A. T. Cour, C. I. B.

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THE

PHILOSOPHY OF KANT,

AS CONTAINED IN EXTRACTS FROM

HIS OWN WRITINGS.

SELECTED AND TRANSLATED BY

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PREFATORY NOTE.

My reason for presenting to the public these translations from the philosophical writings of Kant will be best understood if I state how they came to be made. The teacher of philosophy soon finds that a very powerful irritant is needed to awaken his pupils from their "dogmatic slumber." I do not doubt that it is possible to secure the desired end by a systematic criticism of the preconceptions that stand in the way of genuine philosophical comprehension. But my experience is that it is almost impossible, by this method, to prevent the average student from accepting what he is told without mastering it and making it his own. Thus he passes from one form of dogmatism to another, and with the new dogmatism comes the great enemy of all education, a conceit of knowledge without its reality. The study of philosophy is of little value if it does not teach a man to think for himself. The process of self-education is necessarily a severe one, and, therefore, distasteful to the natural man. Yet any attempt to evade it by some "short and easy method" defeats the end. What is required is a process by which the student who is really in earnest may pass, gradually and surely, from a lower to a higher plane of thought. The philosophical writings
of Kant, which exhibit in brief the transition from the old to the new, I believe to be a potent instrument for this end. But the struggle upwards must be made by the student himself. A man may hear, and seem to appreciate, a course of lectures on the Critical philosophy, containing a clear, and even a full statement of it, and may yet fail to enter into its spirit. To obviate this danger as far as possible, I tried some years ago what could be done by throwing the student more upon himself. My plan was to set a class of more advanced pupils at work upon extracts from the philosophy of Kant, to watch them as they forced their way through its perplexities, and to put forth a helping hand only when it seemed to be needful. The experiment justified itself. No method that I have tried—and I have tried several—has been so fruitful in results.

The limited edition of Extracts, originally printed for the use of my own students, but also used in other American Universities, is now out of print. I have, therefore, gone carefully over the writings of Kant again, selecting and re-translating all the passages that seem to be essential to the understanding of his philosophy. The Extracts have been taken from four treatises—the Critique of Pure Reason, the Metaphysic of Morality, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of Judgment.

In the translations I have sought to express Kant's meaning as clearly and simply as I could, and in no case, so far as I am aware, have I been biased by a pre-conceived theory of what he ought to say. To render Kant into intelligible English I have not found an easy task, but it has been made much lighter for me by the labours of my predecessors, Mr. Meiklejohn, Mr.
Max Müller, Dr. Hutchison Stirling, Mr. Mahaffy, and Mr. Abbott, to whom I beg to express my obligations. My very special thanks are also due to Professor Edward Caird, of Glasgow University, for his great kindness in reading the whole of the manuscript, and making a number of valuable suggestions.

The pages of the first and second editions of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* are given on the margin—the former to the right, the latter to the left. The references in other cases are to the complete edition of Kant's works published by Hartenstein in 1867. The Index at the end of the volume, which I have tried to make as complete as possible, will, I hope, be found useful.

What I call the *Preface* to the Critique of Pure Reason really consists of two prefaces thrown into one; but the extracts have been taken mainly from the preface to the second edition, though a few passages from that to the first edition have been inserted. Here, and in one or two other places, I have made a slight change from the order of the original; but the transpositions are few, and are sufficiently indicated by the references on the margin. As a rule, my editorial privilege has been exercised only in the way of omission.

I am well aware that objection may be taken to the whole principle of these Extracts. The work of a great author, it may be said, should be represented "all in all, or not at all." The objection is not without force, but it seems to me to apply mainly to the selection of disconnected passages, and to the mutilation of a faultless work of art like the *Republic* of Plato. The writings of Kant, which are full of confusing repetitions that really mar their perfection of form, hardly deserve
the same tenderness of treatment. This is a case in which it may be doubted if the less does not contain the greater and even more. At least it is safe to say that most students are more likely to turn to the full text of Kant after a study of the more important passages in his works, than if they had to make their way against greater obstacles. No doubt there are suggestive points which the plan of this work has compelled me to omit, but I have tried to reduce these to a minimum. I believe that what is here given contains all the main ideas of Kant in their systematic connection. It is to be hoped, however, that the student who has mastered these Extracts will not be satisfied until he has read all that Kant has to say.

University of Queen's College,
Kingston, Canada,
May, 1888.
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THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.

PREFACE.

This may well be called the age of criticism, a criticism from which nothing need hope to escape. When religion seeks to shelter itself behind its sanctity, and law behind its majesty, they justly awaken suspicion against themselves, and lose all claim to the sincere respect which reason yields only to that which has been able to bear the test of its free and open scrutiny.

Metaphysic has been the battlefield of endless conflicts. Dogmatism at first held despotic sway; but from time to time scepticism destroyed all settled forms of government; and now a widespread indifferentism prevails. Never has metaphysic been so fortunate as to strike into the sure path of science, but has kept groping about, and groping, too, among mere ideas. What can be the reason of this failure? Is a science of metaphysic impossible? Then, why should nature disquiet us with a restless longing after it, as if it were one of our most important concerns? Nay more, how can we put any faith in human reason, if in one of the very things that we most desire to know, it not merely
forsakes us, but lures us on by false hopes only to cheat us in the end? Or are there any indications that the true path has hitherto been missed, and that by starting afresh we may yet succeed where others have failed?

It seems to me that the intellectual revolution, by which at a bound mathematics and physics became what they now are, is so remarkable, that we are called upon to ask what was the essential feature of the change that proved so advantageous to them, and to try at least to apply to metaphysic as far as possible a method that has been successful in other sciences of reason. In mathematics I believe that, after a long period of groping, the true path was disclosed in the happy inspiration of a single man. If that man was Thales, things must suddenly have appeared to him in a new light, the moment he saw how the properties of the isosceles triangle could be demonstrated. The true method, as he found, was not to inspect the visible figure of the triangle, or to analyze the bare conception of it, and from this, as it were, to read off its properties, but to bring out what was necessarily implied in the conception that he had himself formed \textit{a priori}, and put into the figure, in the construction by which he presented it to himself.

Physics took a much longer time than mathematics to enter on the highway of science, but here, too, a sudden revolution in the way of looking at things took place. When Galileo caused balls which he had carefully weighed to roll down an inclined plane, or Torricelli made the air bear up a weight which he knew beforehand to be equal to a standard column of water, a new light broke on the mind of the scientific discoverer. It was seen that reason has insight only into that which it produces after a
plan of its own, and that it must itself lead the way with principles of judgment based upon fixed laws, and force nature to answer its questions. Even experimental physics, therefore, owes the beneficial revolution in its point of view entirely to the idea, that, while reason can know nothing purely of itself, yet that which it has itself put into nature must be its guide to the discovery of all that it can learn from nature.

In metaphysical speculations it has always been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects; but every attempt from this point of view to extend our knowledge of objects a priori by means of conceptions has ended in failure. The time has now come to ask, whether better progress may not be made by supposing that objects must conform to our knowledge. Plainly this would better agree with the avowed aim of metaphysic, to determine the nature of objects a priori, or before they are actually presented. Our suggestion is similar to that of Copernicus in astronomy, who, finding it impossible to explain the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they turned round the spectator, tried whether he might not succeed better by supposing the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. Let us make a similar experiment in metaphysic with perception. If it were really necessary for our perception to conform to the nature of objects, I do not see how we could know anything of it a priori; but if the sensible object must conform to the constitution of our faculty of perception, I see no difficulty in the matter. Perception, however, can become knowledge only if it is related in some way to the object which it determines. Now here again I may suppose, either that the conceptions
through which I effect that determination conform to objects, or that objects, in other words the experience in which alone objects are known, conform to conceptions. In the former case, I fall into the same perplexity as before, and fail to explain how such conceptions can be known *a priori*. In the latter case, the outlook is more hopeful. For, experience is itself a mode of knowledge which implies intelligence, and intelligence has a rule of its own, which must be an *a priori* condition of all knowledge of objects presented to it. To this rule, as expressed in *a priori* conceptions, all objects of experience must necessarily conform, and with it they must agree.

Our experiment succeeds as well as we could wish, and gives promise that metaphysic may enter upon the sure course of a science, at least in its first part, where it is occupied with those *a priori* conceptions to which the corresponding objects can be given. The new point of view enables us to explain how there can be *a priori* knowledge, and what is more, to furnish satisfactory proofs of the laws that lie at the basis of nature as a totality of objects of experience. But the consequences that flow from this deduction of our faculty of *a priori* knowledge, which constitutes the first part of our inquiry, are unexpected, and on a superficial view seem to be fatal to the aims of metaphysic, with which we have to deal in the second part of it. For we are brought to the conclusion that we never can transcend the limits of possible experience, and therefore never can realize the object with which metaphysic is primarily concerned.

In truth, however, no better indirect proof could be given that we were correct in holding, as the result of our
first estimate of the *a priori* knowledge of reason, that such knowledge relates not at all to the thing as it exists in itself, but only to phenomena. For that which necessarily forces us to go beyond the limits of experience and of all phenomena is the *unconditioned*, which reason demands of things in themselves, and by right and necessity seeks in the complete series of conditions for everything conditioned. If, then, we find that we cannot think the unconditioned without contradiction, on the supposition of our experience conforming to objects as things in themselves; while, on the contrary, the contradiction disappears, on the supposition that our knowledge does not conform to things in themselves, but that objects as they are given to us as phenomena conform to our knowledge; we are entitled to conclude that what we at xxi first assumed as an hypothesis is now established as a truth.

