words, which they are likewise willing to teach "for a consideration." But they can also teach virtue in a very short time and in the very best manner. Socrates, who is always on the look out for teachers of virtue, is interested in the youth Cleinias, the grandson of the great Alcibiades, and is desirous that he should have the benefit of their instructions. He is quite ready to fall down and worship them; although the greatness of their professions does arouse in his mind a temporary incredulity.

A circle gathers round them, in the midst of which are Socrates, the two brothers, the youth Cleinias, who is watched by the eager eyes of his lover Ctesippus, and others.

The performance begins; and such a performance as might well seem to require an invocation of Memory and the Muses. It is agreed that the brothers shall question Cleinias. "Cleinias," says Euthydemus, "who learn, the wise or the unwise?" "The wise," is the reply; given with blushing and hesitation. "And yet when you learned you did not know and were not wise." Then Dionysodorus takes up the ball: "Who are they who learn
dictation of the grammar-master; the wise boys or the foolish
boys?" "The wise." "Then after all the wise learn." "And
do they learn," said Euthydemus, "what they know or what they
do not know?" "The latter." "And dictation is a dictation
of letters?" "Yes." "And you know letters?" "Yes."
"Then you learn what you know." "But," retorts Dionysodorus,"is not learning acquiring knowledge?" "Yes." "And
you acquire that which you have not got already." "Then you
learn that which you do not know."

Socrates is afraid that the youth Cleinias may be discouraged
at these repeated overthrows. He therefore explains to him the
nature of the process to which he is being subjected. The two
strangers are not serious; there are jests at the mysteries which
precede the enthronement, and he is being initiated into the mys-
teries of the sophistical ritual. This is all a sort of horse-play,
which is now ended. The exhortation to virtue will follow, and
Socrates himself (if the wise men will not laugh at him) is de-
sirous of carrying on such an exhortation, by way of example to
them, according to his own poor notion. He proceeds to question
Cleinias. The result of the investigation may be summed up as
follows: —

All men desire good; and good means the possession of goods,
such as wealth, health, beauty, birth, power, honor; not forget-
ting the virtues and wisdom. And yet in this enumeration the
greatest good of all is omitted. What is that? Good fortune.
But what need is there of good fortune when we have wisdom
already: — in every art and business are not the wise also the
fortunate? This is admitted. And again, the possession of
goods is not enough; there must be a right use of them as well,
and this can only be given by knowledge: in themselves they
are neither good nor evil, but knowledge and wisdom are the only
good, and ignorance and folly the only evil. The conclusion is
that we must get "wisdom." But can wisdom be taught? "Yes,"
says Cleinias. Socrates is delighted at the ingenuousness of the
youth relieving him from the necessity of discussing one of his
great puzzles. "As wisdom is the only good, he must become
a philosopher, or lover of wisdom." "That I will," says Clei-

After Socrates has given this specimen of his own mode of
instruction, the two brothers recommence their exhortation to
virtue, which is of quite another sort.

"You want Cleinias to be wise?" "Yes." "And he is not
wise yet?" "No." "Then you want him to be what he is not,
and not to be what he is? — not to be — that is, to perish. Pretty lovers and friends you must all be!"

Here Ctesippus, the lover of Cleinias interposes in great excitement, thinking that he will teach the two Sophists a lesson of good manners. But he is quickly entangled in the meshes of their sophistry; and as a storm seems to be gathering Socrates pacifies him with a joke, and Ctesippus then says that he is not reviling the two Sophists, he is only contradicting them. "But," says Dionysodorus, "there is no such thing as contradiction. When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe one thing and I describe another, how is there any contradiction in that?" Ctesippus is unable to reply.

Socrates has already heard of the denial of contradiction, and would like to be informed by the great master of the art, "What is the meaning of this?" Do they mean that there is no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood? Then what are they professing to teach? The two Sophists complain that Socrates is ready to answer what they said a year ago, but is "non-plussed" at which they are saying now. "What does the word 'non-plussed' mean?" Socrates is informed in reply that words are lifeless things, and lifeless things have no sense or meaning. Ctesippus again breaks out, and again has to be pacified by Socrates, who renews the conversation with Cleinias. The two Sophists are like Proteus in the variety of their transformations, and he, like Menelaus, hopes to restore them to their natural form.

He had arrived at the conclusion that philosophy must be studied. And philosophy is the possession of knowledge; and knowledge must be of a kind which is profitable, and in which knowledge and use coincide. What knowledge is there which is of such a nature? Not the knowledge which is required in any particular art; nor again the art of the composer of speeches, who knows how to write them, but can not speak them, although he too must be admitted to be a kind of enchanter of wild animals. Neither is the knowledge for which we are searching the knowledge of the general. For the general makes over his prey to the statesman, as the huntsman does to the cook, or the taker of quails to the keeper of quails; he has not the use of that which he acquires. The two inquirers, Cleinias and Socrates, are described as wandering about in a wilderness, vainly searching after the art of life and happiness. At last they fix upon the kingly art, as having the desired sort of knowledge. But the kingly art only gives men those goods which are neither good
nor evil: and if we say further that it makes us wise, in what does it make us wise? Not in special arts, such as cobbling or carpentering, but only in itself: or say again that it makes us good, there is no answer to the question, "good in what?" At length in despair Cleinias and Socrates turn to the "Dioscuri" and request their aid.

Euthydemus argues that Socrates know something; and as he can not know and not know, he can not know some things and not know others, and therefore he knows all things: he and Dionysodorus and all other men know all things. "Do they know shoemaking, etc.?" "Yes." The sceptical Ctesippus would like to have some evidence of this extraordinary statement: he will believe if Euthydemus will tell him how many stumps of teeth Dionysodorus has, and if Dionysodorus will give him a like piece of information about Euthydemus. Even Socrates is incredulous, and indulges in a little raillery at the expense of the brothers. But he restrains himself, remembering that if the men who are to be his teachers think him stupid they will take no pains with him. Another fallacy is produced which turns on the absoluteness of the verb "to know." And here Euthydemus is caught "napping," and is induced by Socrates to confess that "he does not know the good to be unjust." Socrates recommends him to call his brother Dionysodorus to his assistance, as Heracles called his nephew Iolaus. Dionysodorus rejoins that Iolaus was no more the nephew of Heracles than of Socrates. For a nephew is a nephew, and a brother is a brother, and a father is a father, not of one man only, but of all; nor of men only, but of dogs and sea-monsters. Ctesippus makes merry with the consequences which follow: "Much good has your father got out of the wisdom of his puppies."

But, says Euthydemus, unabashed, "Nobody wants much good." Medicine is a good, arms are a good, money is a good, and yet there may be too much of them in wrong places. "No," says Ctesippus, "there can not be too much gold." "And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your belly, a talent in your plate, and a stater in either eye?" Ctesippus, imitating the new wisdom, replies, "And do not the Scythians reckon those to be the happiest of men who have their skulls gilded and see the inside of them?" "Do you see," retorts Euthydemus, "what has the quality of vision or what has not the quality of vision?" "And you see our garments?" "Yes." "Then our garments have the quality of vision." A similar play of words follows, which
is successfully retorted by Ctesippus, to the great delight of Cleinias, who is rebuked by Socrates for laughing at such solemn and beautiful things.

"But are there any beautiful things? And if there are such, are they the same or not the same as absolute beauty?" Socrates replies that they are not the same, but each of them has some beauty present with it. "And are you an ox because you have an ox present with you?" After a few more similar amphiboliae, in which Socrates, like Ctesippus, in self-defence borrows the weapons of the brothers, they both confess that the two heroes are invincible; and the scene concludes with a grand chorus of shouting and laughing, and a panegyrical oration from Socrates:

First, he praises the indifference of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus to public opinion; for most persons would rather be refuted by such arguments than use them in the refutation of others. Secondly, he remarks upon their impartiality; for they stop their own mouths, as well as those of other people. Thirdly, he notes their liberality, which makes them give away their secret to all the world: they should be more reserved, and let no one be present at this exhibition who does not pay them money; or better still they might practise on one another only. He concludes with a respectful request that they will take him and Cleinias as their disciples.

Crito tells Socrates that he has heard one of the audience criticize severely this wisdom,—not sparing Socrates himself for countenancing such an exhibition. Socrates asks what manner of man was this censorious critic. "Not an orator, but a great composer of speeches." Socrates understands that he is an amphibious sort of animal, half philosopher, half politician; one of a class who have the highest opinion of themselves, and a spite against philosophers, whom they imagine to be their rivals. They are a class who are very likely to get mauled by Euthydemus and his friends, and have a great notion of their own wisdom; for they imagine themselves to have all the advantages and none of the drawbacks both of politics and of philosophy. They do not understand the principles of combination, and hence are ignorant that the union of two good things which have different ends produces a compound inferior to either of them taken separately.

Crito is anxious about the education of his children, one of whom is growing up. The description of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus suggests to him the reflection that the professors
of strange beings. Socrates consoles him with the remark that the good in all professions are few, and recommends that "he and his house," should continue to serve philosophy, and not mind about its professors.

There is a stage in the history of philosophy in which the old is dying out, and the new has not yet come into full life. Great philosophies like the Eleatic or Heraclitean, which have enlarged the boundaries of the human mind, begin to pass away in words. They subsist only as forms which have rooted themselves in language—as troublesome elements of thought which can not be either used or explained away. The same absoluteness which was once attributed to abstractions is now attached to the words which are the signs of them. The philosophy which in the first and second generation was a great and inspiring effort of reflection, in the third becomes sophistical, verbal, eristic.

It is this stage of philosophy which Plato satirizes in the Euthydemus. The fallacies which are noted by him appear trifling to us now, but they were not trifling in the age before logic, in the decline of the earlier Greek philosophies, at a time when language was first beginning to perplex human thought. Besides he is caricaturing them; they probably received more subtle forms at the hands of those who seriously maintained them. They are patent to us in Plato, and we are inclined to wonder how any one could ever have been deceived by them; but we must remember also that there was a time when the human mind was only with great difficulty disentangled from such fallacies.

To appreciate fully the drift of the Euthydemus, we should imagine a mental state in which not individuals only, but whole schools during more than one generation, were animated by the desire to exclude the conception of rest, and therefore the very word "thus" from language; in which the ideas of space, time, matter, motion, were proved to be contradictory and imaginary; in which the nature of qualitative change was a puzzle, and even differences of degree, when applied to abstract notions, were not understood; in which contradiction itself was denied; in which, on the one hand, it was affirmed that every predicate was true of every subject, and on the other hand, that no predicate was true of any subject; and that nothing was, or was known, or could be spoken. Let us imagine disputes carried on with religious earnestness and more than scholastic subtlety, in which the catch-
words of philosophy are completely detached from their context. To such disputes the humor, whether of Plato in the ancient, or of Pope and Swift in the modern world, is the natural enemy. Nor must we forget that in modern times there is no fallacy so gross, no trick of language so transparent, no abstraction so barren and unmeaning, no form of thought so contradictory to experience, which has not been found to satisfy the minds of philosophical inquirers at a certain stage, or when regarded from a certain point of view only. The peculiarity of the fallacies of our own age is that we live within them, and are therefore generally unconscious of them.

Aristotle has analyzed several of the same fallacies in his book "De Sophisticis Elenchis," which Plato, with equal command of their true nature, has preferred to bring to the test of ridicule. At first we are only struck with the broad humor of this "reductio ad absurdum:" gradually we perceive that some important questions begin to emerge. Here, as everywhere else, Plato is making war against the philosophers who put words in the place of things, who tear arguments to tatters, who deny predication, and thus make knowledge impossible. Two great truths seem to be indirectly taught through these fallacies: (1) The uncertainty of language, which allows the same words to be used in different meanings, or with different degrees of meaning: (2) The necessary limitation or relative nature of all phenomena. Plato is aware that his own doctrine of ideas, as well as the Eleatic Being and Not-being, alike admit of being regarded as verbal fallacies.

Contrasted with the exhibition of the Sophists are the two discourses of Socrates in several respects: (1) In their perfect relevancy to the subject of discussion, whereas the Sophistical discourses are wholly irrelevant: (2) In their inquiring sympathetic tone, which encourages the youth, instead of "knocking him down," after the manner of the two Sophists: (3) In the absence of any definite conclusion — for while Socrates and the youth are agreed that philosophy is to be studied, they are not able to arrive at any certain result about the art which is to teach it. This is a question which will hereafter be answered in the Republic and the Politicus.

The characters of the Dialogue are easily intelligible. There is Socrates once more in the character of an old man; and his equal in years, Crito, the father of Critobulus, like Lysimachus in the Laches, his fellow demesman, to whom the scene is narrated, and who once or twice interrupts with a remark after the manner
of the interlocutor in the Phaedo, and adds his commentary at the end; Socrates makes a playful allusion to his money-getting habits. There is the youth Cleinias, the grandson of Alcibiades, who may be compared with Lysis, Charmides, Menexenus, and other ingenuous youths out of whose mouths Socrates draws his own lessons, and to whom he always seems to stand in a kindly and sympathetic relation. Crito will not believe that Socrates has not improved or perhaps invented the answers of Cleinias. The name of the grandson of Alcibiades, who is described as long dead, and who died at the age of forty-four, in the year 404 B.C., suggests not only that the intended scene of the Dialogue could not have been earlier than 404, but that as a fact this Dialogue, which is probably one of the earliest of the Platonic writings, could not have been composed before 390 at the soonest, and probably even later. Ctesippus, who is the lover of Cleinias, has been already introduced to us in the Lysis, and seems there too to deserve the character which is here given him, of a somewhat uproarious young man. But the chief study of all is the picture of the two brothers, who are unapproached in their effrontery, equally careless of what they say to others and of what is said to them, and never at a loss. They are "Arcades ambo et cantare pares et respondere parati." Some superior degree of wit or subtlety is attributed, however, to Euthydemus, who continues the conversation when Dionysodorus has been put to silence.

The epilogue or conclusion of the Dialogue has been criticized as inconsistent with the general scheme. Such a criticism is like similar criticisms on Shakespeare, and proceeds upon a narrow notion of the variety which the Dialogue, like the drama, seems to admit. Plato in the abundance of his dramatic power has chosen to write a play upon a play, just as he often gives us an argument within an argument. At the same time he takes the opportunity of assailing another class of persons who are as alien from the spirit of philosophy as Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. The Eclectic, the Syncretist, the Doctrinaire, have been apt to have a bad name both in ancient and modern times. The persons whom Plato ridicules in the epilogue to the Euthydemus are of this class. They occupy a border-ground between philosophy and politics; they are free from the dangers of politics, and at the same time use philosophy as a means of serving their own interests. Plato quaintly describes them as making two good things, philosophy and politics, a little worse by perverting the objects of both.
Education is the common subject of all Plato's earlier Dialogues. The concluding remark of Crito, that he has a difficulty in educating his two sons, and the advice of Socrates to him that he should not give up philosophy because he has no faith in philosophers, seems to be a preparation for the more peremptory declaration of the Meno that "Virtue can not be taught because there are no teachers."
Crito. Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday at the Lyceum? There was such a crowd around you that I could not get within hearing, but I caught a sight of him over their heads, and I made out, as I thought, that he was a stranger with whom you were talking: who was he?

Socrates. There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean?

Cri. The one who was seated second from you on the right-hand side. In the middle was Cleinias the young son of Axiochus, who has wonderfully grown; he is only about the age of my own Critobulus, but he is much forwarder and very good-looking: the other is thin and looks younger than he is.

Soc. He whom you mean, Crito, is Euthydemus; and on my left hand there was his brother Dionysodorus, who also took part in the conversation.

Cri. Neither of them are known to me, Socrates; they are a new importation of Sophists, as I should imagine. Of what country are they, and what is their line of wisdom?

Soc. As to their origin, I believe that they are natives of this part of the world, and have migrated
from Chios and Thurii; they were driven out of Thurii, and have been living for many years past in this region. As to their wisdom, about which you ask, Crito, they are wonderful — consummate! I never knew what the true pancratiaist was before; they are simply made up of fighting, not like the two Acarnanian brothers who fight with their bodies only, but this pair are perfect in the use of their bodies and have a universal mode of fighting (for they are capital at fighting in armor, and will teach the art to any one who pays them): and also they are masters of legal fence, and are ready to do battle in the courts; they will give lessons in speaking and pleading, and in writing speeches. And this was only the beginning of their wisdom, but they have at last carried out the pancratiastic art to the very end, and have mastered the only mode of fighting which had been hitherto neglected by them; and now no one dares look at them: such is their skill in the war of words, that they can refute any proposition whether true or false. Now I am thinking, Crito, of putting myself in their hands; for they say that in a short time they can impart their skill to any one.

Crito. But, Socrates, are you not too old? there may be reason to fear that.

Socrates. Certainly not, Crito; as I will prove to you, for I have the consolation of knowing that they began this art of disputation which I covet, quite, as I may say, in old age; last year, or the year before, they had none of their new wisdom. I am only apprehensive that I may bring the two strangers into disrepute, as I have done Connus the son of Metrobius, the harp-player, who is still my music-master; for when the boys who also go to him see me going, they laugh at me and call him grandpapa's master. Now I should not like the strangers to experience this sort of treat-
ment, and perhaps they may be afraid and not like to receive me because of this; and therefore, Crito, I shall try and persuade some old men to go along with me to them, as I persuaded them to go to Con-
nus, and I hope that you will make one: and perhaps we had better take your sons as a bait; they will want to have them, and will be willing to receive us as pupils for the sake of them.

*Cri.* I see no objection, Socrates, if you like; but first I wish that you would give me a description of their wisdom, that I may know beforehand what we are going to learn.

*Soc.* I will tell you at once; for I can not say that I did not attend: the fact was that I paid great atten-
tion to them, and I remember and will endeavor to tell you the whole story. I was providentially sitting alone in the dressing-room of the Lyceum in which you saw me, and was about to depart, when as I was getting up I recognized the familiar divine sign: so I sat down again, and in a little while the two broth-
ers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus came in, and sev-
eral others with them, whom I believe to be their dis-
ciples, and they walked about in the covered space; they had not taken more than two or three turns when Cleinias entered, who, as you truly say, is very much improved: he was followed by a host of lovers, one of whom was Ctesippus the Paeanian, a well-bred youth, but also having the wildness of youth. Cleinias saw me from the entrance as I was sitting alone, and at once came and sat down on the right hand of me, as you describe; and Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him, at first stopped and talked with one another, now and then glancing at us, for I par-
ticularly watched them; and then Euthydemus came and sat down by the youth, and the other by me on the left hand; the rest anywhere. I saluted the broth-
ers, whom I had not seen for a long time; and then I said to Cleinias: These two men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Cleinias, are not in a small but in a large way of wisdom, for they know all about war,—all that a good general ought to know about the array and command of an army, and the whole art of fighting in armor: and they know about law too, and can teach a man how to use the weapons of the courts when he is injured.

They heard me say this, and I was despised by them; they looked at one another, and both of them laughed; and then Euthydemus said: Those, Socrates, are matters which we no longer pursue seriously; they are secondary occupations to us.

Indeed, I said, if such occupations are regarded by you as secondary, what must the principal one be; tell me, I beseech you, what that noble study is?

The teaching of virtue, Socrates, he replied, is our principal occupation; and we believe that we can impart it better and quicker than any man.

My God! I said, and where did you learn that? I always thought, as I was saying just now, that your chief accomplishment was the art of fighting in armor; and this was what I used to say of you, for I remember that this was professed by you when you were here before. But now if you really have the other knowledge, O forgive me: I address you as I would superior beings, and ask you to pardon the impiety of my former expression. But are you quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus; the promise is so vast, that a feeling of incredulity will creep in.

You may take our word, Socrates, for the fact.

Then I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king is in the possession of his kingdom. And please to tell me whether you intend to exhibit this wisdom, or what you will do.
That is why we are come hither, Socrates; and our purpose is not only to exhibit, but also to teach any one who likes to learn.

But I can promise you, I said, that every unvirtuous person will want to learn. I shall be the first; and there is the youth Cleinias, and Ctesippus: and here are several others, I said, pointing to the lovers of Cleinias, who were beginning to gather round us. Now Ctesippus was sitting at some distance from Cleinias; and when Euthydemus leaned forward in talking with me, he was prevented from seeing Cleinias, who was between us; and so, partly because he wanted to look at his love, and also because he was interested, he jumped up and stood opposite to us: and all the other admirers of Cleinias, as well as the disciples of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, followed his example. And these were the persons whom I showed to Euthydemus, telling him that they were all eager to learn: to which Ctesippus and all of them with one voice vehemently assented, and bid him exhibit the power of his wisdom. Then I said: O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I earnestly request you to do myself and the company the favor to exhibit. There may be some trouble in giving the whole exhibition; but tell me one thing,—can you make a good man only of him who is convinced that he ought to learn of you, or of him also who is not convinced? either because he imagines that virtue is not a thing which can be taught at all, or that you two are not the teachers of it. Say whether your art is able to persuade such an one nevertheless that virtue can be taught; and that you are the men from whom he will be most likely to learn.

This is the art, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and no other.

And you, Dionysodorus, I said, are the men who
among those who are now living are the most likely to stimulate him to philosophy and the study of virtue?

Yes, Socrates, I rather think that we are.
Then I wish that you would be so good as to defer the other part of the exhibition, and only try to persuade the youth whom you see here that he ought to be a philosopher and study virtue. Exhibit that, and you will confer a great favor on me and on every one present; for the fact is that I and all of us are extremely anxious that he should be truly good. His name is Cleinias, and he is the son of Axiochus, and grandson of the old Alcibiades, cousin of the Alcibiades that now is. He is quite young, and we are naturally afraid that some one may get the start of us, and turn his mind in a wrong direction, and he may be ruined. Your visit, therefore, is most happily timed; and I hope that you will make a trial of the young man, and converse with him in our presence, if you have no objection.

These were pretty nearly the expressions which I used; and Euthydemus, in a lofty and at the same time cheerful tone, replied: There can be no objection, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer questions.

He is quite accustomed to that, I replied; for his friends often come and ask him questions and argue with him; so that he is at home in answering.

What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? for not slight is the task of rehearsing infinite wisdom, and therefore, like the poets, I ought to commence my relation with an invocation to Memory and the Muses. Now Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant?

The youth, overpowered by the question, blushed,
and in his perplexity looked at me for help; and I, knowing that he was disconcerted, said: Don't be afraid, Cleinias, but answer like a man whichever you think; for my belief is that you will derive the greatest good from their questions.

Whichever he answers, said Dionysodorus, leaning forward in my ear and laughing, I prophesy that he will be refuted, Socrates.

While he was speaking to me, Cleinias gave his answer: the consequence was that I had no time to warn him of the predicament in which he was placed, and he answered that those who learned were the wise.

Euthydemus proceeded: There are those whom you call teachers, are there not?

The boy assented.

And they are the teachers of those who learn—the grammar-master and the lyre-master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners?

Yes.

And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you were learning?

No, he said.

And were you wise then?

No, indeed, he said.

But if you were not wise you were unlearned?

Certainly.

You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were learning?

The youth nodded assent.

Then the unlearned learn, and not the wise, Cleinias, as you imagine.

At these words the followers of Euthydemus, of whom I spoke, like a chorus at the bidding of their director, laughed and cheered. Then, before the youth had well time to recover, Dionysodorus took him in hand, and said: Yes, Cleinias; and when the
grammar-master dictated to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned who learned the dictation?
   The wise, replied Cleinias.
   Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned; and your last answer to Euthydemus was wrong.
   Then followed another peal of laughter and shouting, which came from the admirers of the two heroes, who were ravished with their wisdom, while the rest of us were silent and amazed. This Euthydemus perceiving, determined to persevere with the youth; and in order to heighten the effect went on asking another similar question, which might be compared to the double turn of an expert dancer. Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or what they do not know?
   Dionysodorus said to me in a whisper: That, Socrates, is just another of the same sort.
   Good heavens, I said; and your last question was so good!
   Like all our other questions, Socrates, he replied,—inevitable.
   I see the reason, I said, why you are in such reputation among your disciples.
   Meanwhile Cleinias had answered Euthydemus that those who learned learn what they do not know; and he put him through a series of questions as before.
   Don’t you know letters?
   He assented.
   All letters?
   Yes.
   But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters?
   He admitted that.
   Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know?
He admitted that also.

Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he only who does not know letters learns?

Nay, said Cleinias; but I do learn.
Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters?
He admitted that.
Then, he said, you were wrong in your answer.
The word was hardly out of his mouth when Dionysodorus took up the argument, like a ball which he caught, and had another throw at the youth. Cleinias, he said, Euthydemus is deceiving you. For tell me now, is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns?
Cleinias assented.
And knowing is having knowledge at the time?
He agreed.
And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time?
He admitted that.
And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing?
Those who have not.
And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of those who have not?
He nodded assent.
Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of those who have?
He agreed.
Then, Cleinias, he said, those who do not know learn, and not those who know.
Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third fall; but I knew that he was in deep water, and therefore, as I wanted to give him a rest, and also in order that he might not get out of heart, I said to him
consolingly: You must not be surprised, Cleinias, at the singularity of their mode of speech: this I say because you may not understand what they are doing with you; they are only initiating you after the manner of the Corybantes in the mysteries; and this answers to the enthronement, which, if you have ever been initiated, is, as you will know, accompanied by dancing and sport; and now they are just prancing and dancing about you, and will next proceed to initiate you; and at this stage you must imagine yourself to have gone through the first part of the sophistical ritual, which, as Prodicus says, begins with initiation into the correct use of terms. The two strange gentlemen wanted to explain to you, as you do not know, that the word "to learn" has two meanings, and is used, first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of some matter of which you previously have no knowledge, and also, when you have the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this same matter done or spoken by the light of this knowledge; this last is generally called "knowing" rather than "learning;" but the word "learning" is also used, and you did not see that the word is used of two opposite sorts of men, of those who know, and of those who do not know, as they explained. There was a similar trick in the second question, when they asked you whether men learn what they know or what they do not know. These parts of learning are not serious, and therefore I say that these gentlemen are not serious, but only in fun with you. And if a man had all that sort of knowledge that ever was, he would not be at all the wiser; he would only be able to play with men, tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of words. He would be like a person who pulls away a stool from some one when he is about to sit down, and then laughs and claps his hands at the sight
of his friend sprawling on the ground. And you must regard all that has passed hitherto as merely play. But now I am certain that they will proceed to business, and keep their promise (I will show them how); for they promised to give me a sample of the hortatory philosophy, but I suppose that they wanted to have a game of play with you first. And now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I said, I think that we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you exhibiting to the young man, and showing him how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you what I conceive to be the nature of the task, and what I desire to hear; and if I do this in a very inartistic and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at me, for I only venture to improvise before you because I am eager to hear your wisdom: and I must therefore ask you to keep your countenances, and your disciples also. And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you: Do not all men desire happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one of those ridiculous questions which I am afraid to ask, and which ought not to be asked by a sensible man: for what human being is there who does not desire happiness?

There is no one, said Cleinias, who does not.

Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be happy? — that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the first, for there can be no doubt of the answer.

He assented.

And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us this, which may be easily answered; for every one will say that wealth is a good.
Certainly, he said.
And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?
He agreed.
Now, can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honors in one's own land, are goods?
He assented.
And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of justice, temperance, courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you say?
They are goods, said Cleinias.
Very well, I said; and in what company shall we find a place for wisdom—among the goods or not?
Among the goods.
And now, I said, think whether we have left out any considerable goods.
I do not think that we have, said Cleinias.
Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the greatest of them all.
What is that? he asked.
Fortune, Cleinias, I replied; which all, even the most foolish, admit to be the greatest of goods.
True, he said.
On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axiochus, have you and I escaped making a laughing-stock of ourselves to the strangers.
Why do you say that?
Why, because we have already spoken of fortune, and are but repeating ourselves.
What do you mean?
I mean that there is something ridiculous in putting fortune again forward, and saying the same thing twice over.
He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied: Surely wisdom is good fortune; even a child may know that.

The simple-minded youth was amazed; and, observing this, I said to him: Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players are most fortunate and successful in performing on the flute?

He assented.

And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters?

Certainly.

Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole than wise pilots?

None, certainly.

And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the risk — in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one?

With a wise one.

And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illness — a wise physician, or an ignorant one?

A wise one.

You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one?

He assented.

Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man could ever err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer. At last we somehow contrived to agree in a general conclusion, that he who had wisdom had no longer need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember, I said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us?

He assented.
And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they profited us not, or if they profited us?

If they profited us, he said.

And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should we be profited?

Certainly not, he said.

Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of all that he ought to possess? For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked?

Certainly not, he said.

And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them?

No indeed, Socrates.

Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them?

True.

Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness?

Yes, in my opinion.

And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly?

He must use them rightly.

That is quite true, I said. And the wrong use of a thing is far worse than the non-use; for the one is an evil, and the other is neither a good nor an evil. You admit that.

He assented.
Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter?

Nothing else, he said.

And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them?

He agreed.

And in the use of the goods of which we spoke at first—wealth and health and beauty, is not knowledge that which directs us to the right use of them, and guides our practice about them?

Knowledge, he replied.

Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only good fortune but success?

He assented.

And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he have neither sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes? if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable?

Certainly, he said.

And who would do least—a poor man or a rich man?

A poor man.

A weak man or a strong man?

A weak man.

A noble man or a mean man?

A mean man.

And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man?

Yes.
And an indolent man less than an active man?
He assented.

And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen eyes?

All this was mutually allowed by us.

Then, I said, Cleinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are more able to minister to the evil principle which rules them; and when under the guidance of wisdom and virtue, they are greater goods: but in themselves they are nothing?

That, he said, appears to be certain.

What then, I said, is the result of all this? Is not this the result — that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and ignorance the only evil?

He assented.

Let us consider this further point, I said: Seeing that all men desire happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, and a right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and good fortune in the use of them, is given by knowledge, — the inference is that every man ought by all means to try and make himself as wise as he can?

Yes, he said.

And the desire to obtain this treasure, which is far more precious than money, from a father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor, whether citizen or stranger — the eager desire and prayer to them that they would impart wisdom to you, is not at all dis-
honorable, Cleinias; nor is any one to be blamed for doing any honorable service or ministration to any man, whether a lover or not, if his aim is wisdom. Do you agree to that, I said?

Yes, he said, I quite agree, and think that you are right.

Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not come to man spontaneously; for that is a point which has still to be considered, and is not yet agreed upon by you and me.

But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said.

Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say that; and I am also grateful to you for having saved me from a long and tiresome speculation as to whether wisdom can be taught or not. But now, as you think that wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man happy and fortunate, will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to love wisdom, and that you in particular should be of this mind and try to love her?

Certainly, Socrates, he said; and I will do my best.

I was pleased at hearing this; and I turned to Dionysodorus and Euthydemus and said: That is an example, clumsy and tedious I admit, of the sort of exhortations which I desire you to offer; and I hope that one of you will set forth what I have been saying in a more artistic style: at any rate take up the inquiry where I left off, and next show the youth whether he should have all knowledge; or whether there is one sort of knowledge only which will make him good and happy, and what that is. For, as I was saying at first, the improvement of this young man in virtue and wisdom is a matter which we have very much at heart.

Thus I spoke, Crito, and was all attention to what
was coming. I wanted to see how they would approach the question, and where they would start in their exhortation to the young man that he should practise wisdom and virtue. Dionysodorus the elder spoke first. Everybody's eyes were directed towards him, perceiving that something wonderful might shortly be expected. And certainly they were not far wrong; for the man, Crito, began a remarkable discourse well worth hearing, and wonderfully persuasive as an exhortation to virtue.

Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest?

(I was led by this to imagine that they fancied us to have been jesting when we asked them to converse with the youth, and that this made them jest and play, and being under this impression, I was the more decided in saying that we were in profound earnest.) Dionysodorus said:

Reflect, Socrates; you may have to deny your words.

I have reflected, I said; and I shall never deny my words.

Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise?

Undoubtedly.

And he is not wise as yet?

At least his modesty will not allow him to say that he is.

You wish him, he said, to become wise and not to be ignorant?

That we do.

You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is.

I was thrown into consternation at this.

Taking advantage of my consternation he added:
You wish him no longer to be what he is, which can only mean that you wish him to perish. Pretty lovers and friends they must be who want their favorite not to be, or to perish!

When Ctesippus heard this he got very angry (as a lover might) and said: Strangers of Thurii — if politeness would allow me I should say, You be —. What can make you tell such a lie about me and the others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to perish?

Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to tell a lie?

Yes, said Ctesippus; I should be mad to deny that.

And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not?

You tell the thing of which you speak.
And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other?

Yes, said Ctesippus.
And that is a distinct thing apart from other things?
Certainly.
And he who says that thing says that which is?
Yes.
And he who says that which is, says the truth. And therefore Dionysodorus, if he says that which is, says the truth of you and no lie.

Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but in saying this, he says what is not.

Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not.

True.
And that which is not is nowhere?
Nowhere.
And can any one do anything about that which has
no existence, or do to Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere?
   I think not, said Ctesippus.
   Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing?
   Nay, he said, they do something.
   And doing is making?
   Yes.
   And speaking is doing and making?
   He agreed.
   Then no one says that which is not, for in saying that, he would be doing nothing; and you have already acknowledged that no one can do what is not. And therefore, upon your own showing, no one says what is false; but if Dionysodorus, says anything, he says what is true and what is.
   Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but he speaks of things in a certain way and manner, and not as they really are.
   Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one speaks of things as they are?
   Yes, he said, — all gentlemen and truth-speaking persons.
   And are not good things good, and evil things evil?
   He assented.
   And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are?
   Yes.
   Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they are?
   Yes, indeed, he said; and they speak evil of evil men. And if I may give you a piece of advice, you had better take care that they don’t speak evil of you, since I can tell you that the good speak evil of the evil.
   And do they speak great things of the great,
rejoined Euthydemus, and warm things of the warm?

Yes, indeed, said Ctesippus; and they speak coldly of the insipid and cold dialectician.

You are abusive, Ctesippus, you are abusive!

Indeed, I am not, Dionysodorus, he replied; for I love you and am giving you friendly advice, and, if I could, would persuade you not to make so uncivil a speech to me as that I desire my beloved, whom I value above all men, to perish.

I saw that they were getting exasperated with one another, so I made a joke with him and said: O Ctesippus, I think that we must allow the strangers to use language in their own way, and not quarrel with them about words, but be thankful for what they give us. If they know how to destroy men in such a way as to make good and sensible men out of bad and foolish ones — whether this is a discovery of their own, or whether they have learned from some one else, this new sort of death and destruction, which enables them to get rid of a bad man and put a good one in his place — if they know this (and they do know this — at any rate they said just now that this was the secret of their newly-discovered art) — let them, in their phraseology, destroy the youth and make him wise, and all of us with him. But if you young men do not like to trust yourselves with them, then fiat experimentum in corpore senis; I will be the Carian on whom they shall operate. And here I offer my old person to Dionysodorus; he may put me into the pot, like Medea the Colchian, kill me, pickle me, eat me, if he will only make me good.

Ctesippus said: And I, Socrates, am ready to commit myself to the strangers; they may skin me alive, if they please (and I am pretty well skinned by them already), if only my skin is made at last, not like that
of Marsyas, into a leathern bottle, but into a piece of virtue. And here is Dionysodorus fancying that I am angry with him, when I am really not angry at all; I do but contradict him when he seems to me to be in the wrong: and you must not confound abuse and contradiction, O illustrious Dionysodorus; for they are quite different things.

Contradiction! said Dionysodorus; why, there never was such a thing.

Certainly there is, he replied; there can be no question of that. Do you, Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not?

You will never prove to me, he said, that you have heard any one contradicting any one else.

Indeed, he said; then now you may hear Ctesippus contradicting Dionysodorus. Are you prepared to make that good?

Certainly, he said.

Well, then, are not words expressive of things?

Yes.

Of their existence or of their non-existence?

Of their existence. For, as you may remember, Ctesippus, we just now proved that no man could affirm a negative; for no one could affirm that which is not.

And what does that signify, said Ctesippus; you and I may contradict all the same for that.

But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us are describing the same thing? Then we must surely be speaking the same thing?

He admitted that.

Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? For then neither of us says a word about the thing at all?

He granted that also.

But when I describe something and you describe
another thing, or I say something and you say nothing—is there any contradiction? How can he who speaks contradict him who speaks not?

Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I have often heard, and have been amazed, to hear this thesis of yours, which is maintained and employed by the disciples of Protagoras, and others before them, and which to me appears to be quite wonderful and suicidal, as well as destructive, and I think that I am most likely to hear the truth of this from you. The dictum is that there is no such thing as falsehood; a man must either say what is true or say nothing. Is not that your position?

He assented.

But if he can not speak falsely, may he not think falsely?
No, he can not, he said.
Then there is no such thing as false opinion?
No, he said.
Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of facts?
Certainly, he said.
And that is impossible?
Impossible, he replied.
Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously maintain that no man is ignorant?
Do you refute me? he said.
But how can I refute you, if, as you say, falsehood is impossible?
Very true, said Euthydemus.
Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how can I tell you to do that which is not?
O Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception
of these subtleties and excellent devices of wisdom; I am afraid that I hardly understand them, and you must forgive me therefore if I ask a very stupid question: if there be no falsehood or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no such thing as erroneous action, for a man can not fail of acting as he is acting — that is what you mean?

Yes, he replied.

And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question: If there is no such thing as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in the name of goodness, do you come hither to teach? And were you not just now saying that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who could learn?

And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionysodorus, that you bring up now what I said at first — and if I had said anything last year, I suppose that you would bring that up — but are non-plussed at the words I have just uttered?

Why, I said, they are not easy to answer; for they are the words of wise men: and indeed I have a great difficulty in knowing what you mean in that last expression of yours, "that I am non-plussed at them." What do you mean by that, Dionysodorus? You must mean that I have no refutation of them. Tell me if the words have any other sense.

No, he said; the sense or meaning of them is that there is a difficulty in answering them; and I wish that you would answer.

What, before you, Dionysodorus? I said.

Answer, said he.

And is that fair?

Yes, quite fair, he said.

Upon what principle? I said. I can only suppose that you are a very wise man, who comes to us in the character of a great logician, and who knows when to
answer and when not to answer — and now you won't open your mouth at all, because you know that you ought not.

You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you admit that I am wise, answer as I tell you.

I suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the question.

Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless?

They are alive.

And do you know of any word which is alive?

I can not say that I do.

Then why did you ask me what sense my words had?

Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a sense; — what do you say, wise man? If I was not in error, and you do not refute me, all your wisdom will be non-plussed; but if I did fall into error, then again you are wrong in saying that there is no error, — and this remark was made by you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that this argument is not very likely to advance: even your skill in the subtleties of logic, which is really amazing, has not found out the way of throwing another and not falling yourself.

Ctesippus said: Men of Chios, Thurii, or however and whatever you call yourselves, I wonder at you, for you seem to have no objection to talking nonsense.

Fearing that there would be high words, I endeavored to soothe Ctesippus, and said to him: To you, Ctesippus, I must repeat what I said before to Cleinias — that you don't understand the peculiarity of these philosophers. They are not serious, but, like the Egyptian wizard, Proteus, they take different
forms and deceive us by their enchantments: and let us, like Menelaus, refuse to let them go until they show us their real form and character. When they are in earnest their full beauty will appear: let us then beg and entreat and beseech them to shine forth. And I think that I had better show them once more the form in which I pray to behold them. I will go on where I left off before, as well as I can, in the hope that I may touch their hearts and move them to pity, and that when they see me deeply serious, they may also be serious. You, Cleinias, I said, shall remind me at what point we left off. Did we not agree that philosophy should be studied? and was not that our conclusion?

Yes, he replied.

And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge?

Yes, he said.

And what knowledge ought we to acquire? Is not the simple answer to that, A knowledge that will do us good?

Certainly, he said.

And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the places where most gold was hidden in the earth?

Perhaps we should, he said.

But have we not already proved, I said, that we should be none the better off, even if without trouble and digging all the gold that there is in the earth were ours? And if we knew how to convert stones into gold, the knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how to use the gold? Do you not remember? I said.

I quite remember, he said.

Nor would any other knowledge, whether of money-making, or of medicine, or of any other art which knows only how to make a thing, and not to use that
which is made, be of any use to us. Is not that true?

He agreed.

And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal, without giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality, neither would there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy of the previous instances?

To all this he agreed.

Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as well as makes?

True, he said.

And our desire is not to be skilful lyre-makers, or artists of that sort; far otherwise: for with them the art which makes is one, and the art which uses is another. Having to do with the same, they are divided; for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre differ widely from one another. Am I not right?

He agreed.

And clearly we do not want the art of the flute-maker; for that is another of the same sort?

He assented.

But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches — would that be the art which would make us happy?

I think not, rejoined Cleinias.

And what proof have you of that? I asked.

I see, he replied, that there are some composers of speeches who do not know how to use the speeches which they make, just as the makers of lyres do not know how to use the lyres; and also some who are of themselves unable to compose speeches, but are able to use the speeches which the others make for them; and this proves that the art of making speeches is not the same as the art of using them.

Yes, I said; and that I think is a sufficient proof
that the art of making speeches is not one which will make a man happy. And yet I did think that the art which we are seeking might be discovered in that direction; for the composers of speeches, whenever I meet them, always appear to me to be very extraordinary men, Cleinias, and their art is lofty and divine, and no wonder. For their art is a part of the great art of enchantment, and hardly, if at all, inferior to it: and whereas the art of the enchanter is a mode of charming snakes and spiders and scorpions, and other monsters and pests, this art acts upon dicasts and ecclesiasts and bodies of men, for the charming and consoling of them. Do you agree with me?