It may seem from this that the result of our critical investigation is purely *negative*, and merely warns us not to venture with speculative reason beyond the limits of experience. And no doubt this is its first use; but a *positive* result is obtained when it is seen that the principles with which speculative reason ventures beyond its proper limits, in reality do not *extend* the province of reason, but inevitably *narrow* it. For in seeking to go xxv altogether beyond its true limits, the limits of sensibility, those principles threaten to supplant pure reason in its xxvii practical aspect. Let us suppose that the necessary distinction which our criticism shows to exist between things as objects of experience and the same things as they are in themselves, had not been made. Then the principle of causality, and with it the mechanical
conception of nature as determined by it, would apply to all things in general as efficient causes. Hence I could not, without palpable contradiction, say of the same being, for instance the human soul, that its will is free, and yet is subject to the necessity of nature, that is, is not free. But, if our criticism is sound and the object may be taken in two distinct senses, on the one hand as a phenomenon, and on the other hand as a thing in itself; there is no contradiction in supposing that the very same will, in its visible acts as a phenomenon, is not free, but necessarily subject to the law of nature, while yet, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject to that law, but is free. Now, morality requires us only to be able to think freedom without self-contradiction, not to understand it; it is enough that our conception of the act as free puts no obstacle in the way of the conception of it as mechanically necessary, for the act stands in quite a different relation to freedom from that in which it stands to the mechanism of nature. From the critical point of view, therefore, the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature may each be true in its own sphere; which could never have been shown had not criticism previously established our unavoidable ignorance of things in themselves, and limited all that we can know to mere phenomena. I have, therefore, found it necessary to deny knowledge of God, freedom, and immortality, in order to find a place for faith.

It is dogmatism, or the preconception that progress in metaphysic may be made without a previous criticism of pure reason, that is responsible for that dogmatic unbelief which is so hostile to morality. The first and most important task of philosophy is to deprive metaphysic
once for all of its pernicious influence by closing up the
xxxv sources of its errors. Our critique is not opposed to the
dogmatic procedure of reason as a science of pure know-
ledge, but only to dogmatism, that is, to the presumption
that we may follow the time-honoured method of con-
structing a system of pure metaphysic out of principles
that rest upon mere conceptions, without first asking in
what way reason has come into possession of them, and
by what right it employs them. Dogmatism, in a word,
is the dogmatic procedure of reason without any previous
criticism of its own powers.

The critique of pure reason is not a criticism of books vi
and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in so
far as reason seeks for knowledge that is independent
of all experience. I have evaded none of its questions,
on the plea of the imbecility of human reason. In fact, vii
reason is so perfect a unity that, if it were in principle
inadequate to the solution of even a single one of the
questions which by its very nature it raises, we might at
once with perfect certainty set it aside as incapable of
xxxvii answering any of the others. For as it is a true organic
unity, in which the whole exists for the sake of each of
the parts, and each part for the sake of the whole,
xxxviii the slightest imperfection, whether it is due to a flaw
or to a defect, will inevitably betray itself in use.

INTRODUCTION.


There can be no doubt whatever that all our knowledge|
begins with experience. By what means should the
faculty of knowledge be aroused to activity but by objects, which, acting upon our senses, partly of themselves produce ideas in us, and partly set our understanding at work to compare these ideas with one another, and, by combining or separating them, to convert the raw material of our sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is called experience? In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge prior to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins.

But, although all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that it all originates from experience. For it may well be that experience is itself made up of two elements, one received through impressions of sense, and the other supplied from itself by our faculty of knowledge on occasion of those impressions. If that be so, it may take long practice before our attention is drawn to the element added by the mind, and we learn to distinguish and separate it from the material to which it is applied.

It is, therefore, a question which cannot be lightly put aside, but can be answered only after careful investigation, whether there is any knowledge that is independent of experience, and even of all impressions of sense. Such knowledge is said to be a priori, to distinguish it from empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, or in experience.

The term a priori must, however, be defined more precisely, in order that the full meaning of our question may be understood. We say of a man who undermines the foundations of his house, that he might have known a priori that it would fall; by which we mean, that he
might have known it would fall, without waiting for the
event to take place in his experience. But he could
not know it completely a priori; for it is only from ex-
perience that he could learn that bodies are heavy, and
must fall by their own weight when there is nothing to
support them.

By a priori knowledge we shall, therefore, in what
follows understand, not such knowledge as is inde-
pendent of this or that experience, but such as is
absolutely independent of all experience. Opposed to
it is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible
only a posteriori, that is, by experience. A priori
knowledge is pure, when it is unmixed with anything
empirical. The proposition, for instance, that every
change has its cause is a priori, but it is not pure,
because change is an idea that can be derived only
from experience.

2. Science and Common Sense contain a priori
Knowledge.

Evidently what we need is a criterion by which to
distinguish with certainty between pure and empirical
knowledge. Now, experience can tell us that a thing
is so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise.
Firstly, then, if we find a proposition that, in being
thought, is thought as necessary, it is an a priori
judgment; and if, further, it is derived only from one
which is itself necessary, it is absolutely a priori.
Secondly, experience never bestows on its judgments
true or strict universality, but only the assumed or
comparative universality of induction; so that, properly
speaking, it merely says, that so far as our observation
has gone, there is no exception to this or that rule. If, therefore, a judgment is thought with strict universality, so that there can be no possible exception to it, it is not derived from experience, but is absolutely \textit{a priori}. Necessity and strict universality are, therefore, sure criteria of \textit{a priori} knowledge, and are also inseparably connected with each other.

Now, it is easy to show that in human knowledge there actually are judgments, that in the strictest sense are universal, and therefore pure \textit{a priori}. If an example from the sciences is desired, we have but to think of any proposition in mathematics; if an instance from common sense is preferred, it is enough to cite the proposition, that every change must have a cause. To take the latter case, the very idea of cause so manifestly implies the idea of necessary connection with an effect, that it would be completely lost, were we to derive it, with Hume, from the repeated association of one event with another that precedes it, and were we to reduce it to the subjective necessity arising from the habit of passing from one idea to another. Even without appealing to such examples to show that as a matter of fact there are in our knowledge pure \textit{a priori} principles, we might prove \textit{a priori} that without such principles there could be no experience whatever. For, whence could experience derive the certainty it has, if all the rules that it follows were merely empirical and therefore contingent? Surely such rules could not be dignified with the name of first principles.
3. *A Science is needed to determine a priori the possibility, the principles, and the extent of all Knowledge.*

A far more important consideration remains than anything that has yet been stated. There is a sort of knowledge that even quits the field of all possible experience, and claims to extend the range of our judgments beyond its limits, by means of conceptions to which no corresponding object can be presented in experience. Now, it is just in the province of this sort of knowledge, where experience can neither show us the true path nor put us right when we go astray, that reason carries on those high investigations, the results of which we regard as more important than all that understanding can discover within the domain of phenomena. Nay, we are even willing to stake our all, and to run the risk of being completely deluded, rather than consent to forego inquiries of such moment, either from uncertainty or from carelessness and indifference. These unavoidable problems, set by pure reason itself, are *God, freedom,* and *immortality,* and the science which brings all its resources to bear on the one single task of solving them is *metaphysic.*

Now, one might think that men would hesitate to leave the solid ground of experience, and to build an edifice of truth upon knowledge that has come to them they know not how, and in blind dependence upon principles of which they cannot tell the origin, without taking the greatest pains to see that the foundation was secure. One might think it only natural, that they would long ago have raised the question, how we have come into possession of all this *a priori* knowledge, and what may
8 be its extent, its import and its value. But the fact is, 4 that a part of this knowledge—mathematical knowledge, for instance—has so long been established as certain, that we are less ready to suspect the evidence for other parts, although these may be of a totally different nature. Besides, when we are once outside the circle of experience, we are sure not to be contradicted by experience; and so strong is the impulse to enlarge our knowledge, that nothing short of a clear contradiction will avail to arrest our footsteps. Now, such contradiction may easily be avoided, even where we are dealing with objects that are merely imaginary, if we are only careful in putting our fictions together. Mathematics shows us by a splendid instance, how far a science may advance a priori without the aid of experience. It is true that by it objects and conceptions are considered only in so far as they can be presented in perception; but it is easy to overlook the limitation, because the perception in this case can itself be given a priori, and is therefore hard to distinguish from a mere idea. Deceived by this proof of the power of reason, we can see no limits to the extension of knowledge. So Plato forsook the world of sense, chafing at the narrow limits it set to our knowledge, and, on the wings of pure ideas, launched out into the empty space of the pure understanding. He did not see that with all his efforts he was making no real progress. But it is no unusual thing for human reason to complete its speculative edifice in such haste, that it forgets to look to the stability of the foundation. The reason why we have no fear or anxiety while the work of construction is going on, but take it for granted that the foundation stands firm, is, that much of the work of reason, perhaps
the greater part, consists in the *analysis* of conceptions
which we already possess. This analysis really gives us a kind of *a priori* knowledge that is safe and useful. But, misled by this success, reason interpolates propositions of quite a different character, which but superficially resemble the others. I shall therefore at the very outset point out the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge.

4. The distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments.

There are two ways in which the predicate of an affirmative judgment may be related to the subject. Either the predicate B is already tacitly contained in the subject A, or B lies entirely outside of A, although it is in some way connected with it. In the one case I call the judgment *analytic*, in the other case *synthetic*. Analytic judgments are those in which the predicate is related to the subject in the way of identity, while in synthetic judgments the predicate is not thought as identical with the subject. The former class might also be called *explicative*, because the predicate adds nothing to the subject, but merely breaks it up into its logical elements, and brings to clear consciousness what was already obscurely thought in it. The latter class we may call *ampliative*, as adding in the predicate something that was in no sense thought in the subject, and that no amount of analysis could possibly extract from it. "Body is extended," for instance, is an analytic judgment. For, to be conscious that extension is involved in the conception signified by the term body, it is not necessary to go outside that conception, but merely to analyze it into
the various logical elements that are always thought in it. But in the proposition "Body has weight," the predicate is not implied in the very conception of body, but is a perfectly new idea. The addition of such a predicate, therefore, yields a synthetic judgment.

Judgments of experience are all by their very nature synthetic. To say that I must have recourse to experience for an analytic judgment is absurd, because I can frame the judgment without going beyond the conception I already possess. I have, for instance, the conception of body, and by mere analysis I become aware of the attributes extension, impenetrability, figure, etc., which the thought of it involves. To enlarge my conception, I turn again to experience, from which the conception was originally derived, and, finding weight to be invariably connected with those attributes, I attach it to them by synthesis as a new attribute. The possibility of this synthesis of the attribute weight with the conception body therefore rests upon experience. The two ideas are quite distinct, but they yet are parts of the same experience, and experience is itself a whole in which a number of perceptions are synthetically though only contingently combined.

In a priori synthetic judgments, on the other hand, I can get no aid whatever from experience. But, if it is here vain to look to experience for aid, on what other support am I to rely, when I seek to go beyond a certain conception A, and to connect B synthetically with it? Take the proposition, that every event must have its cause. No doubt I cannot have the conception of an event without thinking of something as having a moment of time before it, and from this certain analytic judg-
ments may be derived. But the conception of a cause lies entirely outside the conception of an event, and introduces an idea not contained in it. By what right, then, do I pass from the conception of an event to the totally different conception of a cause? How do I know that there is a necessary connection between the two conceptions, when I can perfectly well think the one without the other? What is here the unknown \( x \), which gives support to the understanding, when it seems to have discovered an entirely new predicate \( B \) to belong necessarily to the subject \( A \)? Experience it cannot be, because the principle has a degree of universality that experience can never supply, as it is supposed to connect the new conception with the old in the way of necessity, and must do so entirely \( a \) priori, and on the basis of mere conceptions. And yet our speculative \( a \) priori knowledge must rest upon such synthetic or ampliative propositions.

5. The principles of all Theoretical Sciences of reason are \( a \) priori Synthetic Judgments.

(1) All mathematical judgments, without exception, are synthetic. No doubt the mathematician, in his demonstrations, proceeds on the principle of contradiction, but it is a mistake to suppose that the propositions on which his demonstrations rest can be known to be true by that principle. The mistake arises from not observing that, while a synthetic proposition may certainly be seen to be true by the principle of contradiction, its truth is in that case evident, not from itself, but only because it is seen to follow from another proposition that has been previously obtained by synthesis.
The first thing to notice is, that no truly mathematical judgments are empirical, but always are *a priori*. They carry necessity on their very face, and therefore cannot be derived from experience. Should any one demur to this, I am willing to limit my assertion to the propositions of *pure mathematics*, which, as everybody will admit, are not empirical judgments, but perfectly pure *a priori* knowledge.

At first sight it may seem that the proposition \(7 + 5 = 12\) is purely analytic, and follows, by the principle of contradiction, from the conception of a sum of 7 and 5. But, when we look more closely we see that the conception of the sum of 7 and 5 is merely the idea of the union of the two numbers, and in no way enables us to tell what may be the single number that forms their sum. To think that 7 and 5 are to be united is not to have the conception 12, and I may analyze the idea of the possible sum as long as I please, without finding the 12 in it. To get beyond the separate ideas of 7 and 5, I must call in the aid of perception, referring to my five fingers, or to five points, and, starting with the conception 7, go on to add to it, unit by unit, the 5 so presented to me in perception. The propositions of arithmetic are therefore all synthetic. This is even more manifest if I take larger numbers, when it becomes at once obvious that without the aid of perception no mere analysis of my conceptions, turn and twist them as I may, could ever yield the sum.

Nor is any proposition of pure geometry analytic. That the straight line between any two points is the shortest, is a synthetic proposition. My idea of straight is purely an idea of quality, not of quantity. From no
analysis of the conception of a straight line can the knowledge that it is the shortest be derived. Perception has to be called in to enable me to make the synthesis.

17 (2) The principles on which physics rests are a priori synthetic judgments. I shall content myself with citing two such judgments: first, that in all changes of the material world the quantity of matter remains the same; and, secondly, that in the communication of motion, action and reaction are always equal. Both propositions, it is plain, are not only necessary, and therefore in their origin a priori, but they are also synthetic. The conception of matter does not include the idea of permanence, but merely signifies its presence in the space which it occupies. When, therefore, I say that matter is permanent in quantity, I add to the conception of matter an attribute which was not at first thought in it. Accordingly, the proposition is not analytic, but at once a priori and synthetic; and so with the other propositions of pure physics.

18 (3) Unsuccessful as metaphysic may hitherto have been in solving the unavoidable problems set to it by human reason, its aim undoubtedly is to acquire a priori synthetic knowledge. That aim it certainly will never attain by merely dissecting the conceptions of things which we have in our mind a priori, and expressing them in analytic propositions. For it seeks to enlarge our a priori knowledge, and therefore it must try to show that there are judgments that add to a conception something not already contained in it, even if it should be led to venture into a region where experience cannot follow, as for instance in the proposition that the world must have
had an absolute beginning. In its aim at least metaphysic therefore consists entirely of *a priori* synthetic propositions.


It is of very great advantage, to others as well as to oneself, to be able to bring together various topics of investigation in a single problem. Now, the true problem of pure reason may be put in this way—*How are *a priori* synthetic judgments possible?*

Should this question be answered in a satisfactory way, we shall at the same time learn what part reason plays in the foundation and completion of those sciences which contain a theoretical *a priori* knowledge of objects. Thus we shall be able to answer the questions—*How is pure mathematics possible? How is pure physics possible?* As these sciences actually exist, we may fairly ask how they are possible; for that they must be possible is proved by the fact that they exist. But as no real progress has as yet been made in the construction of a system that realizes the essential aim of metaphysic, it cannot be said that metaphysic exists, and there is, therefore, reason to doubt whether it is possible at all.

Yet in one sense metaphysic may certainly be said to exist, namely, in the sense that there is in man a natural disposition to seek for this kind of knowledge. But as all attempts to answer the questions which human reason is naturally impelled to ask, as, for instance, whether the world had a beginning, or has existed from all eternity, have always and unavoidably ended in self-contradiction; we cannot be satisfied with asserting the mere natural
disposition to metaphysical speculation, or, in other words, with the bare ability of pure reason to construct some sort of metaphysic. It must be possible for reason to attain to certainty one way or the other: we must be able to ascertain whether reason can know the objects it seeks, or whether it cannot know them; we must find a conclusive answer to the question whether pure reason is capable or incapable of determining the nature of those objects, and whether, therefore, its domain may with confidence be enlarged beyond the limits of experience, or must be restricted within them. Accordingly, the third and last question, which flows from the general problem of pure reason, may be correctly put in this way: How is a science of metaphysic possible? Thus a criticism of reason in the end necessarily leads to science, whereas the dogmatic employment of reason without previous criticism can lead only to groundless assertions, to which other assertions equally specious may always be opposed, the inevitable result being scepticism.

7. Idea and Division of the Critique of Pure Reason.

From all that has been said we get the idea of a unique science, which may be called the Critique of Pure Reason. It is not a doctrine, but a criticism of pure reason, and its speculative value is entirely negative, because it does not enlarge our knowledge, but only casts light upon the nature of our reason and enables us to keep it free from error. By transcendental knowledge I mean all knowledge that is occupied, not with objects, but with the way in which a knowledge of objects may be gained, so far as that is possible a priori. What we propose is not a
doctrine of pure reason, but a transcendental criticism, the purpose of which is not to extend knowledge, but to rectify it, and to supply a touchstone of the value of all *a priori* knowledge.

This transcendental criticism will afford a complete architectonic plan of transcendental philosophy, as exhibited in its principles, and will therefore give a perfect guarantee of the completeness and stability of the edifice in all its parts.

The Critique of Pure Reason therefore contains all that is essential to the idea of transcendental philosophy, and if we distinguish it from that philosophy, the reason is that it does not carry its analysis beyond what is required in a complete estimate of *a priori* synthetic knowledge.

The main thing to be kept in view in the division of such a science is that no ideas be allowed to enter that are in any way of empirical origin, or, in other words, that it consist only of perfectly pure *a priori* knowledge. Hence, although the principles and fundamental conceptions of morality are *a priori*, they form no part of a transcendental philosophy, because they are necessarily relative to the conceptions of pleasure and pain, desire, and inclination, etc., which in their origin are empirical.

In a systematic division of this science we must have, firstly, a doctrine of the *elements*, secondly, a doctrine of the *method* of pure reason. As to the subdivisions, it seems enough to say at present that there are two stems of human knowledge—Sensibility and Understanding, which may perhaps spring from a common root, unknown to us, and that by the one objects are given, by the other they are thought. Now, if Sensibility is found to contain an *a priori* element, without which objects could not be
given to us, an investigation into the nature of that element will be one of the tasks of transcendental philosophy. The doctrine of this transcendental element of sensible perception will form the first part of the science of elements, because we must consider the conditions under which objects of human knowledge are given, before we go on to inquire into the conditions under which they are thought.
34 Sensation is the actual affection of our sensibility, or capacity of receiving impressions, by an object. The perception which refers itself to an object through sensation, is empirical perception. The undetermined object of such a perception is a phenomenon (Erscheinung).

That element in the phenomenon which corresponds to sensation I call the matter, while that element which makes it possible that the various determinations of the phenomenon should be arranged in certain ways relatively to one another, is its form. Now, sensations cannot possibly give order or form to themselves. The matter of a phenomenon is given to us entirely a posteriori, but its form must lie a priori in the mind, ready to be applied to all sensations as they arise, and hence it must be capable of being considered by itself apart from sensation.

This pure form of sensibility is also called pure perception. Thus, if from the consciousness of a body, I separate all that the understanding has thought into it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and all that is due to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc.; what is left over are extension and figure. These, therefore, belong to pure perception, which exists in the mind a priori, as a mere form of sensibility, even when no sensation or object of sense is actually present.
The science of all the \textit{a priori} principles of sensibility I call \textit{Transcendental Ästhetic}, in contradistinction from the science of the principles of pure thought, which I call \textit{Transcendental Logic}.

In Transcendental Ästhetic we shall first of all isolate sensibility, abstracting from all that the understanding contributes through its conceptions, so that we may have nothing before us but empirical perception. In the next place, we shall separate from empirical perception all that belongs to sensation; when there will remain only pure perception, or the mere form of phenomena, the sole element that sensibility can yield \textit{a priori}. If this is done, it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible perception, which constitute principles of \textit{a priori} knowledge, namely, Space and Time. With these it will now be our business to deal.