Yes, he said, I think that you are quite right.

Whither then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have recourse?

I do not see my way, he said.

But I think that I do, I replied.

And what is your notion? asked Cleinias.

I think that the art of the general is the one the possession of which is most likely to make a man happy.

I do not think that, he said.

Why not? I said.

The art of the general is surely an art of hunting mankind.

What of that? I said.

Why, he said, no art of hunting extends beyond hunting and capturing; and when the prey is taken they can not use it; but the huntsman or fisherman hands it over to the cook, and the geometricians and astronomers and calculators (who all belong to the hunting class, for they do not make their diagrams, but only find out that which was previously contained in them) — they, I say, not being able to use but only to catch their prey, hand over their inventions to the
dialecticians to be applied by them, if they have any sense in them.

Good, I said, fairest and wisest Cleinias. And is this true?

Certainly, he said; just as a general when he takes a city or a camp hands over his new acquisition to the statesman, for he does not know how to use them himself; or as the quail-taker transfers the quails to the keeper of them. If we are looking for that art which is to make us blessed, and which is able to use that which it makes or takes, the art of the general is not the one, and some other must be found.

_Cri._ And do you mean to say, Socrates, that the youngster said that?

_Soc._ Are you incredulous, Crito?

_Cri._ Indeed, I am; for if he said that, I am of opinion that he needs neither Euthydemus nor any one else to be his instructor.

_Soc._ Perhaps I may have forgotten, and Ctesippus was the real answerer.

_Cri._ Ctesippus! nonsense.

_Soc._ All I know is that I heard these words, and that they were not spoken either by Euthydemus or Dionysodorus. I dare say, my good Crito, that they may have been spoken by some superior person. That I heard them I am certain.

_Cri._ Yes, indeed, Socrates, by some one a good deal superior, as I should be disposed to think. But did you carry the search any further, and did you find the art which you were seeking?

_Soc._ Find! my dear sir, no indeed. And we cut a poor figure; we were like children after larks, always on the point of catching the art, which was always getting away from us. But why should I repeat the whole story? At last we came to the kingly art, and inquired whether that gave and caused hap-
piness, and then we got into a labyrinth, and when we thought we were at the end, came out again at the beginning, having still to seek as much as ever.

_Cri._ How did that happen, Socrates?

_Soc._ I will tell you; the kingly art was identified by us with the political.

_Cri._ Well, and what came of that?

_Soc._ To this royal or political art all the arts, including that of the general, seemed to render up the supremacy, as to the only one which knew how to use that which they created. This seemed to be the very art which we were seeking — the art which is the source of good government, and which may be described, in the language of Aeschylus, as alone sitting at the helm of the vessel of state, piloting and governing all things, and utilizing them.

_Cri._ And were you not right, Socrates?

_Soc._ You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what followed; for we resumed the inquiry, and a question of this sort was asked: Does this kingly art, having this supreme authority, do anything for us? To be sure, was the answer. And would not you, Crito, say the same?

_Cri._ Yes, I should.

_Soc._ And what would you say that the kingly art does? If medicine were supposed to have supreme authority over the subordinate arts, and I were to ask you a similar question about that, you would say that it produces health?

_Cri._ I should.

_Soc._ And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have supreme authority over the subject arts — what does that do? Does it not supply us with the fruits of the earth?

_Cri._ Yes.

_Soc._ And what does the kingly art do when in-
vested with supreme power? Perhaps you may not
be ready with an answer?

_Cri._ Indeed I am not, Socrates.

_Soc._ No more were we, Crito. But at any rate
you know that if this is the art which we were seeking,
it ought to be useful?

_Cri._ Certainly.

_Soc._ And surely it ought to do us some good?

_Cri._ Certainly, Socrates.

_Soc._ And Cleinias and I had arrived at the con-
clusion that knowledge is the only good?

_Cri._ Yes, that was what you were saying.

_Soc._ All the other results of politics, and they are
many, as for example, wealth, freedom, tranquillity,
were neither good nor evil in themselves; but the
political science ought to make us wise, and impart
wisdom to us, if that is the science which is likely to
do us good, and make us happy.

_Cri._ Yes; that was the conclusion at which you had
arrived, according to your report of the conversation.

_Soc._ And does the kingly art make men wise and
good?

_Cri._ Why not, Socrates?

_Soc._ What, all men, and in every respect? and
teach them all the arts, — carpentering, and cobblling,
and the rest of them?

_Cri._ I do not think that, Socrates.

_Soc._ But then what is this knowledge, and what are
we to do with it? For it is not the source of any works
which are neither good nor evil, nor of any knowledge,
but the knowledge of itself; what then can it be, and
what are we to do with it? Shall we say, Crito, that
it is the knowledge by which we are to make other
men good?

_Cri._ By all means.

_Soc._ And in what way will they be good and use-
ful? Shall we repeat that they will make others good, and that these others will make others again, without ever determining in what they are to be good; for we put aside the results of politics, as they are called. Why, here is iteration; as I said, we are just as far, if not farther, than ever from the knowledge of the art or science of happiness.

_Cri._ Indeed, Socrates, you do appear to have got into a great perplexity.

_Soc._ Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on the point of shipwreck, I lifted up my voice, and earnestly entreated and called upon the strangers to save me and the youth from the whirlpool of the argument; they were our Castor and Pollux, I said, and they should be serious, and show us in sober earnest what that knowledge was which would enable us to pass the rest of our lives in happiness.

_Cri._ And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge?

_Soc._ Yes, indeed; he proceeded in a lofty strain to the following effect: Would you rather, Socrates, said he, that I should show you this knowledge about which you are doubting, or shall I prove that you already have it?

What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this?

Indeed I am.

Then I would much rather that you should prove me to have such a knowledge; at my time of life that will be more agreeable than having to learn.

Then tell me, he said, do you know anything?

Yes, I said, I know many things, but not anything of much importance.

That will do, he said. And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is?
Certainly not.
And did you not say that you knew something?
I did.
If you know, you are knowing.
Certainly, of the knowledge which I have.
That makes no difference; — and must you not, if
you are knowing, know all things?
Certainly not, I said, for there are many other
things which I do not know.
And if you do not know, you are not knowing.
Yes, my friend, I said, I am not knowing of that
which I do not know.
Still you are not knowing, and you said just now
that you were knowing; and therefore you are and
are not at the same time, and in reference to the same
things.
That sounds well, Euthydemus; and yet I must
ask you to explain how I have that knowledge which
we were seeking; — since a thing can not be and not
be, and if I know one thing I know all, for I can not
be knowing and not knowing at the same time, and
if I know all things, I must have that knowledge as
well. May I not assume that to be your ingenious
notion?
Out of your own mouth, Socrates, you are con-
victed, he said.
Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never hap-
pened to you; for if I am only in the same case as you
and our beloved Dionysodorus, I can not greatly mind
that. Tell me then, you two, do you not know some
things, and not know others?
Certainly not, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.
What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing?
Nay, he replied, we do know something.
Then, I said, you know all things, if you know
anything?
Yes, all things, he said; and that is as true of you as of us.
O, indeed, I said, what a wonderful thing, and what a great blessing! And do all other men know all things or nothing?
Certainly, he replied; they can not know some things, and not know others, and be at the same time knowing and not knowing.
Then what is the inference? I said.
They all know all things, he replied, if they know one thing.
O heavens, Dionysodorus, I said, I see now that you are in earnest; hardly have I got you to that point. And do you really know all things, including carpentering and leather-cutting?
Certainly, he said.
And do you know stitching?
Yes, indeed we do, and cobbling, too.
Yes.
And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand?
Certainly; did you think that we should say No to that?
By Zeus, said Ctesippus, interrupting, I only wish that you would give me some proof which would enable me to know whether you say truly.
What proof shall I give you? he said.
Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? and Euthydemus shall tell how many teeth you have.
Will you not take our word that we know all things?
Certainly not, said Ctesippus; you must further tell us this one thing, and then we shall know that you are speaking the truth; if you tell us the number, and we count them, and you are found to be right, we will
believe the rest. They fancied that Ctesippus was making game of them, and they refused, and contented themselves with saying, in answer to each of his questions, that they knew all things. Ctesippus at last began to throw off all restraint; no question was too bad for him; he would ask them if they knew the foulest things, and they, like wild boars, came rushing on his blows, and fearlessly replied that they did. At last, Crito, I too was carried away by my incredulity, and asked Euthydemus whether Dionysodorus could dance.

Certainly, he replied.

And can he vault upon swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? has he got to such a height of skill as that?

He can do anything, he said.

And did you always know this?

Always, he said.

When you were children, and at your birth?

They both said that they did.

This we could not believe. And Euthydemus said: You are incredulous, Socrates.

Yes, I said, and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know that you are wise men.

But if you will answer, he said, I will make you confess to similar marvels.

Well, I said, there is nothing that I should like better than to be self-convicted of this, for if I am really a wise man, which I never knew before, and you will prove to me that I know and have always known all things, there is nothing in life that would be a greater gain to me than that.

Answer then, he said.

Ask, I said, and I will answer.

Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing?

Something, I said.
And do you know with what you know, or with something else?
With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul?
Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked?
Well, I said; but then what am I to do? for I will do what you bid; when I do not know what you are asking, you tell me to answer nevertheless, and not to ask again.

Why, you surely have some notion of my meaning, he said.

Yes, I replied.

Well then answer according to your notion of my meaning.

Yes, I said; but if the question which you ask in one sense is understood and answered by me in another, will that please you — if I answer what is not to the point?
That will please me very well; but will not please you equally well, as I imagine.

I certainly will not answer unless I understand you, I said.
You won’t answer, he said, according to your view of the meaning, because you are an old fool and pedant.

Now I saw that he was getting angry with me for drawing distinctions, when he wanted to catch me in his springes of words. And I remembered that Connus was always angry with me when I opposed him, and then he neglected me, because he thought that I was stupid; and as I was intending to go to Euthydemus as a pupil, I thought that I had better let him have his way, as he might think me a blockhead, and refuse to take me. So I said: You are a far better dialectician than myself, Euthydemus, for I have
never made a profession of the art, and therefore do as you say; ask your questions once more, and I will answer.

Answer then, he said, once more, whether you know what you know with something, or with nothing.

Yes, I said; I know with my soul.

The man will go on adding to the question; for, said he, I did not ask you with what you know, but whether you know with something.

My ignorance, I said, led me to answer more than you asked, and I hope that you will forgive that. And now I will answer simply that I always know what I know with something.

And is that something, he rejoined, always the same, or sometimes one thing, and sometimes another thing?

Always, I replied, when I know, I know with this. Will you not cease adding to your answers?

My fear is that this word "always" may get us into trouble.

You, perhaps, but certainly not us. And now answer: Do you always know with this?

Always; since I am required to withdraw the words "when I know."

You always know with this, or, always knowing, do you know some things with this, and some things with something else, or do you know all things with this?

All that I know, I replied, I know with this.

There again, Socrates, he said, the addition is superfluous.

Well, then, I said, I will take away the words, "that I know."

Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favors of you; but let me ask: Would you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things?
Quite impossible.

And now, he said, you may add on whatever you like, for you confess that you know all things.

I suppose that is true, I said, if my qualification implied in the words, "that I know," is not allowed to stand; and so I do know all things.

And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which you know, whether you make the addition of when you know them or not? for you have acknowledged that you have always and at once known all things, that is to say, when you were a child, and at your birth, and when you were growing up, and before you were born, and before the heaven and earth existed, you knew all things if you always know them; and I swear that you shall always continue to know them if I am of the mind to make you.

But I hope that you will be of that mind, reverend Euthydemus, I said, if you are really speaking the truth, and yet I a little doubt your power to accomplish this unless you have the help of your brother Dionysodorus; then you may do it. Tell me now, for although in the main I can not doubt that I really do know all things, when I am told so by men of your prodigious wisdom — how can I say that I know such things as this, Euthydemus, that the good are unjust; come, do I know that or not?

Certainly, you know that.

What do I know?

That the good are not unjust.

Quite true, I said; and I have always known that; but the question is, where did I learn that the good are unjust?

Nowhere, said Dionysodorus.

Then, said I, I do not know this.

You are ruining the argument, said Euthydemus to
Dionysodorus; he will be proved not to know, and then after all he will be knowing and not knowing at the same time.

Dionysodorus blushed.

I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus? Does not your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake?

What, replied Dionysodorus in an instant; am I the brother of Euthydemus?

Thereupon I said, Please not to interrupt, my good friend, or prevent Euthydemus from proving to me that I know the unjust to be the good; such a lesson you might at least allow me to learn.

You are running away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and refusing to answer.

No wonder, I said, for I am not a match for one of you, and a fortiori I must run away from two. I am no Heracles; and even Heracles could not fight against the Hydra, who was a she-sophist, and had the wit to shoot up many new heads when one of them was cut off; especially when he saw a second monster of a sea-crab, who was also a Sophist, and appeared to have newly arrived from a sea voyage, bearing down upon him from the left, opening his mouth and biting. Then he called Iolaus, his nephew, to his help, and he ably succored him; but if my Iolaus, who is Patrocles the statuary, were to come, he would make a bad business worse.

And now that you have delivered yourself of this strain, said Dionysodorus, will you inform me whether Iolaus was the nephew of Heracles any more than he is yours?

I suppose that I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said, for you will insist on asking—that I pretty well know—out of envy, in order to prevent me from learning the wisdom of Euthydemus.
Then answer me, he said.
Well then, I said, I have only to say in answer, that Iolaus was not my nephew at all, but the nephew of Heracles; and his father was not my brother Patrocles, but Iphicles, who has a name rather like his, and was the brother of Heracles.
And is Patrocles, he said, your brother?
Yes, I said, he is my half brother, the son of my mother, but not of my father.
Then he is and is not your brother.
Not by the same father, my good man, I said, for Chaeredemus was his father, and mine was Sophroniscus.
And was Sophroniscus and Chaeredemus a father?
Yes, I said; the former was mine, and the latter his father.
Then, he said, Chaeredemus is not a father.
He is not my father, I said.
But can a father be other than a father? or are you the same as a stone?
I certainly do not think that I am a stone, I said, though I am afraid that you may prove me one.
Are you not other than a stone?
I am.
And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than gold, you are not gold.
Very true.
And so Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a father, is not a father.
I suppose that he is not a father, I replied.
For if, said Euthydemus, taking up the argument, Chaeredemus is a father, then Sophroniscus, being other than a father, is not a father; and you, Socrates, are without a father.
Ctesippus retorted: And is not your father in the same case, for he is other than my father?
Assuredly not, said Euthydemus.
Then he is the same?
He is the same.
I can not say that I like the connection; but is he only my father, Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men?
Of all other men, he replied. Do you suppose that he is a father and not a father?
Certainly, I did imagine that, said Ctesippus.
And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man?
They are not "in pari materia," Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, and you had better take care, for it is monstrous to suppose that your father is the father of all.
But he is, he said.
What, of men only, said Ctesippus, or of horses and all other animals?
Of all, he said.
And your mother, too, is the mother of all?
Yes, our mother too.
Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea-urchins then?
Yes; and yours, he said.
And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers.
And yours too.
And your papa is a dog.
And so is yours, he said.
If you will answer my questions, said Dionysodorus, I will soon extract the same admissions from you, Ctesippus. You say that you have a dog.
Yes, a villain of a one, said Ctesippus.
And he has puppies?
Yes, and they are very like himself.
And the dog is the father of them?
Yes, he said, I certainly saw him and the mother of the puppies come together.
And is he not yours?
To be sure he is.
Then he is a father, and he is yours; ergo, he is your father, and the puppies are your brothers.
Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat this dog?
Ctesippus said, laughing, Indeed I do; and I only wish that I could beat you instead of him.
Then you beat your father, he said.
I should have had far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? much good has this father of you and other curs got out of your wisdom.
But neither he nor you, Ctesippus, have any need of much good.
And have you no need, Euthydemus? he said.
Neither I nor any other man; for tell me now, Ctesippus, if you think it good or evil for a man who is sick to drink medicine when he wants it; or to go to war armed rather than unarmed.
Good, I say. And yet I know that I am going to be caught in one of your charming puzzles.
That, he replied, you will discover, if you answer; for seeing that you admitted medicine to be good for a man to drink, when wanted, must it not be good for him to drink as much as possible — a cartload of hellebore will not be too much for him?
Ctesippus said: Certainly not, Euthydemus, if he who drinks be as big as the statue of Delphi.
And if, he said, in war it be good to have arms, he ought to have as many spears and shields as possible?
Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think that
he ought to have one shield only, Euthydemus, and one spear?
    I do.
And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way?
    Considering the skill which you and your companion have in fighting in armor, I thought that you would have known better. Here Euthydemus held his peace, and Dionysodorus returned to the previous answer.

Don’t you think the possession of gold is good?
    Yes, said Ctesippus, and the more the better.
And to have money everywhere and always is a good.
    Certainly, a great good, he said.
And you admit that gold is a good?
    I have admitted that, he replied.
And ought not a man then to have gold everywhere and always, and as much as possible in himself, and may he not be deemed the happiest of men who has three talents of gold in his belly, and a talent in his head, and a stater of gold in either eye?
    Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; and the Scythians count them the happiest and bravest of men who have gold in their own skulls (that is only another instance of your manner of speaking about the dog and father), and what is still more extraordinary, they drink out of their own skulls gilt, and see the inside of them, and hold their own heads in their hands.

And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, or that which has not? said Euthydemus.
    That which has the quality of vision clearly.
And you also see that which has the quality of vision? he said.
Yes, I do.
Then do you see our garments?
Yes.
Then our garments have the quality of vision. They can see to any extent, said Ctesippus.
What can they see?
Nothing; but you, my sweet man, may perhaps imagine that they do not see; and certainly, Euthydemus, you do seem to me to have been caught napping when you were not asleep, and that if it be possible to say and say nothing — that is what you are doing.

And may not a person speak and be silent? said Dionysodorus.
Impossible, said Ctesippus.
Or be silent and speak.
That is still more impossible, he said.
But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak (of them) silent?
Not when I pass a smithy; for then the iron bars make a tremendous noise and outcry if they are touched: so that here your wisdom is strangely mistaken; please, however, to tell me how you can be silent when speaking (I thought that Ctesippus was put upon his mettle because Cleinias was present).

When you are silent, said Euthydemus, are you not silent about all things?
Yes, he said.
Then the speaking are silent, if speaking things are included in all things.
What, said Ctesippus, are not all things silent?
Certainly not, said Euthydemus.
Then, my good friend, do they all speak?
Yes; those which speak.
Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things are silent or speak?
Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing; I am sure that you will be "non-plussed" at that answer.

Here Ctesippus, as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter; he said, That brother of yours, Euthydemus, has got into a dilemma; all is over with him. This delighted Cleinias, whose laughter made Ctesippus ten times as uproarious; but I can not help thinking that the rogue must have picked up this answer from them; for there has been no wisdom like theirs in our time. Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and beautiful things?

Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing?

Yes, Dionysodorus, I replied, I have seen many. Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful?

Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I thought that I was rightly served for having opened my mouth at all: I said however, They are not the same as absolute beauty, but they have beauty present with each of them.

And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you?

I don't like to hear you say that, I replied. But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, will one thing be another?

Is that your difficulty? I said. For I was beginning to imitate their skill, on which my heart was set.

Yes, he answered, and I and all the world are in a difficulty about the non-existent.

What do you mean, Dionysodorus, I said. Is not the honorable honorable and the base base?

That, he said, is as I please. And do you please?
Yes, he said.

Also you will admit that the same is the same, and the other other; for surely the other is not the same; I should imagine that even a child will hardly have any difficulty about this. But, I think, Dionysodorus, that you must have intentionally missed the last question; for in general you seem to me to be a good workman, and to do the dialectician’s business excellently well.

What, said he, is the business of a good workman? tell me, in the first place, whose business is hammering?

The smith’s.

And whose the making of pots?

The potter’s.

And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and cook?

The cook, I said.

And if a man does his business he does rightly?

Certainly.

And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted that?

Yes, I have admitted that, but you must not be too severe upon me.

Then if some one were to kill, mince, boil, roast the cook, he would do his business, and if he were to hammer the smith, and pot the potter, he would do their business.

Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have such wisdom of my own?

And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has become your own?

Certainly, I said, if you will allow me.

What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own?

Yes, I do, subject to your correction; for you are
the bottom, and Euthydemus is the top, of all my wisdom.

Is not that which you would deem your own, he said, that which you have in your own power, and which you are able to use as you would desire, for example, an ox or a sheep—would you not think that your own which you could sell and give and sacrifice to any god whom you pleased, and that which you could not give or sell or sacrifice you would think not to be in your own power?

Yes, I said (for I was certain that something good would come of the questions, which I was impatient to hear); yes, such things only are mine.

Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings?

Yes, I said.

You admit then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the power to do all these things which I was just naming.

I admit that.

Then, after an ironical pause, in which he seemed to be thinking of something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus? Here anticipating the final move which was to enclose me in the net, in the attempt to get away, I gave a desperate twist and said: No, Dionysodorus, I have not.

What a miserable man you must be then, he said; you are not an Athenian if you have no ancestral gods or temples, or any other good.

Nay, Dionysodorus, I said, do not be rough; good words, if you please; in the way of religion I have altars and temples, domestic and ancestral, and all that other Athenians have.

And have not other Athenians, he said, an ancestral Zeus?

That name, I said, is not to be found among the
Ionians, whether colonists or citizens of Athens; an ancestral Apollo there is, who is the father of Ion, and a family Zeus, and a Zeus guardian of the phratry, and an Athene guardian of the phratry. But the name of ancestral Zeus is unknown to us.

No matter, said Dionysodorus, for you admit that you have Apollo, Zeus, and Athene.

Certainly, I said.

And they are your gods, he said.

Yes, I said, my lords and ancestors.

At any rate they are yours, he said, did you not admit that?

I did, I said; what is going to happen to me?

And are not these gods animals? For you admit that all things which have life are animals; and have not these gods life?

They have life, I said.

And are they not animals?

They are animals, I said.

And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased?

I did admit that, Euthydemus, and I have no way of escape.

Well then, said he, if you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours, can you sell them or give them away, or do what you will with them, as you would with other animals?

At this I was quite struck dumb, Crito, and lay prostrate. Ctesippus came to the rescue.

Bravo, Heracles, brave words, said he.

Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a bravo? said Di-
onysodorus.

Poseidon, said Ctesippus, what awful distinc-
tions. I will have no more of them; the pair are invincible.
Then, my dear Crito, there was universal applause of the speakers and their words, and what with laughing and clapping of hands and rejoicings the two men were quite overpowered; for hitherto only their partisans had cheered at each successive hit, but now the whole company shouted with delight until the columns of the Lyceum returned the sound, seeming almost to sympathize in their joy. To such a pitch was I affected myself, that I made a speech, in which I acknowledged that I had never seen the like of their wisdom; I was their devoted servant, and fell to praising and admiring of them. What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you to acquire this great perfection in such a short time? There is much, indeed, to admire in your words, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, but there is nothing that I admire more than your magnanimous disregard of any opinion—whether of the many, or of the grave and reverend seigniors—which is not the opinion of those who are like minded with you. And I do verily believe that there are few who are like you, and would approve of your arguments; the majority of mankind are so ignorant of their value, that they would be more ashamed of employing them in the refutation of others than of being refuted by them. I must further express my approval of your kind and public-spirited denial of all differences, whether of good and evil, white or black, or any other; the result of which is that, as you say, every mouth is stopped, not excepting your own, which graciously follows the example of others; and thus all ground of offence is taken away. But what appears to me to be more than all is, that this art and invention of yours is so admirably contrived, that in a very short time it can be imparted to any one. I observe that Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time. Now this quickness of attain-
ment is an excellent thing; but at the same time I would advise you not to have any more public entertainments; there is a danger that men may undervalue an art which they have so easy an opportunity of learning; the exhibition would be best of all, if the discussion were confined to your two selves; but if there must be an audience, let him only be present who is willing to pay a handsome fee; — you should be careful of this; — and if you are wise, you will also bid your disciples discourse with no man but you and themselves. For only what is rare is valuable; and water, which, as Pindar says, is the best of all things, is also the cheapest. And now I have only to request that you will receive Cleinias and me among your pupils.

Such was the discussion, Crito; and after a few more words had passed between us we went away. I hope that you will come to them with me, since they say that they are able to teach any one who will give them money, however old or stupid. And one thing which they said I must repeat for your especial benefit, — that not even the business of making money need hinder any man from taking in their wisdom with ease.

Crito. Truly, Socrates, though I am curious and ready to learn, yet I fear that I am not like minded with Euthydemus, but one of the other sort, who, as you were saying, would rather be refuted by such arguments than use them in refutation of others. And though I may appear ridiculous in venturing to advise you, I think that you may as well hear what was said to me by a man of very considerable pretensions — he was a professor of legal oratory — who came away from you while I was walking up and down. "Crito," said he to me, "are you attending to these wise men?" "No, indeed," I said to him;
"I could not get within hearing of them, there was such a crowd." "You would have heard something worth hearing if you had." "What was that?" I said. "You would have heard the greatest masters of the art of rhetoric discoursing." "And what did you think of them?" I said. "What did I think of them," he said; "what any one would think of them who heard them talking nonsense, and making much ado about nothing." That was the expression which he used. "Surely," I said, "philosophy is a charming thing." "Charming!" he said; "what simplicity! philosophy is nought; and I think that if you had been present you would have been ashamed of your friend — his conduct was so very strange in placing himself at the mercy of men who care not what they say, and fasten upon every word. And these, as I was telling you, are supposed to be the most eminent professors of their time. But the truth is, Crito, that the study and the men themselves are both equally mean and ridiculous." Now his censure of the pursuit, Socrates, whether coming from him or from others, appears to me to be undeserved; but as to the impropriety of holding a public discussion with such men, I confess that I thought he was in the right about that.

Soc. O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say? What manner of man was he who came up to you and censured philosophy; was he an orator who himself practises in the courts, or an instructor of orators, who makes the speeches with which they do battle?

Cri. He was certainly not an orator, and I doubt whether he had ever been into court; but they say that he knows the business, and is a clever man, and composes wonderful speeches.

Soc. Now I understand, Crito; he is one of an
amphibious class, whom I was on the point of mentioning—one of those whom Prodicus describes as on the border-ground between philosophers and statesmen—they think that they are the wisest of all men, and that they are generally esteemed the wisest; nothing but the rivalry of the philosophers stands in their way; and they are of the opinion that if they can prove the philosophers to be good for nothing, no one will dispute their title to the palm of wisdom, for that they are really the wisest, although they are apt to be mauled by Euthydemus and his friend, when they get hold of them in conversation. This opinion which they entertain of their own wisdom is very natural; for they have a certain amount of philosophy, and a certain amount of political wisdom; there is reason in what they say, for they argue that they have just enough of both, while they keep out of the way of all risks and conflicts and reap the fruits of their wisdom.

_Cri._ What do you say of them, Socrates? There is certainly something specious in that notion of theirs.

_Soc._ Yes, Crito, there is more speciousness than truth; they can not be made to understand the nature of intermediates. For all persons or things, which are intermediate between two other things, and participant of them—if one of these two things is good and the other evil, are better than the one and worse than the other; but if they are in a mean between two good things which do not tend to the same end, they fall short of either of their component elements in the attainment of their ends. Only in the case when the two component elements which do not tend to the same end are evil is the participant better than either. Now, if philosophy and political action are both good, but tend to different ends, and they participate in both, and are in a mean between them, then they are
talking nonsense, for they are worse than either; or, if the one be good and the other evil, they are better than the one and worse than the other; only on the supposition that they are both evil could there be any truth in what they say. I do not think that they will admit that their two pursuits are either wholly or partly evil; but the truth is, that these philosopher-politicians who aim at both fall short of both in the attainment of their respective ends, and are really third, although they would like to stand first. There is no need, however, to be angry at this ambition of theirs—they may be forgiven that; for every man ought to be loved who says and manfully pursues and works out anything which is at all like wisdom: at the same time we shall do well to see them as they really are.

*Cri.* I have often told you, Socrates, that I am in a constant difficulty about my two sons. What am I to do with them? There is no hurry about the younger one, who is only a child; but the other, Crito-bulus, is getting on, and needs some one who will improve him. I can not help thinking, when I hear you talk, that there is a sort of madness in many of our anxieties about our children:—in the first place, about marrying a wife of good family to be the mother of them, and then about heaping up money for them—and yet taking no care about their education. But then again, when I contemplate any of those who pretend to educate others, I am amazed. They all seem to me to be such outrageous beings, if I am to confess the truth: so that I do not know how I can advise the youth to study philosophy.

*Soc.* Dear Crito, do you not know that in every profession the inferior sort are numerous and good for nothing, and the good are few and beyond all price: for example, are not gymnastic and rhetoric
and money-making and the art of the general, noble arts?

_Cri_. Certainly they are, in my judgment.

_Soc._ Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are ridiculous performers?

_Cri_. Yes, indeed, that is very true.

_Soc._ And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your son?

_Cri_. That would not be reasonable, Socrates.

_Soc._ Do you then be reasonable, Crito, and do not mind whether the teachers of philosophy are good or bad, but think only of philosophy herself. Try and examine her well and truly, and if she be evil seek to turn away all men from her, and not your sons only; but if she be what I believe that she is, then follow her and serve her, you and your house, as the saying is, and be of good cheer.
INTRODUCTION

The Ion is the shortest, or nearly the shortest, of all the writings which bear the name of Plato, and is not authenticated by any early external testimony. The grace and beauty of this little work supply the only, and perhaps a sufficient, proof of its genuineness. The plan is simple, and the dramatic interest consists entirely in the contrast between the irony of Socrates and the transparent vanity and childlike enthusiasm of the rhapsode Ion. The theme of the Dialogue may possibly have been suggested by the passage of Xenophon's Memorabilia (iv. 2, 10) in which the rhapsodists are described by Euthydemus as "very precise about the exact words of Homer, but very foolish themselves."

Ion the rhapsode has just come to Athens; he has been exhibiting in Epidaurus at the festival of Asclepius, and is intending to exhibit at the festival of the Panathenaea. Socrates admires and envies the rhapsode's art — for he is always well dressed and in good company — in the company of good poets and of Homer, who is the prince of them. In the course of conversation the admission is elicited from Ion that his skill is restricted to Homer, and that he knows nothing of inferior poets, such as Hesiod and Archilochus; — he brightens up and is wide awake when Homer is being recited, but is apt to go to sleep at the recitations of any other poet. "And yet, surely, he who knows the superior ought to know the inferior also; — he who can judge of the good speaker is able to judge of the bad. And poetry is a whole; and he who judges of poetry by rules of art ought to be able to judge all poetry." This is confirmed by the analogy of sculpture, painting, flute-playing, and the other arts. The argument is at last brought home to the mind of Ion, who asks how this contradiction is to be solved. The solution given by Socrates is as follows: —

The rhapsode is not guided by rules of art, but is an inspired person who derives a mysterious power from the poet; and the poet, in like manner, is inspired by the God. The poets and
their interpreters may be compared to a chain of magnetic rings suspended from one another, and from a magnet. The magnet is the Muse, and the large ring which comes next in order is the poet himself; then follow the rhapsodes and actors, who are rings of inferior power; and the last ring of all is the spectator. The poet is the inspired interpreter of the God, and the rhapsode is the inspired interpreter of the poet, and this is the reason why some poets, like Tynnichus, are the authors of single poems, and some rhapsodes the interpreters of single poets.

Ion is delighted at the notion of being inspired, and acknowledges that he is beside himself when he is performing; — his eyes rain tears and his hair stands on end. Socrates is of opinion that a man must be mad who behaves in this way at a festival when there is nothing to trouble him. Ion is confident that Socrates would never think him mad if he could only hear his embellishments of Homer. Socrates asks whether he can speak well about everything in Homer. "Yes, indeed he can." "What about things of which he has no knowledge?" Ion answers that he can interpret anything in Homer. But, rejoins Socrates, when Homer speaks of the arts, as for example, of chariot-driving, or of medicine, or of prophecy, or of navigation — will he, or will the charioteer or physician or prophet or pilot be the better judge? Ion is compelled to admit that every man will judge of his own particular art better than the rhapsode. He still maintains, however, that he understands the art of the general as well as any one. "Then why in this city of Athens, in which men of merit are always being sought after, is he not at once appointed a general?" Ion replies that he is a foreigner, and the Athenians and Spartans will not appoint a foreigner to be their general. "No, that is not the real reason. But Ion has long been playing tricks with the argument; like Proteus, he transforms himself into a variety of shapes, and is at last about to escape in the disguise of a general. Would he rather be regarded as inspired or dishonest?" Ion eagerly embraces the alternative of inspiration.

The Ion, like the other earlier Platonic Dialogues, is a mixture of jest and earnest, in which no definite result is obtained, but some Socratic or Platonic truths are allowed dimly to appear.

The elements of a true theory of poetry are contained in the notion that the poet is inspired. Genius is often said to be unconscious, or spontaneous, or a gift of nature: that genius is akin to madness is a popular aphorism of modern times. The greatest
strength is often observed to have an element of limitation. It is said, too, that the force of nature must have its way, and is incapable of correction or improvement. Reflections of this kind may have been passing before Plato's mind when he describes the poet as inspired, or when, as in the Apology, he speaks of poets as the worst critics of their own writings — anybody taken at random from the crowd is a better interpreter of them than they are of themselves. They are sacred persons, "winged and holy things," who have a touch of madness in their composition, and should be treated with every sort of respect, but not allowed to live in a well-ordered state.

In the Protagoras the ancient poets are recognized by Protagoras himself as the original sophists; and this family resemblance may be traced in the Ion. The rhapsode belongs to the realm of imitation and of opinion: he professes to have all knowledge, which is derived by him from Homer, just as the sophist professes to have all wisdom, which is contained in his art of rhetoric. Even more than the sophist he is incapable of appreciating the commonest logical distinctions; his great memory remarkably contrasts with his inability to follow the steps of the argument. And in his highest dramatic flights he has an eye to his own gains.

The old quarrel between philosophy and poetry, which in the Republic leads to their final separation, is already working in the mind of Plato, and is embodied by him in the contrast between Socrates and Ion. Yet, as in the Republic, Socrates shows a sort of sympathy with the poetic nature. Also, the manner in which Ion is affected by his own recitations affords a lively illustration of the power which, in the Republic, Socrates attributes to dramatic performances over the mind of the performer. His allusion to his embellishments of Homer, in which he declares himself to have surpassed Metrodorus of Lampsacus and Stesimbrotus of Thasos, seems to show that, like them, he belonged to the allegorical school of interpreters. The circumstance that nothing more is known of him may be adduced in confirmation of the argument that this truly Platonic little work is not a forgery of later times.
ION

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE

SOCRATES. ION.

Socrates. WELCOME, Ion. Are you from your native city of Ephesus?

Ion. No, Socrates; but from Epidaurus, where I attended the festival of Asclepius.

Soc. And do the Epidaurians have contests of rhapsodes at the festival?

Ion. O yes, and of all sorts of musical performers.

Soc. And were you one of the competitors — and did you succeed?

Ion. I obtained the first prize of all, Socrates.

Soc. Well done; and I hope that you will do the same for us at the Panathenaea.

Ion. And I will, please heaven.

Soc. I often envy the profession of a rhapsode, Ion; for you have always to wear fine clothes and to look as beautiful as you can is a part of your art. Then, again, you are obliged to be continually in the company of many good poets; and especially of Homer, who is the best and most divine of them; and to understand him, and not merely learn his words by rote, is a thing greatly to be envied. And no man can be a rhapsode who does not understand the meaning of the poet. For the rhapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hearers, and he can not do this well unless he knows what he means. All this is greatly to be envied.
Ion. That is true, Socrates; and that has certainly been the most troublesome part of my art; and I believe that I can speak about Homer better than any man; and that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus of Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor any one else that ever was, had as good ideas about Homer as I have, or as many of them.

Soc. I am glad to hear that, Ion; for I see that you will not refuse to acquaint me with them.

Ion. Certainly, Socrates; you ought to hear my embellishments of Homer. I think that the Homeridae should give me a golden crown as a reward for them.

Soc. I shall take an opportunity of hearing them at some future time. But just now I should like to ask you a question: Does your art extend to Hesiod and Archilochus, or to Homer only?

Ion. To Homer only; and that appears to me to be quite enough.

Soc. Are there any things about which Homer and Hesiod agree?

Ion. Yes; I am of opinion that there are a good many.

Soc. And can you interpret better what Homer says, or what Hesiod says, about these matters in which they agree?

Ion. I can interpret them equally well, Socrates, where they agree.

Soc. But what about matters in which they do not agree? — for example, about divination, of which both Homer and Hesiod have something to say.

Ion. Very true.

Soc. Well now, would you or a good prophet be a better interpreter of what these two poets say, whether they agree or disagree, about divination?

Ion. A prophet.
Soc. But if you were a prophet, would you not be able to interpret them when they disagree as well as when they agree?

Ion. Clearly.

Soc. Well then, how come you to have this skill about Homer, but not about Hesiod or the other poets? Does not Homer speak of the same themes which all other poets handle? Is not war his great argument? and does he not speak of human society and of intercourse of men, good and bad, skilled and unskilled, and of the gods conversing with one another and with mankind, and about what happens in heaven and in the world below, and the generations of gods and heroes? Are not these the themes of which Homer sings?

Ion. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. And do not the other poets sing of the same?

Ion. Yes, Socrates; but not in the same way as Homer.

Soc. What! in a worse way?

Ion. Yes, in a far worse.

Soc. And Homer is better?

Ion. He is incomparably better.

Soc. And yet surely, my dear friend Ion, in a discussion about arithmetic, where many people are speaking, and some one person speaks better than the rest, any one can judge who is the good speaker?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And he who judges of the good will be the same as he who judges of the bad speakers?

Ion. The same.

Soc. And he will be the arithmetician?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Well, and in discussions about the wholesomeness of food, when many persons are speaking, and
one speaks better than the rest, will he who recognizes
the better speaker be a different person from him who
recognizes the worse, or the same?

_Ion._ Clearly the same.

_Soc._ And who is he, and what is his name?

_Ion._ A physician.

_Soc._ And speaking generally, in all discussions in
which the subject is the same and many men are
speaking, will not he who knows the good know the
bad speaker also? Or if he does not know the bad,
neither will he know the good.

_Ion._ True.

_Soc._ Is not the same person skilful in both?

_Ion._ Yes.

_Soc._ And you say that Homer and the other poets,
such as Hesiod and Archilochus, speak of the same
things, although not in the same way; but the one
speaks well and the other not so well?

_Ion._ Yes; and I am right in saying that.

_Soc._ And if you know the good speaker, you would
also know that the inferior speakers are inferior?

_Ion._ That is true.

_Soc._ Then, my dear friend, can I be mistaken in
saying that Ion is equally skilled in Homer and in
other poets, since he himself acknowledges that the
same person will be a good judge of all those who
speak of the same things; and that almost all poets
do speak of the same things?

_Ion._ What then, Socrates, is the reason why I lose
attention and go to sleep and have absolutely no ideas,
when any one speaks of any other poet; but when
Homer is mentioned, I wake up at once and am all
attention and have plenty to say?

_Soc._ That, my friend, is easily explained. No one
can fail to see that you speak of Homer not by any
art or knowledge. If you were able to speak of him
by rules of art, you would have been able to speak of all other poets, for poetry is a whole.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And when any one acquires any other art as a whole, the same may be said of them. Would you like me to explain my meaning, Ion?

Ion. Yes, indeed, Socrates; I wish that you would: for I love to hear you wise men talk.

Soc. I wish, Ion, that we could be truly called wise: but the truth is that you rhapsodes and actors, and the poets whose verses you sing, are wise; and I am a common man, who only speaks the truth. For do but consider what a very common and trivial thing this is, which I have said — a thing which any man might say; that when a man has acquired a knowledge of a whole art, the inquiry into good and bad is one and the same. Let us think about this; is not the art of painting a whole?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And there are and have been many painters good and bad?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And did you ever know any one who was skilful in pointing out the excellences and defects of Polygnotus the son of Aglaophon, but incapable of criticizing other painters; and when the work of any other painter was produced, went to sleep and was at a loss and had no ideas; but when he had to give his opinion about Polygnotus, or whoever the painter might be, woke up and was attentive and had plenty to say?

Ion. No indeed, I never did.

Soc. Or did you ever know of any one in sculpture, who was skilful in expounding the merits of Daedalus the son of Metion, or of Epeius the son of Panopeus, or of Theodorus the Samian, or of some other individual sculptor; but when the works of other sculp-
tors were produced, was at a loss and went to sleep and had nothing to say?

Ion. No indeed, I never did.

Soc. And if I am not mistaken, you never met with any one among flute-players or harp-players or singers to the harp or rhapsodes who was able to discourse of Olympus or Thamyris or Orpheus, or Phemius, the rhapsode of Ithaca, but was at a loss when he came to speak of Ion of Ephesus, and had no notion of his merits or defects?

Ion. I can not deny that, Socrates. Nevertheless I am conscious in my own self that I do speak better and have more to say about Homer than any other man, and this is the general opinion. But I do not speak equally well about others — tell me the reason of this?

Soc. I perceive, Ion; and I will proceed to explain to you what I imagine to be the reason of this. This gift which you have of speaking excellently about Homer is not an art, but, as I was just saying, an inspiration; there is a divinity moving you, like that in the stone which Euripides calls a magnet, but which is commonly known as the stone of Heraclea. For that stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain: and all of them derive their power of suspension from the original stone. Now this is like the Muse, who first gives to men inspiration herself; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration from them. For all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not as works of art, but because they are inspired and possessed. And as the Corybantian revellers when they
dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric poets are not in their right mind when they are composing their beautiful strains: but when falling under the power of music and metre they are inspired and possessed; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers, when they are under the influence of Dionysus, but not when they are in their right mind. And the soul of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves tell us; for they tell us that they gather their strains from honied fountains out of the gardens and dells of the Muses; thither, like the bees, they wing their way. And this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: when he has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles. Many are the noble words in which poets speak of actions like your own words about Homer; but they do not speak of them by any rules of art: only when they make that to which the Muse impels them are their inventions inspired; and then one of them will make dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another choral strains, another epic or iambic verses — and he who is good at one is not good at any other kind of verse: for not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine. Had he learned by rules of art, he would have known how to speak not of one theme only, but of all; and therefore God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers, as he also uses diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them may know that they speak not of themselves who utter these priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that God is the speaker, and that through them he is conversing with us. And Tynnichus the Chalcidian affords a striking instance of what I am saying: he
wrote nothing that any one would care to remember but the famous paean which is in every one’s mouth, and is one of the finest poems ever written, and is certainly an invention of the Muses, as he himself says. For in this way the God would seem to indicate to us and not allow us to doubt that these beautiful poems are not human, or the work of man, but divine and the word of God; and that the poets are only the interpreters of the Gods by whom they are severally possessed. Was not this the lesson which the God intended to teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the best of songs? Am I not right, Ion?

 Ion. Yes, indeed, Socrates, I feel that you are; for your words touch my soul, and I am persuaded somehow that good poets are the inspired interpreters of the Gods.

 Soc. And you rhapsodists are the interpreters of the poets?

 Ion. That again is true.

 Soc. Then you are the interpreters of interpreters?

 Ion. Precisely.

 Soc. I wish you would frankly tell me, Ion, what I am going to ask of you: When you produce the greatest effect upon the spectators in the recitation of some striking passage, such as the apparition of Odysseus leaping forth on the floor, recognized by the suitors and casting his arrows at his feet, or the description of Achilles rushing at Hector, or the sorrows of Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam,—are you in your right mind? Are you not carried out of yourself, and does not your soul in an ecstasy seem to be among the persons or places of which she is speaking, whether they are in Ithaca or in Troy or whatever may be the scene of the poem?

 Ion. That proof strikes home to me, Socrates. For
I must confess that at the tale of pity my eyes are filled with tears, and when I speak of horrors, my hair stands on end and my heart throbs.

Soc. Well, Ion, and what are we to say of a man who at a sacrifice or festival, when he is dressed in holiday attire, and has gold crowns upon his head, of which nobody has robbed him, appears weeping or panic-stricken in the presence of more than twenty thousand friendly faces, when there is no one spoiling or wronging him; — is he in his right mind or is he not?

Ion. No indeed, Socrates, I must say that strictly speaking he is not in his right mind.

Soc. And are you aware that you produce similar effects on most of the spectators?

Ion. Yes indeed, I am; for I look down upon them from the stage, and behold the various emotions of pity, wonder, sternness, stamped upon their countenances when I am speaking: and I am obliged to attend to them; for unless I make them cry I myself shall not laugh, and if I make them laugh, I shall do anything but laugh myself when the hour of payment arrives.

Soc. Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings which, as I am saying, derive their power from the original magnet; and the rhapsode like yourself and the actors are intermediate links, and the poet himself is the first link of all? And through all these the God sways the souls of men in any direction which he pleases, and makes one man hang down from another. There is also a chain of dancers and masters and undermasters of bands, who are suspended at the side, and are the rings which hang from the Muse. And every poet has a Muse from whom he is suspended, and by whom he is said to be possessed, which is nearly the same thing; for he is taken possession
of. And from these first rings, which are the poets, depend others, some deriving their inspiration from Orpheus, others from Musaeus; but the greater number are possessed and held by Homer. Of which latter you are one, Ion — possessed by Homer; and when any one repeats the verses of another poet you go to sleep, and know not what to say; but when any one recites a strain of Homer you wake up in a moment, and your soul leaps within you, and you have plenty to say, for not by art or knowledge about Homer do you say what you say, but by divine inspiration and by possession; just as the revellers too have a quick perception of that strain only which is appropriated to the God by whom they are possessed, and have plenty of dances and words for that, but take no heed of any other. And you too, Ion, when the name of Homer is mentioned have plenty to say, and nothing to say of others. And the reason of this is, that you praise Homer not by art but by divine inspiration: and this is the answer to your question.

Ion. That is good, Socrates; and yet I doubt whether you will ever have eloquence enough to persuade me that I praise Homer only when I am mad and possessed; and if you could hear me speak of him I am sure that you would never think that.

Soc. I should like very much to hear you, but not until you have answered a question which I have to ask. On what part of Homer do you speak well? — not surely about every part?

Ion. There is no part, Socrates, about which I do not speak well: of that I can assure you.

Soc. Surely not about things in Homer of which you have no knowledge?

Ion. And what is there of which Homer speaks of which I have no knowledge?

Soc. Why! does not Homer speak in many pas-
sages about arts? For example, about driving; if I can only remember the lines I will repeat them.

Ion. I remember, and will repeat them.

Soc. Tell me then, what Nestor says to Antilochus, his son, where he tells him to be careful of the bend at the horse race in honor of Patroclus.

Ion. "Bend gently," he says, "in the polished chariot to the left of them, and give the horse on the right hand a touch of the whip, and shout — and at the same time slacken his rein. And when you are at the goal, let the left horse draw near, yet so that the nave of the well-wrought wheel may not even seem to touch the extremity; and keep from catching the stone." ¹

Soc. Enough. Now, Ion, will the charioteer or the physician be the better judge of the propriety of these lines?

Ion. The charioteer, clearly.

Soc. And will the reason be that this is his art, or will there be any other reason?

Ion. No, that will be the reason.

Soc. And every art is appointed by God to have knowledge of a certain work; for that which we know by the art of the pilot we do not know by the art of medicine?

Ion. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor do we know by the art of the carpenter that which we know by the art of medicine?

Ion. Certainly not.

Soc. And this is true of all the arts; — that which we know with one art we do not know with the other? But let me preface this question by another: You admit that there are differences of arts?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. You would argue, as I should, that when the subject of knowledge is different, the art is also different?

¹ Iliad xxiii. 335.
Ion. Yes.

Soc. Yes; for surely, if the subject of knowledge were the same, there would be no meaning in saying that the arts were different,—if they both gave the same knowledge. For example, I know that here are five fingers, and you know the same. And if I were to ask whether I and you became acquainted with this fact by the help of the same science of arithmetic, you would acknowledge that we did?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Tell me, then, what I was going to ask you just now,—whether this holds universally? Must the same art have the same subject of knowledge, and any others have other subjects of knowledge?

Ion. That is my opinion, Socrates.

Soc. Then he who has no knowledge of a particular art will have no right judgment of the sayings and doings of that art?

Ion. That is true.

Soc. Then which will be a better judge of the lines of Homer which you were reciting, you or the charioteer?

Ion. The charioteer.

Soc. Why, yes, because you are a rhapsode and not a charioteer.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And the art of the rhapsode is different from that of the charioteer?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And if a different knowledge, then a knowledge of different matters?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. You know the passage in which Hecamede the concubine of Nestor is described as giving to the wounded Machaon a posset, as he says,
"Made with Pramnian wine; and she grated cheese of goat's milk with a brazen knife, and at his side there was an onion which gives a relish to drink."  

Would you say now that the art of the rhapsode or the art of medicine was better able to judge of these lines?

Ion. The art of medicine.

Soc. And when Homer says,

"And she descended into the deep like a leaden plummet, which, set in the horn of ox that ranges in the fields, rushes along carrying death among the ravenous fishes," —

will the art of the fisherman or of the rhapsode be better able to judge of the propriety of these lines?

Ion. Clearly, Socrates, the art of the fisherman.

Soc. Come now, suppose that you were to say to me: Since you, Socrates, are able to assign different passages in Homer to their corresponding arts, I wish that you would tell me what are the passages the excellence of which ought to be judged of by the prophet and prophetic art, and you shall see how readily and truly I will answer you. For there are many such passages, particularly in the Odyssee; as, for example, the passage in which Theoclymenus of the house of Melampus says to the suitors:

"Wretched men! what is happening to you? Your heads and your faces and your limbs underneath are shrouded in night; and the voice of lamentation bursts forth, and your cheeks are wet with tears. And the vestibule is full, and the court is full, of ghosts descending into the darkness of Erebus, and the sun has perished out of heaven, and an evil mist is spread abroad."  

And there are many such passages in the Iliad also; as for example in the description of the battle near the rampart, where he says:

1 Il. x. 638, 630. 2 Il. xxiv. 80. 3 Od. xx. 351.
"As they were eager to pass the ditch, there came to them an omen: a soaring eagle, holding back the people on the left, bore a huge bloody dragon in his talons, still living and panting; nor had he yet resigned the strife, for he bent back and smote the bird which carried him on the breast by the neck, and he in pain let him fall from him to the ground into the midst of the multitude. And the eagle, with a cry, was borne afar on the wings of the wind."  

These are the sort of things which I should say that the prophet ought to consider and determine.

Ion. And you are quite right, Socrates, in saying that.

Soc. Yes, Ion, and you are right also. And as I have selected from the Iliad and Odyssee for you passages which describe the office of the prophet and the physician and the fisherman, do you, who know Homer so much better than I do, Ion, select for me passages which relate to the rhapsode and the rhapsode's art, and which the rhapsode ought to examine and judge of better than other men.

Ion. All passages, I should say, Socrates.

Soc. Not all, Ion, surely. Have you already forgotten what you were saying? A rhapsode ought to have a better memory.

Ion. Why, what am I forgetting?

Soc. Do you not remember that you declared the art of the rhapsode to be different from the art of the charioteer?

Ion. Yes, I remember.

Soc. And you admitted that being different they would have different subjects of knowledge?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art of the rhapsode, will not know everything.

Ion. I dare say, Socrates, that there may be exceptions.

1 Il. xii. 200.
Soc. You mean to say that he will not know the subjects of the other arts. As he does not know all of them, which of them will he know?

Ion. He will know what a man ought to say and what a woman ought to say, and what a freeman and what a slave ought to say, and what a ruler and what a subject.

Soc. Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the pilot what the ruler of a sea-tossed vessel ought to say?

Ion. No; the pilot will know that best.

Soc. Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the ruler of a sick man ought to say?

Ion. He will not.

Soc. But he will know what a slave ought to say?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Suppose the slave to be a cowherd; the rhapsode will know better than the cowherd what he ought to say in order to soothe the rage of infuriated cows?

Ion. No, he won't.

Soc. But he will know what a spinning-woman ought to say about the working of wool?

Ion. No.

Soc. But he will know what a general ought to say when exhorting his soldiers?

Ion. Yes, that is the sort of thing which the rhapsode will know.

Soc. Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general?

Ion. I am sure that I should know what a general ought to say.

Soc. Why, yes, Ion, because you may possibly have a knowledge of the general's art; and you may also have a knowledge of horsemanship as well as of the lyre: in that case you would know when horses were well or ill managed. But suppose I were to
ask you: By the help of which art, Ion, do you know whether horses are well managed, by your skill as a horseman or as a performer on the lyre—what would you answer?

Ion. I should reply, as a horseman.

Soc. And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would admit that you judged of them as performers on the lyre, and not as horsemen?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And in judging of the general’s art, do you judge of that as a general or a rhapsode?

Ion. That appears to me to be all one.

Soc. What do you mean? Do you mean to say that the art of the rhapsode and of the general is the same?

Ion. Yes, one and the same.

Soc. Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general?

Ion. Certainly, Socrates.

Soc. And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode?

Ion. No; I don’t say that.

Soc. But you do say that he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general?

Ion. Certainly.

Soc. And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes?

Ion. Far the best, Socrates.

Soc. And are you the best general, Ion?

Ion. To be sure, Socrates; and Homer was my master.

Soc. But then, Ion, what in the name of goodness can be the reason why you, who are the best of generals as well as the best of rhapsodes in all Hellas, go about as a rhapsode instead of being a general? Do you think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown, and do not want a general?
Ion. Why, Socrates, the reason is, that my countrymen, the Ephesians, are the servants and soldiers of Athens, and don't need a general; and you and Sparta are not likely to have me, for you think that you have enough generals of your own.

Soc. My good Ion, did you never hear of Apollodorus of Cyzicus?

Ion. Who may he be?

Soc. One who, though a foreigner, has often been chosen their general by the Athenians: and there is Phanosthenes of Andros, and Heraclides of Clazomenae, whom they have also appointed to the command of their armies and to other offices, although aliens, after they had shown their merit. And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian as their general, and honor him, if he prove himself worthy? Were not the Ephesians originally Athenians; and Ephesus is no mean city? But, indeed, Ion, if you are correct in saying that by art and knowledge you are able to praise Homer, you don't deal fairly with me, and after all your professions of knowing many glorious things about Homer, and promises that you would exhibit them to me, do only deceive me, and will not even explain at my earnest entreaties what is the art of which you are a master. You have literally as many forms as Proteus; and now you go all manner of ways, twisting and turning, and, like Proteus, become all manner of people at once, and at last slip away from me in the disguise of a general, in order that you may escape exhibiting your Homeric lore. And if, as I was saying, you have art, then I should say that in falsifying your promise that you would exhibit Homer, you are not dealing fairly with me. But if, as I believe, you have no art, but speak all these beautiful words about Homer unconsciously under his inspiring influence, then I acquit you of
dishonesty, and shall only say that you are inspired. Which do you prefer to be thought, dishonest or inspired?

Ion. There is a great difference, Socrates, between them; and inspiration is the far nobler alternative.

Soc. Then, Ion, I shall assume the nobler alternative; and attribute to you in your praises of Homer inspiration, and not art.
THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO

VOLUME FOUR. PART TWO

Selections from the Translations of

B. JOWETT, M. A.

Edited with Introductions by

M. J. KNIGHT
1. THE GOOD MAN DESIRES, NOT A LONG, BUT A VIRTUOUS LIFE

The Gorgias, like several other writings of Plato, is not easily summarized under a single head, although numerous commentators and editors have attempted the task. We shall, perhaps, not be far wrong if we say that the dialogue is intended to set forth the final victory of truth and righteousness over falsehood and injustice; but we have to travel by many winding roads in order to reach our goal. There is a true rhetoric which convinces us of sin, and a false rhetoric which places evil in a specious light, and "makes the worse appear the better cause." Again, there is a true art of politics which considers only the welfare of the state, and a bastard kind which flatters the multitude and brings ruin on the city. Lastly, there is the contrast between the just man who is happy "even though he suffer undeservedly," and the wicked, who, if they escape punishment in this life, receive fitting chastisement in another world. The lesson or "moral" is pointed by a myth which shows how futile are the falsehoods and conventions of human life, when the soul comes to appear before the judgment-seat of the sons of Zeus in Hades.

The dialogue probably belongs to a middle period of the Platonic writings. It seems to be later than the Phaedrus, which also treats of Rhetoric true and false, but is written in a lighter and more playful vein; it can scarcely come after the Republic, in which the triumph of justice again furnishes a guiding principle of the whole discourse. Thus it may be described as a resumption of the one, and a preparation for the other. A further reason for assigning the dialogue to a later rather than to an earlier date is to be found in the appearance of that austerity or bitterness of tone which marks several of Plato's most important works, e.g. the Statesman and the Laws, and which we may indulge our fancy by attributing in a measure to the circumstances of his life.
The characters of the dialogue, besides the familiar figure of Socrates, are Gorgias, the famous Sophist; Polus, his young disciple, the same whose "Licymnian diction" is ridiculed in the Phaedrus, and Callicles, a wealthy Athenian and friend of Gorgias, not otherwise known to us. Chaerophon, the "excitable" admirer of Socrates, also appears in the prologue, although he does not share in the subsequent discussion. Gorgias himself plays a somewhat subordinate part; and neither he nor his confident and forward pupil, Polus, can offer any substantial resistance to the dialectical prowess of Socrates, that "hero of argument." Callicles, coming to the rescue of Polus, maintains against Socrates "the law of nature," or the principle that "might is right;" he, however, is in turn vanquished, and grudgingly admits "that he is almost convinced" of the truth of his opponent's words. This is the most serious portion of the dialogue; but the earnestness is slightly veiled as usual by the irony of Socrates, which really helps to heighten the effect.

... The connection of the passage which is here quoted with what immediately precedes is as follows:—Callicles has been asserting that virtue is a mere sham or convention, and that the unjust man is happy so long as he prospers in his career of crime. Socrates protests against such an impious doctrine, and declares that the unjust is only happy when he is punished for his wickedness. Callicles says that this is absurd; for will not the tyrant be able to put the just man to death or treat him in any cruel manner which he pleases? The answer according to Socrates is that life in itself is of little value; the just man simply desires a good life, whether short or long, happy or miserable. He then proceeds in his half-jesting manner to support his thesis by humorous instances of life-saving arts which are held in little esteem among mankind.

Cal. You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert everything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods?

Soc. Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in the city, but I
wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he will kill him if he has a mind — the bad man will kill the good and true.

Cal. And is not that just the provoking thing?

Soc. Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you think that all our cares are to be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger always; like that art of rhetoric which saved men in courts of law, and which you recommend me to cultivate?

Cal. Yes, truly, and very good advice too.

Soc. Well, my friend, but what do you think of the art of swimming; does that appear to have any great pretensions?

Cal. No, indeed.

Soc. And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there are occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the swimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the pilot, which not only saves the souls of men, but also their bodies and properties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. But this art is modest and unassuming, and has no airs or pretences of doing anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation which is given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if the voyage is from Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt at the utmost two drachmae, for the great benefit of saving the passenger and his wife and children and goods, and disembarking them safely at the Piraeus; and he who is the master of the art, and has done all this, gets out and walks about on the sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is a philosopher, you must know, and is aware that there is no certainty as to which of his fellow-passengers he has benefited, and
which of them he has injured in not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they are just the same when he disembarked them as when they embarked, and not a whit better either in their bodies or in their souls; and he considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way benefited by him in having been kept alive; much more must this be true of one who has great and incurable diseases, not in his body, but in his soul, which is the more honorable part of him; neither is life worth having nor of any profit to him, whether he be saved from the sea, or the law-courts, or any other devourer;—he knows that the bad man had better not live, for he can not live well.

And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our savior, is not usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not a whit behind either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving power, for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison between him and the pleader? And yet, Callicles, if he were to talk in your grandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring and insisting that we ought all of us to be engine-makers, and that they are the only realities; he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters to marry his son, or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your principle, what justice or reason is there in this? What right have you to despise the engine-maker, and the other whom I was just now mentioning? I know that you will say, "I am better, and better born." But if the better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man saving himself and his, whatever may be his character, then your censure
of the engine-maker, and of the physician, and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous.

O my friend! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly be something different from saving and being saved, and that he who is truly a man ought not to care about living a certain time: — he knows, as women say, that none can escape the day of destiny, and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all that with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed term: — whether by assimilating himself to that constitution under which he lives, as you at this moment have to consider, how you may become as like as possible to the Athenian people, if you intended to be dear to them, and to have power in the state; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is for the interest of either of us; — I would not have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, who, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own perdition.

ALCIBIADES I

SOCRATES HUMILIATES ALCIBIADES BY SHOWING HIM HIS INFERIORITY TO THE KINGS OF LACEDAEMON AND OF PERSIA.

There is little substantial reason to doubt the genuineness of the vast majority of the writings which have come down to us under the name of Plato. A few works, however, have been preserved, which are of a less certain character. Of these a small proportion may actually be dialogues written by Plato at an early period of his life, or in hours when the Muses were unpropitious, or they may be the work of members of his school to which, by a natural confusion, his own name has come to be affixed. The remainder and larger number appear to belong to a later date, and are so unmistakably inferior to the undoubted compositions
of Plato, that it is hardly possible seriously to maintain their authenticity.

The First Alcibiades is a good specimen of the former class. It is by no means without merit, and is clearly and simply written. The principal ground for suspicion is that it seems to be merely a rewriting of the theme which occupies a considerable space in the Symposium,—the relations of Socrates to Alcibiades. But the color and glow of the master are wanting: everything betrays the feeble hand of the copyist who is striving to imitate some work of original genius.

The characters of the Dialogue are only two, Socrates and Alcibiades, and no attempt is made to describe the scene or the surroundings. Alcibiades, who is on the point of entering public life, is cross-examined by Socrates as to his fitness for the career of a statesman. Alcibiades at first is confident that he is thoroughly prepared; but Socrates by a series of questions entangles him in self-contradictions, and finally reduces him to a humiliating confession of ignorance. He does not even, as the Delphian inscription recommends, "know himself," and much less is he capable of managing the affairs of others.

The passage which follows is a humorous contrast between the greatness and wealth of the Kings of Sparta and Persia and the insignificance of Alcibiades, both in respect of birth and means. The satire which it conveys on the statesmen of Athens is quite in the spirit of Plato; and we must suppose the writer, if not really Plato himself, to have had in mind the depreciatory references to Pericles and other public men in the Gorgias and the Statesman. And it may have been one at least of the objects with which the Dialogue was composed to exhibit the unfitness and incapacity of the politicians of the time, as well as to show that Socrates was not justly to be blamed for the wickedness and folly of some of those who called themselves his disciples. (Cp. Socrates’ defence of himself against this charge in the Apology.)

Soc. You surely know that our city goes to war now and then with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king?

Al. True enough.

Soc. And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not be right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings are your true rivals?
Al. I believe that you are right.

Soc. Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others like him, who manage our politics; in whom, as the women would remark, you may still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds as well as on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to flatter us and not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, and then you will have no need to take any heed of yourself in this noble contest; you will not have to trouble yourself either with learning what has to be learned, or practising what has to be practised, or with any other sort of preparation for a political career.

Al. I think, Socrates, that you are right in that; I do not suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really different from anybody else.

Soc. But, my dear friend, do consider what this is which you are saying.

Al. What shall I consider?

Soc. In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are not?

Al. Clearly, if I have such a fear of them.

Soc. And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take any care of yourself?

Al. No, I shall be greatly benefited.

Soc. And this is one very important respect in which that notion of yours is bad.

Al. True.

Soc. In the next place, consider that what you say is probably false.

Al. How is that?

Soc. Let me ask you whether better natures
are likely to be found in noble races or not in noble races?

_AI_. Clearly in noble races,

_Soc._ Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to be perfect in nature?

_AI_. Certainly.

_Soc._ Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent? Have we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the latter from Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?

_AI_. Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus!

_Soc._ And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, who, by the way of Hephaestus, also goes back to Zeus. But, for all this, we are far inferior to them. For they are descended "from Zeus," through a line of kings — either kings of Argos and Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia which they have always possessed, and at various time have been sovereigns of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our fathers were but private persons. How ridiculous would you be thought for making a parade of your ancestors and of Salamis the island of Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancient Aeacus to Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes. You should consider how inferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in other particulars. Did you never observe how great is the property of the Spartan kings? And their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori, who are public officers, and watch over them, in order to preserve the purity of the Heracleid blood.

And the Persian king far surpasses them; for no one ever entertains a suspicion that a prince of Per-
sia can have any other father. Such is the awe which invests the person of the queen, that she needs no other guard. And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all the subjects of the king feast; and the day of his birth is forever afterwards kept as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, when you and I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the neighbors hardly knew of the important event. After the birth of the royal child, he is tended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of the royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of the child, and especially with the fashioning and formation of his limbs, in order that he may be as fair as possible; and this being their calling, they are held in great honor. And when the young prince is seven years old he is put upon a horse and taken to the riding-masters and begins to go out hunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal schoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed to be the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is the wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourth the most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster, the son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and teaches him also the duties of his royal office; the second, who is the justest, teaches him always to speak the truth; the third, or most temperate, forbids him to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be accustomed to be a freeman and king indeed,—lord of himself first, and not a slave; the most valiant makes him bold and fearless, telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave; whereas Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zophyrtus the Thracian, a slave of his with whom he could do nothing else.

I might enlarge on the nurture and education of
your rivals, but that would be tedious; and what I have said is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said. I have only to remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth or nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian, unless he has a lover who takes care of him. And if you cast an eye on the wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, the anointings with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other bravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own inferiority; or if you would look at the temperance and orderliness and ease and grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil and desire of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians— in all these respects you will regard yourself as a child in comparison of them. Nay, even in wealth, if you are inclined to think much of that, I must reveal to you the true state of the case; for if you form an estimate of the wealth of the Lacedaemonians, you will see that our possessions fall far short of theirs. For no one here can compete with them either in the extent and fertility of their own and the Messenian territory, or in the number of their slaves, and especially of the Helots, or of their horses, or of the animals which feed on the Messenian pastures.

But I have said enough of this: and as to gold and silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon than in all the rest of Hellas, for during many generations gold has been always flowing in to them from the whole Hellenic world, and often from the barbarian also, and never flowing out, as in the fable of Aesop, the fox said to the lion, "The prints of the feet of those going in are distinct enough;" but who ever saw the trace of money going out of Lacedaemon? and therefore you may safely infer that the inhab-
itants are the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and their kings are the richest of them, for the greater part of this harvest goes to their kings, and they have also a tribute paid to them, which is very considerable. Yet the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the wealth of the other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians and their kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went up to the king [at Susa], that he passed through a large tract of excellent land, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of the country called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called her veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved for the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several habiliments. Now, I can not help thinking to myself, What, if some one were to go to Amestrís, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and say to her, There is a certain Dinomachè, whose whole wardrobe is not worth fifty minae — and that will be more than the value — and she has a son who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and he has a mind to go to war with your son — would she not wonder to what this Alcibiades trusts for success in the conflict? "He must rely," she would say to herself, "upon his training and wisdom — these are the things which Hellenes value." And if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly uneducated, and that when his lover tells him that he ought to get education and training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says that he is well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask, "On what, then, does the youth rely?" And if we reply that he relies on his beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would
think that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you possess with those of her own people. And I believe that Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, all of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present uneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she, too, would be equally astonished. But how disgraceful, that we should not have as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies' wives have of the qualities which are required in their assailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me and hear the Delphian inscription, "Know thyself;" deem these kings to be our antagonists, who are not such as you think, but quite of another sort, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill. And if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becoming renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire, as no other man ever desired anything.

PARMENIDES

THE MEETING OF SOCRATES AND PARMENIDES AT ATHENS. CRITICISM OF THE IDEAS

The Parmenides is perhaps the most difficult of all the dialogues of Plato, and one of a group which are not very attractive to the reader who has not been initiated into the "mysteries of dialectic." The subject is the Doctrine of Ideas, those metaphysical abstractions which occupied the mind of Plato more or less during the greater part of his life. They have often been supposed to be the keystone of his system, on which all his other thoughts and conceptions depend for stability.

This view, however, goes beyond the truth. It is a mistake to imagine that Plato had in view a complete scheme of philosophy, which he endeavored to draw out in a series of treatises. His genius was unsystematic and irregular; he was almost as much
a poet as a philosopher; and the testimony of his own writings is sufficient to show that he fell at various periods under the influence of different teachers. The Ideas ought rather to be treated by us as an attempt to convey Plato's conviction that there was a truth unrealized beyond sense, which could only be grasped by the mind when freed from the thraldom of the body. But he was greatly perplexed by the difficulty of finding an adequate expression of his thoughts, and he was perfectly conscious of the many and serious objections which could be urged against his own doctrines.

In the Parmenides, which we may reasonably consider a work of Plato's later years, he has reached a stage at which he is able by an extraordinary effort of intellectual power to produce a criticism of the Ideas which he himself can not refute. Yet he hints by the mouth of Parmenides that he is still convinced of their reality and existence; for, without abstract ideas, thought and reasoning would be impossible. And in the Sophist he resumes the topic with more success, and clears away some of the obstacles to his theory which in the Parmenides had appeared to him to be insuperable.

We went from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, and met Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Agora. Welcome, said Adeimantus, taking me by the hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens?

Why, yes, I said, I am come to ask a favor of you.

What is that? he said.

I want you to tell me the name of your half-brother, which I have forgotten; he was a mere child when I last came hither from Clazomenae, but that was a long time ago; your father's name, if I remember rightly, is Pyrilampes?

Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask?

Let me introduce some countrymen of mine, I said; they are lovers of philosophy, and have heard that Antiphon was in the habit of meeting Pythodorus, the friend of Zeno, and remembers certain arguments
which Socrates and Zeno and Parmenides had together, and which Pythodorus had often repeated to him.

That is true.

And could we hear them? I asked.

Nothing easier, he replied; when he was a youth he made a careful study of the pieces; at present his thoughts run in another direction; like his grandfather, Antiphon, he is devoted to horses. But, if that is what you want, let us go and look for him; he dwells at Melita, which is quite near, and he has only just left us to go home.

Accordingly we went to look for him; he was at home, and in the act of giving a bridle to a blacksmith to be fitted. When he had done with the blacksmith, his brothers told him the purpose of our visit; and he saluted me as an acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit, and we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first he was not very willing, and complained of the trouble, but at length he consented. He told us that Pythodorus had described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they came to Athens, he said, at the great Panathenaeae; the former was, at the time of his visit, about 65 years old, very white with age, but well favored. Zeno was nearly 40 years of age, of a noble figure and fair aspect; and in the days of his youth he was reported to have been beloved of Parmenides. He said that they lodged with Pythodorus in the Ceramicus, outside the wall, whither Socrates and others came to see them; they wanted to hear some writings of Zeno, which had been brought to Athens by them for the first time. He said that Socrates was then very young, and that Zeno read them to him in the absence of Parmenides, and had nearly finished when Pythodorus entered, and with him Parmenides and Aris-
toteles who was afterwards one of the Thirty; there was not much more to hear, and Pythodorus had heard Zeno repeat them before.

When the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first hypothesis of the first discourse might be read over again, and this having been done, he said: What do you mean, Zeno? Is your argument that the existence of many necessarily involves like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like; is that your position? Just that, said Zeno. And if the unlike can not be like, or the like unlike, then neither can the many exist, for that would involve an impossibility. Is the design of your argument throughout to disprove the existence of the many? and is each of your treatises intended to furnish a separate proof of this, there being as many proofs in all as you have composed arguments, of the non-existence of the many? Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you?

No, said Zeno; you have quite understood the general drift of the treatise.

I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno is your second self in his writings too; he puts what you say in another way, and half deceives us into believing that he is saying what is new. For you, in your compositions, say that the all is one, and of this you ad-duce excellent proofs; and he, on the other hand, says that the many is naught, and gives many great and convincing evidences of this. To deceive the world, as you have done, by saying the same thing in different ways, one of you affirming and the other denying the many, is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us.

Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound in pursuing the track,
you do not quite apprehend the true motive of the performance, which is not really such an artificial piece of work as you imagine; there was no intention of concealment effecting any grand result—that was a mere accident. For the truth is, that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who ridicule him, and urge the many ridiculous and contradictory results which were supposed to follow from the assertion of the one. My answer is addressed to the partisans of the many, and intended to show that greater or more ridiculous consequences follow from their hypothesis of the existence of the many if carried out, than from the hypothesis of the existence of the one. A love of controversy led me to write the book in the days of my youth, and some one stole the writings, and I had therefore no choice about the publication of them; the motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an old man, but the pugnacity of a young one. This you do not seem to see, Socrates; though in other respects, as I was saying, your notion is a very just one.

That I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell me, Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in the abstract, and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term many, participate; and that the things which participate in likeness are in that degree and manner like; and that those which participate in unlikeness are in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both? And all things may partake of both opposites, and be like and unlike to themselves, by reason of this participation. Even in that there is nothing wonderful. But if a person
could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would be a real wonder; not, however, if the things which partake of the ideas experience likeness and unlikeness—there is nothing extraordinary in this. Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and that the same is many by partaking of many, would that be very wonderful? But if he were to show me that the absolute many was one, or the absolute one many, I should be truly amazed. And I should say the same of other things. I should be surprised to hear that the genera and species had opposite qualities in themselves; but if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one, there would be no marvel in that. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower half, for I can not deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one, and in saying both he speaks truly. Or if a person shows that the same wood and stones and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he shows the existence of the one and many, but he does not show that the many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a wonder but a truism. If, however, as I was suggesting just now, we were to make an abstraction, I mean of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, and then to show that these in their abstract form admit of admixture and separation, I should greatly wonder at that. This part of the argument appears to be treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner; nevertheless, as I was saying, I should be far more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves
which are conceptions, the same puzzle and entangle-
ment which you have shown to exist in visible objects.

While Socrates was saying this, Pythodorus thought that Parmenides and Zeno were not alto-
gether pleased at the successive steps of the argu-
ment; but still they gave the closest attention, and
often looked at one another, and smiled as if in ad-
miration of him. When he had finished, Parmenides
expressed these feelings in the following words: —

Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind
towards philosophy; tell me now, was this your own
distinction between abstract ideas and the things
which partake of them? and do you think that there
is an idea of likeness apart from the likeness which
we possess, or of the one and many, or of the other
notions of which Zeno has been speaking?

I think that there are such abstract ideas, said
Socrates.

Parmenides proceeded. And would you also make
abstract ideas of the just and the beautiful and the
good, and of all that class of notions?

Yes, he said, I should.

And would you make an abstract idea of man dis-
tinct from us and from all other human creatures,
or of fire and water?

I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether
I ought to include them or not.

And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates,
about things the mention of which may provoke a
smile? — I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or
anything else that is foul and base; would you sup-
pose that each of these has an idea distinct from the
phenomena with which we come into contact, or not?

Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like
these are such as they appear to us, and I am afraid
that there would be an absurdity in assuming any
idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I have taken up this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and I return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking, and busy myself with them.

Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young; the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer grasp of you, if I am not mistaken, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at your age, you are too much disposed to look to the opinions of men. But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain forms or ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they are named; that similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity; and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and beauty?

Yes, certainly, said Socrates, that is my meaning.

And does not each individual partake either of the whole of the idea or of a part of the idea? Is any third way possible?

Impossible, he said.

Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet being one, exists in each one of many?

Why not, Parmenides? said Socrates.

Because one and the same existing as a whole in many separate individuals, will thus be in a state of separation from itself.

Nay, replied the other; the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may be one and the same in all.
I like your way, Socrates, of dividing one into many; and if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, that, as I suppose, in your way of speaking, would be one and a whole in or on many — that will be the sort of thing which you mean?

I am not sure.

And would you say that the whole sail is over each man, or a part only?

A part only.

Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and the individuals will have a part only and not the whole existing in them?

That seems to be true.

Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one?

Certainly not, he said.

Suppose that you divide greatness, and that of many great things each one is great by having a portion of greatness less than absolute greatness — is that conceivable?

No.

Or will each equal part, by taking some portion of equality less than absolute equality, be equal to some other?

Impossible.

Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but a part of the small, and therefore the small is greater; and while the absolute small is greater, that to which the part of the small is added, will be smaller and not greater than before.

That is impossible, he said.

Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?

Indeed, he said, that is a question which is not easily determined.
Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question?
What is that?
I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume the existence of ideas is as follows: — You see a number of great objects, and there seems to you to be one and the same idea of greatness pervading them all; and hence you conceive of a single greatness.

That is true, said Socrates.
And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to contemplate the idea of greatness and these other greatnesses, and to compare them, will not another idea of greatness arise, which will appear to be the source of them all?

That is true.
Then another abstraction of greatness will appear over and above absolute greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; and then another, which will be the source of that, and then others, and so on; and there will be no longer a single idea of each kind, but an infinite number of them.

But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be cognitions only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case there may be single ideas, which do not involve the consequences which were just now mentioned.

And can there be individual cognitions which are cognitions of nothing?
That is impossible, he said.
The cognition must be of something?
Yes.
Of something that is or is not?
Of something that is.
Must it not be of the unity, or single nature, which the cognition recognizes as attaching to all?
Yes.
And will not this unity, which is always the same in all, be the idea?

From that, again, there is no escape.

Then, said Parmenides, if you say that other things participate in the ideas, must you not say that everything is made up of thoughts or cognitions, and that all things think; or will you say that being thoughts they are without thought?

But that, said Socrates, is irrational. The more probable view, Parmenides, of these ideas is, that they are patterns fixed in nature, and that other things are like them, and resemblances of them; and that what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.

But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be like the individual, in as far as the individual is a resemblance of the idea? That which is like, can not be conceived of as other than the like of like.

Impossible.
And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea?
They must.
And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the absolute idea [of likeness]?
Certainly.
Then the idea can not be like the individual, or the individual like the idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always arise, and if that be like anything else, another and another; and new ideas will never cease being created, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it?
Quite true.
The theory, then, that other things participate in
the ideas by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation devised?

That is true.

Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming self-existent ideas?

Yes, indeed.

And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small part of the difficulty which is involved in your assumption, that there are ideas of all things, which are distinct from them.

What difficulty? he said.

There are many, but the greatest of all is this:—If an opponent argues that these self-existent ideas, as we term them, can not be known, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he who is disputing their existence be a man of great genius and cultivation, and is willing to follow a long and laborious demonstration—he will remain unconvinced, and still insist that they can not be known.

How is that, Parmenides? said Socrates.

In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who maintains the existence of absolute ideas, will admit that they can not exist in us.

Why, then they would be no longer absolute, said Socrates.

That is true, he said; and any relation in the absolute ideas, is a relation which is among themselves only, and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or whatever they are to be termed, which are in our sphere, and the participation in which gives us this or that name. And the subjective notions in our mind, which have the same name with them, are likewise only relative to one another, and not to the ideas which have the same name with them, and belong to themselves, and not to the ideas.

How do you mean? said Socrates.
I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides: — A master has a slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them; they are both relations of some man to another man; but there is also an idea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery in the abstract; and this abstract nature has nothing to do with us, nor we with the abstract nature; abstract natures have to do with themselves alone, and we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning?

Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.

And does not knowledge, I mean absolute knowledge, he said, answer to very and absolute truth?

Certainly.

And each kind of absolute knowledge answers to each kind of absolute being?

Yes.

And the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have?

Certainly.

But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and can not have?

No, we can not.

And the absolute ideas or species, are known by the absolute idea of knowledge?

Yes.

And that is an idea which we have not got?

No.

Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge?

They are not.

Then the ideas of the beautiful, and of the good, and the like, which we imagine to be absolute ideas, are unknown to us?
That appears to be the case.
I think that there is a worse consequence still.
What is that?
Would you, or would you not, say, that if there is such a thing as absolute knowledge, that must be a far more accurate knowledge than our knowledge, and the same of beauty and other things?
Yes.
And if there be anything that has absolute knowledge, there is nothing more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?
Certainly.
But then, will God, having this absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things?
And why not?
Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas have no relation to human notions, nor human notions to them; the relations of either are in their respective spheres.
Yes, that has been admitted.
And if God has this truest authority, and this most exact knowledge, that authority can not rule us, nor that knowledge know us, or any human thing; and in like manner, as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our masters; neither do they know the things of men.
Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.
These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few, of the difficulties which are necessarily involved in the hypothesis of the existence of ideas, and the attempt to prove the absoluteness of each of them; he who hears of them will doubt or deny their existence, and will maintain that even if they do exist,
they must necessarily be unknown to man, and he will think that there is reason in what he says, and as we were remarking just now, will be wonderfully hard of being convinced; a man must be a man of real ability before he can understand that everything has a class and an absolute essence; and still more remarkable will he be who makes out all these things for himself, and can teach another to analyze them satisfactorily.

I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say is very much to my mind.

And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his mind on these and the like difficulties, refuses to acknowledge ideas or species of existences, and will not define particular species, he will be at his wit's end; in this way he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning; and that is what you seem to me to have particularly noted.

Very true, he said.

But, then, what is to become of philosophy? What resource is there, if the ideas are unknown?

I certainly do not see my way at present.

Yes, said Parmenides; and I think that this arises, Socrates, out of your attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas generally, without sufficient previous training. I noticed your deficiency, when I heard you talking here with your friend Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is noble and divine — never doubt that — but there is an art which often seems to be useless, and is called by the vulgar idle talking; in that you must train and exercise yourself, now that you are young, or truth will elude your grasp.

And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would recommend?
That which you heard Zeno practising; at the same time, I give you credit for saying to him that you did not care to solve the perplexity in reference to visible objects, or to consider the question in that way; but only in reference to the conceptions of the mind, and to what may be called ideas.

Why, yes, he said, there appears to me to be no difficulty in showing that visible things experience likeness or unlikeness or anything else.

Quite true, he said; but I think that you should go a step further, and consider not only the consequences which flow from a given hypothesis, but the consequences which flow from denying the hypothesis; and the exercise will be still better.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean, for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis of Zeno’s about the many, you should inquire not only what will follow either to the many in relation to themselves and to the one, or to the one in relation to itself and the many, on the hypothesis of the existence of the many, but also what will follow to the one and many in their relation to themselves or to one another, on the opposite hypothesis. Or if likeness does or does not exist — what will follow on either of these hypotheses to that which is supposed, and to other things in relation to themselves and to one another, and the same of unlikeness; and you may argue in a similar way about motion and rest, about generation and destruction, and even about existence and non-existence; and in a word, whatever you like to suppose as existing or non-existing, or experiencing any sort of affection. You must look at what follows in relation to the thing supposed, and to any other things which you choose, — to the greater number, and to all in like manner; and you must also look at other things in relation to them-
selves and to anything else which you choose, whether you suppose that they do or do not exist, if you would train yourself perfectly and see the real truth.