\textbf{Section I.—Space.}

2. \textit{Metaphysical Exposition of Space.}

In external sense we are conscious of objects as outside of ourselves, and as all without exception in space. In space their shape, size, and relative position are marked out, or are capable of being marked out. Inner sense, in which we are conscious of ourselves, or rather of our own state, gives us, it is true, no direct perception of the soul itself as an object; but it nevertheless is the one single form in which our own state comes before us as a definite object of perception; and hence all inner determinations appear to us as related to one another in time. We cannot be conscious;
of time as external, any more than we can be conscious of space as something within us. What, then, are space and time? Are they in themselves real things? Are they only determinations, or perhaps merely relations of things, which yet would belong to things in themselves even if those things were not perceived by us? Or, finally, have space and time no meaning except as forms of perception, belonging to the subjective constitution of our own mind, apart from which they cannot be predicated of anything whatever? To answer these questions I shall begin with a metaphysical exposition of space. An exposition I call it, because it gives a distinct although not a detailed, statement of what is implied in the idea of space; and the exposition is metaphysical, because it brings forward the reasons we have for regarding space as given a priori.

(1) Space is not an empirical conception, which has been derived from external experiences. For I could not be conscious that certain of my sensations are relative to something outside of me, that is, to something in a different part of space from that in which I myself am; nor could I be conscious of them as outside of and beside one another, were I not at the same time conscious that they not only are different in content, but are in different places. The consciousness of space is, therefore, necessarily presupposed in external perception. No experience of the external relations of sensible things could yield the idea of space, because without the consciousness of space there would be no external experience whatever.

(2) Space is a necessary a priori idea, which is presupposed in all external perceptions. By no effort can
we think space to be away, although we can quite readily think of space as empty of objects. Space we therefore regard as a condition of the possibility of phenomena, and not as a determination dependent on phenomena. It is thus a priori, and is necessarily presupposed in external phenomena.

(3) Space is not a discursive or general conception of the relations of things, but a pure perception. For we can be conscious only of a single space. It is true that we speak as if there were many spaces, but we really mean only parts of one and the same identical space. Nor can we say that these parts exist before the one all-embracing space, and are put together to form a whole; but we can think of them only as in it. Space is essentially single; by the plurality of spaces, we merely mean that because space can be limited in many ways, the general conception of spaces presupposes such limitations as its foundation. From this it follows, that an a priori perception, and not an empirical perception, underlies all conceptions of pure space. Accordingly, no geometrical proposition, as, for instance, that any two sides of a triangle are greater than the third side, can ever be derived from the general conceptions of line and triangle; but only from perception. From the perception, however, it can be derived a priori, and with demonstrative certainty.

(4) Space is presented before our consciousness as an infinite magnitude. Now, in every conception we certainly think of a certain attribute as common to an infinite number of possible objects, which are subsumed under the conception; but, from its very nature, no conception can possibly be supposed to contain an
infinite number of determinations *within* it. But it is just in this way that space is thought of, all its parts being conceived to co-exist *ad infinitum*. Hence the original consciousness of space is an *a priori* perception, not a conception.


A transcendental exposition seeks to show how, from a certain principle, the possibility of other *a priori* synthetic knowledge may be explained. To be successful, it must prove (1) that there really are synthetic propositions which can be derived from the principle in question, (2) that they can be so derived only if a certain explanation of that principle is adopted.

Now, geometry is a science that determines the properties of space synthetically, and yet *a priori*. What, then, must be the nature of space, in order that such knowledge of it may be possible? Our original consciousness of it must be perception, for no new truth, such as we have in the propositions of geometry, can be obtained from the mere analysis of a given conception (Introduction, 5). And this perception must be *a priori*, or, in other words, must be found in us before we actually observe an object, and hence it must be pure, not empirical perception. For all geometrical propositions, as, for instance, that space has but three dimensions, are of demonstrative certainty, or present themselves in consciousness as necessary; and such propositions cannot be empirical, nor can they be derived from judgments of experience (Introduction, 2).

How, then, can there be in the mind an external
perception, which is antecedent to objects themselves, and in which the conception of those objects may be determined a priori? Manifestly, only if that perception has its seat in the subject, that is, if it belongs to the formal constitution of the subject, in virtue of which it is so affected by objects as to have a direct consciousness or perception of them; therefore, only if perception is the universal form of outer sense.

Our explanation is, therefore, the only one that makes the possibility of geometry intelligible, as a mode of a priori synthetic knowledge. All other explanations fail to do so, and, although they may have an external resemblance to ours, may readily be distinguished from it by this criterion.

Inferences.

(a) Space is in no sense a property of things in themselves, nor is it a relation of things in themselves to one another. It is not a determination that still belongs to objects even when abstraction has been made from all the subjective conditions of perception. For we never could perceive a priori any determination of things, whether belonging to them individually or in relation to one another, antecedently to our perception of those things themselves.

(b) Space is nothing but the form of all the phenomena of outer sense. It is the subjective condition without which no external perception is possible for us. The receptivity of the subject, or its capability of being affected by objects, necessarily exists before there is any perception of objects. Hence it is easy to understand, how the form of all phenomena may exist in the mind
a priori, antecedently to actual observation, and how, as a pure perception in which all objects must be determined, it may contain the principles that determine beforehand the relations of objects when they are met with in experience.

It is, therefore, purely from our human point of view that we can speak of space, of extended things, etc. Suppose the subjective conditions to be taken away, without which we cannot have any external perception, or be affected by objects, and the idea of space ceases to have any meaning. We cannot predicate spatial dimensions of things, except in so far as they appear in our consciousness. The unalterable form of this receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all the relations in which objects are perceived as outside of us, and this form, when it is viewed in abstraction from objects, is the pure perception that is known by the name of space. We are not entitled to regard the conditions that are proper to our sensibility as conditions of the possibility of things, but only of things as they appear to us. Hence, while it is correct to say, that space embraces all things that are capable of appearing to us as external, we cannot say, that it embraces all things as they are in themselves, no matter what subject may perceive them, and, indeed, whether they are perceived or not. For we have no means of judging whether other thinking beings are in their perceptions bound down by the same conditions as ourselves, and which for us hold universally. If we state the limitations under which a judgment holds of a given subject, the judgment is then unconditionally true. The proposition, that all things are side by side in space, is
true only under the limitation that we are speaking of our own sensible perception. But, if we more exactly define the subject of the proposition by saying, that all things as external phenomena are side by side in space, it will be true universally and without any exception. Our exposition, therefore, establishes the reality, or objective truth of space, as a determination of every object that can possibly come before us as external; but, at the same time, it proves the ideality of space, when space is considered by reason relatively to things in themselves, that is, without regard to the constitution of our sensibility. We, therefore, affirm the empirical reality of space, as regards all possible external experience; but we also maintain its transcendental ideality, or, in other words, we hold that space is nothing at all, if its limitation to possible experience is ignored, and it is treated as a necessary condition of things in themselves.

Section II.—Time.


(1) Time is not an empirical conception, which has been derived from any experience. For we should not observe things to co-exist or to follow one another, did we not possess the idea of time a priori. It is, therefore, only under the presupposition of time, that we can be conscious of certain things as existing at the same time (simultaneously), or at different times (successively).

(2) Time is a necessary idea, which is presupposed in all perceptions. We cannot be conscious of phenomena if time is taken away, although we can quite readily
suppose phenomena to be absent from time. Time is, therefore, given a priori. No phenomenon can exist at all that is not in time. While, therefore, phenomena may be supposed to vanish completely out of time, time itself, as the universal condition of their possibility, cannot be supposed away.

(3) Time is not a discursive, or general conception, but a pure form of sensible perception. Different times are but parts of the very same time. Now, the consciousness of that which is presented as one single object, is perception. Moreover, the proposition, that no two moments of time can co-exist, cannot be derived from a general conception. The proposition is synthetic, and cannot originate in mere conceptions. It therefore rests upon the direct perception and idea of time.

(4) The infinity of time simply means, that every definite quantity of time is possible only as a limitation of one single time. There must, therefore, be originally a consciousness of time as unlimited. Now, if an object presents itself as a whole, so that its parts and every quantity of it can be represented only by limiting that whole, such an object cannot be given in conception, for conceptions contain only partial determinations of a thing. A direct perception must therefore be the foundation of the idea of time.

5. Transcendental Exposition of Time.

Apodictic principles which determine relations in time, or axioms of time in general, are possible only because time is the necessary a priori condition of all phenomena. Time has but one dimension; different times do not co-exist but follow one another, just as different spaces do
not follow one another but co-exist. Such propositions cannot be derived from experience, which never yields strict universality or demonstrative certainty. If they were based upon experience, we could say only, that it has ordinarily been observed to be so, not that it must be so. Principles like these have the force of rules, that lay down the conditions without which no experience whatever is possible: they are not learned from experience, but anticipate what experience must be.

Let me add here that change, including motion or change of place, is conceivable only in and through the idea of time. Were time not an inner a priori perception, we could not form the least idea how there should be any such thing as change. Take away time, and change combines in itself absolutely contradictory predicates. Motion, or change of place, for instance, must then be thought of as at once the existence and the non-existence of one and the same thing in the same place. The contradiction disappears, only when it is seen that the thing has those opposite determinations one after the other. Our conception of time as an a priori form of perception, therefore explains the possibility of the whole body of a priori synthetic propositions in regard to motion that are contained in the pure part of physics, and hence it is not a little fruitful in results.

6. Inferences.

(a) Time is not an independent substance nor an objective determination of things, and hence it does not survive when abstraction has been made from all the subjective conditions of perception. Were it an independent thing, it would be real without being a real object of
consciousness. Were it a determination or order of things as they are in themselves, it could not precede our perception of those things as its necessary condition, nor could it be known by means of synthetic judgments. But the possibility of such judgments becomes at once intelligible if time is nothing but the subjective condition, without which we can have no perception whatever. For in that case we may be conscious of this form of inner perception before we are conscious of objects, and therefore a priori.

(b) Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the perception of ourselves and our own inner state. As it has no influence on the shape or position of an object, time cannot be a determination of outer phenomena as such; what it does determine is the relation of ideas in our own inner state. And just because this inner perception has no shape of its own, we seek to make up for this want by analogies drawn from space. Thus, we figure the series of time as a line that proceeds to infinity, the parts of which form a series; and we reason from the properties of this line to all the properties of time, taking care to allow for the one point of difference, that the parts of the spatial line all exist at once, while the parts of the temporal line all follow one after the other. Even from this fact alone, that all the relations of time may thus be presented in an external perception, it would be evident that time is itself a perception.

(c) Time is the formal a priori condition of all phenomena without exception. Space, as the pure form of all external phenomena, is the a priori condition only of external phenomena. But all objects of perception,
external as well as internal, are determinations of the mind, and, from that point of view, belong to our inner state. And as this inner state comes under time, which is the formal condition of inner perception, time is an *a priori* condition of all phenomena: it is the immediate condition of inner phenomena, and so the mediate condition of outer phenomena. Just as I can say, *a priori*, that all external phenomena are in space, and are determined *a priori* in conformity with the relations of space, so, from the principle of the inner sense, I can say quite generally that all phenomena are in time, and stand necessarily in relations of time.

If we abstract from the manner in which we immediately perceive our own inner state, and mediately all external phenomena, and think of objects in themselves, we find that in relation to them time is nothing at all. It is objectively true in relation to phenomena, because we are conscious of phenomena as *objects of our senses*; but it is no longer objective, if we abstract from our sensibility, and therefore from the form proper to our perceptive consciousness, and speak of *things as such*. Time is therefore a purely subjective condition of human perception, and in itself, or apart from the subject, it is nothing at all. Nevertheless, it is necessarily objective in relation to all phenomena, and therefore also to everything that can possibly enter into our experience. We cannot say that all things are in time, because when we speak of things in this unqualified way, we are thinking of things in abstraction from the manner in which we perceive them, and therefore in abstraction from the condition under which alone we can say that they are in time. But, if we qualify our assertion by adding that
condition, and say that all things as phenomena, or objects of sensible perception, are in time, the proposition is, in the strictest sense of the word, objective, and is universally true a priori.

We see, then, that time is empirically real, or is objectively true in relation to all objects that are capable of being presented to our senses. And as our perception always is sensuous, no object can ever be presented to us in experience, which does not conform to time as its condition. On the other hand, we deny to time all claim to absolute reality, because such a claim, in paying no heed to the form of sensible perception, assumes time to be an absolute condition or property of things. Such properties, as supposed to belong to things in themselves, can never be presented to us in sense. From this we infer the transcendental ideality of time; by which we mean that, in abstraction from the subjective conditions of sensible perception, time is simply nothing, and cannot be said either to subsist by itself, or to inhere in things that do so subsist.


To this doctrine, which admits the empirical reality of time, but denies its absolute or transcendental reality, there is one objection so commonly made, that I must suppose it to occur spontaneously to everybody who is new to the present line of thought. It runs thus: No one can doubt that there are real changes, for, even if it is denied that we perceive the external world, together with the changes in it, we are at least conscious of a change in our own ideas. Now, changes can take place only in time. Therefore time is real.
There is no difficulty in meeting this objection. I admit all that is said. Certainly time is real: it is the real form of inner perception. It has reality for me relatively to my inner experience; in other words, I actually am conscious of time, and of my own determinations as in it. Time is therefore real, not as an object beyond consciousness, but as the manner in which I exist for myself as an object of consciousness. But, if I could be perceived by myself or by any other being without the condition of sensibility, the very same determinations, which now appear as changes, would not be known as in time, and therefore would not be known as changes. The empirical reality of time thus remains, on our theory, the condition of all our experience. It is only its absolute reality that we refuse to admit. Time is therefore nothing but the form of our inner perception. If we take away from it the peculiar condition of our sensibility, the idea of time also vanishes; for time does not belong to objects as they are in themselves, but only to the subject that perceives them.

Time and space are two sources of knowledge from which a variety of *a priori* synthetic judgments may be derived. Mathematics, especially, supplies a splendid instance of such judgments, in the science of space and the relations of space. Time and space are the two pure forms of all sensible perception, and as such they make *a priori* synthetic propositions possible. And just because they are mere conditions of sensibility, they mark out their own limits as sources of *a priori* knowledge. Applying only to objects regarded as phenomena, they do not present things as they are in themselves. Beyond the phenomenal world, which is their legitimate domain,
they cannot be employed in determination of objects. But this limitation in no way lessens the stability of our empirical knowledge; for, such knowledge, as depending upon necessary forms of the perception of things, is just as certain as if it rested upon necessary forms of things in themselves.

58 Transcendental æsthetic cannot contain more than these two elements. This is plain, if we reflect that all other conceptions belonging to sensibility presuppose something empirical. Even the idea of motion, in which both elements are united, presupposes the observation of something that moves. Now, there is nothing movable in space considered purely by itself; hence that which is movable can be found in space only by experience, and is therefore an empirical datum. Similarly the idea of change cannot be put among the a priori data of transcendental æsthetic. Time itself does not change, but only something that is in time; hence the idea of change must be derived from the observation of some actual object with its successive determinations—that is, from experience.


62 (1) A distinction is commonly drawn between what belongs essentially to an object, and is perceived by every one to belong to it, and what is accidental, being perceived only from a certain position, or when a special organ is affected in a particular way. In the one case, we are said to know the object as it is in itself; in the other case, to know it only as it appears to us. This, however, is merely an empirical distinction. For, it must be re-
membered, that the empirical object which is here called the thing, is itself but an appearance. If this were all, our transcendental distinction would be altogether lost sight of, and we might imagine ourselves to know things in themselves when we knew only phenomena. For the truth is, that, however far we may carry our investigations into the world of sense, we never can come into contact with aught but appearances. For instance, we call the rainbow in a sun-shower a mere appearance, and the rain the thing itself. Nor is there any objection to this, if we mean to state merely the physical truth, that from whatever position it is viewed the rain will appear to our senses as a real object of experience. But, if we go beyond the fact, that the sensible object is here the same for every one, and ask whether the object is known as it is in itself, we pass to the transcendental point of view, and the question now is in regard to the relation of our consciousness of the object to the object as it exists apart from our consciousness. In this point of view, not merely the rain-drops, but their round shape, and even the space in which they fall, must be regarded as mere appearances, not as things in themselves. Every aspect of the phenomenon, in short, is but a modification or a permanent form of our sensible perception, while the transcendental object remains to us unknown.

(2) It is recognized in natural theology, not only that God cannot be an object of perception to us, but that He can never be an object of sensuous perception to Himself. At the same time, His knowledge must be perception, and not thought, for thought always involves limitations. Now, the natural theologian is very careful to say, that God, in His perception, is free from the
limits of space and time. But, how can this possibly be maintained, if it has previously been assumed, that space and time are forms of things in themselves? It must then be held that, even if those things were annihilated, space and time would continue to be *a priori* conditions of their existence. And if they are conditions of all existence, they must be conditions of the existence even of God. We can avoid this conclusion only by saying that space and time are not objective forms of all things, but subjective forms of our outer as well as of our inner perceptions. In fact our perception is sensuous, just because it is *not original*. Were it original, the very existence of the object would be given in the perception, and such a perception, so far as we can see, can belong only to the Original Being. Our perception is dependent upon the existence of the object, and therefore it is possible only if our perceptive consciousness is affected by the presence of the object.

Nor is it necessary to say, that man is the only being who perceives objects under the forms of space and time; it may be that all finite thinking beings agree with man in that respect, although of this we cannot be certain. But, however universal this mode of perception may be, it cannot be other than sensuous, simply because it is derivative (*intuitus derivatius*) and not original (*intuitus originarius*), and therefore is not an intellectual perception. An intellectual perception, as we have already seen reason to believe, is the prerogative of the Original Being, and never can belong to a being which is dependent in its existence as well as in its perception, and in fact is conscious of its own existence only in relation to given objects.
Conclusion of the Transcendental Ästhetic.

We have, then, in the Transcendental Ästhetic, one of the elements required in the solution of the general problem of transcendental philosophy: *How are a priori synthetic propositions possible?* Such propositions rest upon space and time, which are pure *a priori* perceptions. To enable us to go beyond a given conception, in an *a priori* judgment, we have found that something is needed, which is not contained in the conception, but in the perception corresponding to it, something therefore that may be connected with that conception synthetically. But such judgments, as based upon perception, can never extend beyond objects of sense, and therefore hold true only for objects of possible experience.
There are two ultimate sources from which knowledge comes to us: either we receive ideas in the form of impressions, or, by our spontaneous faculty of conception, we know an object by means of those ideas. In the former case, the object is given to us; in the latter case, it is thought in relation to the impressions that arise in our consciousness. Perception and conception, therefore, are the two elements that enter into all our knowledge. To every conception some form of perception corresponds, and no perception yields knowledge without conception. Both may be either pure or empirical; empirical, if sensation, which occurs only in the actual presence of an object, is implied; pure, if there is no intermixture of sensation. We may call sensation the matter of sensuous knowledge. Hence pure perception contains only the form under which a definite object is perceived, and pure conception the form in which an object in general is thought. Pure perceptions or pure conceptions alone are possible *a priori*, while empirical perceptions or empirical conceptions are possible only *a posteriori*.

If sensibility is the receptivity of the mind in the actual apprehension of some impression, understanding is the spontaneity of knowledge, or the faculty that of itself pro-
duces ideas. We are so constituted that our perception always is sensuous; or it shows merely the manner in which we are affected by objects. But, we have also understanding, or the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous perception. Neither of these is to be regarded as superior to the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, perceptions without conceptions are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our conceptions sensuous, that is, to add the object to them in perception, as it is to make our perceptions intelligible, that is, to bring them under conceptions. Neither of these faculties or capacities can do the work of the other. Understanding can perceive nothing, the senses can think nothing. Knowledge arises only from their united action. But this is no reason for confusing the function of either with that of the other; it is rather a strong reason for carefully separating and distinguishing the one from the other. Hence it is, that we distinguish Æsthetic, as the science of the universal rules of sensibility, from Logic, which is the science of the universal rules of understanding.

General logic, as distinguished from the special logic or organon of a particular science, is either pure or applied; but only the former is in the strict sense a science. There are two rules that must ever be kept in mind in pure general logic. (1) As general logic, it abstracts from all content of thought, and from all distinction of objects, and deals only with the pure form of thought. (2) As pure logic, it has no empirical principles. Psychology has no influence on the canon of the
understanding, and therefore it does not, as has sometimes been supposed, contribute anything to pure logic. Logic is a demonstrative science, and whatever it contains must be certain entirely \textit{a priori}.