THEAETETUS

The Theaetetus is a dialogue for which it is peculiarly difficult to assign a place in the series of the Platonic writings. In style it belongs rather to the earlier class, having many affinities to such works as the Protagoras or the Meno. But in the order of thought it is nearest akin to the Sophist and the Statesman, with which also it appears to be expressly connected by Plato.

The only indication of date which is furnished by the Dialogue itself is the mention in the prologue of the fighting near Corinth. This, however, contains an element of uncertainty. If the Corinthian War (B.C. 394-387) is intended (which is most probably the case), Plato must at least have passed his fortieth year when he wrote the Theaetetus. Or, if the reference is to the later operations in B.C. 369, when Iphicrates was in command at the Isthmus, we must refer the composition of the work to a correspondingly later time in Plato's life.

The principal subject of the dialogue is a discussion of the nature of knowledge and the manner in which it is received by us through perception and sensation. It takes the form chiefly of a criticism of the doctrine of Protagoras that "man is the measure of all things," which is identified with the Heracleitean theory that "all is in a flux," and is explained by Socrates to mean that all knowledge is relative, both in the intellectual and the moral sphere.

Neither of the two passages which follow relate to the main theme. They have the character of digressions, which pleasantly help to beguile the long and sometimes tedious course of the discussion. And we are inclined perhaps to sympathize with Theodorus, when he is dragged back by the indefatigable Socrates into the direct path, and to say that we "prefer the digressions to the argument itself."

1. Socrates, a Midwife and the Son of a Midwife

Socrates is here humorously described by one of those figures of speech in which Plato takes such delight, as the midwife who
delivers men of their thoughts and ideas, "the fair and immortal children of the mind," of whom he discourses in the Symposium. For Socrates is unlike any other of the great teachers of mankind; he does not convey ideas to his hearers, but elicits their intellectual conceptions from them, more sometimes, as Theaetetus says, "than was ever in them."

This is part of his mission, or rather, perhaps, another way of describing it; and when the thought comes to the light, he tries and tests it in every way to see whether it is the genuine offspring of wisdom, or the spurious progeny of self-conceit and vanity. Nor can we wonder that the "parents of the child," when it was condemned and pronounced wanting by the merciless judge, were apt to "fall into a rage," and fancied that they had been "deprived of some cherished possession."

Soc. Such are the midwives, whose work is a very important one, but not so important as mine; for women do not bring into the world at one time real children, and at another time idols which are with difficulty distinguished from them; if they did, then the discernment of the true and false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery—you would think that?

Theaet. Yes, I certainly should.

Soc. Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but the difference lies in this—that I attend men and not women, and I practise on their souls when they are in labor, and not on their bodies; and the triumph of my art is in examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man is bringing to the birth is a false idol or a noble and true creation. And like the midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them myself, is very just; the reason is, that the god compels me to be a midwife, but forbids me to bring forth. And therefore I am not myself wise, nor have I anything which is the invention or
offspring of my own soul, but the way is this:—Some of those who converse with me, at first appear to be absolutely dull, yet afterwards, as our acquaintance ripens, if the god is gracious to them, they all of them make astonishing progress; and this not only in their own opinion but in that of others. There is clear proof that they have never learned anything of me, but they have acquired and discovered many noble things of themselves, although the god and I help to deliver them.

And the proof is, that many of them in their ignorance, attributing all to themselves and despising me, either of their own accord or at the instigation of others, have gone away sooner than they ought; and the result has been that they have produced abortions by reason of their evil communications, or have lost the children of which I delivered them by an ill bringing up, deeming lies and shadows of more value than the truth; and they have at last ended by seeing themselves, as others see them, to be great fools. Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, is one of this sort, and there are many others. The truants often return to me and beg that I would converse with them again—they are ready to go down on their knees—and then, if my familiar allows, which is not always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again. Dire are the pangs which my art is able to arouse and to allay in those who have intercourse with me, just like the pangs of women in childbirth; night and day they are full of perplexity and travail which is even worse than that of the women. So much for them. And there are others, Theaetetus, who come to me apparently having nothing in them; and as I know that they have no need of my art, I coax them into another union, and by the grace of God I can generally tell who is likely to do them good. Many
of them I have given away to Prodicus, and some to other inspired sages.

I tell you this long story, friend Theaetetus, because I suspect, as indeed you seem to think yourself, that you are in labor — great with some conception. Come then to me, who am a midwife and the son of a midwife, and try to answer the question which I will ask you. And if I abstract and expose your first-born, because I discover upon inspection that the conception which you have formed is a vain shadow, do not quarrel with me on that account, as the manner of women is when their first children are taken from them. For I have actually known some who were ready to bite me when I deprived them of a darling folly; they did not perceive that I acted from good will, not knowing that no god is the enemy of man (that was not within the range of their ideas); neither am I their enemy in all this, but religion will never allow me to admit falsehood, or to stifle the truth. Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question, "What is knowledge?" and do not say that you can not tell; but quit yourself like a man, and by the help of God you will be able to tell.

2. THE LAWYER AND THE PHILOSOPHER

The description of the lawyer and the philosopher in the Theaetetus is one of the most striking delineations of character in all the writings of Plato. The two types of men are opposed to one another with perfect skill and completeness. The contrast intended by Plato is the same as that which has always existed among mankind under various names and disguises. Aristotle has it in view when he speaks of the "life of action" and the "life of speculation," and a similar difference also appears in another age as the "secular" and the "religious life."

The philosopher is the man of thought and reflection, who dwells apart from others in a world of his own imagination. His mind is absorbed in the contemplation of the eternal and divine;
he can not condescend to the things " which lie at his feet." He
sees the faults and follies of human nature so clearly that he is
incapacitated for action. But if he has almost too little of the
mundane spirit, his rival and opponent is wholly taken up with
the matters of daily life. He is the man of affairs, who is unable
to snatch an hour from business for solitude and meditation, and
whose horizon is bounded by the narrow limits of self-interest.
The higher impulses of his nature have withered and died in this
arid atmosphere. He is a match for the philosopher in the law
courts and the senate; but when he is drawn into a philosophical
argument, what a laughing-stock does he become to the wise man!
This is a picture which Plato is never weary of painting: — the
philosopher and the politician in the Euthydemus; the philos-
opher and the man of the world in the Gorgias; the true and
the false rhetorician in the Phaedrus, are all variations of the
same theme. The union of the two characters in one person is
the favorite dream of Plato; the philosopher is to be the king in
the state, or, at least, the princes of this world must be trained
and educated in the school of philosophy.

Soc. Here is a new question offering, Theodorus, which is likely to be still longer than the last.
Theod. Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure.
Soc. That is true, and your remark recalls to my
mind an observation which I have often made, that
those who have passed their days in the pursuit of
philosophy are ridiculously at fault when they have
to appear and plead in court. How natural is this!
Theod. What do you mean?
Soc. I mean to say, that those who from their
youth upwards have been knocking about in the
courts and such like places, compared with those who
have received a philosophical education, are slaves,
and the others are freemen.
Theod. In what is the difference seen?
Soc. In the leisure of which you were speaking,
and which a freeman can always command; he has
his talk out in peace, and, like ourselves, wanders at
will from one subject to another, and from a second
to a third, if his fancy prefers a new one, caring not whether his words are many or few; his only aim is to attain the truth. But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the water of the clepsydra driving him on, and not allowing him to expatiate at will; and there is his adversary standing over him, enforcing his rights; the affidavit, which in their phraseology is termed the brief, is recited; and from this he must not deviate. He is a servant, and is disputing about a fellow-servant before his master, who is seated, and has the cause in his hands; the trial is never about some indifferent matter, but always concerns himself; and often he has to run for his life. The consequence has been, that he has become keen and shrewd; he has learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed; but his soul is small and unrighteous. His slavish condition has deprived him of growth and uprightness and independence; dangers and fears, which were too much for his truth and honesty, came upon him in early years, when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them, and he has been driven into crooked ways; from the first he has practised deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. And so he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no soundness in him; and is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is the lawyer, Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the argument? Do not let us abuse the freedom of digression which we claim.

Theod. Nay, Socrates, let us finish what we were about; for you truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, and are not the servants of the argument; but the argument is our servant, and must wait our leisure. Where is the judge or spec-
tator who has a right to censure or control us, as he might the poets?

_Soc._ Then, as this is your wish, I will describe the leaders; for there is no use in talking about the inferior sort. In the first place, the lords of philosophy have never, from their youth upwards, known their way to the Agora, or the dicastery, or the council, or any other political assembly; they neither see nor hear the laws or votes of the state written or spoken; the eagerness of political societies in the attainment of offices—clubs, and banquets, and revels, and singing-maidens, do not enter even into their dreams. Whether any event has turned out well or ill in the city, what disgrace may have descended to any one from his ancestors, male or female, are matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he can tell, as they say, how many pints are contained in the ocean. Neither is he conscious of his ignorance. For he does not hold aloof in order that he may gain a reputation; but the truth is, that the outer form of him only is in the city; his mind, disdaining the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human things, is “flying all abroad,” as Pindar says, measuring with line and rule the things which are under and on the earth and above the heaven, interrogating the whole nature of each and all, but not condescending to anything which is within reach.

_Theod._ What do you mean, Socrates?

_Soc._ I will illustrate my meaning, Theodorus, by the jest which the clever, witty Thracian handmaid made about Thales, when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This is a jest which is equally applicable to all philosophers. For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his
next door neighbor; he is ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but whether he is or is not a human creature; he is searching into the essence of man, and is unwearied in discovering what belongs to such a nature to do or suffer different from any other; — I think that you understand me, Theodorus?

Theod. I do, and what you say is true.

Soc. And thus, my friend, on every occasion, private as well as public, as I said at first, when he appears in a law-court, or in any place in which he has to speak of things which are at his feet and before his eyes, he is the jest, not only of Thracian handmaids but of the general herd, tumbling into wells and every sort of disaster through his inexperience. He looks such an awkward creature, and conveys the impression that he is stupid. When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals of any one, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being praised and glorified, he can not help laughing very sincerely in the simplicity of his heart; and this again makes him look like a fool. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of cattle — a swineherd, or shepherd, or cowherd, who is being praised for the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them; and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less tractable and more insidious nature. Then, again, he observes that the great man is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any shepherd — for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed proprietors of ten thousand acres and more, our philosopher deems this to be a
trifle, because he has been accustomed to think of the whole earth; and when they sing the praises of family, and say that some one is a gentleman because he has had seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that their sentiments only betray the dulness and narrowness of vision of those who utter them, and who are not educated enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man has had thousands and thousands of progenitors, and among them have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and barbarians, many times over. And when some one boasts of a catalogue of twenty-five ancestors, and goes back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, he can not understand his poverty of ideas. Why is he unable to calculate that Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth ancestor, who might have been anybody, and was such as fortune made him, and he had a fiftieth, and so on? He is amused at the notion that he can not do a sum, and thinks that a little arithmetic would have got rid of his senseless vanity. Now, in all these cases our philosopher is derided by the vulgar, partly because he is above them, and also because he is ignorant of what is before him, and always at a loss.

Theod. That is very true, Socrates.

Soc. But, O my friend, when he draws the other into upper air, and gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of justice and injustice in their own nature and in their difference from one another and from all other things; or from the commonplaces about the happiness of kings to the consideration of government, and of human happiness and misery in general — what they are, and how a man should seek after the one and avoid the other — when that narrow, keen, little legal mind is called to account about all this, he gives the philos-
opher his revenge; for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging, and from which he looks into space, which is a strange experience to him, he being dismayed, and lost, and stammering out broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the situation, but by every man who has not been brought up as a slave. Such are the two characters, Theodorus: the one of the philosopher or gentleman, who may be excused for appearing simple and useless when he has to perform some menial office, such as packing up a bag, or flavoring a sauce or fawning speech; the other, of the man who is able to do every kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman; still less does he acquire the music of speech, or hymn the true life which is lived by immortals or men blessed of heaven.

Theod. If you could only persuade everybody, Socrates, as you do me, of the truth of your words, there would be more peace and fewer evils among men.

Soc. Evils, Theodorus, can never perish; for there must always remain something which is antagonist to good. Of necessity, they hover around this mortal sphere and the earthly nature, having no place among the gods in heaven. Wherefore, also, we ought to fly away thither, and to fly thither is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy and just and wise. But, O my friend, you can not easily convince mankind that they should pursue virtue or avoid vice, not for the reasons which the many give, in order, forsooth, that a man may seem to be good; — this is what they are always repeating, and this, in my judgment, is an old wives' fable. Let them hear the truth: In God is no unrighteousness at all — he
is altogether righteous; and there is nothing more like him than he of us, who is the most righteous. And the true wisdom of men, and their nothingness and cowardice, are nearly concerned with this. For to know this is true wisdom and manhood, and the ignorance of this is too plainly folly and vice. All other kinds of wisdom or cunning, which seem only, such as the wisdom of politicians, or the wisdom of the arts, are coarse and vulgar. The unrighteous man, or the sayer and doer of unholy things, had far better not yield to the illusion that his roguery is cleverness; for men glory in their shame—they fancy that they hear others saying of them, "these are not mere good-for-nothing persons, burdens of the earth, but such as men should be who mean to dwell safely in a state." Let us tell them that they are all the more truly what they do not know that they are; for they do not know the penalty of injustice, which above all things they ought to know—not stripes and death, as they suppose, which evil-doers often escape, but a penalty which can not be escaped.

_Theod._ What is that?

_Soc._ There are two patterns set before them in nature: the one, blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched; and they do not see, in their utter folly and infatuation, that they are growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of their evil deeds; and the penalty is, that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they resemble. And if we tell them, that unless they depart from their cunning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death; and that here on earth, they will live ever in the likeness of their own evil selves, and with evil friends—when they hear this they in their superior cunning will seem to be listening to fools.
Theod. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Too true, my friend, as I well know; there is, however, one peculiarity in their case: when they begin to reason in private about their dislike of philosophy, if they have the courage to hear the argument out, and do not run away, they grow at last strangely discontented with themselves; their rhetoric fades away, and they seem to be no better than children. These, however, are digressions from which we must now desist, or they will overflow, and drown our original argument; to which, if you please, we will now return.

Theod. For my part, Socrates, I would rather have the digressions, for at my age I find them easier to follow; but if you wish, let us go back to the argument.

SOPHIST

THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS AND THEIR PUZZLES

The Sophist, like the Parmenides, deals with metaphysical problems and puzzles, and with the Doctrine of the Ideas. The form which it takes is an inquiry into the nature and character of the Sophist or pretender to wisdom, who is exhibited in an odious light as the opposite to the true philosopher, ambitious, shallow, mercenary, disputatious, a sorcerer who makes that which is not appear to be.

But, the question is asked, how can "not-being" exist? This, which seems to us an almost meaningless fallacy, was to Plato and his contemporaries a real philosophical difficulty. And accordingly he proceeds to show that the separation of the spheres of the absolute and the relative, of being and not-being, which had been taught by Parmenides and his followers, could not be maintained. All ideas are not incompatible, although some are. Being, for instance, partakes both of rest and motion; whereas rest and motion are inconsistent. Not-being is only the negation of being, just as not-motion or rest is the negation of motion.
In the course of the discussion Plato gives a sketch of the history of Greek philosophy, which is interesting in itself, and is also the first attempt of the kind which is known to us. It is, as we might expect, only an outline of which we are left to fill up the details to the best of our power. Plato divides the philosophers who preceded him into several schools or sects:—

(1) The early Ionian philosophers, like Pherecydes (B.C. 560), who maintained the existence of two or three principles, such as heat and cold, moist and dry, and declared that these were sometimes united and sometimes at strife:

(2) The Eleatics, who derived their origin from Xenophanes (B.C. 540), and Parmenides (B.C. 504), and taught that "the many was also one," and "asserted the unity of the Universe:"

(3) "The Ionian and Sicilian Muses" (Heracleitus, B.C. 504), and Empedocles (B.C. 443), who combined the tenets of Pherecydes and the Eleatics; Heracleitus affirming that plurality and unity were in perpetual process of union and division by love and hate, while Empedocles supposed that they were in regular alternation to each other.

These somewhat crude and primitive philosophers were succeeded by more subtle teachers, whom Plato regards as his principal opponents. He has not clearly stated to whom he is referring; but he appears to have in view chiefly the Megarian School, or, possibly, the early Cynics, who delighted in verbal questions and disputes about being and not-being, and "found no end, in wandering mazes lost."

Lastly, there were the Idealists, by whom is probably intended a School who held in some form a Doctrine of Ideas; and the fierce and uncouth sect of the Materialists, who dragged heaven to earth, and believed in nothing except the evidence of their senses.

Into the midst of this warfare of words Plato has to descend. His object is not so much to put forward opinions of his own, as to gain from the different combatants the truest part of that for which they were fighting. He was by temperament an Eclectic, in the best sense of the term, and during the whole of his life, we find him indefatigable in the search after truth, and ready to welcome her from whatever side she appeared.

The principal character in this dialogue is taken by a Stranger from Elea, "a disciple of Parmenides and Zeno, and a true philosopher."
Str. Will you, then, forgive me, and, as your words imply, be contented if I slightly flinch from the grasp of such a sturdy argument?

Theaet. Certainly, I will.

Str. There is also another request which I have to make.

Theaet. What is that?

Str. That you will promise not to regard me as a parricide.

Theaet. Why do you say that?

Str. I mean to say that, in self-defence, I must test the philosophy of my father Parmenides, and try to prove by main force that in a certain sense non-being is, and that being is not.

Theaet. Some attempt of the kind is clearly needed.

Str. Yes, a blind man, as they say, might see that, and, unless a decision on this point is obtained, no one when he speaks of false words, or false opinion, or idols, or images, or imitations, or apparitions, or about the arts which are concerned with them, can avoid falling into ridiculous contradictions.

Theaet. Most true.

Str. And therefore I must venture to lay hands on my father's argument; for, if I am to be scrupulous, I must entirely give the matter up.

Theaet. Nothing in the world should ever induce us to do that.

Str. I have a third little excuse which I wish to offer.

Theaet. What is that?

Soc. You heard me say what I have always felt and still feel — that I have no heart for this argument?

Theaet. I did.

Str. I tremble at the thought of what I have said,
and expect that you will deem me mad, when you hear of my sudden changes and shiftings; let me therefore observe to you, that I am proceeding with the argument entirely out of regard for you.

Theaet. You certainly need not fear my bad opinion, or that I shall impute any impropriety to you, if you attempt to establish your refutation; take heart, therefore, and proceed.

Str. And where shall I begin the perilous enterprise? I think that the road which I had better take is —

Theaet. Which? — Let me hear.

Str. I think that we had better, first of all, consider the points which at present are regarded as self-evident, lest we should have fallen into some confusion about them, and be too ready to assent to one another, fancying that we have the means of judging.

Theaet. Say more clearly what you mean.

Str. I think that Parmenides, and all who undertook to determine the number and nature of existence, talked to us in rather a light and easy strain.

Theaet. How did they talk to us?

Str. As if we had been children, to whom they repeated each their own particular mythus or story; — one said that there were three principles at one time warring in a manner with one another, and then at peace again; and they were married and begat children, and brought them up; and another spoke of two principles, — a moist and dry, or hot and cold, which he brought together and gave in marriage to one another. The Eleatics in our part of the world say that all things are many in name, but in nature one; this is their mythus, which begins with Xenophanes, and is even older. Then there are Ionian, and in more recent times Sicilian muses, who have con-
ceived the thought that to unite the two principles is safer; and they say that being is one and many, which are held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting, as the more potent masters of harmony assert, while the general ones do not insist on the perpetual strife and peace, but admit a relaxation and alternation of them; peace and friendship sometimes prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite, and then again diversity and war, by reason of a principle of strife. Whether any of them spoke the truth in all this is hard to determine; antiquity and famous men should have reverence, and not be liable to such insinuations. Yet one thing may be said of them without offence:

Theaet. What is that?

Str. That they went on their several ways with a good deal of disdain of people like ourselves; they did not care whether they took us with them, or left us behind them.

Theaet. How do you mean?

Str. I mean to say, that when they talk of one, two, or more elements, which are or have become or are becoming, or again of heat mingling with cold, and in some other part of their works assume separations and combinations of them,—tell me, Theaetetus, do you understand what they mean by these expressions? When I was a younger man, I used to fancy that I understood quite well what was meant by the term "not-being," which is our present subject of dispute; and now you see in what a perplexity we are landed.

Theaet. I see.

Str. And very likely we have been getting into the same difficulty about "being," and yet may fancy that when anybody utters the word, we understand him and are in no difficulty, although we still admit
that we are ignorant of not-being, when the truth is, that we are equally ignorant of both.

*Theaet.* I dare say.

*Str.* And the same may be said of all the subjects of the previous discussion.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* Most of them may be deferred for the present; but we had better now consider the chief captain and leader of them.

*Theaet.* I suppose that you are speaking of being, and you want to take this first, and discover what they mean who use the word?

*Str.* You follow close at my heels, Theaetetus. For the right method, I conceive, will be to call into our presence and interrogate the dialectic philosophers. To them we will say, "O ye, who speak of hot and cold, or of any other two principles of which the universe consists, what term is this which you apply to both of them, and what do you mean when you say that both and each of them are? How are we to understand the word "are?" Are we to suppose that there is a third principle over and above the other two, and that there are three in all, and not two, according to your notions? For clearly you can not say that one of the two principles is being, and yet attribute being equally to both of them; for, whichever of the two is identified with being, they would be one and not two."

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Str.* You mean, then, to call the sum of both of them "being?"

*Theaet.* I suppose so.

*Str.* Then, friends, we shall reply to them, the answer to that is plainly that the two will thus be resolved into one.

*Theaet.* Most true.
Str. Since, then, we are in a difficulty, please to tell us what you mean, when you speak of being; for there can be no doubt that you always from the first understood your own meaning, whereas we once thought that we understood you, but now we are in a great strait. Please to begin by explaining this matter to us, and let us no longer fancy that we understand you, when we entirely misunderstand you. There will be no impropriety in our thus inquiring either of the dualists or of the pluralists?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Str. And what about the assertors of the all and one — must we not endeavor to ascertain from them what they mean by "being?"

Theaet. By all means.

Str. Then let us ask a question of them: — One, you say, alone is? Yes, they will reply.

Theaet. True.

Str. And, again, being is?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And is being the same as one, and do you apply two names to the same thing?

Theaet. What will be their answer to that, Stranger?

Str. It is clear, Theaetetus, that he who asserts the unity of being will find a difficulty in answering this or any other question.

Theaet. How is that?

Str. To admit of two names, and to affirm that there is nothing but unity, is surely ridiculous?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And equally irrational to admit that a name has any real existence?

Theaet. How is that?

Str. If the name is distinguished from the thing, that supposes two things.
Theaet. Yes.

Str. And yet he who identifies the name with the thing will be compelled to say that the name is of nothing, or if he says that the name is of something, then the name will be the name of a name, and of nothing else.

Theaet. True.

Str. The one in the same way will be only one of one, and although absolute unity, will be of a mere name.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And would they say that the whole is other than the one being, or the same with it?

Theaet. To be sure they will and do say that.

Str. If the one is a whole, as Parmenides sings,—

"Every way like the fulness of a well-formed sphere,
Equally balanced from the centre on every side,
And must needs be neither greater nor less,
Neither on this side nor on that—"

then being has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must also have parts.

Theaet. True.

Str. And that which has parts may have the attribute of unity in all the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. But that of which this is the condition can not be absolute unity?

Theaet. How is that?

Str. Because, according to right reason, that which is absolutely one ought to be affirmed to be indivisible.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. But this indivisible, if made up of parts, will contradict reason.

Theaet. I understand.
Str. Shall we say that being is one and a whole only as having the attribute of unity? Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all?
Theaet. That is a hard alternative to offer.
Str. Most true; for being having in a certain sense the attribute of unity, is yet proved not to be the same as unity, and the all is therefore more than one.
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And yet if being be not a whole in having the attribute of one, and there being such a thing as an absolute whole, then being lacks something of the nature of being?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. Upon this view, again, being having a defect of being, will become not-being?
Theaet. True.
Str. And, again, the all becomes more than one, for being and the whole will each have their separate nature.
Theaet. Yes.
Str. But if the whole does not exist at all, all the previous difficulties remain the same, and there will be the further difficulty, that besides having no existence, being can never have come into existence.
Theaet. Why is that?
Str. Because that which comes into existence always comes into existence as a whole, so that he who does not give whole a place among existences, can not speak either of essence or generation as being.
Theaet. Yes, that certainly appears to be true.
Str. Again; how can that which is not a whole have any quantity? For that which is of a certain quantity must necessarily be of that quantity taken as a whole.
Theaet. Exactly.
Str. And there will be innumerable other points,
each of them involving infinite perplexity to him who says that being is either one or two.

Theaet. The difficulties which are already appearing prove this; for one objection connects with another, and they are always increasing in difficulty and eliciting fresh doubts about what has preceded.

Str. We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as the result of all, that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of not-being.

Theaet. Then now we are to go to the others.

Str. There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on among them; they are fighting about the nature of essence.

Theaet. How is that?

Str. Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to earth, and seem determined to grasp in their hands rocks and oaks; of these they lay hold, and are obstinate in maintaining, that the things only which can be touched or handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one, and if any one says that what is not a body exists they altogether despise them, and will hear of nothing but body.

Theaet. I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they are.

Str. And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend themselves from above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true essence consists of certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the bodies of the materialists, which are maintained by them to be the very truth, they break up into little bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be generation and not essence. O, Theaetetus, there is an end-
less war which is always raging between these two armies on this ground.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* Let us ask each of them, in turn, to give an account of that which they call essence.

*Theaet.* How shall we get that out of them?

*Str.* With those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be less difficulty, for they are civil people enough; but there will be very great difficulty, or rather an absolute impossibility, in arguing with those who drag everything down to matter. I will tell you what I think that we must do.

*Theaet.* What is that?

*Str.* Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not possible, let us imagine them to be better than they are, and more willing to answer in accordance with the rules of argument, and then their opinion will be more worth having; for that which better men acknowledge has more weight than that which is acknowledged by inferior men. And we are no respecters of persons, but seekers of the truth.

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**STATESMAN**

**THE REIGN OF CRONOS**

*The Statesman* is a companion piece to the *Sophist*, which it much resembles in style and manner of treatment. It contains a picture of the ideal statesman or ruler who is "set over against" his rival, the mere politician. The true king or statesman is the superior of his fellow citizens, and governs them by knowledge and not by power. His rule is better than that of the law: for the law is fixed and unbending, whereas the individual can allow himself to be guided by circumstances. But since this "king by nature" is scarcely or never to be found among men, they prefer to submit to one of the various "imperfect forms of government."
There was an age, however, when mankind was ruled in the true sense of the word. This was in the time of Cronos, those happy days during which the human race lived in Paradisiacal innocence under the government of Divine Shepherds, who were appointed by Cronos himself. Our present and far inferior state is due to the revolutions of the Universe.

In the beginning, the course of the world was guided by the hand of God; but when the appointed number of generations had been born from the earth and had returned again to her, the Creator ceased His directing care; the Universe fell to chaos, and all living creatures perished. A new race succeeded; the evil which is inherent in matter reasserted itself, and the world went from bad to worse, until the Creator at last again interposed, and restored order to creation. At the same time He introduced a new principle of life; the earth no longer brought forth men and animals, but they reproduced their species, each after their kind. Men were at first poor and helpless; gradually, however, by the aid of the Gods, they learned the arts of life and formed themselves into communities.

In this remarkable myth Plato, while adding confirmation by the example of the rule of Cronos to the argument respecting the true nature of government, is also enabled to set forth in a poetical form his solution of two different problems which seem to have been a frequent subject of his thoughts — (1) the existence of evil, and (2) the growth of human society.

(1) He is sorely perplexed, as men have been in all ages, by the existence of evil in the Universe. He saw everywhere the marks of design; yet the efforts of the Designer appeared liable to be thwarted by some malignant influence. And this power or principle of evil he supposed to be, not a "Prince of Darkness," who was opposed on almost equal terms to the Deity, but an inherent quality of matter, against which even the Creator was not wholly able to contend. Hence also he was led to place between the Creator and the Creation an intermediate order of divine beings who execute "their Father's will in the best and wisest manner which they can."

(2) The growth of civilization was a subject of much curiosity to the Greeks. Their lively and reflective minds were deeply stirred by what they were able to learn of the ancient history of the East and of Egypt. They felt how truly they might be called a "race of children;" for their national history was brief and hardly more than a mass of inconsistent legends and traditions, while the Egyptian priests could recite to Herodotus the
names of "330 kings who reigned in Egypt between the days of Menes and his own time." Moreover, short and imperfect as was their knowledge of the events of the past, they were well aware that great revolutions had happened, and that kingdoms which had once been powerful had fallen into decay, while others had succeeded in their place.

They were easily led, therefore, to the conclusion that "there had been many destructions of mankind," and that civilization had grown up by slow and painful efforts among the survivors of some deluge or other catastrophe, such as had become familiar to their minds from the legends of the deluges of Ogyges and Deucalion or the destruction of the earth by Phaëthon. Plato recurs once more to this subject in the Third Book of the Laws, where we shall find him treating of the manner in which the several forms of government may be supposed to have developed among men.

The conversation is between the Eleatic Stranger of the "Sophist" and the younger Socrates, who is not a relation of his namesake.

Str. Let us make a beginning, and travel by a different road.

Τ. Soc. What road?

Str. I think that we may have a little amusement; there is a famous tale, of which a good portion may with advantage be interwoven, and then we may resume our series of divisions, and proceed along that path until we arrive at the summit or desired end. Shall we do as I say?

Τ. Soc. By all means.

Str. Listen, then, to a tale which a child would love to hear, and you are not too old to be amused as a child.

Τ. Soc. Let me hear.

Str. There did really happen, and will again happen, like many other events of which ancient tradition has preserved the record, the portent which is traditionally said to have occurred in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes. You remember what that was?
T. Soc. I suppose that you mean the token of the golden lamb?

Str. No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how the sun and the stars rose in the west, and set in the east, and that the god reversed their motion, and gave them that which they have at present as a testimony to the right of Atreus.

T. Soc. Yes; that is certainly related.

Str. Again, we have been often told of the kingdom of Cronos.

T. Soc. Yes, very often.

Str. Did you ever hear that the men of former times were earth-born, and not begotten of one another?

T. Soc. Yes, that is also an old tradition.

Str. All these stories, and ten thousand others which are still more wonderful, have a common origin; many of them have been lost in the lapse of ages, or exist only as fragments; but the origin of them is what no one has told, and may as well be told now; for the tale is suited to throw light on the nature of the king.

T. Soc. Very good; and I hope that you will give the whole story, and leave out nothing.

Str. Listen, then. There is a time when God goes round with the world, which he himself guides and helps to roll; and there is a time, on the completion of a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being a living creature, and having originally received intelligence from its author and creator, turns about and revolves in the opposite direction.

T. Soc. Why is that?

Str. Why, because only the most divine things of all are unchangeable, and body is not included in this class. Heaven and the universe, as we have termed them, although they have been endowed by the
Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily nature, and therefore can not be entirely free from perturbations. But the heavenly motion is, as far as possible, single and in the same place, and in relation to the same; and is therefore only subject to a reversal, which is the least alteration possible. For the lord of all moving things is alone able to move of himself; and to think that he can go at one time in one direction and at another time in another, is unlawful. Hence we must not say that the world is either self-moved always, or that the universe is made to go round by God in two opposite courses; or that two Gods, having intelligence, oppose one another in the movement of the world. But as I have already said (and this is the only remaining alternative) the world is guided by an accompanying divine power and receives life and immortality by the appointment of the Creator, and then, when let go again, moves spontaneously, being let go at such a time as to have, during infinite cycles of years, a reverse movement: this is due to exquisite perfection of balance, and the size of the universe; which is the greatest of bodies, and turns on the smallest pivot.

T. Soc. All that description seems to be very reasonable indeed.

Str. Let us now reflect upon what has been said, and try to comprehend the nature of this great mythological wonder, which has been called by us, and assuredly is, the cause of the other wonders.

T. Soc. To what are you referring?

Str. To the reversal of the motion of the universe.

T. Soc. How was that the cause of the others?

Str. Of all changes in the heavens, this is to be deemed the greatest and mightiest.

T. Soc. I should imagine that.

Str. And may be supposed to have resulted in the
greatest changes to the human beings who were the inhabitants of the world at the time.

T. Soc. That, again, is not unlikely.

Str. And animals, as we know, are seriously affected by great changes of many different kinds happening together.

T. Soc. Very true.

Str. Hence there necessarily occurred a great destruction of them, which extended also to the life of man; few survivors of the race were left, and those who remained became the subjects of several novel and remarkable phenomena, and of one in particular, which is simultaneous with the revulsion, and took place at the time when the transition was made to the cycle opposite to that in which we live.

T. Soc. What was that?

Str. The life of all animals first came to a stand, and the mortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed and grew young and delicate; the white locks of the aged darkened again, and the cheeks of the bearded man became smooth, and he was restored to his original youth; the bodies of the young grew finer and smaller, continually by day and night returning and becoming assimilated to the nature of a newly-born child in mind as well as body; in the succeeding stage they wasted away and wholly disappeared. And the bodies of those who had died by violence quickly passed through the like changes, and in a few days were no more seen.

T. Soc. Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those days; and in what way were they begotten of one another?

Str. It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing in the then order of nature as the procreation of animals from one another; the primeval race, who were given back from the earth, was the one then in
existence; and of this tradition, which is now-a-days often unduly discredited, our ancestors, who came into existence immediately after the end of the first period and at the beginning of this, are the heralds to us. For mark how consistent the sequel of the tale is; after the return of age to youth, follows the return of the dead, who are lying in the earth, to life; the wheel of their existence has been turned back, and they come together and rise and live in the opposite order, unless God has carried any of them away to some other lot. And these are the so-called earth-born men who, according to the tradition, of necessity came into existence, and this is the explanation of the term.

T. Soc. Certainly that is quite consistent with what has preceded; but let me interrupt you to ask whether the life which you said existed in the reign of Cronos was in that cycle of the world, or in this? For the change in the course of the stars and the sun might certainly have occurred in either.

Str. I see that you enter into my meaning; — no, that blessed and spontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world, but to the previous one, in which God superintended the whole revolution of the universe; and the parts of the universe were distributed under the rule of certain inferior deities, which is the way in some places still. There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various species and herds of animals, and each one was in all respects sufficient for those of whom he was the shepherd; neither was there any violence, or devouring of one another, or war or quarrel among them; and I might tell of ten thousand other blessings, which belonged to that dispensation. Now, the reason why the old fable speaks of the spontaneous life of man is as follows. In those days God himself was their
shepherd, and ruled over them, just as man, who is by comparison a divine being, still rules over the animals. Under him there were no governments or separate possessions of women and children. For all men rose again from the earth, having no memory of any past events; and they had no property or families, but the earth gave them abundance of fruits, which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden, and were not planted by the hand of man. And they dwelt naked, and mostly in the open air, for the temperature of their seasons was mild; and they had no beds, but lay on soft couches of grass, which grew plentifully out of the earth. Such was the life of man in the days of Cronos, Socrates; the character of our present life, which is said to be under Zeus, you know from your own experience. Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem the happier?

T. Soc. I can not.

Str. Then shall I determine for you as well as I can?

T. Soc. By all means.

Str. Suppose that the children of Cronos, having this boundless leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men but with the animal creation, had used all these advantages with a view to philosophy, conversing with the animals as well as with one another, and learning of every nature which was gifted with any special power, and was able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom, there would be no difficulty in determining which was the happier. Or, again, if they had merely eaten and drunk until they were full, and told stories to one another, and to the animals — such stories as are now told of them — in this case also, as I should imagine, the answer would be easy. But as there is no satisfactory reporter of the desires and thoughts
of those times, I think that we must leave the question unanswered, and go at once to the point of the tale, and then we will proceed on our journey.

In the fulness of time, when the change was to take place, and the earth-born race had all perished, and every soul had fallen into the earth and been sown her appointed number of times, the governor of the universe let the helm go, and retired to his place of view; and then Fate and innate desire reversed the motion of the world. Then, also, all the other deities who share the rule of the supreme power, being informed of what was happening, let go the parts of the world of which they were severally the guardians. And the world turning round with a sudden shock, having received an opposite impulse at both ends, was shaken by a mighty earthquake, producing a new destruction of all manner of animals. After a while the tumult and confusion and earthquake ceased, and the universal creature, once more at peace, attained to a calm, and settled down into his own orderly and accustomed course, having the charge and rule of himself and of all other creatures, and remembering and executing the instructions of the Father and Creator of the world, more particularly at first, but afterwards with less exactness.

The reason of the falling off was the admixture of matter in the world; this was inherent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder, until attaining to the present cosmos or order. From God, the constructor, the world indeed received every good, but from a previous state came elements of violence and injustice, which, thence derived, were implanted in the animals. While the world was producing animals in unison with God, the evil was small, and great the good which worked within, but in the process of separation from him, when the world was let go, at
first all proceeded well enough; then, as time went on, there was more and more forgetting, and the old discord again entered in and got the better, and burst forth; and at last small was the good, and great was the admixture of the elements of evil, and there was a danger of universal ruin of the world and the things in the world. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, seeing that the world was in great straits, fearing that all might be dissolved in the storm, and go to the place of chaos and infinity, again seated himself at the helm; and reversing the elements which had fallen into dissolution and disorder when left to themselves in the previous cycle, he set them in order and restored them, and made the world imperishable and immortal.

And this is the whole tale, of which the first part will suffice to illustrate the nature of the king. For when the world returned to the present cycle of generation, the age of man again stood still, and another change was the result. The small creatures which had almost disappeared grew in stature, and the newly-born children of the earth became grey and died and sank into the earth again. All things changed, imitating and following the condition of the universe, and agreeing with that in their mode of conception and generation and nurture; for no animal was any longer allowed to come into being in the earth through the agency of other creative beings, but as the world was ordained to be the lord of his own progress, in like manner the parts were ordained to grow and generate and give nourishment, as far as they could, of themselves, impelled by a similar movement.

And so we have arrived at the real end of this discourse; for although there might be much to tell of the lower animals, and of the reasons and causes of
their changes, about men there is not much, and that little is more to the purpose. Deprived of the care of God, who had possessed and tended them when, in process of time, most of the animals who were by nature intractable had grown wild, they were left helpless and defenceless, and were torn in pieces by them; moreover, in the first ages they carried on the struggle for existence without arts or resources; the food which once grew spontaneously had failed, and they knew not how to procure any more, because no necessity had hitherto compelled them. For all these reasons they were in a great strait; wherefore, also the gifts spoken of in the old tradition were imparted to them by the gods, together with the indispensable knowledge and information of their uses; fire was given to us by Prometheus, the arts by Hephaestus and his fellow-worker (Athene), seeds and plants by others. Out of these human life was framed; since the care of the Gods, as I was saying, had now failed men, and they had to order their course of life for themselves, and were their own masters, just like the universal creature, whom they imitate and follow, ever living and being born into the world, at one time after this manner, at another time after another manner.

PHILEBUS

The First Taste of Logic. The Art of Dialectic

The Philebus is one of the more purely metaphysical dialogues of Plato, and was probably composed in his later years. The subject of the work may be briefly said to be,—"Pleasure in relation to Knowledge and to the Good," or, "The place of Pleasure in the life of man." Pleasures are divided into two classes, the pure and the impure kind; the latter have no part in the virtuous life; the former are allowed, but are placed last
in the scale of goods. First comes measure; second, symmetry; third, reason; fourth, knowledge; fifth, the pure pleasures.

The passage which follows does not relate to the principal thesis of the dialogue, but is rather an account of the method in which Plato thinks that such an inquiry should be pursued. This is the "Dialectic" of which we so often hear in the Platonic writings. Yet there is a difference in his language in the Philebus when compared with that which he employs in other works, and especially in the Republic and Symposium. In these dialogues Dialectic is spoken of as the "steps" by which we mount from sensible objects to the contemplation of true being or the eternal beauty. This vague conception is not further explained by Plato in the Republic, and in the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Philebus, he returns to the more prosaic notion of Dialectic which he has already stated in the Phaedrus, where it is said to be the art by which the philosopher is enabled to divide things into their species, "according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might."

It is, therefore, a logical process of division and subdivision, closely analogous to what Aristotle calls his "customary method by which the compound is resolved into the elements or least parts of the whole." This seems to have been merely a passing phase of Plato's philosophy, when in his "warfare on behalf of mind" he felt the necessity, as he himself expresses it, "of having weapons of another make from those which he used before." In the Laws Dialectic occupies a far less important place, and is only the name given to the mode of carrying on the argument by question and answer, which affords a "suitable pastime" for the days of old age.

Soc. Good; and where shall we begin this great and comprehensive battle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall we begin thus?

Pro. How shall we begin?

Soc. We say that the one and many are identified by the reasoning power, and that they run about everywhere together, in and out of every word which is uttered, as they have done in all time present as well as past, and this will never cease, and is not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality
of reason, as such, which never grows old in us. Any young man, when he first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure of wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he sets (not every stone, but) every thought rolling, now converting the many into the one, and kneading them together, now unfolding and dividing them; he puzzles himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbors, whether they are older or younger, or of his own age— that makes no difference; neither father nor mother does he spare; no human being who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog; and a barbarian would have no chance with him, if an interpreter could only be found.

Pro. Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us are young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may conspire and attack you, if you speak evil of us? Yet we understand; and if there is any better way or manner of quietly escaping out of all this tumult and perplexity, and arriving at the truth, we hope that you will guide us into that way, and we will do our best to follow, for the inquiry in which we are engaged, Socrates, is not a small one.