2. \textit{Transcendental Logic.}

Pure general logic, then, abstracts from all the content of knowledge, or what is the same thing, from all relation of knowledge to its objects, and considers merely the logical form implied in the relation of one element of knowledge to another, or the universal form of thought. Now, we have learned from the Transcendental \AE sthetic that there are pure as well as empirical perceptions, and it may well be, that a similar distinction obtains between the pure and the empirical thought of objects. In that case, there will be a logic that does not abstract from all the content of knowledge. Containing merely the rules of the pure thought of an object, it will exclude all knowledge, the content of which is empirical. It will also refer our knowledge of objects to its origin, in so far as that origin cannot be ascribed to objects themselves.

Let us suppose, then, that there are conceptions which relate to objects \textit{a priori}, but which, as mere functions of pure thought, stand to objects in quite a different relation from that in which perceptions stand to them, whether these are pure or sensuous. As these conceptions will be of neither empirical nor \AE sthetic origin, we get the idea of a science of pure understanding and pure reason, the aim of which is to examine into the knowledge which we obtain by thinking objects completely \textit{a}
priori. Such a science, as setting forth the origin, the limits, and the objective validity of pure conceptions, we must call Transcendental Logic.

3. Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic.

General logic analyzes the whole formal procedure of understanding and reason into its elements, and presents these as principles by which the logical validity of knowledge may be estimated. This part of logic, which is well called Analytic, supplies a negative touchstone of truth . . . but it does not enable us to determine positively anything in regard to objects. At the same time, there is something so seductive in an art that enables us to reduce all our knowledge to the form of understanding, however empty and poor in content it may be, that general logic, although it is merely a canon of judgment, is apt to be used as an organon by means of which new truth, or rather the specious appearance of new truth, may be obtained. When it is thus misused as a supposed organon, logic is called Dialectic.

4. Division of Transcendental Logic into Analytic and Dialectic.

Just as in Transcendental Æsthetic we isolated the sensibility, so in Transcendental Logic we shall isolate the understanding, and throw into relief that element in our knowledge which has its origin in the understanding alone. This pure element can be employed in actual knowledge, only on condition that objects are presented
in perception to which it may be applied. For, without perception, the pure element of knowledge has no object, and therefore remains perfectly empty. That part of Transcendental Logic which sets forth the pure element in knowledge that belongs to understanding, and the principles without which no object whatever can be thought, is Transcendental Analytic. It is a logic of truth, because no knowledge can contradict it without losing all content, that is, all relation to an object, and therefore all truth. But there is a very seductive and deceptive tendency to employ that pure knowledge of understanding and those principles by themselves, and to apply them even beyond the limits of experience. Only in experience, however, can any matter or object be found to which the pure conceptions of understanding may be applied. There is thus a danger that understanding, with a mere show of rationality, may make a material use of its purely formal principles, and pass judgments upon all objects without distinction, whether they are given to us or not, and perhaps even although they cannot be given to us at all. That which is merely a canon for the criticism of understanding in its empirical use, is misused, when it is supposed to be an organon that may be employed universally and without restriction, and when it permits understanding to venture upon synthetic judgments about objects in general, and to pronounce and decide upon them. Pure understanding is then employed dialectically. The second part of Transcendental Logic must therefore consist of a criticism of dialectical illusion. It is called Dialectic, not because it is an art of producing illusion dogmatically—a favourite art of too many metaphysical jugglers—but because it is
a criticism of understanding and reason in their hyper-physical use; a criticism, the aim of which is to expose their specious and groundless pretensions to the discovery and extension of knowledge through purely transcendental principles, and to preserve understanding from all sophistical illusion.
TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC.

BOOK I.—ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTIONS.

CHAPTER I.—GUIDING-THREAD FOR THE DISCOVERY OF THE CATEGORIES.

The first part of Transcendental Analytic deals with the conceptions, the second part with the judgments of pure understanding.

It is the privilege as well as the duty of transcendental philosophy, to proceed in the search for its conceptions upon a definite principle; for these conceptions spring from the understanding pure and unmixed, and must therefore be connected together in the unity of a single conception or idea. This one fundamental conception is a systematic principle, by the application of which we may be certain a priori that we have found out all the pure conceptions of understanding, and have assigned to each its proper place in the whole system.

Section I.—The Logical Use of Understanding.

Understanding has already been defined, negatively, as a non-sensuous faculty of knowledge. Now, as without sensibility we can have no perception, understanding cannot be a faculty of perception. But, apart from perception, the only other mode of obtaining knowledge is by means of conceptions. Therefore the knowledge that is due to understanding, or at least to
human understanding, is a knowledge by means of conceptions; it is not perceptive, but discursive. All perceptions, as sensuous, rest upon affections, whereas conceptions rest upon functions. By function I mean the unity of act, in which various ideas are brought under a common idea. Conceptions are based on the spontaneity of thought, sensuous perceptions on the receptivity of impressions. Now the only use that understanding can make of these conceptions is to judge by means of them. And, as without perception there is no direct consciousness of an object, a conception is never related directly to an object, but always indirectly, through a perception or through another conception. Judgment is therefore the indirect knowledge of an object, or the knowledge of knowledge. In every judgment there is a conception which holds true of various ideas, and, among others, of one which is directly referred to an object. Thus, in the judgment that all bodies are divisible, the conception of divisibility applies to various other conceptions, but it is in an especial way related to the conception of body, as this again is related to certain objects that we directly perceive. Of these objects we are therefore conscious only indirectly in the conception of divisibility. Accordingly, all judgments are functions of unity, because they do not consist in the direct knowledge of an object, but bring that and other knowledge under the unity of a higher and more comprehensive conception. And as we can reduce all acts of understanding to judgments, understanding itself may be said to be a faculty of judgment. For, as we have seen above, understanding is the faculty of thought. To think is to know by means of conceptions. But conceptions, as predi-
cates of possible judgments, are relative to the idea of an object not yet determined. By the conception of body is meant something—metal, for instance—which may be known by means of that conception. Body is a conception, just because it contains under it other determinations by means of which it may be referred to actual objects. It is thus the predicate of a possible judgment, such as, that every metal is a body. We may, therefore, find out all the possible functions of judgment if we can but tell what are all the possible functions of unity in judgment. And this, as we shall see in the next section, can quite readily be done.


If we abstract from all the content of a judgment, and only pay heed to the mere form of understanding, we find that the functions of thought in judgment may be brought under four heads, each of which contains three subdivisions. Thus we get the following table:

1. Quantity of Judgments.
   Universal.
   Particular.
   Singular.

2. Quality.
   Affirmative.
   Negative.
   Infinite.

3. Relation.
   Categorical.
   Hypothetical.
   Disjunctive.

   Problematic.
   Assertoric.
   Apodictic.
Section III.—10. The Pure Conceptions of Understanding or Categories.

General Logic, as has been said, abstracts from all the content of knowledge, and looks to some other source, whatever that may be, for the content that it is to transform by analysis into conceptions. Transcendental Logic, on the other hand, has lying before it a complex of a priori sensibility, which it receives from Transcendental Æsthetic; without this complex, as a material upon which to operate, the conceptions of pure understanding would be without content or perfectly empty. Now, space and time have not only themselves, as pure a priori perceptions, a complexity of content; but, as they are the conditions without which the mind could not be receptive of impressions, and therefore could not be conscious of objects, they must always affect our conception of objects. Conception, however, is due to the spontaneous activity of thought, and hence the complex content of pure perception must first be surveyed, taken up into thought and combined, before there can be any knowledge. This act I call synthesis.

By synthesis, in its most general sense, is meant the act of putting various ideas together, and grasping their multiplicity in one consciousness. Such synthesis is pure, if the multiplicity is given, not empirically but a priori, as in the case of space and time. Now, before we can analyze any idea, we must first have the idea, and hence the content of a conception cannot originally come into consciousness by analysis. It is by synthesis of various elements, whether those elements are given empirically or a priori, that we first get knowledge. No doubt the
synthesis may at first be crude and confused, and it may stand in need of analysis, but yet it is by synthesis that the various elements are gathered together and united in the knowledge of a certain concrete object. It is to synthesis, therefore, that we must first direct our attention, if we would learn the true origin of our knowledge.

Synthesis in general, as we shall afterwards see, is due solely to the operation of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatever, but of which we are seldom even conscious. To bring this synthesis to conceptions is the function of understanding, and it is only by this operation of understanding that we obtain what can properly be called knowledge.

104 *Pure synthesis*, viewed in its most general aspect, is the pure conception of understanding. By this pure synthesis I understand that which rests upon a basis of *a priori* synthetic unity. Thus in arithmetical addition, as is readily seen in the case of larger numbers, the synthesis conforms to a conception, because it proceeds on a common basis of unity, as, for instance, the decade. By this conception the unity in the synthesis of a complex is made necessary.

By analysis various ideas are brought under a single conception, as is shown in general logic. But it belongs to transcendental logic to tell us how the *pure synthesis of ideas* is brought to conceptions. The first element that enters into the knowledge of all objects *a priori* is the complex content of pure perception. The second element is the synthesis of this content by imagination. But as even this is not enough to constitute knowledge,
a third element is supplied by understanding, in the conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the consciousness of this necessary, synthetic unity.

The same function which gives unity to various ideas in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various ideas in a perception; and this synthesis, in its most general expression, is the pure conception of understanding. Understanding at once gives analytic unity to conceptions, and synthetic unity to the complex content of perception; and indeed the logical form of judgment presupposes and rests upon the very same acts of thought as those by which a transcendental content is given to the various determinations of our consciousness. Hence it is that the pure conceptions of understanding, as they are fitly called, apply to objects a priori, and therefore do not fall within the view of general logic.

In this way there arises exactly the same number of pure conceptions of understanding, applying a priori to all objects of perception, as there are logical functions of judgments in the preceding table; for those functions completely specify understanding, and give a perfect measure of its powers. We shall call the pure conceptions categories, after Aristotle, because our object is the same as his, although our method and results are widely different.

Table of Categories.

1. Quantity.
   Unity.
   Plurality.
   Totality.
2. Quality.  
Reality.  
Negation.  
Limitation.  

3. Relation.  
Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens).  
Causality and Dependence (cause and effect).  
Community (reciprocity between the active and the passive).  