Soc. Not a small one, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and there neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favorite way, which has nevertheless already often deserted me in the hour of need.

Pro. Tell us what that is?

Soc. One which may be easily explained, but is by no means easy of application, and is the parent of all the discoveries of the art.

Pro. Say only what.

Soc. A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed into the world by the hands of some Prometheus, together with a blaze of fire; and the an-
cientists, who were our betters and nearer the gods than we are, handed down the tradition, that all things which are supposed to exist draw their existence from the one and many, and have the finite and infinite in them as a part of their nature: seeing, then, that such is the order of the world, we too ought in all our investigations to assume that there is one idea of everything; this unity we shall be sure to find, and having found, we may next proceed to look for two, if there be two, or, if not, then for three or some other number, subdividing each of these units, until at last the original one is seen, not only as one and many and infinite, but also in some definite number; the infinite must not be suffered to approach the many until the entire number of the species intermediate between unity and infinity has been found out,—then, and not till then, we may rest from division, and all the remaining individuals may be allowed to pass into infinity.

This, as I was saying, is the way of considering and learning and teaching one another, which the gods have handed down to us. But the wise men of our time are either too quick or too slow in conceiving plurality in unity. Having no method, they make their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass at once to infinity, without thinking of the intermediate steps. And this, I repeat, is what makes the difference between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic.
The Timaeus is connected by Plato himself with the Republic and the Critias. Socrates is supposed to have recounted on the following day the conversation recorded in the Republic to a circle of friends who have promised to deliver in turn a discourse upon some philosophical topic. The persons named are Timaeus, a citizen of Locri in Italy, Hermocrates, probably the famous Syracusan general, and Critias, the Athenian, who has previously appeared in the Charmides and Protagoras. A fifth member of the group, whose name is not mentioned, is said to have been absent through illness.

We hear nothing of any other auditors, and we miss the dramatic or artistic setting which enhances the effect of the earlier Platonic writings. In these respects the Timaeus seems akin to the Sophist and the Statesman, which it also resembles in the circumstance that Socrates is no longer the chief speaker, but a stranger who has come on a visit to Athens. Here Timaeus is the protagonist, no doubt because, as a native of Southern Italy, he could fitly expound a theory of the Cosmos which was to a considerable extent based upon Pythagorean ideas. His task is to explain how the world came into being, and how man and the animals were created. Before, however, Timaeus commences his speech, Critias relates in outline a story which he proposes to take for his theme on the morrow.

This is the famous legend of Atlantis, the great island which once existed in the Atlantic and afterwards sank beneath the waves. The tale has exercised a curious power of attraction over the imagination, which has lasted almost to our own time: the site of Atlantis has been gravely debated by learned writers, and has formed the subject of many treatises. Yet the story is probably only the birth of Plato's prolific fancy, or rests at most upon a vague tradition of a land beyond the Atlantic which had reached Athens from the Western Mediterranean. For it is not unreasonable to suppose that the nations who lived upon the verge of the great ocean may have dreamed of a "New World" on the other side, which their fancy would paint in bright and alluring colors as the seat of an ancient and primitive civilization. And it is even possible that the adventurous Phoenicians may have gained a knowledge of one or more of the Atlantic islands which
would gradually come to the ears of the Greek sailors and merchants.

However this may be, the object of Plato in narrating the legend is clearly enough indicated by him. He wishes to picture, as he himself says, "the ideal state engaged in a conflict with her neighbors, and showing by her actions and the magnanimity of her words a result worthy of her training." He invents, therefore, an imaginary Athenian commonwealth which is supposed to have existed many centuries ago, and to have waged a victorious war with the people of Atlantis. This is at the same time an allegory or another version of the unceasing struggle between the Hellenes and the Barbarian, which so greatly occupied the Greek mind; and Plato's use of the legend may be compared to the manner in which Herodotus turns the ancient myth into a prelude of the Persian War.

Atlantis is the typical Barbarian power, like Babylon or Egypt, full of luxury and vain pomp and glory; while Athens is the Hellenic state, "endowed with slender means," but strong in the virtue and patriotism of its citizens. The conflict is unequal; yet the issue is not doubtful. Hellenic valor and discipline prevail, as they did when the Athenians and their allies triumphed over the unwieldy hosts of Persia on the plains of Marathon, or when Xenophon led the Ten Thousand through the heart of the Persian empire to the shores of the Pontus.

**Crit.** Then listen, Socrates, to a strange tale which is, however, certainly true, as Solon, who was the wisest of the seven sages, declared. He was a relative and a great friend of my great-grandfather, Dropidas, as he himself says in several of his poems; and Dropidas told Critias, my grandfather, who remembered and told us:—That there were of old great and marvellous actions of the Athenians, which have passed into oblivion through time and the destruction of the human race, and one in particular, which was the greatest of them all, the recital of which will be a suitable testimony of our gratitude to you, and also a hymn of praise true and worthy of the goddess, which may be sung by us at the festival in her honor,
Soc. Very good. And what is this ancient famous action of which Critias spoke not as a mere legend, but as a veritable action of the Athenian state, which Solon recounted?

Crit. I will tell an old-world story which I heard from an aged man; for Critias was, as he said, at that time nearly ninety years of age, and I was about ten years of age. Now the day was that day of the Apaturia which is called the registration of youth, at which, according to custom, our parents gave prizes for recitations, and the poems of several poets were recited by us boys, and many of us sang the poems of Solon, which were new at the time. One of our tribe, either because this was his real opinion, or because he thought that he would please Critias, said that in his judgment Solon was not only the wisest of men, but also the noblest of poets. The old man, as I very well remember, brightened up at this and said, smiling: Yes, Amynander, if Solon had only, like other poets, made poetry the business of his life, and had completed the tale which he brought with him from Egypt, and had not been compelled, by reason of the factions and troubles which he found stirring in this country when he came home, to attend to other matters, in my opinion he would have been as famous as Homer or Hesiod, or any poet.

And what was the poem about, Critias? said the person who addressed him.

About the greatest action which the Athenians ever did, and which ought to have been the most famous, but which, through the lapse of time and the destruction of the actors, has not come down to us.

Tell us, said the other, the whole story, and how and from whom Solon heard this veritable tradition.

He replied: — At the head of the Egyptian Delta, where the river Nile divides, there is a certain dis-
strict which is called the district of Sais, and the great city of the district is also called Sais, and is the city from which Amasis the king was sprung. And the citizens have a deity who is their foundress; she is called in the Egyptian tongue Neith, and is asserted by them to be the same whom the Hellenes called Athene. Now the citizens of this city are great lovers of the Athenians, and say that they are in some way related to them.

Thither came Solon, who was received by them with great honor; and he asked the priests, who were most skilful in such matters, about antiquity, and made the discovery that neither he nor any other Hellene knew anything worth mentioning about the times of old. On one occasion, when he was drawing them on to speak of antiquity, he began to tell about the most ancient things in our part of the world—about Phroneus, who is called "the first," and about Niobe; and after the Deluge, to tell of the lives of Deucalion and Pyrrha; and he traced the genealogy of their descendants, and attempted to reckon how many years old were the events of which he was speaking, and to give the dates. Thereupon, one of the priests, who was of a very great age, said: O Solon, Solon, you Hellenes are but children, and there is never an old man who is an Hellene. Solon hearing this, said, What do you mean?

I mean to say, he replied, that in mind you are all young; there is no old opinion handed down among you by ancient tradition; nor any science which is hoary with age. And I will tell you the reason of this. There have been, and will be again, many destructions of mankind arising out of many causes; the greatest have been brought about by the agencies of fire and water, and other lesser ones by innumerable other causes. There is a story, which even you
have preserved, that once upon a time Phaëthon, the son of Helios, having yoked the steeds in his father's chariot, because he was not able to drive them in the path of his father, burned up all that was upon the earth, and was himself destroyed by a thunderbolt. Now, this has the form of a myth, but really signifies a declination of the bodies moving around the earth and in the heavens, and a great conflagration of things upon the earth recurring at long intervals of time; when this happens, those who live upon the mountains and in dry and lofty places are more liable to destructions than those who dwell by rivers or on the seashore. And from this calamity the Nile, who is our never-failing savior, saves and delivers us.

When, on the other hand, the gods purge the earth with a deluge of water, among you, herdsmen and shepherds on the mountains are the survivors, whereas those of you who live in cities are carried by the rivers into the sea. But in this country, neither at that time nor at any other, does the water come from above on the fields, having always a tendency to come up from below, for which reason the things preserved here are said to be the oldest. The fact is, that wherever the extremity of winter frost or of summer sun does not prevent, the human race is always increasing at times, and at other times diminishing in numbers. And whatever happened either in your country or in ours, or in any other region of which we are informed—if any action which is noble or great or in any other way remarkable has taken place, all that has been written down of old, and is preserved in our temples; whereas you and other nations are just being provided with letters and the other things which States require; and then, at the usual period, the stream from heaven descends like a pestilence, and leaves only those of you who are destitute of letters and edu-
cation; and thus you have to begin all over again as children, and know nothing of what happened in ancient times, either among us or among yourselves.

As for those genealogies of yours which you have recounted to us, Solon, they are no better than the tales of children; for in the first place you remember one deluge only, whereas there were many of them; and in the next place, you do not know that there dwelt in your land the fairest and noblest race of men which ever lived, of whom you and your whole city are but a seed or remnant. And this was unknown to you, because for many generations the survivors of that destruction died and made no sign. For there was a time, Solon, before the great deluge of all, when the city which now is Athens, was first in war and was preëminent for the excellence of her laws, and is said to have performed the noblest deeds and to have had the fairest constitution of any of which tradition tells, under the face of heaven. Solon marvelled at this, and earnestly requested the priest to inform him exactly and in order about these former citizens.

You are welcome to hear about them, Solon, said the priest, both for your own sake and for that of the city, and above all, for the sake of the goddess who is the common patron and protector and educator of both our cities. She founded your city a thousand years before ours, receiving from the Earth and Hephæstus the seed of your race, and then she founded ours, the constitution of which is set down in our sacred registers as 8000 years old. As touching the citizens of 9000 years ago, I will briefly inform you of their laws and of the noblest of their actions; and the exact particulars of the whole we will hereafter go through at our leisure in the sacred registers themselves. If you compare these very laws with your
own you will find that many of ours are the counterpart of yours as they were in the olden time. In the first place, there is the caste of priests, which is separated from all the others; next there are the artificers, who exercise their several crafts by themselves and without admixture of any other; and also there is the class of shepherds and that of hunters, as well as that of husbandmen; and you will observe, too, that the warriors in Egypt are separated from all the other classes, and are commanded by the law only to engage in war; moreover, the weapons with which they are equipped are shields and spears, and this the goddess taught first among you, and then in Asiatic countries, and we among the Asiatics first adopted. Then as to wisdom, do you observe what care the law took from the very first, searching out and comprehending the whole order of things down to prophecy and medicine (the latter with a view to health); and out of these divine elements drawing what was needful for human life, and adding every sort of knowledge which was connected with them.

All this order and arrangement the goddess first imparted to you when establishing your city; and she chose the spot of earth in which you were born, because she saw that the happy temperament of the seasons in that land would produce the wisest of men. Wherefore the goddess who was a lover both of war and of wisdom, selected and first of all settled that spot which was the most likely to produce men likest herself. And there you dwelt, having such laws as these and still better ones, and excelled all mankind in all virtue as became the children and disciples of the gods.

Many great and wonderful deeds are recorded of your State in our histories. But one of them exceeds all the rest in greatness and valor. For these his-
tories tell of a mighty power which was aggressing wantonly against the whole of Europe and Asia, and to which your city put an end. This power came forth out of the Atlantic Ocean, for in those days the Atlantic was navigable; and there was an island situated in front of the straits which you call the columns of Heracles; the island was larger than Libya and Asia put together, and was the way to other islands, and from the islands you might pass to the whole of the opposite continent which surrounded the true ocean; for this sea which is within the Straits of Heracles is only a harbor, having a narrow entrance, but that other is a real sea, and the surrounding land may be most truly called a continent.

Now in this island of Atlantis there was a great and wonderful empire which had rule over the whole island and several others, as well as over parts of the continent, and, besides these, they subjected the parts of Libya within the columns of Heracles as far as Egypt, and of Europe as far as Tyrrennia. The vast power thus gathered into one, endeavored to subdue at one blow our country and yours and the whole of the land which was within the straits; and then, Solon, your country shone forth, in the excellence of her virtue and strength, among all mankind; for she was first in courage and military skill, and was the leader of the Hellenes. And when the rest fell off from her, being compelled to stand alone, after having undergone the very extremity of danger, she defeated and triumphed over the invaders, and preserved from slavery those who were not yet subjected, and freely liberated all the others who dwell within the limits of Heracles. But afterwards there occurred violent earthquakes and floods; and in a single day and night of rain all your warlike men in a body sank into the earth, and the island of Atlantis in like manner dis-
appeared, and was sunk beneath the sea. And that is the reason why the sea in those parts is impassable and impenetrable, because there is such a quantity of shallow mud in the way; and this was caused by the subsidence of the island.

I have told you shortly, Socrates, the tradition which the aged Critias heard from Solon. And when you were speaking yesterday about your city and citizens, this very tale which I am telling you came into my mind, and I could not help remarking how, by some coincidence not to be explained, you agreed in almost every particular with the account of Solon; but I did not like to speak at the moment. For as a long time had elapsed, I had forgotten too much, and I thought that I had better first of all run over the narrative in my own mind and then I would speak. And for this reason I readily assented to your request yesterday, considering that I was pretty well furnished with a theme such as the audience would approve, and to find this is in all such cases the chief difficulty.

And therefore, as Hermocrates has told you, on my way home yesterday I imparted my recollections to my friends in order to refresh my memory, and during the night I thought about the words and have nearly recovered them all. Truly, as is often said, the lessons which we have learned as children make a wonderful impression on our memories, for I am not sure that I could remember all that I heard yesterday, but I should be much surprised if I forgot any of these things which I have heard very long ago. I listened to the old man telling them, when a child, with great interest at the time; he was very ready to teach me, and I asked him about them a great many times, so that they were branded into my mind in ineffaceable letters. As soon as the day broke I began
to repeat them to my companions, that they as well as myself might have a material of discourse.

And now, Socrates, I am ready to tell you the whole tale of which this is the introduction. I will give you not only the general heads, but the details exactly as I heard them. And as to the city and citizens, which you yesterday described to us in fiction, let us transfer them to the world of reality; this shall be our city, and we will suppose that the citizens whom you imagined, were our veritable ancestors—the same of whom the priest was telling; they will perfectly agree, and there will be no inconsistency in saying that the citizens of your republic are these ancient Athenians.

2. THE BALANCE OF MIND AND BODY

The Timaeus, after the close of the Introduction, is a monologue unbroken by any of the auditors. Timaeus gives a description of the Cosmos, in which he enlarges upon the Creation of the World and of Man, the Starry System, the Four Elements, the Senses, the Nature of Disease, the Parts of the Soul, the Fate of the Soul after Death, and other kindred topics. Towards the end of his discourse he takes occasion to speak of a subject, which, although not immediately connected with the main scheme of the work, is of the highest interest and importance—the relation of the Soul to the Body, and the influence which each of them exercises upon the other.

Plato is here enforcing from a rather different side the lesson which he has already taught us in the Republic, that the cultivation of the mind and the training of the body ought to be pursued in common. He perhaps exaggerates the necessity of harmony between the soul and the bodily frame; for many instances might be quoted in which the very weaknesses and infirmities of the body seem not to have hindered, but even to have quickened and stimulated, the intellectual powers. Yet it is also hardly possible to doubt that a certain sobriety and sanity of judgment is enjoyed by the happy possessor of a healthy and robust constitution. He is freer from morbid and unwholesome thoughts, and his outlook on life is brighter and more cheerful.
In this respect Plato may have been to some extent influenced by the antipathy to deformity and suffering which forms a marked characteristic of the Hellenic temper: and the same spirit is apparently betrayed by the manner in which he speaks of the inutility of attempting to contend against disease, just as in the Republic he derides Herodicus, the "inventor of valetudinarianism," who taught men to protract a useless existence to extreme old age, and to spend on the care of their bodies the time which would have been better employed on the improvement of their minds.

There is a corresponding inquiry concerning the modes in which the mind and the body are to be treated, and by what means they are preserved, on which I may and ought to enter; for it is more our duty to speak of the good than of the evil. Everything that is good is fair, and the fair is not without measure, and the animal who is fair may be supposed to have measure. Now we perceive lesser symmetries and comprehend them, but about the highest and greatest we have no understanding; for with a view to health and disease, and virtue and vice, there is no symmetry or want of symmetry greater than that of the soul to the body; and this we do not perceive, or ever reflect that when a weaker or lesser frame is the vehicle of a great and mighty soul, or conversely, when they are united in the opposite way, then the whole animal is not fair, for it is defective in the most important of all symmetries; but the fair mind in the fair body will be the fairest and loveliest of all sights to him who has the seeing eye. Just as a body which has a leg too long, or some other disproportion, is an unpleasant sight, and also, when undergoing toil, has many sufferings, and makes violent efforts, and often stumbles through awkwardness, and is the cause of infinite evil to its own self — in like manner we should conceive of the double nature which we
call the living being; and when in this compound there is an impassioned soul more powerful than the body, that soul, I say, convulses and disorders the whole inner nature of man; and when too eager in the pursuit of knowledge, causes wasting; or again, when teaching or disputing in private or in public, and strifes and controversies arise, inflames and dissolves the composite frame of man and introduces rheums; and the nature of this is not understood by most professors of medicine, who ascribe the phenomenon to the opposite of the real cause. And once more, when a body large and too much for the soul is united to a small and weak intelligence, seeing that there are two desires natural to man,—one of food for the sake of the body, and one of wisdom for the sake of the diviner part of us—then, I say, the motions of the stronger principle, getting the better and increasing their own power, but making the soul dull, and stupid, and forgetful, engender ignorance, which is the greatest of diseases.

There is one protection against both:—that we should not move the body without the soul or the soul without the body, and thus they will aid one another, and be healthy and well balanced. And therefore the mathematician or any one else who devotes himself to some intellectual pursuit, must allow his body to have motion also, and practise gymnastic; and he who would train the limbs of the body, should impart to them the motions of the soul, and should practise music and all philosophy, if he would be called truly fair and truly good.

And in like manner should the parts be treated, and the principle of the whole similarly applied to them; for as the body is heated and also cooled within by the elements which enter in, and is again dried up and moistened by external things, and experiences
these and the like affections from both kinds of motions, the result is that the body if given up to motion when in a state of quiescence is overmastered and destroyed; but if any one, in imitation of that which we call the foster-mother and nurse of the universe, will not allow the body to be at rest, but is always producing motions and shakings, which constantly react upon the natural motions both within and without, and by shaking moderately the affections and parts which wander about the body, brings them into order and affinity with one another according to the theory of the universe which we were maintaining, he will not allow enemy placed by the side of enemy to create wars and disorders in the body, but he will place friend by the side of friend, producing health.

Now of all motions that is the best which is produced in a thing by itself, for it is most akin to the motion of the intelligent and the motion of the universe; but that motion which is caused by others is not so good, and worst of all is that which moves the parts of the body, when prostrate and at rest, in parts only and by external means; wherefore also that is the best of the purifications and adjustments of the body which is effected by gymnastic; next is that which is effected by carrying the body, as in sailing or any other mode of conveyance which is not fatiguing; the third sort of motion may be of use in a case of extreme necessity, but in any other will be adopted by no man of sense: I mean the purgative treatment of physicians; for diseases which are not attended by great dangers should not be irritated by purgatives, for every form of disease is in a manner akin to the living being — for the combination out of which they were formed has an appointed term of life and of existence. And the whole race and every animal has his appointed natural time, apart from violent casu-
alties; for the triangles are originally framed with power to live for a certain time, beyond which no man can prolong his life. And this holds also of the nature of diseases, for if any one regardless of their appointed time would destroy nature by purgatives, he only increases and multiplies them. Wherefore we ought always to manage them by regimen, as far as a man can spare the time, and not provoke a disagreeable enemy by medical treatment.

Let this much be said of the general nature of man, and of the body which is a part of him, and of the manner in which a man may govern himself and be governed best, and live most according to reason: and we must begin by providing that the governing principle shall be the fairest and best possible for the purpose of government. But to discuss such a subject accurately would be a sufficiently long business of itself. As a mere supplement or sequel of what has preceded, it may be summed up as follows. As I have often said, that there are three kinds of soul located within us, each of them having their own proper motions—so I must now say in the fewest words possible, that the one part, if remaining inactive and ceasing from the natural motion, must necessarily become very weak, but when trained and exercised then very strong. Wherefore we should take care that the three parts of the soul are exercised in proportion to one another.

Concerning the highest part of the human soul, we should consider that God gave this as a genius to each one, which was to dwell at the extremity of the body, and to raise us like plants, not of an earthly but of a heavenly growth, from earth to our kindred which is in heaven. And this is most true; for the divine power suspended the head and root of us from that place where the generation of the soul first began,
and thus made erect the whole body. He, therefore, who is always occupied with the cravings of desire and ambition, and is eagerly striving after them, must have all his opinions mortal, and, as far as man can be, must be all of him mortal, because he has cherished his mortal part. But he who has been earnest in the love of knowledge and true wisdom, and has been trained to think that these are the immortal and divine things of a man, if he attain truth, must of necessity, as far as human nature is capable of attaining immortality, be all immortal, as he is ever serving the divine power; and having the genius residing in him in the most perfect order, he must be preëminently happy.

Now there is only one way in which one being can serve another, and this is by giving him his proper nourishment and motion. And the motions which are akin to the divine principle within us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe. These each man should follow, and correct those corrupted courses of the head which are concerned with generation, and by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the whole, should assimilate the perceiver to the thing perceived, according to his original nature, and by thus assimilating them, attain that final perfection of life, which the gods set before mankind as best, both for the present and the future.

CRITIAS

OR THE ISLAND OF ATLANTIS

The legend of Atlantis is resumed in the Critias, but the story is abruptly broken off a short way from the commencement. Why the work was not completed by Plato, we can not say. He may have found the task too difficult even for his artistic powers. The theme would scarcely bear elaboration, nor could the result, we
may think, have been entirely satisfactory. Allegory and satire have generally been most successful in proportion to their shortness; longer writings of this class are apt to retain only a romantic or a poetical interest for the reader, while their deeper meaning is forgotten or ignored.

It is, however, possible that Plato may have been compelled by circumstances of which we are ignorant to "leave half-told" the myth of Atlantis. We may please ourselves, if we choose, by imagining that the second or third journey which Plato is alleged to have made to Sicily was the cause of the interruption. Yet such a conjecture does not give us any real assistance, and we must be content to let the question, like so many other literary problems, remain without an answer.

Timaeus. How thankful I am, Socrates, that I have arrived at last, and, like a weary traveller after a long journey, may now be at rest! And I pray the being who always was of old, and has now been by me declared, to receive and preserve my words, in so far as they have been spoken truly and acceptably to him; and if unintentionally I have said anything wrong, I pray that he will impose upon me a fitting retribution, and the proper retribution of him who errs is to set him in the right way. Wishing, then, that for the future I may speak truly concerning the generation of the gods, I pray them to give me knowledge, which of all medicines is the most perfect and best. — That is my prayer. And now I deliver the argument into the hands of Critias, according to our agreement.

Critias. And I, Timaeus, accept the trust, and as you at first said that you were going to speak of high matters, and begged that some allowance might be extended to you, I must request the same or a greater allowance for what I am about to say. And although I very well know that I am making an ambitious and a somewhat rude request, I must not be deterred by that. For will any man of sense deny
that you have spoken well? I can only attempt to show that my theme is more difficult, and claims more indulgence than yours; and I shall argue that to seem to speak well of the gods to men is far easier than to speak well of mortals to one another: for the inexperience and utter ignorance of his hearers about such matters is a great assistance to him who has to speak of them, and we know how ignorant we are concerning the gods. But I should like to make my meaning clearer, if you will follow me.

All that we are any of us saying can only be imitation and assimilation. For if we consider how the works of the painter represent bodies divine and heavenly, and the different degrees of gratification with which the eye of the spectator receives them, we shall see that we are satisfied with the artist who is able in any degree to imitate the earth and its mountains, and the rivers, and the woods, and the universe, and the things that are and move therein, and further, that knowing nothing precise about such matters, we do not examine or analyze the painting; all that is required is a sort of indistinct and deceptive mode of shadowing them forth. But when a person endeavors to paint the human form we are quick at finding out defects, and our familiar knowledge makes us severe judges of any one who does not render every point of similarity; and this is also true of discourse; we are satisfied with a picture of divine and heavenly things which has very little likeness to them; but we are more precise in our criticism of mortal and human things. Wherefore if at the moment of speaking we can not suitably express what we mean, you must excuse us, considering that to form approved likenesses of human things is the reverse of easy. This is what I want to suggest to you, and at the same time to beg, Socrates, that I may have not less, but
more indulgence conceded to me in what I am about to say. Which favor, if I am right in asking, I hope that you will be ready to grant.

*Socrates.* Certainly, Critias, we will grant that, and we will grant the same by anticipation to Hermocrates, who has to speak third; for I have no doubt that when his turn comes a little while hence, he will make the same request which you have made. In order, then, that he may provide himself with a fresh beginning, and not be compelled to say the same things over again, let him understand that the indulgence is already extended by anticipation to him. And now, friend Critias, I will announce to you the judgment of the theatre. They are of opinion that the last performer was wonderfully successful, and that you will need a great deal of indulgence if you are to rival him.

*Hermocrates.* The warning, Socrates, which you have addressed to him, I must also regard as applying to myself. But remember, Critias, that faint heart never yet raised a trophy; you must go and attack the argument like a man. First invoke Apollo and the Muses, and then let us hear you sing the praises of your ancient citizens.

*Crit.* Friend Hermocrates, you who are stationed last and have another in front of you, have not lost heart as yet; whether you are right or not, you will soon know; meanwhile I accept your exhortations and encouragements. But in addition to the gods whom you have mentioned, I would specially invoke Mnemosyne; for all the important part of what I have to tell is dependent on her favor, and if I can recollect and recite enough of what was said by the priests and brought hither by Solon, I doubt not that I shall satisfy the requirements of this theatre. To that task then I will at once address myself.
Let me begin by observing first of all, that nine thousand was the sum of years which had elapsed since the war which was said to have taken place between all those who dwelt outside the pillars of Heracles and those who dwelt within them; this war I am now to describe. Of the combatants on the one side, the city of Athens was reported to have been the ruler and to have directed the contest; the combatants on the other side were led by the kings of the islands of Atlantis, which, as I was saying, once had an extent greater than that of Libya and Asia; and when afterwards sunk by an earthquake, became an impassable barrier of mud to voyagers sailing from hence to the ocean. The progress of the history will unfold the various tribes of barbarians and Hellenes which then existed, as they successively appear on the scene; but I must begin by describing first of all the Athenians, as they were in that day, and their enemies who fought with them; and I shall have to tell of the power and form of government of both of them. Let us give the precedence to Athens:

In former ages, the gods had the whole earth distributed among them by allotment; there was no quarrelling; and you can not suppose that the gods did not know what was proper for each of them to have; or, knowing this, that they would seek to procure for themselves by contention that which more properly belonged to others. Each of them obtained righteously by lot what they wanted, and peopled their own districts; and when they had peopled them they tended us human beings who belonged to them as shepherds tend their flocks, excepting only that they did not use blows or bodily force, as the manner of shepherds is, but governed us like pilots from the stern of a vessel, which is an easy way of guiding animals, by the rudder of persuasion, taking hold of
our souls according to their own pleasure; — thus did they guide all mortal creatures.

Now different gods had their inheritance in different places which they set in order. Hephaestus and Athene, who were brother and sister, and sprang from the same father, having a common nature, and being united also in the love of philosophy and of art, both obtained as their allotted region this land, which was naturally adapted for wisdom and virtue; and there they implanted brave children of the soil, and put into their minds the order of government; their names are preserved, but their actions have disappeared by reason of the destruction of those who had the tradition, and the lapse of ages. For the survivors of each destruction, as I have already said, dwelt in the mountains; they were ignorant of the art of writing, and had heard only the names of the chiefs of the land, and a very little about their actions. The names they gave to their children out of affection, but of the virtues and laws of those who preceded them, they knew only by obscure traditions; and as they themselves and their children were for many generations in want of the necessaries of life, they directed their attention to the supply of their wants, and of that they discoursed, to the neglect of events that had happened in times long passed; for mythology and the inquiry into antiquity are introduced into cities when they have leisure, and when they see the necessaries of life already beginning to be provided, but not before. And this is the reason why the names of the ancients have been preserved to us without their deeds. This I infer because Solon said that the priests in their narrative of that war mentioned most of the names which are recorded prior to the time of Theseus, such as Cecrops, and Erechtheus, and Erichthonius, and Erysichthon, and the names
of the women in like manner. Moreover, the figure and image of the goddess show that at that time military pursuits were common to men and women, and that in accordance with that custom they dedicated the armed image of the goddess as a testimony that all animals, male and female, which consort together, have a virtue proper to each class, which they are all able to pursue in common.

Now the country was inhabited in those days by various classes of citizens;—there were artisans, and there were husbandmen, and there was a warrior class originally set apart by divine men; these dwelt by themselves, and had all things suitable for nurture and education; neither had any of them anything of their own, but they regarded all things as common property; nor did they require to receive of the other citizens anything more than their necessary food. And they practised all the pursuits which we yesterday described as those of our imaginary guardians. Also about the country the Egyptian priests said what is not only probable but also true, that the boundaries were fixed by the Isthmus, and that in the other direction they extended as far as the heights of Cithaeron and Parnes; the boundary line came down towards the plain, having the district of Oropus on the right, and the river Asopus on the left, as the limit towards the sea. The land was the best in the world, and for this reason was able in those days to support a vast army, raised from the surrounding people. And a great proof of this fertility is, that the part which still remains may compare with any in the world for the variety and excellence of its fruits and the suitableness of its pastures to every sort of animal; and besides beauty the land had also plenty.

How am I to prove this? and of what remnant
of the land then in existence may this be truly said? I would have you observe the present aspect of the country, which is only a promontory extending far into the sea away from the rest of the continent, and the surrounding basin of the sea is everywhere deep in the neighborhood of the shore. Many great deluges have taken place during the nine thousand years, for that is the number of years which have elapsed since the time of which I am speaking; and in all the ages and changes of things, there has never been any settlement of the earth flowing down from the mountains as in other places, which is worth speaking of; it has always been carried round in a circle and disappeared in the depths below.

The consequence is, that in comparison of what then was, there are remaining in small islets only the bones of the wasted body, as they may be called; all the richer and softer parts of the soil having fallen away, and the mere skeleton of the country being left. But in former days, and in the primitive state of the country, what are now mountains were only regarded as hills; and the plains, as they are now termed, of Phelleus were full of rich earth, and there was abundance of wood in the mountains. Of this last the traces still remain, for there are some of the mountains which now only afford sustenance to bees, whereas not long ago there were still remaining roofs cut from the trees growing there, which were of a size sufficient to cover the largest houses; and there were many other high trees, bearing fruit and abundance of food for cattle. Moreover, the land enjoyed rain from heaven year by year, not, as now, losing the water which flows off the earth into the sea, but having an abundance in all places, and receiving and treasuring up in the close clay soil the water which drained from the heights, and letting this off into the
hollows, providing everywhere abundant streams of fountains and rivers; and there may still be observed indications of them in ancient sacred places, where there are fountains; and this proves the truth of what I am saying.

Such was the natural state of the country, which was cultivated, as we may well believe, by true husbandmen, who were lovers of honor, and of a noble nature, and did the work of husbandmen, and had a soil the best in the world, and abundance of water, and in the heaven above an excellently tempered climate. Now the city in those days was arranged on this wise; in the first place the Acropolis was not as now. For the fact is that a single night of excessive rain washed away the earth and laid bare the rock; at the same time there were earthquakes, and then occurred the third extraordinary inundation, which immediately preceded the great destruction of Deucalion. But in primitive times the hill of the Acropolis extended to the Eridanus and Ilissus, and included the Pnyx and the Lycabettus as a boundary on the opposite side to the Pnyx, and was all well covered with soil, and level at the top, except in one or two places. Outside the Acropolis and on the sides of the hill there dwelt artisans, and such of the husbandmen as were tilling the ground near; at the summit the warrior class dwelt by themselves around the temples of Athene and Hephaestus, living as in the garden of one house, and surrounded by one enclosure.

On the north side they had common houses, and had prepared for themselves winter places for common meals, and had all the buildings which they needed for the public use, and also temples, but unadorned with gold and silver, for these were not in use among them; they took a middle course between meanness and extravagance, and built moderate
houses in which they and their children's children grew old, and handed them down to others who were like themselves, always the same. And in summer-time they gave up their gardens and gymnasia and common tables and used the southern quarter of the Acropolis for such purposes. Where the Acropolis now is there was a single fountain, which was extinguished by the earthquake, and has left only a few small streams which still exist, but in those days the fountain gave an abundant supply of water, which was of equal temperature in summer and winter. This was the fashion in which they lived, being the guardians of their own citizens and the leaders of the Hellenes, who were their willing followers. And they took care to preserve the same number of men and women for military service, which was to continue through all time, and still is,—that is to say, about twenty thousand.

Such were the ancient Athenians, and after this manner they righteously administered their own land and the rest of Hellas; they were renowned all over Europe and Asia for the beauty of their persons and for the many virtues of their souls, and were more famous than any of their contemporaries. And next, if I have not forgotten what I heard when I was a child, I will impart to you the character and origin of their adversaries. For friends should not keep their stories to themselves, but have them in common.

Yet, before proceeding further in the narrative, I ought to warn you, that you must not be surprised if you should hear Hellenic names given to foreigners. I will tell you the reason of this: Solon, who was intending to use the tale for his poem, made an investigation into the meaning of the names, and found that the early Egyptians in writing them down had translated them into their own language, and he re-
covered the meaning of the several names and retranslated them, and copied them out again in our language. My great-grandfather, Dropidas, had the original writing, which is still in my possession, and was carefully studied by me when I was a child. Therefore if you hear names such as are used in this country, you must not be surprised, for I have told you the reason of them. The tale, which was of great length, began as follows:—

I have before remarked in speaking of the allotments of the gods, that they distributed the whole earth into portions differing in extent, and made themselves temples and sacrifices. And Poseidon, receiving for his lot the island of Atlantis, begat children by a mortal woman, and settled them in a part of the island, which I will proceed to describe. On the side towards the sea and in the centre of the whole island, there was a plain which is said to have been the fairest of all plains and very fertile. Near the plain again, and also in the centre of the island at a distance of about fifty stadia, there was a mountain not very high on any side. In this mountain there dwelt one of the earth-born primeval men of that country, whose name was Evenor, and he had a wife named Leucippe, and they had an only daughter who was called Cleito. The maiden was growing up to womanhood, when her father and mother died; Poseidon fell in love with her and had intercourse with her, and breaking the ground, inclosed the hill in which she dwelt all round, making alternate zones of sea and land larger and smaller, encircling one another; there were two of land and three of water, which he turned as with a lathe, out of the centre of the island, equidistant every way, so that no man could get to the island, for ships and voyages were not as yet heard of. He himself, as he was a god,
found no difficulty in making special arrangements for the centre island, bringing two streams of water under the earth, which he caused to ascend as springs, one of warm water and the other of cold, and making every variety of food to spring up abundantly in the earth.

He also begat and brought up five pairs of male children, dividing the island of Atlantis into ten portions; he gave to the first-born of the eldest pair his mother’s dwelling and the surrounding allotment, which was the largest and best, and made him king over the rest; the others he made princes, and gave them rule over many men, and a large territory. And he named them all; the eldest, who was the king, he named Atlas, and from him the whole island and the ocean received the name of Atlantic. To his twin brother, who was born after him, and obtained as his lot the extremity of the island towards the pillars of Heracles, as far as the country which is still called the region of Gades in that part of the world, he gave the name which in the Hellenic language is Eumelus, in the language of the country which is named after him, Gadeirus. Of the second pair of twins he called one Ampheres, and the other Evaemon. To the third pair of twins he gave the name Mneseus to the elder, and Autochthon to the one who followed him. Of the fourth pair of twins he called the elder Elasippus, and the younger Mestor. And of the fifth pair he gave to the elder the name of Azaes, and to the younger that of Diaprepes. All these and their descendants were the inhabitants and rulers of divers islands in the open sea; and also, as has been already said, they held sway in the other direction over the country within the pillars as far as Egypt and Tyrrenia.

Now Atlas had a numerous and honorable family,
and his eldest branch always retained the kingdom, which the eldest son handed on to his eldest for many generations; and they had such an amount of wealth as was never before possessed by kings and potentates, and is not likely ever to be again, and they were furnished with everything which they could have, both in the city and country. For because of the greatness of their empire many things were brought to them from foreign countries, and the island itself provided much of what was required by them for the uses of life. In the first place, they dug out of the earth whatever was to be found there, mineral as well as metal, and that which is now only a name and was then something more than a name, orichalcum, was dug out of the earth in many parts of the island, and with the exception of gold was esteemed the most precious of metals among the men of those days. There was an abundance of wood for carpenter's work, and sufficient maintenance for tame and wild animals.

Moreover, there were a great number of elephants in the island, and there was provision for animals of every kind, both for those which live in lakes and marshes and rivers, and also for those which live in mountains and on plains, and therefore for the animal which is the largest and most voracious of them. Also whatever fragrant things there are in the earth, whether roots, or herbage, or woods, or distilling drops of flowers or fruits, grew and thrived in that land; and again, the cultivated fruit of the earth, both the dry edible fruit and other species of food, which we call by the general name of legumes, and the fruits having a hard rind, affording drinks and meats and ointments, and good store of chestnuts and the like, which may be used to play with, and are fruits which spoil with keeping, and the pleasant kinds of dessert,
which console us after dinner, when we are full and
tired of eating — all these that sacred island lying
beneath the sun, brought forth fair and wondrous in
infinite abundance. All these things they received
from the earth, and they employed themselves in con-
structing their temples and palaces and harbors and
docks; and they arranged the whole country in the
following manner:—

First of all they bridged over the zones of sea which
surrounded the ancient metropolis, and made a pas-
sage into and out of the royal palace; and then they
began to build the palace in the habitation of the god
and of their ancestors. This they continued to orna-
ment in successive generations, every king surpassing
the one who came before him to the utmost of his
power, until they made the building a marvel to be-
hold for size and for beauty. And beginning from
the sea they dug a canal of three hundred feet in width
and one hundred feet in depth, and fifty stadia in
length, which they carried through to the uttermost
zone, making a passage from the sea up to this, which
became a harbor, and leaving an opening sufficient to
enable the largest vessel to find ingress. Moreover,
they divided the zones of land which parted the zones
of sea, constructing bridges of such a width as would
leave a passage for a single trireme to pass out of one
into another, and roofed them over; and there was a
way underneath for the ships; for the banks of the
zones were raised considerably above the water. Now
the largest of the zones into which a passage was cut
from the sea was three stadia in breadth, and the zone
of land which came next of equal breadth; but the
next two, as well the zone of water as of land, were
two stadia, and the one which surrounded the central
island was a stadium only in width.

The island in which the palace was situated had a
diameter of five stadia. This and the zones and the bridge, which was the sixth part of a stadium in width, they surrounded by a stone wall, on either side placing towers, and gates on the bridges where the sea passed in. The stone which was used in the work they quarried from underneath the centre island, and from underneath the zones, on the outer as well as the inner side. One kind of stone was white, another black, and a third red, and as they quarried, they at the same time hollowed out rocks double within, having roofs formed out of the native rock. Some of their buildings were simple, but in others they put together different stones which they intermingled for the sake of ornament, to be a natural source of delight. The entire circuit of the wall, which went round the outermost one, they covered with a coating of brass, and the circuit of the next wall they coated with tin, and the third, which encompassed the citadel, flashed with the red light of orichalcum.

The palaces in the interior of the citadel were constructed on this wise:—In the centre was a holy temple dedicated to Cleito and Poseidon, which remained inaccessible, and was surrounded by an enclosure of gold; this was the spot in which they originally begat the race of the ten princes, and thither they annually brought the fruits of the earth in their season from all the ten portions, and performed sacrifices to each of them. Here, too, was Poseidon’s own temple of a stadium in length, and half a stadium in width, and of a proportionate height, having a sort of barbaric splendor. All the outside of the temple, with the exception of the pinnacles, they covered with silver, and the pinnacles with gold. In the interior of the temple the roof was of ivory, adorned everywhere with gold and silver and orichalcum; all the other parts of the walls and pillars and
floor they lined with orichalcum. In the temple they placed statues of gold — there was the god himself standing in a chariot — the charioteer of six winged horses — and of such a size that he touched the roof of the buildings with his head; around him there were a hundred Nereids riding on dolphins, for such was thought to be the number of them in that day. There were also in the interior of the temple other images which had been dedicated by private individuals. And around the temple on the outside were placed statues of gold of all the ten kings and of their wives, and there were many other great offerings both of kings and of private individuals, coming both from the city itself and the foreign cities over which they held sway. There was an altar too, which in size and workmanship corresponded to the rest of the work, and there were palaces, in like manner, which answered to the greatness of the kingdom, and the glory of the temple.

In the next place, they used fountains both of cold and hot springs; these were very abundant, and both kinds wonderfully adapted to use by reason of the sweetness and excellence of their waters. They constructed buildings about them and planted suitable trees; also cisterns, some open to the heaven, others which they roofed over, to be used in winter as warm baths; there were the king's baths, and the baths of private persons, which were kept apart; also separate baths for women, and others again for horses and cattle, and to each of them they gave as much adornment as was suitable for them. The water which ran off they carried, some to the grove of Poseidon, where were growing all manner of trees of wonderful height and beauty, owing to the excellence of the soil; the remainder was conveyed by aqueducts which passed over the bridges to the outer circles; and there
were many temples built and dedicated to many gods; also gardens and places of exercise, some for men, and some set apart for horses, in both of the two islands formed by the zones; and in the centre of the larger of the two there was a race-course of a stadium in width, and in length allowed to extend all round the island, for horses to race in. Also there were guard-houses at intervals for the body-guard, the more trusted of whom had their duties appointed to them in the lesser zone, which was nearer the Acropolis; while the most trusted of all had houses given them within the citadel, and about the persons of the kings. The docks were full of triremes and naval stores, and all things were quite ready for use. Enough of the plan of the royal palace. Crossing the outer harbors, which were three in number, you would come to a wall which began at the sea and went all round: this was everywhere distant fifty stadia from the largest zone and harbor, and enclosed the whole, meeting at the mouth of the channel towards the sea. The entire area was densely crowded with habitations; the canal and the largest of the harbors were full of vessels and merchants coming from all parts, who, from their numbers, kept up a multitudinous sound of human voices and din of all sorts night and day.

I have repeated his descriptions of the city and the parts about the ancient palace nearly as he gave them, and now I must endeavor to describe the nature and arrangement of the rest of the country. The whole country was described as being very lofty and precipitous on the side of the sea, but the country immediately about and surrounding the city was a level plain, itself surrounded by mountains which descended towards the sea; it was smooth and even, but of an oblong shape, extending in one direction three thousand stadia, and going up the country from
the sea, through the centre of the island, two thousand stadia; the whole region of the island lies towards the south, and is sheltered from the north. The surrounding mountains he celebrated for their number and size and beauty, in which they exceeded all that are now to be seen anywhere; having in them also many wealthy inhabited villages, and rivers, and lakes, and meadows supplying food enough for every animal, wild or tame, and wood of various sorts, abundant for every kind of work.

I will now describe the plain, which had been cultivated during many ages by many generations of kings. It was rectangular, and for the most part straight and oblong; and what it wanted of the straight line followed the line of the circular ditch. The depth, and width, and length of this ditch were incredible, and gave the impression that such a work, in addition to so many other works, could hardly have been wrought by the hand of man. But I must say what I have heard. It was excavated to the depth of a hundred feet, and its breadth was a stadium everywhere; it was carried round the whole of the plain, and was ten thousand stadia in length. It received the streams which came down from the mountains, and winding round the plain and touching the city at various points, was there let off into the sea. From above, likewise, straight canals of a hundred feet in width were cut in the plain, and again let off into the ditch towards the sea: these canals were at intervals of an hundred stadia, and by them they brought down the wood from the mountains to the city, and conveyed the fruits of the earth in ships, cutting transverse passages from one canal into another, and to the city. Twice in the year they gathered the fruits of the earth — in winter having the benefit of the rains, and in summer introducing the water of the canals.
As to the population, each of the lots in the plain had an appointed chief of men who were fit for military service, and the size of the lot was to be a square of ten stadia each way, and the total number of all the lots was sixty thousand. And of the inhabitants of the mountains and of the rest of the country there was also a vast multitude having leaders, to whom they were assigned according to their dwellings and villages. The leader was required to furnish for the war the sixth portion of a war-chariot, so as to make up a total of ten thousand chariots; also two horses and riders upon them, and a light chariot without a seat, accompanied by a fighting man on foot carrying a small shield, and having a charioteer mounted to guide the horses; also, he was bound to furnish two heavy armed, two archers, two slingers, three stone-shooters, and three javelin-men, who were skirmishers, and four sailors to make up the complement of twelve hundred ships. Such was the order of war in the royal city — that of the other nine governments was different in each of them, and would be wearisome to narrate.

As to offices and honors, the following was the arrangement from the first. Each of the ten kings in his own division and in his own city had the absolute control of the citizens, and in many cases, of the laws, punishing and slaying whomsoever he would. Now the relations of their governments to one another were regulated by the injunctions of Poseidon as the law had handed them down. These were inscribed by the first men on a column of orichalcum, which was situated in the middle of the island, at the temple of Poseidon, whither the people were gathered together every fifth and sixth years alternately, thus giving equal honor to the odd and to the even number. And when they were gathered together they con-
sulted about public affairs, and inquired if any one had transgressed in anything, and passed judgment on him accordingly, and before they passed judgment they gave their pledges to one another on this wise: — There were bulls who had the range of the temple of Poseidon; and the ten who were left alone in the temple, after they had offered prayers to the gods that they might take the sacrifices which were acceptable to them, hunted the bulls, without weapons, but with staves and nooses; and the bull which they caught they led up to the column; the victim was then struck on the head by them and slain over the sacred inscription. Now on the column, besides the law, there was inscribed an oath invoking mighty curses on the disobedient.

When therefore, after offering sacrifice according to their customs, they had burned the limbs of the bull, they mingled a cup and cast in a clot of blood for each of them; the rest of the victim they took to the fire, after having made a purification of the column all round. Then they drew from the cup in golden vessels, and pouring a libation on the fire, they swore that they would judge according to the laws on the column, and would punish any one who had previously transgressed, and that for the future they would not, if they could help, transgress any of the inscriptions, and would not command or obey any ruler who commanded them, to act otherwise than according to the laws of their father Poseidon. This was the prayer which each of them offered up for himself and for his family, at the same time drinking and dedicating the vessel in the temple of the god, and after spending some necessary time at supper, when darkness came on, and the fire about the sacrifice was cool, all of them put on most beautiful azure robes, and, sitting on the ground, at
night, near the embers of the sacrifices on which they had sworn, and extinguishing all the fire about the temple, they received and gave judgment, if any of them had any accusation to bring against any one; and when they had given judgment, at daybreak they wrote down their sentences on a golden tablet, and deposited them as memorials with their robes.

There were many special laws which the several kings had inscribed about the temples, but the most important was the following: — That they were not to take up arms against one another, and they were all to come to the rescue if any one in any city attempted to overthrow the royal house; like their ancestors, they were to deliberate in common about war and other matters, giving the supremacy to the family of Atlas. And the king was not to have the power of life and death over any of his kinsmen unless he had the assent of the majority of the ten kings.

Such was the vast power which the god settled in the lost island of Atlantis; and this he afterwards directed against our land on the following pretext, as traditions tell: For many generations, as long as the divine nature lasted in them, they were obedient to the laws, and well-affectioned towards the gods, who were their kinsmen; for they possessed true and in every way great spirits, practising gentleness and wisdom in the various chances of life, and in their intercourse with one another. They despised everything but virtue, not caring for their present state of life, and thinking lightly of the possession of gold and other property, which seemed only a burden to them; neither were they intoxicated by luxury; nor did wealth deprive them of their self-control; but they were sober, and saw clearly that all these goods are increased by virtuous friendship with one another, and that by excessive zeal for them, and honor of
them, the good of them is lost and friendship perishes with them. By such reflections and by the continuance in them of a divine nature, all that which we have described waxed and increased in them; but when this divine portion began to fade away in them, and became diluted too often and with too much of the mortal admixture, and the human nature got the upper hand, then they, being unable to bear their fortune, became unseemly, and to him who had an eye to see, they began to appear base, and had lost the fairest of their precious gifts; but to those who had no eye to see the true happiness, they still appeared glorious and blessed at the very time when they were filled with unrighteous avarice and power. Zeus, the god of gods, who rules with law, and is able to see into such things, perceiving that an honorable race was in a most wretched state, and wanting to inflict punishment on them, that they might be chastened and improve, collected all the gods into his most holy habitation, which being placed in the centre of the world, sees all things that partake of generation. And when he had called them together, he spake as follows: —

THE LAWS

We have now reached the work which seems to have occupied the last years of Plato's long life, the "swan song" with which he takes his leave of the world (Phaedo). The Laws may be called either a remodelling of the Republic, or a companion treatise on a slightly altered theme. The question, in Aristotle's language, is no longer, "What State is best in the abstract?" but "What State is the best relatively to circumstances?" In every respect the two Dialogues form a striking contrast.

The Republic is written with the greatest literary skill, and with the utmost grace and refinement: the Laws are ill composed,
THE LAWS

and put together without order or purpose; the dialogue is halting and badly sustained; the language is harsh and obscure. Yet the later work had also some merits such as are hardly possessed in an equal degree by any other composition of Plato, and which render it one of the most remarkable remains of Classical Antiquity.

There is a singular power of insight in many passages, and an exalted moral tone pervades the whole. It is marked, too, by an earnestness and intensity of feeling which rather remind us of a Jewish prophet than of an Hellenic philosopher. The veil of irony and humor behind which Plato has hitherto concealed his deepest reflections is cast aside, and he preaches, as it were, to us so eagerly and sincerely that the utterance of his thoughts is impeded, and he can no longer clothe them with an artistic dress.

These peculiarities of the Laws have been made a reason for throwing a doubt upon the genuineness of the Dialogue, though without any real ground. The deficiency of arrangement, the faults of language, the contradictions and obscurities, which are unquestionably to be discovered in the Laws, become intelligible when we consider that it was written by Plato in the decline of his life, and most probably never received its final shape from him. And on the other hand, the extraordinary genius which is everywhere manifested in the work, forbids us to suppose that the author could have been any other than Plato. The reader, if he will not allow himself to be deterred by the uncouth exterior, but will persist in his perusal until the dialogue has grown thoroughly familiar to him, will find a rich reward; the irregularities and difficulties will gradually disappear from view, and he will recognize "as familiar friends" the spirit of inquiry and the love of truth, which are no less characteristic of the Laws than of all the other writings of Plato.

The persons of the dialogue are three old men, an Athenian, to whom no name is given, Megillus a Spartan, Cleinias a Cretan. They are walking together from Cnosus to the cave and Temple of Zeus, and spend the time, as becomes the citizens of such famous states, in discoursing on laws and government. After the conversation has proceeded to a considerable length, Cleinias announces that he is one of the commissioners appointed by the Cnosians to establish a new colony in Crete, and begs his companions to assist him in drawing up a constitution. This they consent to do, and the Athenian, (for he is the only speaker of importance), accordingly details the institutions which he thinks suitable for the proposed State.
The First Book opens with a criticism of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan institutions. Both have a single object in view,—to inspire courage in war. But the lawgiver should have regard to all the virtues, and not to one only. Better is he who has temperance and courage than he who has courage alone; and better also is he who is faithful in civil strife than he who is merely a good soldier. Peace, again, is better than war; reconciliation than conquest. Moreover, there are two kinds of courage: a courage which arms a man against fear, and teaches him to endure hardships; and a courage which inspires him to resist the insidious assaults of pleasure and desire. Neither quality ought to be wanting in him who aims at being perfect in virtue.

How can this nobler spirit be implanted in the citizens of a state? Clearly they must be educated from the first to fight against the temptations of pleasure, just as children are taught in their earliest years to play at the occupations which they will one day follow in earnest. There must be festive gatherings, presided over by sober "rulers of the feast," at which there will be a free use of wine under proper regulations. For wine is a test of character,—"in vino veritas," says the proverb, and the older citizens especially will only show their real natures under its stimulating influence.

1. THE TRUE NATURE OF EDUCATION

We have already seen how deep an interest Plato, like many other of the great Greek philosophers, took in the subject of education. It may indeed be doubted whether the most advanced of modern nations have established systems of education which would wholly satisfy the aspirations of Plato and Aristotle.

In this passage Plato gives expression to the important principle that children should be trained from the first with an eye to the callings which they will pursue in after-life. And we have ourselves begun to realize that education does not begin and end merely with a knowledge of books; but that the eye and the hand require training no less than the ear and the mind. Nor is the advantage of such studies by any means confined to those who will find them of practical service hereafter; for there is no child who will not receive benefit from a knowledge of draw-
ing or an acquaintance with the simpler mechanical arts, even though he may never need to use them in order to gain a livelihood.

Ath. You seem to be quite ready to listen; and I am also ready to perform as much as I can of an almost impossible task, which I will nevertheless attempt. At the outset of the discussion, let me define the nature and power of education; for this is the way by which our argument must travel onwards to the God Dionysus.

Cle. Let us proceed, if you please.

Ath. Well, then, if I tell you what are my notions of education, will you tell me whether you agree with them?

Cle. Let us hear.

Ath. According to my view, he who would be good at anything must practise that thing from his youth upwards, both in sport and earnest, in the particular way which the work requires; for example, he who is to be a good builder, should play at building children’s houses; and he who is to be a good husbandman, at tilling the ground; those who have the care of their education should provide them when young with mimic tools. And they should learn beforehand the knowledge which they will afterwards require for their art. For example, the future carpenter should learn to measure or apply the line in play; and the future warrior should learn riding, or some other exercise for amusement, and the teacher should endeavor to direct the children’s inclinations and pleasures by the help of amusements, to their final aim in life. The sum of education is right training in the nursery. The soul of the child in his play should be trained to that sort of excellence in which when he grows up to manhood he will have to be perfected. Do you agree with me thus far?
Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambiguous or ill-defined. At present, when we speak in terms of praise or blame about the bringing-up of each person, we call one man educated and another uneducated, although the uneducated man may be sometimes very well educated for the calling of a retail trader, or of a captain of a ship, and the like. For we are not speaking of education in this sense of the word, but of that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey. This is the only training which, upon our view, would be characterized as education; that other sort of training, which aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intelligence and justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to be called education at all. But let us not quarrel with one another about the name, provided that the proposition which has just been granted hold good; to wit, that those who are rightly educated generally become good men. Neither must we cast a slight upon education, which is the first and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take a wrong direction, is capable of reformation. And this work of reformation is the great business of every man while he lives.

Cle. Very true; and we quite agree with you.

2. MAN THE PUPPET OF THE GODS

The Laws, as we have previously had occasion to observe, are pervaded by a tone of pessimism and bitterness, which appears to have grown upon Plato during his later years. The world is a stage on which men and women play their several parts in the tragi-comedy of life: human affairs are hardly worthy of
serious consideration: the incurable wickedness of man makes the work of the legislator a sad necessity; for even in the best-governed states evil natures which are proof against instruction and admonition will spring up like weeds in a fair garden.

Plato himself was not unconscious that this feeling sometimes carried him too far: "You have a low opinion of mankind, stranger," says Megillus to the Athenian on one occasion. It may have been due partly to the chilling effect of age, which, while it sharpened the mental vision, diminished enthusiasm and hope in a proportionate degree. In the earlier dialogues, at least, there is a brighter and serener atmosphere; but in the Republic and the Theaetetus Plato begins to moralize upon the pettiness and insignificance of mortal things; and in the Statesman he speaks of men and governments in the same depreciatory manner which is so marked in the Laws.

Ath. Let us look at the matter in this way: May we not regard every living being as a puppet of the Gods, which may be their plaything only, or may be created with a purpose; for that is a matter which we cannot certainly know? but this we know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings, which pull us different and opposite ways, and to opposite actions; and herein lies the difference between virtue and vice. The argument tells me, that every man ought to follow one of these cords and not let go, but pull with that against all the rest; and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the common law of the State; there are others also which are hard and of iron, but this is soft because golden; and there are various other kinds. Now we ought always to cooperate with the lead of the best, which is law. For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles. And thus the moral tale about our being puppets will not be lost, and the meaning of the expression "superior or inferior to a man's self" will become clearer; as also that in this
matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, cities as well as individuals should live according to reason; the individual attaining reason in himself, and the city receiving reason from some god, or from the legislator who knows, making that her law in her intercourse with herself and with other states. In this way virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us.

BOOK II

In the Second Book Plato continues the subject of education. During the early years of life children are educated by perceptions of pleasure and pain, and the pleasure is chiefly conferred by means of dance and song. These, which are the gifts of our "kind playfellows the gods," should not be left unregulated, as is now the case; they should be fixed and established by law after the manner of the Egyptians. The criterion of excellence in music should be pleasure, yet not the pleasure of the base or the foolish; the pleasant, the just, and the noble will be declared by the law to be identical. There will be three choruses at our festivals, one of children, another of youth, a third of elder men from thirty to sixty; and all will utter the same strain,—"that virtue and happiness are inseparable." The aged, too, who can not sing, will tell stories to the like effect, as with the voice of an oracle. The elder men may be permitted some indulgence in wine, which will warm their hearts and overcome their diffidence; to children and the young in general it will be forbidden. Our fifty-year-old choristers must be true judges of music, well grounded in the principles of harmony and rhythm.

But how can they receive the necessary training? If they are allowed to drink without regulation at their festivals, they will be disorderly and mutinous; and therefore, as we have before said, they must have sober rulers of the feast, men of ripe age and experience, who will enforce discipline among them, and teach them to choose good and fitting melodies and reject those which are unsuitable.

A final word may be added about the use of wine:—Drinking must be kept under strict control, and only tolerated at all in a few cases which will be determined by the legislator.
With the concluding words of the Second Book Plato completes the discussion of the question:—Whether his future citizens may be permitted to drink wine? The inquiry has a modern sound; and we perhaps wonder that Plato should raise it. For intoxication was not a national vice among the Greeks, but rather a mark of barbarism. The "paradise of drunkenness," which Musaeus sang, was, we may suppose, an idea derived with the Orphic mysteries from Thrace. We know, indeed, that drinking was fashionable among certain circles at Athens, yet this may have been a custom borrowed from the Persians or Macedonians, or the Sicilian tyrants. And when Plato tells us that he had seen "all Tarentum drunk at the Dionysia," we must remember that he is speaking of a religious festival; and that the intoxication was hardly more than the gaiety and infectious light-heartedness of a Southern race enjoying a holiday. The Hellenic temperament was in general averse to excess: even in matters of food and drink the Greek was abstemious, and conscious of a limit which should not be passed.

It is probable that Plato's prohibition of wine is due to Spartan influence. The sentiment grew partly out of the ascetic dislike of pleasure which the institutions of Lycurgus had impressed on the Spartans, and partly out of the feeling that a habit which might "deprive a man of his wits" at some critical moment was a dangerous vice for the citizens of a Greek state who personally took part in war and in government (cp. Shakespeare, Othello A. ii, sc. 3:—"O that men should put an enemy in their mouths to steal away their brains!").

Plato, therefore, will only allow a limited use of wine in his new colony. He has already strictly forbidden it to the young, while permitting, perhaps as much in jest as earnest, some indulgence to the aged. And now he seriously declares his conviction that men and women engaged in the various pursuits of life, whether in war or peace, ought entirely to refrain from the perilous habit. We have had a wider experience than Plato, and our motives of action are not entirely the same; but we, too, seem inclined more and more to return to the old Hellenic ideals, and to insist that our youth shall be educated in an atmosphere of sobriety and temperance.

The reader may compare a passage from the Politics of Aristotle, (vii. 17, § 1), where, speaking of the rearing of children, he says:—"It would appear from the example of animals,
and of those nations who desire to create the military habit, that the food which has most milk in it is best suited to human beings; but the less wine the better, if they would escape diseases."

*Ath.* One part of this subject has been already discussed by us, and there remains another part to be discussed?

*Cle.* Exactly.

*Ath.* I have first to add a crown to my discourse about drink, if you do not object.

*Cle.* What is that?

*Ath.* I would say that if a city seriously means to adopt this practice of drinking, under due regulation and with a view to the enforcement of temperance; and in like manner, and on the same principle, will allow of other pleasures, designing to gain the victory over them—in this way all of them may be used. But if the State makes only an amusement of it, and whoever likes may drink whenever he likes, and with whom he likes, and add to this any other indulgences, I shall never agree or allow that this city or this man should adopt such a usage of drinking. I would go farther than the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and am disposed rather to the law of the Carthaginians, that no one while he is on a campaign should be allowed to taste wine at all; but I would say that he should drink water during all that time, and that in the city no slave, male or female, should ever drink wine; and that no rulers should drink during their year of office, nor pilots of vessels, nor judges while on duty should taste wine at all; nor any one who is going to hold a consultation about any matter of importance, nor in the day-time at all, unless in consequence of exercise or as medicine; nor again at night, when any one, either man or woman, is minded to get children. There are numberless other cases
also in which those who have good sense and good
laws ought not to drink wine, so that if what I say is
ture, no city will meet many vineyards. Their hus-
bandry and their way of life in general will follow
an appointed order, and their cultivation of the vine
will be the most limited and moderate of their employ-
ments. And this, Stranger, shall be the crown of
my discourse about wine, if you agree.

Cle. Excellent: we agree.

BOOK III

Plato now diverges abruptly to another part of his theme:—
the origin of the various forms of government.

There have been many destructions of mankind by deluges and
other catastrophes in past ages. And after each calamity society
has grown up again in the same way:—First, the isolated
families live under the rule of the eldest; next, several families
live under one chief; thirdly, cities are built, small, originally,
and on high ground; fourthly, the cities become larger and are
built in the plains; and lastly, confederations or nations are
formed by the union of a number of cities.

Such a confederation was the mighty Dorian league of Sparta,
Argos, and Messenê, and its history will furnish us with an im-
portant lesson. Why did this union fail? Because the balance of
power was not observed in two out of the three states, Argos
and Messenê. Sparta, by a happier fate, obtained a better regu-
lated constitution; and she only has retained her original great-
ness. . . . A similar lesson is taught by the history of Persia
and Athens; unbridled tyranny has ruined the one, and excessive
freedom the other.

At this point Cleinias mentions the new Cretan colony, and
requests the aid of his companions.

THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT

The growth and development of human society was a subject
of keen interest to the Greek philosophers. They knew very
little of the history of the past; but their scanty information
merely served to stimulate and intensify their curiosity. The
long-recorded antiquity of the East offered a striking contrast to
the brief and imperfect annals of Hellas. And it seemed natural
to resort for an explanation to the ancient traditions which told
how parts of the earth had often been destroyed, sometimes by
fire and sometimes by water. There had been many civilizations
in the progress of time: man had not proceeded so far along the
road to perfection as he would have done, because the fruit of
his labors was perpetually liable to be swept away by some over-
whelming catastrophe. And then society had to be reconstructed
from the very base: the knowledge of antiquity had perished;
the arts were lost; and the human race was only represented by
a few scattered shepherds and herdsmen. The stages by which
mankind advanced from barbarism are related in much the same
manner by Aristotle in the First Book of the Politics as by Plato
in the Laws, and their account is no doubt true, in the main, at
least, to the history of Hellas.

The earliest form of society in which there is no common head,
and each family is an independent unit, is, though rare, still to
be met with among primitive races, and was once widely
prevalent. The family gives place to the tribe or clan, which is
little more than a union of families under a single head. But
civilization progresses, and the necessities of defence and pro-
tection impel men to collect together in settlements. City life
begins at this point, and the Hellene, accustomed to the small
polities of his own country, could hardly rise beyond the city to
the formation of a great nation.

The ancients, we may also remark, fell into the error of sup-
posing that such changes were more uniform than they really
were. They did not understand the degree to which men are
affected by circumstances; how, for instance, level and fertile
plains, such as those of Egypt and Assyria, afford a natural field
for the growth of large and highly organized communities, while
impenetrable forests and rugged mountains are the appropriate
refuge of weak and barbarous races, like the Arcadians or the
Epeirots, who are thus enabled to retain their independence at
the cost of progress in the arts of civilization.

Athenian Stranger. Enough of this. And what,
then, is to be regarded as the origin of government?
Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of
view in which he may behold the progress of states
and their transitions to good or evil?
Cleinias. What do you mean?
Ath. I mean that he might watch them from the point of view of time, and observe the changes that take place in them during infinite ages.

Cle. How is that?

Ath. Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?

Cle. Hardly.

Ath. But you are sure that it must be vast and in-calculable?

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. And have there not been thousands and thousands of cities which have come into being and perished during this period? And has not every place had endless forms of government, and been sometimes rising and at other times falling, and again improving or waning?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Let us endeavor to ascertain the cause of these changes; for that will probably explain the first origin and succession of states.

Cle. Very good. You shall endeavor to impart your thoughts to us, and we will make an effort to understand you.

Ath. Do you believe that there is any truth in ancient traditions?

Cle. What traditions?

Ath. The traditions about the many destructions of mankind which have been occasioned by deluges and diseases, and in many other ways, and of the preservation of a remnant.

Cle. Every one is disposed to believe them.

Ath. Let us imagine one of them: I will take the famous one which was caused by a deluge.

Cle. What are we to think about that?

Ath. I mean to say that those who then escaped
would only be hill shepherds,—small sparks of the human race preserved on the tops of mountains.

Cle. Clearly.

Ath. Such survivors would necessarily be unacquainted with the arts of those who live in cities, and with the various devices which are suggested to them by interest or ambition, and all the wrongs which they contrive against one another.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Let us suppose, then, that the cities in the plain and on the sea-coast were utterly destroyed at that time.

Cle. Let us suppose that.

Ath. Would not all implements perish and every other excellent invention of political or any other sort of wisdom utterly fail at that time?

Cle. Why, yes, my friend; and if things had always continued as they are at present ordered, how could any discovery have ever been made even in the least particular? For it is evident that the arts were unknown during thousands and thousands of years. And no more than a thousand or two thousand years have elapsed since the discoveries of Daedalus, Orpheus and Palamedes,—since Marcyas and Olympus invented music, and Amphion the lyre,—not to speak of numberless other inventions which are but of yesterday.

Ath. Have you forgotten, Cleinias, the name of a friend who is really of yesterday?

Cle. I suppose that you mean Epimenides.

Ath. The same, my friend; for his ingenuity does indeed far overleap the heads of all your great men; what Hesiod had theorized about long before, he converted into a fact, as you declare.

Cle. Yes, that is our tradition.

Ath. After the great destruction, may we not sup-
pose that the state of man was something of this sort: — There was a fearful, illimitable desert and a vast expanse of land; a herd or two of oxen would be the only survivors of the animal world; and there might be a few goats, hardly enough to support the life of those who tended them in the beginning of things.

Cle. True.

Ath. And of cities or governments or legislation, about which we are now talking, do you suppose that they could have any recollection at all?

Cle. They could not.

Ath. And out of this state of things has there not sprung all that we now are and have: cities and governments, and arts and laws, and a great deal of vice and a great deal of virtue?

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. Why, my good friend, how can we possibly suppose that those who knew nothing of all the good and evil of cities could have attained their full development, whether of virtue or of vice?

Cle. I understand your meaning, and you are quite right.

Ath. But, as time advanced and the race multiplied, the world came to be what the world is.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Doubtless the change was not made all in a moment, but little by little, during a very long period of time.

Cle. That is to be supposed.

Ath. At first, they would have a natural fear ringing in their ears which would prevent their descending from the heights into the plain.

Cle. Of course.

Ath. The fewness of the survivors would make them desirous of intercourse with one another; but
then the means of travelling either by land or sea would have been almost entirely lost, as I may say, with the loss of the arts, and there would be great difficulty in getting at one another; for iron and brass and all metals would have become confused, and would have disappeared; nor would there be any possibility of extracting them; and they would have no means of felling timber. Even if you suppose that some implements might have been preserved in the mountains, they would quickly have worn out and disappeared, and there would be no more of them until the art of metallurgy had again revived.

Cle. There could not have been.

Ath. In how many generations would this be attained?

Cle. Clearly, not for many generations.

Ath. During this period, and for some time afterwards, all the arts which require iron and brass and the like would disappear.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Faction and war would also have died out in those days, and for many reasons.

Cle. How would that be?

Ath. In the first place, the desolation of these primitive men would create in them a feeling of affection and friendship towards one another; and, in the second place, they would have no occasion to fight for their subsistence, for they would have pasture in abundance, except just at first, and in some particular cases; on this pasture-land they would mostly support life in that primitive age, having plenty of milk and flesh, and procuring other food by the chase, not to be despised either in quantity or quality. They would also have abundance of clothing and bedding, and dwellings, and utensils either capable of standing on the fire or not; for the plastic and weaving arts
do not require any use of iron: God has given these two arts to man in order to provide him with necessaries, that, when reduced to their last extremity, the human race may still grow and increase.

Hence in those days there was no great poverty; nor was poverty a cause of difference among men; and rich they could not be, if they had no gold and silver, and such at that time was their condition. And the community which has neither poverty nor riches will always have the noblest principles; there is no insolence or injustice, nor, again, are there any contentions or envyings among them. And therefore they were good, and also because of what would be termed the simplicity of their natures; for what they heard of the nature of good and evil in their simplicity they believed to be true, and practised. No one had the wit to suspect another of a falsehood, as men do now; but what they heard about Gods and men they believed to be true, and lived accordingly; and therefore they were in all respects such as we have described them.

Cle. That quite accords with my views, and with those of my friend here.

Ath. Would not many generations living on in this way, although ruder, perhaps, and more ignorant of the arts generally, and in particular of those of land or naval warfare, and likewise of other arts, termed in cities legal practices and party conflicts, and including all conceivable ways of hurting one another in word and deed; — although inferior to those who lived before the deluge, or to the men of our day in these respects, would they not, I say, be simpler and more manly, and also more temperate and in general more just? The reason of this has been already explained.

Cle. Very true.
In the Fourth Book the new colony is further discussed, and some first principles of government are laid down.

The site proposed for the city is at a considerable distance from the sea, and this is an advantage: for maritime states are unstable and given to the pursuit of gain. The colonists are to be Hellenes, and Peloponnesians will have the preference.

The legislator, like other artists, requires favorable conditions for the exercise of his art; and the greatest good fortune which can befall him is that he should be aided in his work by a young tyrant, who possesses both virtue and absolute power. But such a conjunction occurs very rarely in the course of ages.

What is to be the constitution? Modern states are governed in the selfish interests of the ruling class; in our commonwealth the law will be supreme, and the rulers will be only the ministers of the law.

The citizens will be exhorted by the legislator to follow virtue, and to pay due honor to Gods and to parents. His words will be a general prelude to legislation; and the laws, which should be clearly and precisely stated, should each likewise have a preamble, intended to explain the law and make men more inclined to obey it.

1. THE VIRTUOUS TYRANT

The idea of the "virtuous tyrant" who supplies the force necessary to set the new machinery of government in motion, is a somewhat paradoxical expression of a thought which has arisen in the minds of many philosophers and political writers. It is not, perhaps, an impossible task to frame an imaginary polity which would be an improvement upon any constitution known to exist in the world. But how can the legislator induce or compel mankind to obey his commands? The answer seems obvious: — Let him for a short time enjoy absolute power, or let his efforts be seconded by some "benevolent despot" or "savior of society," and the rest will be easy; — to use the language of Plato in the familiar passage of the Republic, "the evils of the world will only cease when philosophers are kings or kings are philosophers."

To the Greek especially such a conception was natural. He was inclined to exaggerate the power of the legislator to alter the entire character of a nation, as Lycurgus was supposed to
have done at Sparta; and the rapid rise of Hellenic civilization prevented him from clearly seeing that states grow rather than are made, and are, like men, "conditioned by their circumstances." The uncertain equilibrium of the small Greek commonwealths and the violent changes which they underwent,—from aristocracy or oligarchy to tyranny, from tyranny to democracy, from democracy to oligarchy again,—also contributed to strengthen this feeling. In the larger and more solidly based communities of modern Europe, on the other hand, the continuity of history is generally better maintained, and the reform of existing institutions, which, in the words of Aristotle, "is no less difficult a task than the establishment of new ones," is the principal object of the statesman's efforts.

_Ath._ And might not this be also said of legislation as well as of other things; even supposing all other circumstances favorable, the true legislator is still required, from time to time, to provide for the happiness of the state?

_Cle._ That I admit.

_Ath._ In each case the artist would be right in praying for certain favorable conditions, under which he would only require to exercise his art?

_Cle._ That is very true.

_Ath._ And all other artists, if they had to offer up their prayers, would ask a similar boon?

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ And the legislator would do the same thing which they did?

_Cle._ I believe that he would.

_Ath._ "Come, legislator," we will say to him; "and what are the conditions which you require of us previously to organizing your state?" What ought to be his answer to this? Shall I give the answer of the legislator?

_Cle._ Very good.

_Ath._ He will say—"Give me a state which is governed by a tyrant, and let the tyrant be young
and have a good memory; let him be quick at learning, and of a courageous and noble nature; let him have that which, as I said before, is the inseparable companion of all the other parts of virtue, if there is to be any good in them."

Cle. I suppose, Megillus, that this companion virtue of which the Stranger speaks, must be temperance?

Ath. Yes, Cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense, not that which in the exaggerated language of some philosophers is demonstrated to be prudence, but that which is the natural gift of children and animals, and makes some of them live continently and others incontinently, but when isolated was, as we said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods. I think that you must understand my meaning?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then our tyrant must have this as well as the other qualities, if the state is to acquire the form of government which is most conducive to happiness in the best manner and in the shortest time; for there neither is nor ever will be a better or speedier way of establishing a polity than this.

Cle. By what possible arguments, Stranger, can any one ever persuade another that he is right in saying that?

Ath. There is surely no difficulty in seeing, Cleinias, that this is according to the order of nature?

Cle. You would assume, as you say, a tyrant who was young, temperate, quick at learning, having a good memory, courageous, of a noble nature?

Ath. Yes; and you must add fortunate; and his good fortune must be that he is the contemporary of a great legislator, and that some happy chance brings them together. When this has been accomplished, God has done all that He can ever do for a state which
He desires to be eminently prosperous; He has done this in an inferior degree for a state in which there are two such rulers, and in the third degree when there are three. The difficulty increases with the increase of the number, and diminishes with the diminution of the number.

Cle. You mean to say, I suppose, that the best government is produced from a tyranny, and originates in a good lawgiver and an orderly tyrant, and most easily and rapidly passes out of such a tyranny into a perfect form of government; and, in the second degree, out of an oligarchy; and, in the third degree, out of a democracy: is not that your meaning?

Ath. Not so; I mean rather to say that the change is best made out of a tyranny; and secondly, out of a monarchy; and thirdly, out of some sort of democracy; fourthly, in the capacity for improvement, comes oligarchy, which has the greatest difficulty in admitting of such a change, because the government is in the hands of a number of potentates. I am supposing that the legislator is by nature of the true sort, and that his strength is united with that of the chief men of the state; and when he is strongest, and, at the same time, there are the fewest persons concerned, as in a tyranny, there the change is likely to be easiest and most rapid.

Cle. How is that? I do not understand.

Ath. And yet I have repeated what I am saying a good many times; but I suppose that you have never seen a city which is under a tyranny?

Cle. No; I can not say that I have any great desire to see one.

Ath. And yet, where there is a tyranny, you might certainly see that of which I am now speaking.

Cle. What do you mean?
Ath. I mean that you might see how, without trouble and in no very long period of time, the tyrant, if he wishes, can change the manners of a state; he has only to go in the direction of virtue or of vice, whichever he prefers, he himself setting an example in his own person, praising and countenancing some actions, and reproving and setting a note of dishonor upon others.

Cle. But how can we imagine that the citizens in general will at once follow the example set to them; or how can he have this power both of persuading and of compelling them?

Ath. Let no one, my friends, persuade us that there is any quicker and easier way in which laws act upon states than when the rulers lead: such changes never have, nor ever will, come to pass is any other way. The real impossibility or difficulty is of another sort, and is rarely surmounted in the course of ages; but when this is once effected in a state, ten thousand or rather all blessings follow.

Cle. Of what are you speaking?

Ath. The difficulty is to find the divine love of temperate and just institutions existing in any powerful forms of government, whether in a monarchy or oligarchy of wealth or of birth. You might as well hope to reproduce the character of Nestor, who is said to have excelled all men in the power of speech, and yet more in his temperance. This, however, according to the tradition, was in the times of Troy; in our own days there is nothing of the sort; but if such an one either has or ever shall come into being, or is now among us, blessed is he and blessed are they who hear the wise words that flow from his lips. And this may be said of power in general: When the supreme power in man coincides with the greatest wisdom and temperance, then the best laws are by
nature framed and the best constitution; but in no other way will they ever come into being. And I would have what I am saying regarded as a sort of divination and declaration that, in one point of view, there may be a difficulty for a city to have good laws, but that there is another point of view in which nothing can be easier or sooner effected, granting our supposition.

2. The Life of Virtue

The Laws, among other singular features, are remarkable for the number of addresses and exhortations which they contain, and which take the place of the dialectical arguments of the earlier dialogues. The following passage is one of these discourses, supposed to be addressed to the newly-arrived colonists, and intended to inform them of the moral and religious principles by which their life would have to be guided. There appears to us something strange in a legislator giving such admonitions to a band of settlers; the Greek philosopher saw no boundary fixed between ethics and politics, between the legal and the moral code.

The ideal State which Plato has outlined in the Laws exemplifies this tendency in the highest degree. The community may be compared in Platonic phraseology to the soul which pervades and animates the whole body. The citizens are to have a certain mould impressed upon them from their first entrance into the world to the time when they take leave of it. The children are to be educated in a uniform manner, and no allowance is made for individual fancies and peculiarities. A round of duties is prescribed for the citizens, and the women are, as far as possible, to share the training and occupations of the men.

Plato is not unaware that many of his minute regulations can not be enforced by law; but he thinks that the approbation of the legislator and the force of public opinion will ensure their acceptance. He does not sufficiently realize the feeble and unprogressive character which such a community would assume. There would be no spring of life or energy among the young: no career for promising talent: no expansion of mind or thought. If Plato could have seen his dreams carried into effect, he would have found that he had purchased uniformity by the loss of much that is most valuable in the existence of nations and individuals.
Ath. And now, what is to be the next step? May we not suppose the colonists to have arrived, and proceed to make our speech to them?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. "Friends," we say to them, — "God, as the old tradition declares, holding in His hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is, moves according to His nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of His end. Justice always follows Him, and is the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law. To that law, he who would be happy holds fast, and follows it in all humility and order; but he who is lifted up with pride, or money, or honor, or beauty, who has a soul hot with folly, and youth, and insolence, and thinks that he has no need of a guide or ruler, but is able himself to be the guide of others, he, I say, is left deserted of God; and being thus deserted, he takes to him others who are like himself, and dances about in wild confusion, and many think that he is a great man, but in a short time he pays a penalty which justice can not but approve, and is utterly destroyed, and his family and city with him. Wherefore, seeing that human things are thus ordered, what should a wise man do or think, or not do or think?"

Cle. Every man ought to make up his mind that he will be one of the followers of the God; there can be no doubt of that.

Ath. Then what sort of action is agreeable to the God, and becoming in his followers? There is an old saying, that "like agrees with like, with measure measure," but things which have no measure agree neither with themselves nor with the things which have measure. Now, God is the measure of all things, in a sense far higher than any man could be, as the common saying affirms. And he who would be dear
to God must, as far as is possible, be like Him and such as He is. Wherefore the temperate man is the friend of God, for he is like Him; and the intemperate man is unlike Him, and different from Him, and unjust. And the same holds of other things, and this is the conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of all sayings: — that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the Gods, and hold converse with them by means of prayers and offerings and every kind of service, is the noblest and best of all things, and also the most conducive to a happy life, and very fit and meet. But with the bad man, the opposite of this holds: for the bad man has an impious soul, whereas the good is pure; and from one who is polluted, neither a good man nor God is right in receiving gifts. And therefore the unholy waste their much service upon the Gods, which, when offered by any holy man, is always accepted of them.

Such is the mark at which we ought to aim. But what weapons shall we use, and how shall we direct them? In the first place, we affirm that next after the Olympian Gods, and the Gods of the State, honor should be given to the Gods below; they should receive everything in even numbers, and of the second choice, and of evil omen, while the odd numbers and the first choice, and the things of lucky omen, are given to the Gods above, by him who would rightly hit the mark of piety. Next to these Gods, a wise man will do service to the demons or spirits, and then to the heroes, and after them will follow the sacred places of private and ancestral Gods, having their ritual according to law.

Next comes the honor of living parents, to whom, as is meet, we have to pay the first and greatest and oldest of all debts, considering that all which a man has belongs to those who gave him birth and brought
him up, and that he must do all that he can to minister to them: first, in his property; secondly, in his person; and thirdly, in his soul; paying the debts due to them for the care and travail which they bestowed upon him of old, in the days of his infancy, and which he is now to pay back to them when they are old and in the extremity of their need. And all his life long he ought never to utter, or to have uttered, an unbecoming word to them; for of all light and winged words he will have to give an account; Nemesis, the messenger of justice, is appointed to watch over them. And we ought to yield to our parents when they are angry, and let them satisfy their feelings in word or deed, considering that, when a father thinks that he has been wronged by his son, he may be expected to be very angry. At their death, the most moderate funeral is best, neither exceeding the customary expense, nor yet falling short of the honor which has been usually shown by the former generation to their parents; and let a man not forget to pay the yearly tribute of respect to the dead, honoring them chiefly by omitting nothing that conduces to a perpetual remembrance of them, and giving a reasonable portion of their fortune to the dead. Doing this, and living after this manner, we shall receive our reward from the Gods and those who are above us; and we shall spend our life for the most part in good hope.

**BOOK V**

The Fifth Book of the Laws falls naturally into two divisions:—

(1) The first part is a long monologue of the Athenian, in which the citizens are further instructed in ethical and moral principles. . . . The soul is to be duly honored as the divinest element of man's nature. A mean state of the bodily habits is to be desired, and excess must also be shunned in the acquisition
of property. . . . Reverence should be paid to the elder; and our duties towards kindred, strangers, and suppliants, are to be scrupulously fulfilled. . . . In the relations of life a man should be just, faithful, sincere, unenvious. Injustice is involuntary; the unjust are to be pitied, and only the incurable punished. . . . Selfishness should be avoided. . . . Men should have a true taste for pleasure, and the highest pleasures are those of a temperate life.