Possibility - Impossibility.  
Existence - Non-existence.  
Necessity - Contingency.  

This, then, is a list of all the primary pure conceptions of synthesis that understanding contains within itself a priori. Because it contains these pure conceptions, it is called pure understanding, and only by them can it understand anything in the complex content of perception, that is, think an object. The table has not been left to the uncertain suggestions of empirical induction, but has been drawn up systematically, on the basis of a single principle, namely, the faculty of judgment, or, what is the same thing, the faculty of thought.

The table of categories suggests some nice points, which, perhaps, might be found to have an important bearing on the scientific form of all knowledge of reason. The four classes of categories naturally fall into two groups; those in the first group being concerned with objects of perception, pure as well as empirical, while those in the second group are concerned with the existence of those objects, as related either to one another
or to understanding. The first may be called the mathematical, the second the dynamical categories. The former, as is obvious, have no correlates, the latter have correlates. This distinction must have some ground in the nature of understanding. (2) It is also suggestive that the number of categories in each class is three, because usually all a priori division must be by dichotomy. To this it must be added that the third category in each class arises from the union of the second category with the first. Thus totality or allness is just plurality regarded as unity, limitation is reality combined with negation, community is causality in which two substances mutually determine one another, and lastly, necessity is just existence given by mere possibility.

116 Chapter II.—Deduction of the Categories. 84


There is a distinction in law between the question of right (quid juris) and the question of fact (quid facti). Both must be proved, but proof of a right or claim is called its deduction. Now, among the variety of conceptions that make up the very mixed web of human knowledge, there are certain conceptions that put in a claim for use entirely a priori, and this claim of course stands in need of deduction. It is useless to refer to the fact of experience in justification of such a claim, but at the same time we must know how conceptions can possibly refer to objects of experience, although those objects have not been derived from experience. An explanation of the manner in which conceptions can relate a priori to objects, I call a transcendental
deduction; and from it I distinguish an empirical deduction, which simply tells us how a conception has been acquired by experience and reflection on experience. The former proves our right to the use of a certain conception, the latter merely points out that as a matter of fact it has come into our possession in a certain way.

We had no difficulty in explaining how space and time, although they are themselves known a priori, are yet necessarily related to objects, and make possible a synthetic knowledge of objects which is independent of all experience. For, as it is only by means of these pure forms of sense that we can be conscious of an object in empirical perception, space and time are pure perceptions, which contain a priori the condition of the possibility of objects as phenomena, and therefore synthesis in them has objective validity.

The categories of understanding, on the other hand, are not conditions under which objects are given in perception; hence objects might certainly be presented to us, even if they were not necessarily related to functions of understanding, as their a priori condition. Here, therefore, a difficulty arises that we did not meet with in the field of sensibility. The difficulty is, how subjective conditions of thought should have objective validity, or, in other words, how they should be conditions without which no knowledge of objects would be possible. Take, for instance, the conception of cause. Here we have a peculiar sort of synthesis, in which something B is conceived as following upon something else quite different A, in conformity with a rule. It is hard to see why phenomena should be subject to such an a priori conception. Why should not the conception be perfectly
empty, and without any phenomenal object corresponding to it?

123 We cannot avoid the toil of such investigations by saying that experience is perpetually giving us examples of such conformity to law on the part of phenomena, and that we are thus enabled to form an abstract conception of cause, and to be certain of its objective validity. The conception of cause cannot possibly originate in that way; and hence we must either show that it rests completely a priori upon understanding, or we must discard it altogether as a mere fiction of the brain. For the conception demands that something A should be of such a nature that something else B follows from it necessarily, and in conformity with an absolutely universal rule. No pure conception of understanding can be the product of empirical induction without a complete reversal of its nature and use.

126 The transcendental deduction of all a priori conceptions must therefore be guided by the principle, that these conceptions must be the a priori conditions of all possible experience. Conceptions which make experience possible are for that very reason necessary. An analysis of the experience in which they occur would not furnish a deduction of them, but merely an illustration of their use. Were they not the primary conditions of all the experience in which objects are known as phenomena, their relation to even a single object would be utterly incomprehensible.
Section II.—A Priori Conditions of Experience.*

It would be quite a sufficient deduction of the 96 categories, and justification of their objective application, to show that, apart from them, no object whatever is capable of being thought. But there are two reasons why a fuller deduction is advisable: firstly, because, in thinking an object, other faculties besides understanding, or the faculty of thought proper, come into play; and, secondly, because it has to be explained how understanding can possibly be a condition of the knowledge of real objects. We must, therefore, begin with a consideration of the primary activities of the subject that are essential in the constitution of experience; and these we must view, not in their empirical, but in their transcendental character.

If consciousness were broken up into a number of mutually repellent states, each isolated and separated from the rest, knowledge would never arise in us at all, for knowledge is a whole of related and connected elements. When, therefore, I call sensible perception a synopsis, in order to mark the complexity of its content, it must be remembered that in this synopsis a certain synthesis is implied, and that knowledge is possible only if spontaneity is combined with receptivity. This is the reason why we must say that in all knowledge there is a three-fold synthesis: firstly, the apprehension in perception of various ideas, or modifications of the mind; secondly, their reproduction in imagination; and, thirdly, their recognition in conception. These three forms of synthesis

* All that comes under this heading is taken from the first edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason," and forms what is called in the preface (p. x.) the "subjective deduction."
point to three sources of knowledge, which make understanding itself possible, and through it all experience as an empirical product of understanding.


Whatever may be the origin of our ideas, whether they are due to the influence of external things or are produced by internal causes, whether as objects they have their source a priori or in experience, as modifications of the mind they must all belong to the inner sense. All knowledge is, therefore, at bottom subject to time as the formal condition of inner sense, and in time every part of it without exception must be ordered, connected, and brought into relation with every other part. This is a general remark, which must be kept in mind in the whole of our subsequent inquiry.

We should not be conscious of the various determinations that every perception contains within itself were we not, in the succession of our impressions, conscious of time. If each feeling were limited to a single moment, it would be an absolutely individual unit. In order that the various determinations of a perception, as, for instance, the parts of a line, should form a unity, it is necessary that they should be run over and held together by the mind. This act I call the synthesis of apprehension. It is apprehension, because it goes straight to perception; it is synthesis, because only by synthesis can the various elements of perception be united in one object of consciousness.

Now, this synthesis of apprehension must be employed a priori also, or in relation to determinations not given in sensible experience. Otherwise we should have no
consciousness of space and time *a priori*, for these can be produced only by a synthesis of the various determinations that are presented by sensibility in its original receptivity. There is therefore a pure synthesis of apprehension.


There is an empirical law of the association of ideas. When any two ideas have often followed, or accompanied each other, an association between them is at last formed, and they are so connected that, even when an object is not present, the mind passes from the one to the other in conformity with a fixed rule. But this law of reproduction presupposes that phenomena are themselves actually subject to such a rule, and that the various elements in these phenomena of which we are conscious should accompany or follow one another in accordance with certain rules. On any other supposition our empirical imagination would have nothing to reproduce in any way conforming to its own nature, and would therefore lie hidden in the depths of the mind as a dead, and to us unknown faculty. Were cinnabar, for instance, sometimes red and sometimes black, sometimes light and sometimes heavy; or were the same name given at one time to this object, and at another time to that, without the least regard to any rule implied in the nature of the phenomena themselves, there could be no empirical synthesis of reproduction.

There must, therefore, be something which makes the reproduction of phenomena possible at all, something which is the *a priori* ground of a necessary synthetic unity. That this is so, we may at once see, if we reflect
that phenomena are not things in themselves, but are merely the play of our own ideas, and therefore at bottom determinations of the inner sense. Now, if we can show that even our purest a priori perceptions can yield knowledge, only in so far as they involve such a combination as makes a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction possible, we may conclude that this synthesis of imagination, being prior to all experience, rests upon a priori principles. We must then assume a pure transcendental synthesis as the necessary condition of all experience, for experience is impossible unless phenomena are capable of being reproduced. Now, if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one day to another, or even think of a certain number, it is plain that I must be conscious of the various determinations one after the other. But if the earlier determinations—the prior parts of the line, the antecedent moments of time, the units as they arise one after the other—were to drop out of my consciousness, and could not be reproduced when I passed on to the later determinations, I should never be conscious of a whole; and hence not even the simplest and most elementary idea of space or time could arise in my consciousness.

The synthesis of reproduction is therefore inseparably bound up with the synthesis of apprehension. And as the synthesis of apprehension is the transcendental ground of the possibility of all knowledge—of pure a priori as well as empirical knowledge—the reproductive synthesis of imagination belongs to the transcendental functions of the mind, and may therefore be called the transcendental faculty of imagination.

Were I not conscious that what I think now is identical with what I thought a moment ago, all reproduction in the series of ideas would be useless. The idea reproduced at a given moment would be for me a perfectly new idea. There would be no identical consciousness bound up with the act of producing one idea after another; and as without such consciousness there could be for me no unity, I should never be conscious of the various members of the series as forming one whole. If, in counting, I should forget that the units lying before my mind had been added by me one after the other, I should not be aware that a sum was being produced or generated in the successive addition of unit to unit; and as the conception of the sum is simply the consciousness of this unity of synthesis, I should have no knowledge of the number.

At this point it is necessary to have a clear idea of what we mean by an object of consciousness. We have seen that a phenomenon is just a sensation of which we are conscious, and that no sensation can be said to exist by itself as an object outside of consciousness. What, then, do we mean when we speak of an object as corresponding to our knowledge, and therefore as distinct from it? It is easy to see that this object can be thought of only as something $= x$, for there is nothing beyond knowledge that we can set up as contrasted with knowledge, and yet as corresponding to it.

It is plain that in knowledge we have to do with nothing but the various determinations of our own consciousness; hence the object $= x$, which corresponds
to these determinations, if it is supposed to be distinct from every object of consciousness, is for us nothing at all. The unity which the object demands can be only the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of its various determinations. In saying that we know the object, we mean that we have introduced synthetic unity into the various determinations of perception. But this is impossible, if the perception could not be produced by a function of synthesis, which, in conforming to a rule, makes the reproduction of those determinations a priori necessary, and renders possible a conception that unites them.