(2) The preamble thus finished, we turn to the construction of the state. . . . The citizens are to be 5040 in number, and each of them will receive an equal allotment of land. The constitution will be, not the best, but the second best; communism must be abandoned, being unsuited for citizens reared as ours will have been. Population must be regulated by various devices, and no addition or diminution permitted. . . . The accumulation of wealth will be discouraged. A little money may be coined, of a kind, however, which will not pass current elsewhere. Dowries may not be given, and usury will be disallowed. The state is to be virtuous, not wealthy; both at once it can not be. A good education is far above riches. . . . The citizens will be divided into four classes according to a property qualification; and there will be twelve tribes, with a presiding deity assigned to each. . . . The legislator must pay great attention to numerical proportions and ratios in the arrangement of his state; and he must also encourage the citizens to study Arithmetic, which is an invaluable mental training.

I. THE HONOR OF THE SOUL. PRECEPTS FOR A VIRTUOUS LIFE

The opening of the Fifth Book of the Laws is one of the most noble and striking passages in all the writings of Plato. In solemn and earnest language he lays down the principles which are to guide the soul on her "voyage through life." He wishes his citizens to have true notions respecting the objects of human existence; they are not to regard the accumulation of wealth as the end to which they are to "devote their most serious endeavors," or to degrade themselves by self-indulgence and luxury. They will be the citizens of a State which will have few rivals on earth, and they must strive to be worthy of her.

Plato perceives clearly that, without this ethical foundation, the best laws and institutions will be of little avail; and, although he is aware that even "in a State which is perfectly adapted for virtue" the evil passions of men will bear their inevitable fruit,
he is not disposed to relax his efforts for the improvement of the human race. He remains to the end an idealist, though his estimate of mankind has sunk lower and lower with advancing years. He is filled with disappointment and despair; his spirit is more bitter and pessimistic than in earlier and brighter days; yet he can not bring himself to think that the repeated admonitions and exhortations of the legislator will fall unheeded on the ears of the citizens.

Like Socrates in the Phaedo, he feels that he is soon about to go to "other Gods who are wise and good;" and he would fain stay one brief moment before he takes the final journey, and address a few last words of encouragement and advice to all who will listen to him. The pathos and impressiveness of this parting discourse are greatly heightened by a dignified and lofty tone which was justified by age and the consciousness of a life spent in the service of virtue.

_Athenian Stranger._ Listen, all ye who have just now heard the laws about Gods, and about our dear forefathers:—Of all the things which a man has, next to the Gods, his soul is the most divine and most truly his own. Now in every man there are two parts: the better and superior part, which rules, and the worse and inferior part, which serves; and the ruler is always to be preferred to the servant. Wherefore I am right in bidding every one next to the Gods, who are our masters, and those who in order follow them, to honor his own soul, which every one seems to honor, but no one honors as he ought; for honor is a divine good, and no evil thing is honorable; and he who thinks that he can honor the soul by word or gift, or any sort of compliance, not making her in any way better, seems to honor her, but honors her not at all. For example, every man, in his very boyhood, fancies that he is able to know everything, and thinks that he honors his soul by praising her, and he is very ready to let her do whatever she may like. But I mean to say that in acting thus he only injures his
soul, and does not honor her; whereas, in our opinion, he ought to honor her as second only to the Gods.

Again, when a man thinks that others are to be blamed, and not himself, for the errors which he has committed, and the many and great evils which befell him in consequence, and is always fancying himself to be exempt and innocent, he is under the idea that he is honoring his soul; whereas the very reverse is the fact, for he is really injuring her. And when, disregarding the word and approval of the legislator, he indulges in pleasure, then again he is far from honoring her; he only dishonors her, and fills her full of evil and remorse; or when he does not endure to the end the labors and fears and sorrows and pains which the legislator approves, but gives way before them, then, by yielding, he does not honor the soul, but by all such conduct he makes her to be dishonorable; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a good, does he honor her, but yet once more he dishonors her; for the soul having a notion that the world below is all evil, he yields to her, and does not resist and teach or convince her that, for aught she knows, the world of the Gods below, instead of being evil, may be the greatest of all goods. Again, when any one prefers beauty to virtue, what is this but the real and utter dishonor of the soul? For such a preference implies that the body is more honorable than the soul; and this is false, for there is nothing of earthly birth which is more honorable than the heavenly, and he who thinks otherwise of the soul has no idea how greatly he undervalues this wonderful possession; nor, again, when a person is willing, or not unwilling, to acquire dishonest gains, does he then honor his soul with gifts? — far otherwise; he sells her glory and honor for a small piece of gold; but all the gold which
is under or upon the earth is not to be given in exchange for virtue.

In a word, I may say that he who does not estimate the base and evil, the good and noble, according to the standard of the legislator, and abstain in every possible way from the one and practise the other with all his might, does not know that he is most foully and disgracefully abusing his soul, which is the divinest part of man; for no one, as I may say, ever considers that which is declared to be the greatest penalty of evil-doing—namely, to grow into the likeness of bad men, and growing like them to fly from the conversation of the good, and be cut off from them, and cleave to and follow after the company of the bad. And he who is joined to them must do and suffer what such men by nature do and say to one another, which suffering is not justice but retribution; for justice and the just are noble, whereas retribution is the suffering which waits upon injustice; and whether a man escape or endure this, he is miserable,—in the former case, because he is not cured; in the latter, because he perishes in order that the rest of the world may be saved.

Speaking generally, our glory is to follow the better and improve the inferior, which is susceptible of improvement, in the best manner possible. And of all the possessions which a man has, the soul is by nature most inclined to avoid the evil, and search out and find the chief good; and having found, to dwell with the good, during the remainder of life. Wherefore the soul also is second in honor; and third, as every one will perceive, comes the honor of the body in natural order. Having determined this, we have next to consider which of the honors given to the body are genuine, and which are not genuine. This appears to me to be the business of the legislator, and
he intimates that they are to be ranked in the following order: — Honor is not to be given to the fair, or the strong, or the swift, or the tall, or the healthy body (although this would be the opinion of many), any more than to their opposites; but the mean states of all these habits are by far the safest and most moderate; for the one extreme makes the soul braggart and insolent, and the other illiberal and mean; and the possession of money, and property, and distinction, beats to the same tune. The excess of any of these is apt to be a source of hatreds and divisions among states and individuals; and the defect of them is commonly a cause of slavery.

And, therefore, I would not have any one fond of heaping up riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as rich as possible. For the possession of great wealth is of no use, either to them or to the state. The condition of youth which is free from flattery, and at the same time not in need of the necessaries of life, is the best and most harmonious of all, being in accord and agreement with our nature, and making life to be most entirely free from sorrow. Let parents, then, bequeath to their children not riches, but the spirit of reverence. We, indeed, fancy that they will inherit reverence from us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. But this quality is not really imported to them by the present style of admonition, which only tells them that the young ought always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather exhort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take heed that no young man sees or hears him doing or saying anything base; for where old men have no shame, there young men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. The best way of training the young, is to train yourself at the same time; not to admonish them, but
to be seen always doing that of which you would admonish them.

He who honors his kindred, and reveres those who share in the same Gods, and are of the same blood and family, may fairly expect that the Gods who preside over generation will be propitious to him, and will quicken his seed. And he who deems the services which his friends and acquaintances do to him, greater and more important than they themselves deem them, and his own favors to them less than theirs to him, will have their good will in the intercourse of life. And surely in his relations to the state and his fellow-citizens, he is by far the best, who rather than the Olympic or any other victory of peace or war, desires to win the palm of obedience to the laws of his country; and who, of all mankind, is the person reputed to have obeyed them best during his whole life.

In his relations to strangers, a man should consider that a contract is a most holy thing, and that all concerns and wrongs of strangers are more directly dependent on the protection of God, than the wrongs done to citizens; for the stranger having no kindred and friends, is more to be pitied by Gods and men. Wherefore, also, he who is able to assist him is more zealous in his cause; and he who is most able is the divinity and god of the stranger, who follows in the train of Zeus, the god of strangers. And for this reason, he who has a spark of caution in him, will do his best to pass through life without sinning against the stranger. And of offences committed, whether against strangers or fellow-countrymen, that against suppliants is the greatest. For the God who witnessed to the agreement made with the suppliant, becomes in a special manner the guardian of the sufferer; and he will certainly not suffer unavenged.

Thus we have nearly described the manner in which
a man is to act about his parents, and himself, and his own affairs; and in relation to the state, and his friends, and kindred, both in what concerns his own countrymen, and in what concerns the stranger. I will now describe what manner of man he must be who would best pass through life in respect of those other things which are not matters of law, but of praise and blame only; in which praise and blame educate a man, and make him more tractable and amenable to the laws which are about to be imposed.

Truth is the beginning of every good to the Gods, and of every good to man; and he who would be blessed and happy, should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be trusted; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. Neither condition is to be desired, for the untrustworthy and ignorant has no friend, and as time advances he becomes known, and lays up in store for himself isolation in crabbed age when life is on the wane: so that, whether his children or friends are alive or not, he is equally solitary.

Worthy of honor, too, is he who does no injustice, and of more than twofold honor if he not only does no injustice himself, but hinders others from doing any; the first may count as one man, the second is worth many men, because he informs the rulers of the injustice of others. And yet more highly to be esteemed is he who coöperates with the rulers in correcting the citizens as far as he can—he shall be proclaimed the great and perfect citizen, and bear away the palm of virtue. The same praise may be given about temperance and wisdom, and all other goods which may be imparted to others, as well as acquired by a man for himself; he who imparts them
shall be honored as the man of men, and he who is willing yet is not able, may be allowed the second place; but he who is jealous and will not, if he can help, allow others to partake in a friendly way of any good, is deserving of blame: the good, however, which he has, is not to be undervalued because possessed by him, but to be acquired by us to the utmost of our power. Let every man, then, freely strive for the prize of virtue, and let there be no envy. For the unenvious nature increases the greatness of states—he himself contends in the race and defames no man; but the envious, who thinks that he ought to get the better by defaming others, is less energetic himself in the pursuit of true virtue, and reduces his rivals to despair by his unjust slanders of them. And thus he deprives the whole city of the proper training for the contest of virtue, and diminishes her glory as far as in him lies.

Now every man should be spirited, but he should also be gentle. From the cruel, or hardly curable, or altogether incurable acts of injustice done by others, a man can only escape by fighting and defending himself, and conquering, and by never ceasing to punish them; and no man who is not of a noble spirit is able to accomplish this. As to the actions of those who do evil, but evil which is curable, in the first place, let us remember that the unjust man is not unjust of his own free will. For no man of his own free will would choose to possess the greatest of evils, and least of all in the most honorable part of himself. And the soul, as we said, of a truth is deemed by all men the most honorable. In the soul, then, which is the most honorable part of him, no one, if he could help, would admit, or allow to continue the greatest of evils. The unjust and the unfortunate are always to be pitied in any case; and one can afford to forgive as well as
pity, him who is curable, and refrain and calm one's anger, not giving way to passion, and continuing wrathful with feminine bitterness. But upon him who is incapable of reformation and wholly evil, the vials of our wrath should be poured out; wherefore, I say, that good men ought, when occasion arises, to be both gentle and passionate.

The greatest evil to men, generally, is one which is innate in their souls, and which a man is always excusing in himself and never correcting; I mean, what is expressed in the saying, "that every man by nature is and ought to be his own friend." Whereas the excessive love of self is in reality the source to each man of all offences; for the lover is blinded about the beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the just, the good, and the honorable, and thinks that he ought always to prefer his own interest to the truth. But he who would be a great man, ought to regard what is just, and not himself or his interests, whether in his own actions, or those of others. Through a similar error, men are induced to fancy that their own ignorance is wisdom, and thus we who may be truly said to know nothing, think that we know all things; and because we will not let others act for us in what we do not know, we are compelled to act amiss ourselves. Wherefore, let every man avoid excess of self-love, and condescend to follow a better man than himself, not allowing any false shame to stand in the way.

There are also lesser matters than these which are often repeated, and with good reason; a man should recollect them and remind himself of them. For when a stream is flowing out, there should be water flowing in too; and recollection is the flowing in of failing knowledge. Therefore I say that a man should refrain from excess either of laughter or tears,
and should exhort his neighbor to do the same; he should veil his immoderate sorrow or joy, and seek to behave with propriety, whether his genius be set at good fortune, or whether at the crisis of his fate, when he seems to be mounting high and steep places, the Gods oppose him in some of his enterprises. Still he may hope, that when calamities supervene upon the blessings which the God gives him, he will lighten them and change existing evils for the better; and as to the goods which are the opposite of these evils, he will not doubt that they will be ever present with him, and that he will be fortunate. Such should be men's hopes, and such should be the exhortations with which they admonish one another, never losing an opportunity, but on every occasion distinctly reminding themselves and others, of all these things both in jest and earnest.

2. THE BEST AND THE SECOND-BEST STATE

In the passage which follows, Plato explains the relation between the perfect state of the Republic and the commonwealth described in the Laws. He holds to the opinion that the government of philosophers and the community of women, children, and property are necessary to the highest and best form of the state, although he now concedes that men as they exist in the world are unfitted to live under such institutions. In the Laws, therefore, communism is abandoned, and the rulers are only magistrates whose training has been chiefly of a practical kind. The place of communism is, however, supplied to some extent by the limits imposed upon the accumulation of wealth, by the common education which is given to men and women, and also by the extension of the common meals to women.

The constitution of the new or "second-best" state can hardly be said with propriety to be "next to the perfect form." It has no ideal character, but is an aristocratic government of an ordinary Greek type. The citizens are divided into four classes according to a property qualification; the more important magistracies, though nominally open to all, are practically confined to men of wealth and position by means of complicated methods
of election; the Assembly is reduced to a mere shadow, having no functions of importance, and subject to the control of the Senate.

The distrust of the popular element which Plato shows throughout these arrangements is somewhat remarkable when we consider that he is proposing to construct a state in which there would be no proletariat; for the citizens are to be in a middle condition, equally removed from the extremes of wealth and poverty, and are forbidden to trade or to engage in husbandry. Evidently he is still influenced by his dislike to the city populace of Athens; he forgets that he is legislating for a community of an entirely different nature. This is one of several inconsistencies which are found in the Laws, and may be compared with the manner in which Plato praises the life of peace and yet gives his whole commonwealth a military cast resembling that of Sparta, or in which, while denouncing the evils caused by riches, he makes the distinction of classes and the right to office rest upon the possession of property.

And now comes the movement of the pieces from the sacred line as in the game of draughts. The form of constitution being unusual, may excite wonder when mentioned for the first time; but, upon reflection and trial, will appear to us, if not the best, to be the second best. And yet a person may not approve this form, because he thinks that sort of legislation is ill adapted to a legislator who has not despotic power. The truth is, that there are three forms of government, the best, the second and third best, which we may just mention, and then leave the selection to the ruler of the settlement. Following this method in the present instance, let us speak of that state which is first and second and third in excellence, and then leave to Cleinias, or to any one who has any choice, the selection of that form of polity which he approves in his own country.

The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there pre-
vails most widely the ancient saying, that "Friends have all things in common." Whether there is now, or ever will be, this communion of women and children and of property in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on the same occasions, and the laws unite the city to the utmost,—whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state more exalted in virtue, or truer or better than this. Such a state, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of Gods, will make them blessed who dwell therein; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and, as far as possible, to seek for one which is like this. The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest immortality in the next degree; and, after that, by the grace of God, we will complete the third one. And, we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second.

Let them at once distribute their land and houses, and not till the land in common, since this sort of constitution goes beyond their proposed origin, and nurture, and education. But in making the distribution, let the several possessors feel that their particular lots also belong to the whole city; and as the land is the parent, let them tend this more carefully than children do their mother. For she is a goddess and their queen, and they are her mortal subjects. Such also are the feelings which they ought to entertain to the Gods and demi-gods of the country. And in order that the distribution may always remain, they ought to consider further that the present num-
ber of families should be always retained, and neither increased nor diminished.

This may be secured for the whole city in the following manner: — Let the possessor of a lot leave the one of his children who is his best beloved, and one only, to be the heir of his dwelling, and his successor in the duty of ministering to the Gods, the family and the state, as well the living as those who are departed; but of his other children, if he have more than one, he shall give the females in marriage according to the law to be hereafter enacted, and the males he shall distribute as sons to such of the citizens as have no children, and are willing, if possible; or if there is no one willing, and particular individuals have too many children, male or female, or too few, as in the case of barrenness — in all these cases let the highest and most honorable magistracy created by us, judge and determine what is to be done with the redundant or deficient, and devise a means that the number of 5040 houses shall always remain the same. There are many ways of accomplishing this; for they in whom generation is affluent may be made to refrain, and, on the other hand, special care may be taken to increase the number of births by rewards and stigmas, and by the instruction and admonition of the younger by their elders — in this way the object may be attained.

And if after all there be very great difficulty about the preservation of the 5040 houses, and there be an excess of citizens, owing to the too great love of those who live together, and we are at our wit’s end, there is still the old device often mentioned by us of sending out a colony, which will part friends with us, and be composed of suitable persons. If, on the other hand, there come a wave bearing a deluge of disease, or a plague of war, and the inhabitants become much
fewer than the appointed number by reason of mortality, you ought not to introduce citizens of spurious birth and education, if this can be avoided; but even God is said not to be able to fight against necessity.

3. Riches and Godliness

There is hardly any subject in the Laws on which Plato speaks with greater emphasis and frequency than on his determination to banish from his state the ills which arise out of excessive wealth and the pursuit of gain: "no gold or silver Plutus," as he says in one passage, "shall dwell in our city." To effect this object he proposes: — (1) to make the lot inalienable; (2) to abolish dowries; (3) to debar the citizens from inalienable, and from receiving usury; (4) to forbid the acquisition of property beyond a certain limit; (5) to restrict the power of bequest in various ways. He is aware that the worst evils owe their origin to the accumulation of wealth in a few hands, and he may have had in mind the decadent condition of Sparta, which, according to Aristotle, was largely due to a similar cause.

The only impracticable part of his plan is, probably, the enactment which fixes a limit to the acquisition of wealth. In modern times we should be more inclined to suggest the imposition of a graduated property tax on the owners of large incomes, the resumption of the "unearned increment" by the state, or the extraction of heavy "death duties." The other proposals of Plato seem to be derived from the actual practice of Hellenic states, or at least to have been put forward by previous writers and thinkers. For the inequalities of property had been from the earliest times the "very spring and fountain of revolutions" in the cities of Hellas, which were, as Plato and Aristotle agree in telling us, rent asunder by the endless quarrel of rich and poor.

But although Plato hopes by wise legislation to diminish, if not entirely to destroy, this great social danger, he is not ignorant of the truth on which Aristotle afterwards enlarges, that "it is more important to equalize the desires than the possessions of men." Here is the province of education, which is the basis and foundation of the whole state. By its aid he expects to render his citizens "receptive of virtue," while the Spartan severity and simplicity of their training will raise them above the lower instincts of their nature, and make them docile and obedient to the guiding hand of the legislator.
The intention, as we affirm, of a reasonable statesman, is not what the many declare to be the object of a good legislator; namely, that the state for which he is advising should be as great and as rich as possible, and should possess gold and silver, and have the greatest empire by sea and land;—this they imagine to be the true object of legislation, at the same time adding, inconsistently, that the true legislator desires to have the city the best and happiest possible. But they do not see that some of these things are possible, and some of them are impossible; and he who orders the state will desire what is possible, and will not indulge in vain wishes or attempts to accomplish that which is impossible.

The citizen must indeed be happy and good, and the legislator will seek to accomplish this; but very rich and very good at the same time he can not be, not, at least, in the sense in which the many speak of riches. For they describe by the term "rich," the few who have the most valuable possessions, although the owner of them be a rogue. And if this be true, I can never assent to the doctrine that the rich man will be happy; he must be good as well as rich. And good in a high degree, and rich in a high degree at the same time, he can not be.

Some one will ask, why is this? And we shall answer,—because acquisitions which come from unjust, as well as just sources, are more than double those which come from just sources only; and the sums which are expended neither honorably nor disgracefully, are only half as great as those which are expended honorably, and on honorable purposes. Thus, if one acquires double and spends half, the other who is in the opposite case can not possibly be wealthier than he. One of them is a good man, and the other—I am speaking of the saver and not of
the spender — is not always bad; he may indeed be utterly bad, but, as I was saying, a good man he never is. For he who receives money unjustly as well as justly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, will be a rich man if he be also thrifty. On the other hand, the utterly bad is in general profligate, and therefore poor; while he who spends on noble objects, and acquires wealth by just means only, can hardly be remarkable for riches, any more than he can be very poor. The argument then is right, in declaring that the very rich are not good, and, if they are not good, they are not happy.

But the intention of our laws was, that the citizens should be as happy as possible, and as friendly as possible to one another. And men who are always at law with one another, and amongst whom there are many wrongs done, can never be friends to one another, but only those among whom crimes and lawsuits are few and slight. Therefore, we say that gold and silver ought not to be allowed in the city, nor much of the vulgar sort of trade which is carried on by lending money, or rearing the meaner kinds of live stock; but only the produce of agriculture, and only so much of this as will not compel us in pursuing it to neglect that for the sake of which riches exist,—I mean, soul and body, which without gymnastics, and without education, will never be worth anything; and therefore, as we have said not once but many times, the care of riches should have the last place in our thoughts.

For there are in all three things about which every man has an interest; and the interest about money, when rightly regarded, is the third and lowest of them: midway comes the interest of the body; and, first of all, that of the soul; and the state which we are describing will have been rightly constituted if
it ordains honors according to this scale. But if, in any of the laws which have been ordained, health be preferred to temperance, or wealth to health and temperate habits, that law must clearly be wrong. Wherefore, also, the legislator ought often to impress upon himself the question—"What do I want?" and "Do I attain my aim, or do I miss the mark?" In this way, and in this way only, he may acquit himself and free others from the work of legislation.

BOOK VI

The Sixth Book, like the Fifth, may be divided into two parts. (1) The mode of appointing the chief magistrates and officials of the new state is described. These include Guardians of the Law, Military Officers, a Council or Senate, Priests, Interpreters of Sacred Matters, Temple Treasurers, Wardens of the City, of the Agora, and of the Country, Rural Police, Directors of Music and Gymnastic, a Minister of Education, Judges of Public and Private Causes. (2) A commencement is made with legislation; and laws concerning Marriage, Slaves, Common Meals, Registration of Births, Age for Military and Political Service, are enacted.

BOOK VII

In the Seventh Book the subject of education is resumed and completed.

During the first three years of life children will chiefly require attention to their bodily growth and development. They must not be allowed to walk, lest their tender limbs should become distorted by too early exercise; but, since motion is highly beneficial to them, they must be constantly carried about by their nurses. And motion is no less good for the soul: it quiets fear and promotes courage and cheerfulness. The children should be kept free from pain, yet not be spoiled by too much pleasure.

From three to six they may pass their time in sports and games. . . . At the age of six, boys, and girls, too, if they like, should commence to learn military exercises and the use of
weapons: they must be taught to employ both hands with equal skill.

Education has two branches: — gymnastic, or the training of the body, and music, or the cultivation of the soul. All gymnastic must be practised with a view to war. Music should be simple, and conform to fixed types; for even in amusement innovation is dangerous. The law will prescribe certain principles, from which the composers are not to depart. But with what object are our citizens to learn music? We reply: — In order that they may be better fitted to live the life of peace, propitiating the Gods by dance and song, which is a nobler occupation than the pursuits of war.

Education is to be common to all. Both gymnastic and music must be taught to boys and girls alike. Women should be a help to the state in the hour of peril, and not a useless burden, as they are in most cities. . . . The citizens must lead an active life, rising early and taking little rest.

At daybreak boys must go to school, where they will spend three years in learning to read and write, and three more in the study of music. The compositions which the children commit to memory must be carefully selected. The music must be such as can be readily acquired by every one. Dancing is of two kinds; there is the dance of peace and the dance of war; both must be of a serious and dignified character. Comedy may be performed only by slaves and hirelings. The tragic poets must submit their plays to the censor, before they can be allowed to exhibit.

Three subjects of education remain: — Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy. (1) Arithmetic is an invaluable aid to knowledge, and every freeman should strive to gain skill in it. (2) Geometry is too much neglected by the Hellenes: it will be an easy and innocent study for our scholars. (3) Astronomy is useful in many ways, and teaches us correct notions about the Sun and Moon and the other Gods in Heaven.

A word may be added about hunting. Lazy sports, such as angling and fowling, are objectionable. Let our youth confine themselves to the chase of land animals by day with dogs and horses, which will be a test of their endurance and courage.

1. THE GOOD CITIZEN MUST NOT LEAD AN INACTIVE LIFE

The life of strenuous activity which Plato imposes on his citizens, both in the Republic and in the Laws, is probably a reflection of the restless energy of the Athenians in the days of their
greatness, when, in the familiar words of Thucydides, "they knew no holiday except to do their duty, and deemed the quiet of inaction to be as tedious as the most tiresome business." We may also, perhaps, see in it a trace of Plato's own character and habits; for he shows in several passages of his writings a certain impatience or dislike of sickness and weakness which suggests that he himself had never felt the restraint of "Theages' bridle."

He was well aware, too, that idleness was a fertile source of evil both to the individual and to the state, and he would have agreed with the modern moralist that "it is only in some corner of the brain which we leave empty that Vice can obtain a lodging." His citizens, therefore, are subjected to a discipline which is almost monastic in its severity, although the austere spirit of the cloister is far removed from the cheerfulness and gaiety of Hellenic life. And if, like Adeimantus in the Republic, we were to object that such an existence would be no better than that of a soldier who is compelled to be ever on duty, Plato's reply would still be the same: — That his aim in founding the state was not the disproportionate happiness of a privileged class, but the greatest happiness of the whole.

Ath. What will be the manner of life among men who may be supposed to have their food and clothing provided for them in moderation, and who have entrusted the practice of the arts to others, and whose husbandry committed to slaves paying a part of the produce, brings them a return sufficient for men living temperately; who, moreover, have common tables in which the men are placed apart, and near them are the common tables of their families, of their daughters and mothers, which, day by day, the rulers, male and female, are to dismiss, when they have inspected them and seen to their mode of life; after which the magistrate and his attendants shall honor with libations those Gods to whom that day and night are dedicated, and then go home? To men whose lives are thus ordered, is there no work to be done which is necessary and fitting, but shall each one of them live fattening like a beast? That, we
say, is neither just nor honorable, nor can he who lives in that way fail of meeting his due, and the due reward of the idle fatted beast is that he should be torn in pieces by some other valiant beast whose fatness is worn down by labors and toils. These regulations, if we duly consider them, will never perfectly take effect under present circumstances, nor as long as women and children and houses and all other things are the private property of individuals; but if we can attain the second-best form of polity, with that we may be satisfied. And to men living under this second polity, there remains a work to be accomplished which is far from being small or mean, and is, in truth, the greatest of all works, ordained by the appointment of righteous law. For the life which is wholly concerned with the virtue of body and soul may truly be said to be twice, or more than twice, as full of toil and trouble as the pursuit after Pythian and Olympic victories, which debars a man from every employment of life. For there ought to be no bye-work which interferes with the due exercise and nourishment of the body, or the attainments and habits of the soul. Night and day are not long enough for the accomplishment of their perfection and consummation; and to this end all freemen ought to arrange the time of their employments during the whole course of the twenty-four hours, from morning to evening and from evening to the morning of the next sunrise.

There may seem to be some impropriety in the legislator determining minutely the little details of the management of the house, including such particulars as the duty of wakefulness in those who are to be perpetual watchmen of the whole city; for that any citizen should continue during the whole night in sleep, and not be seen by all his servants, always
the first to awake and the first to rise — this, we say, should be deemed base and unworthy of a freeman, whether the regulation is to be called a law or only a practice; also that the mistress of the house should be awakened by some of her handmaidens instead of herself first awakening them, is what her slaves, male and female, and her children, and, if that were possible, everything in the house should regard as base. If they rise early, they may all of them do much of their public and of their household business, as magistrates in the city, and masters and mistresses in their private houses, before the dawn. Much sleep is not required by nature, either for our souls or bodies, or for the actions in which they are concerned. For no one who is asleep is good for anything, any more than if he were dead; but he of us who has the most regard for life and reason keeps awake as long as he can, reserving only so much time for sleep as is expedient for health; and much sleep is not required, if the habit of not sleeping be once formed. Magistrates in states who keep awake at night are terrible to the bad, whether enemies or citizens, and are honored and reverenced by the just and temperate, and are useful to themselves and to the whole state.

2. THE EDUCATION OF THE YOUNG

The scheme of education which is laid down in the Laws is thoroughly Hellenic in character, and seems to agree in the main with the course of instruction which was actually followed in Greek schools.

Plato expects the children to acquire their "rudiments" in the comparatively short space of three years; for when he speaks of "learning to read and write" it is natural to suppose that he includes under the term elementary arithmetic, and, probably, drawing. We must remember, however, that the curriculum of a Greek school in his time was necessarily simple; there were no lessons in history or geography or grammar, and no relig-
ious teaching: all that the child learned of these subjects was derived from the innumerable verses of Homer and other poets which he committed to memory.

Music is deferred to a rather late age, thirteen, and is also only to be studied for three years. Plato regards music as a means towards the attainment of virtue, and as an "innocent pleasure" for the citizens. They are not to pursue the art beyond a certain point, or to aim at complete proficiency. Here Plato follows the common Greek sentiment, which considered the skill of the professional artist a "vulgar thing," beneath the dignity of the freeman.

It is not easy to gather from Plato's language, either in the Republic or in the Laws, in what way he intended that women should be educated. In both dialogues he tells us that the two sexes are to learn music and gymnastic on an equal footing. But in the present passage he appears to have the boys only in view; nothing whatever is said about the girls. If he meant that they should be left to receive instruction at home, according to the general custom, when and as much as the parents pleased, this is hardly in agreement with the high position which he assigns to women in the state. It may perhaps be a concession to popular prejudice, like the abandonment of communism. (It should be remarked, however, that in a previous passage, he speaks of "school buildings for boys and girls."

His ideal of education is in many ways rather Spartan than Athenian, although in an earlier part of the work he is disposed to criticize the Lacedaemonian institutions. He admires, and desires to imitate, the manner in which the Spartans made "education the business of the State, and took the greatest pains about their children." He has failed to remember how feeble and stunted the intellectual life of Sparta became under the discipline of Lycurgus; nor does he reflect that the "city of the Magnetes" would have offered little or no scope for the growth and development of mental powers such as his own.

*Athenian Stranger.* When the day breaks, the time has arrived for youth to go to their schoolmasters. Now neither sheep nor any other animals can live without a shepherd, nor can children be left without tutors, or slaves without masters. And of all animals the boy is the most unmanageable, inas-
much as he has the fountain of reason in him not yet regulated; he is the most insidious, sharp-witted, and insubordinate of animals. Wherefore he must be bound with many bridle; in the first place, when he gets away from mothers and nurses, he must be under the management of tutors on account of his childishness and foolishness; then, again, being a freeman, he must have teachers, and be educated by them in anything they teach and must learn what he has to learn; but he is also a slave, and in that regard any freeman who comes in his way may punish him and his tutor and his instructor, if any of them does anything wrong; and he who comes across him and does not inflict upon him the punishment which he deserves, shall incur the greatest disgrace; and let the guardian of the law, who is the guardian of education, see to him who coming in the way of the offences which we have mentioned, does not chastise them when he ought, or chastises them in a way which he ought not; let him keep a sharp look-out, and take especial care of the training of our children, directing their natures, and always turning them to good according to the law. . . .

A fair time for a boy of ten years old to spend in letters is three years; at thirteen years he should begin to handle the lyre, and he may continue at this for another three years, neither more nor less, and whether his father or himself like or dislike the study, he is not to be allowed to spend more or less time in learning music than the law allows. And let him who disobeys the law be deprived of those youthful honors of which we shall hereafter speak. Hear, however, first of all, what the young ought to learn in the early years of life, and what their instructors ought to teach them. They ought to be occupied with their letters until they are able to read and
write; but the acquisition of perfect beauty or quickness in writing, if nature has not stimulated them to acquire these accomplishments in the given number of years, they should let alone. And as to the learning of compositions committed to writing which are unaccompanied by song, whether metrical or without rhythmical divisions, compositions in prose, as they are termed, having no rhythm or harmony — seeing how dangerous are the writings handed down to us by many writers of this class — what will you do with them, O most excellent guardians of the law? or, how can the lawgiver rightly direct you about them? I believe that he will be in great difficulty.

Cle. What is the nature of this perplexity, Stranger, under which you seem to be laboring?

Ath. That is a fair question, Cleinias, and to you, who are my partners in the work of education, I must state the difficulties of the case.

Cle. To what do you refer in this instance?

Ath. I will tell you. There is a difficulty in opposing many myriads of mouths.

Cle. Well, and have we not already opposed the popular voice in many important enactments?

Ath. That is quite true; and you mean to imply that the road which we are taking may be disagreeable to some but is agreeable to as many others, or if not to as many, at any rate to persons not inferior to the others, and in company with them you bid me, at whatever risk, proceed along the path of legislation which has opened out of our present discourse, and to be of good cheer, and not to faint.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And I do not faint; I say, indeed, that we have a great many poets writing in hexameter, trimeter, and all sorts of measures; some who are serious, others who aim only at raising a laugh, in
which the aforesaid myriads declare that the youth who are rightly educated should be brought up and saturated; they should be constantly hearing them read at recitations, and learning them, getting off whole poets by heart; while others select choice passages and long speeches, and make compendiums of them, saying that these shall be committed to memory, and that in this way a man is to be made good and wise by varied experience and learning. And you want me to say plainly in what they are right and in what they are wrong.

Cle. Yes, I do.

Ath. But how can I in one word rightly comprehend all of them? I am of opinion, and, if I am not mistaken, there is a general agreement, that every one of these poets has said many things well and many things the reverse of well; and if this be true, then I do affirm that much learning brings danger to youth.

Cle. Then how would you advise the guardian of the law to act?

Ath. In what respect?

Cle. I mean to what pattern should he look as his guide in permitting the young to learn some things and forbidding them to learn others. Do not shrink from answering.

Ath. My good Cleinias, I rather think that I am fortunate.

Cle. In what?

Ath. I think that I am not wholly in want of a pattern, for when I consider the words which we have spoken from early dawn until now, and which, as I believe, have been inspired by Heaven, they appear to me to be quite like a poem. When I reflected upon all these words of ours, I naturally felt pleasure, for of all the discourses which I have ever learned or
heard, either in poetry or prose, this seems to me to be the justest, and most suitable for young men to hear; I can not imagine any better pattern than this which the guardian of the law and the educator can have. They can not do better than advise the teachers to teach the young these and the like words, and if they should happen to find writings, either in poetry or prose, or even unwritten discourses like these of ours, and of the same family, they should certainly retain them, and commit them to writing. And, first of all, the teachers themselves should be constrained to learn and approve them, and, any of them who will not, shall not be employed by them as colleagues, but those whom they find agreeing in their approval, they shall make use of and shall commit to them the instruction and education of youth. And here and on this wise let my fanciful tale about letters and teachers of letters come to an end.

BOOK VIII

The Eighth Book treats of a variety of subjects which are more or less loosely connected.

(1) There are to be daily sacrifices, monthly feasts dedicated to the Twelve Gods, and festivals for men and for women.

(2) Military pastimes and tournaments shall be regularly held, in order that the citizens may be better prepared for war. This is an excellent practice, which is commonly neglected, first, because men are absorbed by the pursuit of gain, and, secondly, because existing states are ruled by selfish partisans who have no regard to the common weal. Also there must be races for armed runners, conflicts in armor, and horse races, three kinds of each, one of boys, another of youths, and a third of men: and similar competitions must be arranged for girls and women, in which they will take part according to their age.

(3) The mention of these various contests and festivals in which men and women meet together serves to introduce a difficult and vexed topic,—the relation of the sexes. Licentiousness is utterly abominable. Men should live in moderation, as nature
enjoins, and not fall below the level of the beasts. If the law cannot ensure this, at least we must insist upon some observance of decency.

(4) There must be laws relating to (a) husbandmen and the cultivation of the soil, (b) artisans, (c) imports and exports, (d) division of produce, (e) the arrangement of hamlets and country dwellings, (f) market regulations, (g) resident aliens.

BOOK IX

With the Ninth Book the criminal code of the new State commences.

Laws are enacted against Temple robbing, Treason, Theft. . . . Capital causes are to go before the Guardians of the Law and a Court of Select Judges.

A distinction is drawn between voluntary and involuntary crimes; or, as it would be better to say, between "injustice" and "hurt." There are many causes of crime and motives of action, but all may be brought under these two heads.

Homicide is divided into various classes: — (1) the killing of another by accident or misadventure; (2) homicide committed in anger, whether with or without premeditation; (3) killing in self-defence: (4) deliberate murder, a crime which is due to three causes, — avarice, ambition, fear: (5) suicide: (6) slaying a thief or burglar or other persons engaged in unlawful acts. An animal which kills a man is to be slain and cast beyond the border.

In cases of wounding, with or without intent to kill, much may be left to the law courts, if they are well constituted. The degree of premeditation has to be borne in mind when fixing the punishment.

Lastly, there is the kindred crime of assault, and in this also the different cases must be distinguished, and appropriate penalties laid down for each.

BOOK X

In the Tenth Book Plato deals with the offences of those who disbelieve in the Gods or have erroneous notions concerning them. They are divided into three classes: — (1) Atheists: (2) men who, although they acknowledge the existence of the Gods, think that they take no care of us; or, (3), imagine that they may be
propitiated by gifts. Each class is solemnly reasoned with before the law is declared, in the hope that the offenders may be brought to a better frame of mind.

(1) The existence of the Gods is proved by the order of the Universe and by the general belief of mankind. Nowadays there are many who assert that chance rules the world, and that law and religion are mere conventions designed to protect the weak against the strong. They falsely suppose that the four elements came into being before the soul, whereas the soul is really prior to all that is material. She alone is self-moved and the origin of motion in other things. But there are two souls, a good and an evil, and it is the good soul which moves the sun, the moon, and the other heavenly bodies and carries them round in their orbits. And as this soul of good is certainly a Divine Principle, we may truly say that “the Universe is full of Gods.”

(2) The opinion that the Gods exist, yet take no heed of human affairs, grows up when men see the unrighteous prospering in the land. They forget that the Gods, who are all-wise and all-good, can not fitly be compared to unworthy artists, attending only to the great and neglecting the small. Man is made for the Universe, the part for the whole, not the whole for the part. Providence designs that good shall triumph over evil, but there is an element of free will and choice in the soul, and we must each in some degree work out our own destiny. The good soul at every change of existence goes to a better place; the soul which has done evil sinks lower and lower into the abyss. This is the justice of Heaven which none may escape.

(3) The third and wickedest class of unbelievers can not be addressed with patience:—they who say that the Gods can be propitiated by gifts and sacrifices, must conceive them to resemble the vilest of men who will betray their trust to gain a paltry bribe.

After the prelude comes the law. The more innocent unbelievers shall be punished with five years’ imprisonment, and, in case of a second offence, with death. The worst sort, mendicant priests and the like, who offer “for a consideration” to win the favor of Heaven and to bring up the dead from Hades, shall be imprisoned during life, and never again hold intercourse with their fellows, and when they die, their bodies shall be cast beyond the borders. . . . There shall be no religious rites in private houses: all public worship must take place in the Temples of the State, under the direction of duly appointed priests and priestesses.
THE LAWS

THE THREE CLASSES OF UNBELIEVERS

The Tenth Book of the Laws is a peculiarly interesting instance of the manner in which that work is related to the Republic. The main ideas are the same; the difference is chiefly one of tone and emphasis. We have already made acquaintance in the Republic with the threefold errors of men respecting the Gods; and now Plato returns to the attack with renewed vigor and zeal.

He first undertakes to prove the existence of the Gods, a subject upon which in his previous writings he had only lightly touched. His arguments, like those which he employs in the Phaedo to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, are not satisfactory or convincing to us; but we, too, feel the force of the appeal which he makes to the better mind of the world in all ages, and acknowledge, as we contemplate the order of the Universe, that God is everywhere. These thoughts move us, as no metaphysical arguments can, and,—slightly to change Plato's own metaphor,—we cling fast to the instinctive belief in the existence of God, as our support in passing through the flood of doubt and discussion.

When, however, Plato proceeds to speak with passionate sincerity of the Goodness of God and His care for His creatures, he is on firmer ground, and we are still more at one with him. He is perplexed to understand how evil can find a place in the scheme of Providence, and discovers the solution in the idea that all things work together to a common end,—the victory of good. His language is vague, but he appears to speak of evil as a principle which is inherent in matter, and can not be eliminated even by the Creator ("There must always remain something which is antagonistic to good"). On the other hand, he supposes that there is in man a real, though limited, freedom of the will, which is assisted in the struggle against evil by the general tendency of the Universe. Life is thus at once the school of character, and the preparation for the world to come.

On the third class of offenders,—those who believe that the Gods favor the wicked in return for their gifts,—Plato does not waste much argument. In his eyes they are moral outlaws, and their opinions must be stamped out of the State like a pestilence. Yet in the law which he proceeds to enact, he distinguishes, as in other cases of unbelief, between a greater and a lesser degree of guilt. The more serious offenders, in his opinion, are they who make a gain out of the fears and terrors of man-
kind, and lead the weak and foolish into the extravagancies of superstition. We can scarcely say that we know of grave social evils which had arisen from such a cause in his day; but he is speaking almost in "a prophetic strain," and his words are in a measure justified by the corruptions of religion in the Roman Empire and in Mediaeval and Modern Europe.

The somewhat intolerant temper which Plato exhibits is remarkable in a Greek philosopher of the Fourth Century B.C. We may observe, however, that his zeal is directed against what he considers an injury to the moral well-being of the State. His feeling is different to the ordinary Greek sentiment, which only objected to "new Gods" as an innovation on the established order of things, and had little or nothing to do with ethical principles; and it is equally removed from the fanaticism with which we are more familiar, and which endeavors to force upon all by any or every means the adoption of a series of dogmatic propositions.

We have already said in general terms what shall be the punishment of sacrilege, whether fraudulent or violent, and now we have to determine what is to be the punishment of those who speak or act insolently toward the Gods. But first we must give them an admonition which may be in the following terms:—No one ever intentionally did any unholy act, or uttered any unlawful word, retaining a belief in the existence of the Gods, but he must have supposed one of three things, — either that they did not exist, — that is the first possibility, or secondly, that if they did they took no care of man, or thirdly, that they were easily appeased by sacrifices, or turned from their course by prayers.

Cle. What shall we say or do to these persons?

Ath. My good friends, let us first hear the jests which I suspect that they in their superiority will utter against us.

Cle. What jests?

Ath. They will make some provoking speech of
this sort: O inhabitants of Athens, and Sparta, and Cnosus, they will reply, in that, you speak truly; for some of us deny the very existence of the Gods, while others, as you say, are of opinion that they do not care about us; and others that they are turned from their course by gifts. Now we have a right to claim, as you yourself allowed, in the matter of the laws, that before you are hard upon us and threaten us, you should argue with us and convince us—you should first attempt to teach and convince us that there are Gods;—let that be shown to us by reasonable evidences—and also that they are too good to be unrighteous, or to be propitiated, or turned from their course by gifts. For when we hear these and the like things said of them by those who are esteemed to be the best of poets, and orators, and prophets, and priests, and innumerable others, the thoughts of most of us are not set upon abstaining from unrighteous acts, but upon doing them and making atonement for them. When lawgivers profess that they are gentle and not stern, we think that they should first of all use persuasion to us, and show us the existence of Gods, if not in a better manner than other men, at any rate in a truer; and who knows but that we shall hearken to them? If then our request is a fair one, please to accept our challenge.

Cle. But is there any difficulty in proving the existence of the Gods?

Ath. How would you prove their existence?

Cle. How? In the first place, the earth and the sun, and the stars and the universe, and the fair order of the seasons, and the division of them into years and months, furnish proofs of their existence; and also there is the fact that all Hellenes and barbarians believe in them.

Ath. I am afraid, my sweet friend, though I will
not say I am ashamed, of the contempt with which the profane will be likely to assail us. For you do not understand the nature of their complaint, and fancy that their minds rush into impiety only from a love of sensual pleasure.

Cle. Why, Stranger, what other reason is there?

Ath. One which you who live in another part of the world would never guess.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. A very grievous sort of ignorance which is imagined to be the greatest wisdom.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. At Athens there are tales preserved in writing which the virtue of your state, as I am informed, refuses to admit. They speak of the Gods in prose as well as verse, and the oldest of them tell of the origin of the heavens and the world, and as they proceed not far from the beginning they narrate the birth of the Gods, and how after they were born they behaved to one another. Whether these stories have a good or a bad influence I should not like to be severe upon them, because they are ancient; but I must say, that looking at them with reference to the duties of children to their parents I can not praise them, or think that they are useful, or at all true. Of the words of the ancients I have nothing more to say; and I should wish to say of them only what is pleasing to the God. But as to our younger generation and their wisdom, I can not let them off when they do mischief. For do but mark the effect of their words: when you and I argue that there are Gods, and produce the sun, moon, and stars as Gods or divine beings, if we would listen to the aforesaid philosophers we should say that they are earth and stones only, which can have no care at all of human affairs,
and that all this is a cooking up of words and a make-believe.

_Cle._ One such teacher, O Stranger, would be bad enough, and you imply that there are many of them, which is worse.

_Ath._ Well, then; what shall we say or do?— shall we assume that some one is accusing us among unholy men, and that they, and not we, are the real defendants in the matter of legislation; they will say of us—How dreadful that we should legislate on the supposition that there are Gods! and shall we make a defence? or shall we leave them and return to our laws, lest the preamble should become longer than the law? For the discourse will certainly extend to great length, if we are to treat the impiously disposed as they desire; partly arguing with them, as they demand, partly frightening them, or inspiring aversion in them, and then proceed to the requisite enactments.

_Cle._ Yes, Stranger; but then how often have we repeated already that there is no reason why brevity should be preferred to length; for there is nobody to hurry us, and it would be paltry and ridiculous to prefer the shorter to the better. It is a matter of no small consequence, that our reasons in proof of the assertion, that there are Gods, and that they are good, and regard justice more than men, should carry some sort of conviction with them. This would be the best and noblest preamble of all our laws. And therefore, without impatience, and without hurry, let us summon as far as possible all the power of persuasion which we possess, and unreservedly consider the whole matter.

_Ath._ When I see you thus earnest, I feel impelled to offer up a prayer, and can no longer refrain. Tell
me, I say, who can preserve calmness, having to speak of the existence of the Gods? For he must hate and abhor the men who are and have been the cause of these words of ours; I speak of those who will not believe the words which they have heard as babes and sucklings from their mothers and nurses, who used them as charms, both in jest and earnest, whom also they have heard and seen offering up sacrifices and prayers — sights and sounds delightful to children — of their parents sacrificing in the most earnest manner on behalf of them and of themselves, and with eager interest talking to the Gods, and beseeching them, as though they were firmly convinced of their existence; moreover, they see and hear the genuflexions and prostrations which are made by Hellenes and barbarians to the rising and setting sun and moon, in all the various turns of good and evil fortune, not as if they thought that there were no Gods, but as if there could be no doubt of their existence, and no suspicion of their non-existence; when men, knowing all these things, despise them on no real grounds, as would be admitted by all who have any particle of intelligence, and when they force us to say what we are now saying, how can any one in gentle terms remonstrate with the like of them, when he has to begin by proving to them the very existence of the Gods? Yet the attempt must be made; for it would be unseemly that one-half of mankind should go mad with lust, and the other half in righteous indignation at them. Our address to these lost and perverted natures should not be spoken in passion; let us suppose ourselves to select some one of them, and gently reason with him, smothering our anger: — O my son, we say to him, you are young, and the advance of time will make you reverse many of the opinions which you now hold. Wait, therefore, until the time
comes, and do not attempt to judge of high matters at present; and that is the highest of which you think nothing — to know the Gods rightly and to live accordingly. And in the first place let me indicate to you one point which is of great importance and of the truth of which I am quite certain: — You and your friends are not the first who have held this opinion about the Gods. There have always been persons more or less numerous who have had the same disorder. I have known many of them, and can tell you this, that no one who had taken up in youth this opinion, that the Gods do not exist, ever continued in the same until he was old; the two other notions certainly do continue in some cases, but not in many; the notion, I mean, that the Gods exist, but take no heed of human things, and also the notion that they do take heed of them, but are easily propitiated with sacrifices and prayers. What may be the true doctrine, if you are patient, and take my advice, you will hereafter discover, by the help of the legislator and of others. In the meantime take heed lest you offend about the Gods. For the duty of the legislator is and always will be to teach you the truth of these matters.

Cle. Your address, Stranger, thus far, is excellent.

Ath. And now we are to address him who, believing that there are Gods, believes also that they take no heed of human affairs: O thou best of men (this is what we will say to him), in believing that there are Gods you are led by some affinity to them, which attracts you towards your kindred and makes you honor and believe in them. But the fortunes of evil and unrighteous men in private as well as public life, which, though not really happy, are wrongly counted happy in the judgment of men, and are sung or spoken of by poets and prose writers, draw you aside
from your natural piety. Perhaps you have seen impious men growing old and leaving their children's children in high offices, and that shakes your faith; you have known or heard or been yourself an eye-witness of many monstrous impieties, and have beheld men by these criminal means from small beginnings reaching the pinnacle of greatness, and considering all these things you do not like to accuse the Gods of them, because they are your relatives; and so from some want of reasoning power, and also from an unwillingness to find fault with them, you are led to believe that they exist indeed, but have no thought or care of human things.

Now, that your present evil opinion may not grow to still greater impiety, and that we may if possible use arguments which may drive away the pollution of error, we will add another argument to that which we addressed to him who utterly denied the existence of the Gods. And do you, Megillus and Cleinias, answer for the young man as you did before; and if any difficulty arises in the course of the argument, I will take the word out of your mouths, and carry you over the river as I did before.

Cle. Very good; do as you say, and we will help you as well as we can.

Ath. There will surely be no difficulty in proving to him that the Gods care about the small as well as about the great. For he was present and heard what was said, that they are perfectly good, and that the care of all things is most entirely natural to them.

Cle. He certainly heard that.

Ath. Let us consider together in the next place what we mean by this virtue which we ascribe to them. Surely we should say that to possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice?

Cle. Certainly.
Ath. Yes; and courage is a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice?
Cle. True.
Ath. And the one is dishonorable, and the other honorable?
Cle. To be sure.
Ath. And the one, like other meaner things, is a human quality, but the Gods have no part in anything of the sort?
Cle. No one will deny that.
Ath. But do we imagine carelessness and idleness and luxury to be virtues? What do you think?
Cle. Certainly not.
Ath. They rank under the opposite class?
Cle. Yes.
Ath. And their opposites would fall under the opposite class?
Cle. Yes.
Ath. But can we suppose that one who takes care of great and small will be luxurious and heedless and idle, like those whom the poet compares to stingless drones?
Cle. And the comparison is a most just one.
Ath. Surely God must not be supposed to have a nature which he himself hates?—and if any one dares to say anything of that sort, he must not be allowed for a moment.
Cle. He must not — of course not.
Ath. Should we not on any principle be entirely mistaken in praising any one who has some special business entrusted to him, he having a mind which takes care of great matters and no care of small ones? Reflect; he who acts in this way, whether he be God or man, must act from one of two principles.
Cle. What are they?
Ath. Either he must think that the neglect of the
small matters is of no consequence to the whole, or if they are of consequence, and he neglects them, his conduct must be attributed to carelessness and indolence. Is there any other way in which his neglect can be explained? For, surely, he will not neglect anything, whether small or great, from any impossibility of taking care of all—or be careless about those things of which an inferior being, who has not the power, whether God or man, might be unable to take care.

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. Now, then, let us examine the offenders, who both alike confess that there are Gods, but with a difference,—the one saying that they may be appeased, and the other that they have no care of small matters—there are three of us and two of them, and we will say to them: In the first place, you both acknowledge that the Gods hear and see and know all things, and that nothing can escape them which is matter of sense and knowledge:—do you admit this?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And do you admit also that they have all power which mortals and immortals can have?

Cle. They will, of course, admit this also.

Ath. And surely we three and they two—five in all—have acknowledged that they are good and perfect.

Cle. Assuredly.

Ath. But, if they are such as we conceive them to be, can we possibly suppose that they ever act in the spirit of carelessness and indolence? For in us inactivity is the child of cowardice, and carelessness of inactivity and indolence.

Cle. Most true.

Ath. Then not from inactivity and carelessness is
any God ever negligent; for he has no cowardice in him.

Cle. That is very true.

Ath. Then the alternative which remains is, that if the Gods neglect the lighter and lesser concerns of the universe, they neglect them because they know that they ought not to care about such matters; what other alternative is there but that they have no knowledge?

Cle. There is none.

Ath. And, O most excellent and best of men, do I understand you to mean that they are ignorant, and do not know that they ought to take care, or that they know and yet like the meanest sort of men, knowing the better choose the worse because they are overcome by pleasures and pains?

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. Do not all human things partake of the nature of soul? And is not man the most religious of all animals?

Cle. That is certainly true.

Ath. Surely we say that all mortal creatures are the property of the Gods, to whom also the whole of heaven belongs?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And, now, whether a person says that these things to the Gods are great or small — in either case the Gods who own us and who are the most careful and the best of owners, are not likely to neglect us. There is also a further consideration.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. Sensation and power are in an inverse ratio to each other in respect to their ease and difficulty.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean that there is greater difficulty in seeing and hearing the small than the great, but more
facility in moving them and controlling them and taking care of them than of their opposites.

Cle. Far more.

Ath. Suppose the case of a physician who is willing and able to cure some living thing as a whole, — how will the whole fare at his hands, if he takes care only of the greater and neglects the lesser?

Cle. Certainly not well.

Ath. No better would be the result with pilots or generals, or householders or statesmen, or any other class, if they neglected the small and regarded only the great; — as the builders say, the larger stones do not lie well without the lesser.

Cle. Of course not.

Ath. Let us not, then, deem God inferior to human workmen, who, in proportion to their skill, finish and perfect their works, small as well as great, by one and the same art; or that God, the wisest of beings, who is willing and able to extend His care to all things, like a lazy good-for-nothing, wants a holiday, and takes no thought of smaller and easier matters, but of the greater only.

Cle. Never, Stranger, let us admit such a supposition about the Gods; which is both impious and false.

Ath. I think that we have now said enough to him who charges the Gods with neglect.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. He has been forced to acknowledge that he is in error, but he still seems to me to need some consolation.

Cle. What consolation will you offer him?

Ath. Let us say to the youth: "The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the preservation and perfection of the whole, and each part has an appointed state of action and passion; and the smallest action or passion of any part affect-
ing the minutest fraction has a presiding minister. And one of these portions of the universe is thine own, stubborn man, which, however little, has the whole in view; and you do not seem to be aware that this and every other creation is for the sake of the whole, and in order that the life of the whole may be blessed; and that you are created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you. For every physician and every skilled artist does all things for the sake of the whole, directing his effort towards the common good, executing the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part. And you are annoyed because you do not see how that which is best for you is, as far as the laws of the creation admit of this, best also for the universe.”

Now, as the soul combining first with one body and then with another undergoes all sorts of changes, either of herself, or through the influence of another soul, all that remains to the master of the game is that he should transpose the pieces; sending the better nature to the better place, and the worse into the worse, and so assigning to them their proper portion.

Cle. How do you mean?

Ath. I am proposing a plan which may be supposed to make the care of all things easy to the Gods. For if any one did not form or fashion all things with a view to the whole,—if, for example, he formed a living element of water out of fire, instead of forming many things out of one, or one out of many, not at random, but in regular order of the first or second or third degree, the transmutation would have been infinite; but now the ruler of the world has a wonderfully easy task.

Cle. How is that?

Ath. In this way:—When the king saw that our actions had life, and that there was much virtue in
them and much vice, and that the soul and body, although not eternal, were indestructible, like the Gods of popular opinion (for if either of them had been destroyed, there would have been no generation of animals); and when he observed that the good of the soul was by nature designed to profit men, and the evil to harm them—he, seeing all this, contrived so to place them in each of the parts that their position might in the easiest and best manner procure the victory of good and the defeat of evil in the whole. And he contrived a general plan by which a thing of a certain nature found a certain seat and room. But the formation of qualities he left to the wills of individuals. For every one of us is made pretty much what he is by the bent of his desires and the nature of his soul.

Cle. Yes, that is probably true.

Ath. Then all things which have a soul change, and possess in themselves a principle of change, and in changing move according to law and the order of destiny: lesser changes of nature move on level ground, but greater crimes sink into the abyss, that is to say, into Hades and other places in the world below, of which the very names terrify men, and about which they dream that they live in them absent from the body. And when the soul changes greatly, either for the better or worse, by her own impulse or the strong influence of others, when she has communion with divine virtue and becomes divine, she is carried into another and better place, which is also divine and perfect in holiness; and when she has communion with evil, then she also changes the place of her life.

"For that is justice of the Gods who inhabit heaven." 2

1 Reading τοῦ πολοῦ.  
2 Hom. Odys. 19. 43.
O youth or young man, who fancy that you are neglected by the Gods, know that if you become worse you shall go to the worse souls, or if better to the better, and in every succession of life and death you will do and suffer what like may fitly suffer at the hands of like. This is a divine justice, which neither you nor any other unfortunate will ever glory in escaping, and which the ordaining powers have specially ordained; take good heed of them, for a day will come when they will take heed of you.

If thou sayest: — I am small and will creep into the depths of the earth, or I am high and will fly up to heaven, you are not so small or so high but that you shall pay the fitting penalty, either in the world below or in some yet more savage place still to which thou shalt be conveyed. This is also the explanation of the fate of those whom you saw, who had done unholy and evil deeds, and from small beginnings had become great, and you fancied that from being miserable they had become happy; and in their actions, as in a mirror, you seemed to see the universal neglect of the Gods, not knowing how they make all things work together and contribute to the great whole. And thinkest thou, bold man, that thou shouldst not know this; he who knows not this can never see any true form or say any true word touching the happiness or unhappiness of life? If Cleinias and this reverend company succeed in proving to you that you know not what you say of the Gods, then will God help you; but should you desire to hear more, listen to what we say to the third opponent, if you have any understanding left in you. For I think that we have sufficiently proved the existence of the Gods, and that they have a care of man, — that they are appeased by wicked men, and take gifts is what
I will not allow, and what every man should disprove to the utmost of his power.

Cle. Very good; let us do as you say.

Ath. Well, then, by the Gods themselves I conjure you to tell me,—if they are to be propitiated, how are they to be propitiated? Who are they, and what is their nature? Must not the eternal administrators of heaven be at least rulers?

Cle. True.

Ath. And to what earthly rulers can they be compared, or who to them? How in the less can we find an image of the greater? Are they charioteers of contending pairs of steeds, or pilots of vessels? Perhaps they might be compared to the generals of armies, or they might be likened to physicians providing against the strife of bodily disease, or to husbandmen observing anxiously the effects of the seasons or the growth of plants; or perhaps to shepherds of flocks. For as we acknowledge the heaven to be full of many goods and also of evils, and of more evils than goods, there is, as we affirm, an immortal conflict going on among us, which requires marvellous watchfulness; and in that conflict the Gods and demigods are our allies, and we are their property. Injustice and insolence and folly are the destruction of us, and justice and temperance and wisdom are the salvation of us; and the place of these latter is in the life of the Gods, and of their virtues some vestige may occasionally be discerned among mankind. But upon this earth there dwell souls who have an unjust spirit, and they, like brute animals, fawn upon their keepers, who may be dogs or shepherds, or may be the best and most perfect masters; and upon these, as the wicked declare, they prevail by flattery and prayers and incantations, and are allowed to make their gains with impunity. And this sin, which
is termed dishonesty, is the same evil as that which is called disease in living bodies or blight in the seasons, and in cities and governments has another name, which is injustice.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. That is what he must say who declares that the Gods are always lenient to the doers of unjust acts, who divide the spoil with them. That is as if wolves might be supposed to toss a portion of their prey to the dogs, and they, mollified by the gift, suffered them to tear the flocks. What but this will he say who maintains that the Gods are to be propitiated?

Cle. That is what he will say.

Ath. And to whom of the abovementioned classes of guardians would any man gravely compare the Gods? Will he say that they are like pilots, who are themselves turned away from their duty by draughts of wine and the savor of fat, and at last overturn both ship and sailors?

Cle. Certainly not.

Ath. And surely they are not like charioteers who are bribed to give up the victory to other chariots?

Cle. That would be a fearful image of the Gods.

Ath. Nor are they like generals, or physicians, or husbandmen, or shepherds; and no one would compare them to dogs who have been silenced by wolves.

Cle. Do not be profane.

Ath. And are not all the Gods the chiefest of all guardians, and do they not guard our highest interests?

Cle. Yes; the chiefest.

Ath. And shall we say that those who guard our noblest interests, and are the best of guardians, are inferior in virtue to dogs, and to men even of moderate excellence, who would never betray justice, for
the sake of gifts which unjust men impiously offer them?

_Cle._ Certainly not; nor is such a notion to be endured, and he who holds this opinion may be fairly singled out and characterized as of all impious men the wickedest and most impious.

_Ath._ Then are the three assertions—that the Gods exist, and that they take care of men, and that they will not be entreated to injustice, now sufficiently demonstrated? May we say that they are?

_Cle._ You have our entire assent to your words.

_Ath._ I have spoken with vehemence because I was jealous of evil men; and I will tell you, dear Cleinias, what is the reason of my jealousy. I would not have them suppose that the wicked having the superiority in argument, may do as they like in accordance with their various imaginations about the Gods; and this zeal has led me to speak more vehemently; but if we have at all succeeded in persuading the men to hate themselves and love their opposites, the preamble of our laws about impiety will not have been spoken in vain.

_Cle._ So let us hope; and even if we have failed, the style of our argument will not discredit the law-giver.

**BOOK XI**

In the Eleventh Book Plato takes up another part of legislation,—that which regulates dealings between man and man.

1. THE EVILS OF RETAIL TRADE, AND THE CURE OF THEM

There was probably no feeling more deeply implanted in the Greek mind than that which taught the essentially "vulgar" character of retail trade. And this is worthy of peculiar remark because the Greeks were themselves the keenest of traders and merchants. They expelled the Phoenicians from their trading stations in the Mediterranean; they went to Tartessus for silver and other metals,—to the shores of the Baltic for amber,—to the steppes of Scythia for grain; they travelled, like Pytheas, to Britain and "farthest Thule" in search of new openings for commerce. No doubt, in Greece, not less than in England, the scale of the operations made a difference to the manner in which they were regarded. The wealthy aristocrat might employ his slaves in a workshop, or let them out for hire as artisans and mechanics: he could not without social degradation, to use Plato's humorous language, "open a shop or keep a tavern." Moreover, and this sentiment also is by no means unknown among ourselves, there appears to have been a distinction drawn between the trader retired with a fortune and the man who was actually engaged in trade. At least, Aristotle asserts that it was not uncommon in oligarchies to allow only those to hold office who had left business for a period of ten years or more.

In most of his previous writings Plato has shown that he shared in the general prejudice; and in the Republic, even while he acknowledges that retail trade is one of the primary necessities of life in the social community, he adds that "in well-ordered states the retailers are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for any other purpose." In the Laws, however, he takes a step further. He has told us in the Fourth Book that a city of merchants and shopkeepers will be "unfriendly and unfaithful, both to her own citizens and to other nations;" but now he begins to reflect that it would be much to the good of the state, if the better class of men and women would follow the pursuits of trade, and turn away the reproach which at present clings to them.

The wish, he admits, is futile; the insatiable desire for riches will always throw an insurmountable obstacle in the way. Here he exhibits the characteristic tone which runs through the Laws:—He has still, in this latest hour of his life, a consuming zeal for the improvement of mankind. Yet the "creeping touch" of age has saddened his temper, and lowered his estimate of the world, and he can not persuade himself that the human
race will ever "make it their first and last and constant and all-absorbing aim to exceed in virtue."

After the practices of adulteration naturally follow practices of retail trade. Concerning these, we will first of all give a word of counsel and reason, and the law shall come afterwards. Retail trade in a city is not by nature intended to do any harm, but quite the contrary; for is not he a benefactor who reduces the inequalities and immeasurabilities of goods to equality and measure? And this is what the power of money accomplishes, and the merchant may be said to be appointed for this purpose. The hireling and the tavern-keeper, and many other occupations, some of them more and others less seemly — all alike have this object; — they seek to satisfy our needs and equalize our possessions. Let us then endeavor to see what is this dishonor and appearance of unseemliness, and what is the accusation brought against retail trade, in order that if not entirely we may yet partially remove the objection by law. To effect this is no easy matter, and implies a great deal of virtue.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. Dear Cleinias, the class of men is small — they must have been rarely gifted by nature, and trained by education, who, when compelled by wants and desires of every sort, are able to hold out and observe moderation, and when they might make a great deal of money are sober in their wishes, and prefer a moderate to a large gain. But the mass of mankind are the very opposite: their desires are unbounded, and when they might gain in moderation they prefer gains without limit; wherefore all that relates to retail trade and merchandise, and keeping of taverns, is denounced and numbered among dishonorable things. For if what I trust may never
be and will not be, we were to compel, if I may venture to say a ridiculous thing, the best men everywhere to keep taverns for a time, or carry on retail trade, or do anything of that sort; or if, in consequence of some dire necessity, the best women were compelled to take to a similar calling, then we should know how agreeable and pleasant all these things are? And if they were carried on according to pure reason, all such occupations would be held in honor, and those who practised them would be deemed parents or nurses; but now that a man goes to desert places and builds houses which can only be reached by long journeys, for the sake of retail trade, and receives strangers who are in need at the desired resting-places, or gives them sweet calm when they are tossed by the storm, or cool shade in the heat; and then instead of behaving to them as friends, and showing the duties of hospitality to those whom he has received under his roof, treats them as enemies and captives who are at his mercy, and will not release them until they have paid the highest, most exorbitant, and base price,—these are the sort of practices, and foul evils they are, which cast a reproach upon the succor of adversity. And the legislator ought always to be devising a remedy for evils of this sort.

There is an ancient saying, which is also a true one—"To fight against two opponents is a difficult thing," as is seen in diseases and in many other cases. And in this case also the war is against two enemies—wealth and poverty; one of whom corrupts the soul of man with luxury, while the other drives him by pain into utter shamelessness. What remedy can a city of sense find against this disease? In the first place, they must have as few as possible of the retail class; and in the second place, they must as-
sign the occupation to that class of men whose corruption will be the least injury to the state; and in the third place, they must devise some way whereby the followers of these occupations themselves will not readily fall into habits of unbridled shamelessness and meanness.

2. THE HONOR OF PARENTS

The respect for age which is everywhere apparent in the Laws may be partly explained by the natural feeling of Plato, writing in the decline of life; but it is also, we can not doubt, due to the influence which Spartan customs and institutions exercised over his mind. The sentiment had a strong hold in a community which preserved so many traces of the patriarchal age of society wherein the eldest bore rule, "because with them government originated in the authority of a father and mother." In the busy city life of Athens, the elder was apt to be pushed aside by his younger and stronger rival; and we observe a similar tendency in the democratic nations of modern times.

At Athens, however, the worship of ancestors still underlay the whole fabric of social and domestic existence, and, probably, as in some Eastern countries, may have retained vitality when other parts of the national religion were in more or less complete decay; and this primitive belief must have helped to maintain a degree of consideration in the young towards their parents and elders. Such a disposition was most welcome to Plato, both for its own sake, and because it would encourage the mildness of temper and subordination to authority which he desired to see incorporated in the citizens of his new State.

And therefore he indicts a brief prelude to the law concerning the right treatment of parents, in which his ancient power of language once again seems to return to him, and in words of singular beauty and pathos he urges upon the young the duty of paying reverence and veneration to the aged, who are far more potent for good and ill than the lifeless statues of the Gods.

Neither God, nor a man who has understanding, will ever advise any one to neglect his parents. To a discourse concerning the honor and dishonor of
parents, a prelude such as the following, about the service of the Gods, will be a suitable introduction: — There are ancient customs about the Gods which are universal, and they are of two kinds: some of the Gods we see with our eyes and honor them, of others we honor the images; raising statues of them which we adore; and though they be lifeless, yet we imagine that the living Gods have a good will and gratitude to us on this account. Now, if a man has a father or mother, or their father or mother treasured up in his house stricken in years, let him consider that no statue can be more potent to grant his requests than they are, who are sitting at his hearth, if only he knows how to show true service to them.

_Cle._ And what do you call the true mode of service?

_Ath._ I will tell you, O my friend, for such things are worth listening to.

_Cle._ Proceed.

_Ath._ Oedipus, as tradition says, when dishonored by his sons, invoked on them the fulfilment of those curses from the God which every one declares to have been heard and ratified by the Gods, and Amyntor in his wrath invoked curses on his son Phoenix, and Theseus upon Hippolytus, and innumerable others have also called down wrath upon their children, which is a plain proof that the Gods listen to the impreca tions of parents against their children; for the curses of a parent are, as they ought to be, mighty against his children as no others are. And shall we suppose that the prayers of a father or mother who is specially dishonored by his or her children, are heard by the Gods in accordance with nature; and that if a man is honored by them, and in the gladness of his heart earnestly entreats the Gods in his prayers to do them good, he is not equally heard, and that
they do not minister to his request? If not, they would be very unjust ministers of good, and that we affirm to be contrary to their nature.

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ May we not think, as I was saying just now, that we can possess no image which is more honored by the Gods, than that of a father or grandfather, or of a mother stricken in years? whom when a man honors, the heart of the God rejoices, and he is ready to answer their prayers. And, truly, the figure of an ancestor is a wonderful thing, far higher than that of a lifeless image. For when they are honored by us, they join in our prayers, and when they are dishonored, they utter imprecations against us; but lifeless objects do neither. And, therefore, if a man makes a right use of his father and grandfather and other aged relations, he will have the best of all images which can procure him the favor of the Gods.

_Cle._ That is excellent.

_Ath._ Every man of understanding fears and respects the prayers of his parents, knowing well that many times and to many persons they have been accomplished. Now, these things being thus ordered by nature, good men think that they are the gainers by having aged parents living, to the end of their life, or if they depart early, they are deeply lamented by them; and to the bad they are very terrible. Wherefore let every man honor with every sort of lawful honor his own parents agreeably to what has now been said.
BOOK XII

The Twelfth Book continues the subject of legislation. — It contains laws respecting Heralds, Theft, Failure of Service, Desertion, Throwing away of Arms and Cowardice in War, Examiners and Censors of Magistrates and the Burial Rites of those who die holding this office, Oaths in Courts of Justice, Neglect of Public Duties, Foreign Travel and the Reception of Strangers, Surety, Right of Search, Limitation of Time in Disputes about Property, Intimidation of Witnesses or Competitors, Receiving Exiles, Making private War or Peace, Taking Bribes, Registration and Assessment of Property, Offerings to the Gods, Suits at Law and their Execution.

Thus the regulations for the round of civil life are concluded; and Plato proceeds to add a few words upon the disposal of the dead. Interment must take place in ground which is unfit for cultivation; the mounds must be low and the stones small. Funerals are to be simple; the amount spent upon them will be fixed by law. Public lamentations and processions through the streets will not be permitted.

Finally, Plato deals with the question, — How can the permanence of his institutions be assured? He proposes to establish an assembly called the "Nocturnal Council," composed of the ten oldest guardians, of all those who have gained the prize of virtue, of the Director and the ex-Director of Education, and of those who have travelled to see the institutions of other countries, besides an equal number of younger colleagues between thirty and forty, appointed one by each of the seniors. The Council will be "the mind of the State," and its members will know the true object of laws, which is not power or wealth or freedom, but virtue. Now virtue is one, although we distinguish four virtues,—courage, temperance, wisdom, justice; and the guardians of the State ought to understand the nature of virtue, and be far better teachers of it than any chance poet or wandering sophist. They will require a special training for this purpose; and they must also have a right knowledge of the Gods, and be firmly grounded in the belief that the soul is prior to the body, and that soul and mind rule the Universe.

The Nocturnal Council, of which the members are men who have been educated in such ideas, will be the salvation of the whole State. If it can be duly established and set up, then will our City become a waking reality and not the mere imagination of a dream.
1. THE GOOD STATE IN ITS INTERCOURSE WITH THE WORLD

The following passage treats of a subject in respect to which the customs of ancient states were singularly unlike those of modern communities. The Hellenic cities were divided by barriers of race, of dialect, of manners, of civil and social institutions, and within their walls the rich were at constant feud with the poor, the oligarch with the democrat:—“all men,” says Cleinias at the very beginning of the long discourse, “are always at war with one another.” The traditions of past ages lingered, especially in the more backward states, and “stranger” and “enemy” continued to be almost synonymous terms.

In this regard, as in every other, Sparta and Athens represented the opposite poles of Hellenic sentiment. Sparta remained the rude warrior state with the virtues and vices and prejudices of primæval days. The stranger was an object of suspicion and dread; and the “harsh and morose” practice of expelling foreigners from the land, — the so-called “Xenelasia,” — was often enforced, while the young men were forbidden to go out into other countries. But at Athens the prevailing conditions were of another kind: the democratic government was less haughty and exclusive: the habits of daily life were free and unconstrained: commercial interests were strong: and in culture and intelligence the city was the “school of Hellas,” and the resort of strangers from the whole Hellenic world.

We are not surprised, therefore, to observe that Plato when he comes to speak of travel and the reception of foreigners, endeavors, in his usual fashion, to combine Athenian and Spartan ideas. He is true to his native origin, and is unwilling to exchange Attic grace and freedom for the blunt and unsociable manners of the Lacedaemonians, “whose existence was modelled after that of a camp.” Moreover he is aware that the criticism of the world is by no means to be despised. Yet he is afraid that the distasteful spirit of innovation will find new entrance into the commonwealth, if the love of wandering is too much encouraged. And so he draws up an ingenious scheme, which will, he hopes, secure a due amount of intercourse with other lands, and at the same time keep the desire of change in subordination. The modern reader, however, will hardly be able to sympathize with him, or to refrain from the remark that a wider experience of the course of history would most probably have led him to a different conclusion.
Athenian. Now, a state which makes money from the cultivation of the soil only, and has no foreign trade, must consider what it will do about the emigration of its own people to other countries, and the reception of strangers from elsewhere. About these matters the legislator has to consider, and he will begin by using his influence as far as he can.

The intercourse of cities with one another is apt to create a confusion of manners; strangers are always suggesting novelties to strangers. When states are well governed by good laws the mixture causes the greatest possible injury; but seeing that most cities are the reverse of well ordered, the confusion which arises in them from the reception of strangers, and from the citizens themselves expatiating in other cities, whenever any one young or old desires to travel abroad at any time or to go anywhere, is of no consequence. And, on the other hand, the refusal to receive others and to allow their own citizens to go to other places is utterly impossible, and to the rest of the world is likely to appear ruthless and uncivilized; we call the practice by the name xenelasia or banishment of strangers, which is a hard word, and is descriptive of hard and morose ways, as men think. And to be thought or not to be thought well of by the rest of the world is no light matter; for the many are not so far wrong in their judgment of who are bad and who are good, as they are removed from the nature of virtue in themselves. Even bad men have a divine instinct which guesses rightly, and very many who are utterly depraved form correct notions and judgments about the differences of good and bad.

Wherefore also the generality of cities are right in exhorting men to value a good reputation in the
world, for there is no truth greater and more important than this—that he who is really good (I am speaking of him who would be perfect), seeks for reputation, with, but not without, the reality of goodness. And our Cretan colony ought also to acquire the fairest and noblest reputation for virtue from other men; and there is every reason to expect that, if the reality answers to the idea, there will be few like her among well-ordered cities, beholding the face of the sun and of the other Gods. Wherefore, in the matter of emigration to other countries and the reception of strangers, we enact as follows:—In the first place, let no one be allowed to go anywhere at all into a foreign country who is less than forty years of age; and no one shall go in a private capacity, but only in some public one, as a herald, or on an embassy, or on a sacred mission. Foreign travel when on an expedition or in war is not to be included among travels authorized by the state. To Apollo at Delphi and to Zeus at Olympia and to Nemea and to the Isthmus citizens should be sent to take part in the sacrifices and games dedicated to these Gods; and they should send as many as possible, and the best and fairest that can be found, and they will make the city renowned at holy meetings in time of peace, procuring a glory which shall be the converse of that which is gained in war; and when they come home they shall teach the young that the institutions of other states are inferior to their own. And they shall send spectators of another sort, if they have the consent of the guardians, being such citizens as desire to look a little more at leisure at the doings of other men; and these no law shall hinder.

For a city which has no experience of good and bad men or intercourse with them, can never be thoroughly and perfectly civilized, nor, again, can the
citizens of a city properly observe the laws by habit only, and without an intelligent understanding of them. And there always are in the world a few inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price, and who spring up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities. And he who lives in a well-ordered city should be ever tracking them out, going forth by sea and land to seek after him who is incorruptible—seeking to establish more firmly the good institutions which they have, and amending what is deficient; for without this examination and inquiry a city will never continue perfect any more than if the examination is ill-conducted.

2. THE BURIAL OF THE DEAD

Few subjects, as Plato has discovered, occasion more trouble to the legislator, than the disposal of the dead. The deepest feelings and the most unreasonable prejudices of mankind unite to increase the difficulty; and religion is so intimately bound up everywhere with the sentiment of veneration and respect for the departed, that it becomes almost impossible to alter the prevailing practices except by a slow and gradual process of enlightenment.

The regulations which Plato desires to introduce are admirable, and contain much which is worthy of our serious consideration. He expressly enjoins that the dead are to be interred in remote and barren spots; and this was easy to effect in a rugged and mountainous country, like Greece, where there are extensive districts which can never be brought under cultivation. He would certainly have censured the customs of European nations, which long permitted the dead to be placed in sacred buildings and in churchyards amid the crowded populations of cities, and which still allow large tracts of soil to be diverted from their natural purpose "of affording sustenance to the living."

Cremation, we observe with some surprise, is not mentioned by him, either here or in a previous passage relating to the burial of the Censors. The rite was probably more common in the heroic ages of Greece than in the historic period; but it is alluded to by Herodotus in the story of King Darius and the Callatians,
and also by Thucydides in his description of the Plague at Athens. Plato may have thought that it would not be required in a state such as the Cnosian colony, chiefly composed of husbandmen spread over a wide area of territory. In our own day it appears to be the best solution of a very difficult question.

The preference of Plato for short epitaphs and simple monuments will meet with general approval in modern times. He shared in full measure the moderation and restraint which marked the Hellenic character; the bad taste and adulation by which our memorials of the dead are too often disfigured would have been revolting to him. And we, when we look with regret upon the "heavy load" which by-gone generations have left to us, may well wish that Plato's rules could have been put in force four or five centuries ago.

The same good sense appears in his law against extravagant expenditure upon funerals. This has been in every age a source of mischief, and has contributed much to the impoverishment of the people. It is one of the evils which are universally deplored, but which no efforts seem able to exterminate. And even Plato, the boldest and most undaunted of reformers, acknowledges that great concessions must be made in these matters to the weakness of human nature. The legislator must have resort to "persuasion rather than to force;" and we may be allowed to borrow Plato's own language, and to say that "men will listen with more gentleness and good-will to the precepts of the lawgiver, if their souls are prepared to receive his words; even a little done in the way of conciliation gains their ear, and is always worth having."

Thus is a man born and brought up and begets and brings up his own children, and has his share of dealings with other men, and suffers if he has done wrong to any one, and receives satisfaction if he has been wronged, and so at the appointed time, under the dominion of the laws, he grows old, and meets his end in the order of nature. Concerning the dead of either sex, the religious ceremonies which may fittingly be performed, whether appertaining to the Gods of the under world or of this, shall be decided by the interpreters with absolute authority. Their
sepulchres are to be in places which are not cultivated, and there shall be no monuments to them, either large or small, but they shall occupy that part of the country which is naturally adapted for receiving and concealing the bodies of the dead with as little hurt as possible to the living. No man, living or dead, shall deprive the living of the sustenance which the earth, our mother, is naturally inclined to bear to them. And let not the mound be piled higher than would be the work of five men completed in five days; nor shall the stone which is placed over the spot be larger than would be sufficient to receive the praises of the dead included in four heroic lines. Nor shall the laying-out of the dead continue for a longer time than is sufficient to distinguish between him who is in a trance only and him who is really dead, and speaking generally, the third day after death will be a fair time for carrying out the body to the sepulchre.

Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that the soul is in all respects superior to the body, and that even in life what makes each one of us to be what we are is only the soul; and that the body follows us about in the likeness of each of us, and therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the dead are rightly said to be our shades or images; for that the true and immortal being of each one of us which is called the soul goes on her way to other Gods—that before them she may give an account—an inspiring hope to the good, but very terrible to the bad, as the laws of our fathers tell us, which also say that not much can be done in the way of helping a man after he is dead. But the living—he should be helped by all his kindred, that while in life he may be the holiest and justest of men, and after death may have no great sins to be punished in the world
below. If this be true, a man ought not to waste his substance under the idea that all this lifeless mass of flesh which is in process of burial is connected with him; he should consider that the son, or brother, or the beloved one, whoever he may be, whom he thinks he is laying in the earth, has gone away to complete and fulfil his own destiny, and that his duty is rightly to order the present, and to spend moderately on the lifeless altar of the Gods below.

But the legislator does not intend moderation to be taken in the sense of meanness. Let the law, then, be as follows: — The expenditure on the entire funeral, of him who is of the highest class, shall not exceed five minae, and for him who is of the second class, three minae, and for him who is of the third class two minae, and for him who is of the fourth class one mina, will be a fair limit of expense. The guardians of the law ought to take especial care of the different ages of life, whether childhood or manhood, or any other age. And at the end of all, let there be some one guardian of the law presiding, who shall be chosen by the friends of the deceased to superintend, and let it be glory to him to fulfil well and with moderation the offices of the dead, and a discredit to him if they are not well fulfilled. Let the laying out and other ceremonies be in accordance with the law, and the lawgiver who is also a citizen may concede something to custom. It would be monstrous to command any man to weep or abstain from weeping over the dead, but he may forbid cries of lamentation, and not allow the voice of the mourner to be heard outside the house; also, he may forbid the bringing of the dead body into the open streets, or the processions of mourners in the streets, and may require that before daybreak they should be outside
the city. Let these, then, be our laws relating to such matters, and let him who obeys be free from penalty; but he who disobeys even a single guardian of the law shall be punished by them all in a fitting penalty.

THE END.