There can be no knowledge without a conception, however indefinite or obscure it may be, and a conception is in form always a universal that serves as a rule. The conception of body, for instance, as a unity of the various determinations thought in it, serves as a rule in our knowledge of external phenomena. Now, it is always a transcendental condition that lies at the foundation of that which is necessary. There must, therefore, be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the various determinations implied in every perception; and this ground must be necessary to the conception of any object whatever, and therefore to the conception of every object of experience. In no other way can there be any object for our perceptions; for the object is nothing but that something = x, the conception of which involves necessity of synthesis.

This original and transcendental condition is just transcendental apperception. The consciousness, in internal perception, of oneself as determined to certain states, is merely empirical, and is always changing. In the flux of
inner phenomena there can be no unchanging or permanent self. This form of self-consciousness is usually called *inner sense* or *empirical apperception*. Now, from empirical data it is impossible to derive the conception of that which must necessarily be numerically identical. What we require, in explanation of such a transcendental presupposition, is a condition that precedes all experience, and makes it possible.

No knowledge whatever, no unity and connection of objects, is possible for us, apart from that unity of consciousness which is prior to all data of perception, and without relation to which no consciousness of objects is possible. This pure, original, unchangeable consciousness I call *transcendental apperception*. That this is the proper name for it is evident, were it only that even the purest objective unity, that of the *a priori* conceptions of space and time, is possible only in so far as perceptions are related to it. The numerical unity of this apperception is, therefore, just as much the *a priori* foundation of all conceptions as the various determinations of space and time are the *a priori* foundation of the perceptions of sense.

It is this transcendental unity of apperception which connects all the possible phenomena that can be gathered together in one experience, and subjects them to laws. There could be no such unity of consciousness were the mind not able to be conscious of the identity of function, by which it unites various phenomena in one knowledge. The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time the consciousness of a necessary unity in the synthesis of all phenomena according to conceptions. These conceptions are
necessary rules, which not only make phenomena capable of reproduction, but determine perception as perception of an object, that is, bring it under a conception of something in which various determinations are necessarily connected together. It would be impossible for the mind to think itself as identical in its various determinations, and indeed to think that identity a priori, if it did not hold the identity of its own act before its eyes, and if it did not, by subjecting to a transcendental unity all the synthesis of empirical apprehension, make the connection of the various determinations implied in that synthesis possible in accordance with a priori rules.

129 15. Possibility of any Combination whatever.*

Though a perception is merely sensuous or receptive, the various determinations of consciousness may be given, while the form, as simply the way in which the subject is affected, may lie a priori in the mind. But the combination (conjunctio) of those determinations can never come to us through the medium of sense, and therefore cannot be contained even in the pure form of sensible perception. Combination is a spontaneous act of consciousness, and, as such, it is the especial characteristic of understanding, as distinguished from sense. All combination, therefore, whether we are aware of it or not, whether it is a combination of the various determinations of perception or of several conceptions, and whether the determinations of perception are empirical or pure, is an act of understanding. This act we call by the general name of synthesis, to draw attention to the fact that we can be conscious of

*What follows (15-27) constitutes the "objective deduction" of the categories, as it appears in the second edition of the "Critique."
nothing as combined in the object, which we have not ourselves previously combined. And as it proceeds entirely from the self-activity of the subject, combination is the element, and the only element, that cannot be given by the object. It is easy to see that this act must in its origin always be of one and the same nature, no matter what may be the form of combination; and that the resolution or analysis, which seems to be its opposite, in point of fact always presupposes it. If understanding has previously combined nothing, there is nothing for it to resolve; for without the combining activity of understanding there can be no consciousness of an object at all.

By combination, however, must be understood not merely the synthesis of the various determinations of sense, but their essential unity. Combination is consciousness of the *synthetic unity* of various determinations. The consciousness of this unity cannot be the result of the combination, for were we not, in being conscious of various determinations, also conscious of their unity, we should have no conception of combination at all. Nor must this unity, which precedes any conception of combination, be confused with the category of unity (10); for all categories rest upon logical functions of judgment, and, in these, combination, or the unity of given conceptions, is already implied. For an explanation of the unity in question, which is qualitative (12), we must go further back, and seek it in that which, as the ground of the unity of various conceptions in judgment, is implied in the possibility even of the logical use of understanding.
16. The original Synthetic unity of Apperception.

The "I think" must be capable of accompanying all my ideas; for, otherwise, I should be conscious of something that could not be thought; which is the same as saying, that I should not be conscious at all, or at least should be conscious only of that which for me was nothing. Now, that form of consciousness which is prior to all thought, is perception. Hence, all the manifold determinations of perception have a necessary relation to the "I think" in the subject that is conscious of them. The "I think," however, is an act of spontaneity, which cannot possibly be due to sense. I call it pure apperception, to distinguish it from empirical apperception. I call it also the original apperception, because it is the self-consciousness which produces the "I think." Now, the "I think" must be capable of accompanying all other ideas, and it is one and the same in all consciousness; but there is no other idea beyond the "I think," to which self-consciousness is bound in a similar way. The unity of apperception I call also the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, to indicate that upon it depends the possibility of a priori knowledge. For, the various determinations given in a certain perception would not all be in my consciousness, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness. True, I may not be aware of this, but yet as they are determinations of my consciousness, they must necessarily conform to the condition, without which they are not capable of standing to¬gether in one universal self-consciousness. In no other way would they all without exception be mine. From this original combination important consequences follow.
The absolute identity of apperception in relation to all the determinations given in perception, involves a synthesis of those determinations, and is possible only through consciousness of the synthesis. For, the empirical consciousness, which accompanies each determination as it arises, is in itself broken up into units, and is unrelated to the one identical subject. Relation to a single subject does not take place when I accompany each determination with consciousness, but only when I add one determination to the other, and am conscious of this act of synthesis. It is only because I am capable of combining in one consciousness the various determinations presented to me, that I can become aware that in every one of them the consciousness is the same. The analytic unity of apperception is, therefore, possible only under presupposition of a certain synthetic unity. The thought, that the determinations given in a perception all belong to me, is the same as the thought, that I unite them, or at least that I am capable of uniting them in one self-consciousness. This does not of itself involve a consciousness of the synthesis of determinations, but it presupposes the possibility of that consciousness. It is only because I am capable of grasping the various determinations in one consciousness, that I can call them all mine; were it not so, I should have a self as many-coloured and various as the separate determinations of which I am conscious. Synthetic unity of the various determinations of perception as given a priori, is therefore the ground of that identity of apperception itself, which precedes a priori every definite act of thought. Now, objects cannot combine themselves, nor can understanding learn that they are combined by
observing their combination. All combination is the work of understanding, and in fact understanding is itself nothing but the faculty of combining *a priori*, and bringing under the unity of apperception, the various determinations given in perception. The unity of apperception is, therefore, the supreme principle of all our knowledge.

This principle of the necessary unity of apperception, is no doubt in itself an identical and therefore an analytic proposition; but it also reveals the necessity for a synthesis of the various determinations given in perception, because without such synthesis the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness is inconceivable. In the simple consciousness of self, no variety of determination is given; such variety of determination can be given only in the perception which is distinguished from the consciousness of self, and can be thought only by being combined in one consciousness. An understanding in which the consciousness of self should at the same time be a consciousness of all the complex determinations of objects, would be *perceptive*; but our understanding can only think, and must go to sense for perception. I am conscious of my self as identical in the various determinations presented to me in a perception, because all determinations that constitute one perception I call mine. But this is the same as saying, that I am conscious of a necessary synthesis of them *a priori*, or that they rest upon the original synthetic unity of apperception, under which all the determinations given to me must stand, but under which they can be brought only by means of a synthesis.
17. The synthetic unity of Apperception is the supreme principle of Understanding.

In the Transcendental Ästhetic, we have seen that the supreme principle, without which perception in its relation to sensibility is impossible, is, that all the determinations of perception should stand under the formal conditions of space and time. Now, the supreme principle, without which perception, in its relation to understanding is impossible, is, that all determinations of perception should stand under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. Under the former stand all determinations of perception, in so far as they are given to us; under the latter, in so far as they must be capable of being combined in one consciousness. Apart from the synthetic unity of apperception, nothing can be thought or known, because the determinations given in perception, not having the act of apperception, "I think," in common, would not be comprehended in one self-consciousness.

Speaking quite generally, understanding is the faculty of knowledge. Knowledge consists in the consciousness of certain given determinations as related to an object. An object, again, is that, in the conception of which the various determinations of a given perception are united. Now, all unification of determinations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the determinations. Hence, the unity of consciousness is absolutely necessary, to constitute the relation of determinations to an object, give them objective validity, and make them objects of knowledge; and on that unity therefore rests the very possibility of understanding.
The principle of the original *synthetic* unity of apperception, as being completely independent of all conditions of sensuous perception, is the supreme condition of the pure use of understanding, and upon this pure use rests the whole of its empirical use. Space, as the mere form of external sensuous perception, does not of itself yield any knowledge: it but supplies the various elements of a *priori* perception that are capable of becoming knowledge. To know anything spatial, as, for instance a line, I must *draw* it, and so produce by synthesis a definite combination of the given elements. Thus, the unity of the act of combination is at the same time the unity of the consciousness in which the line is thought, and only in this unity of consciousness is a determinate space known as an object. The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all knowledge. It is not merely a condition which I must observe in knowing an object, but it is a condition under which every perception must stand, before *it can become an object for me at all*. Without this synthesis, the various determinations would *not* be united in one consciousness.

Although it is thus proved, that the synthetic unity of consciousness is the condition of all thought, the unity of consciousness, as has been already said, is in itself an analytic proposition. For, it says only, that all the determinations of which *I* am conscious in a given perception must stand under the condition, which enables me to regard them as *mine*, or as related to my identical self, and so to comprehend them as synthetically combined in one apperception, through the "*I think*" expressed in all alike.
But this is not the principle of every possible understanding, but only of an understanding, through the pure apperception of which, in the consciousness "I am," no determinations are given. If we had an understanding, which, by its mere self-consciousness, presented to itself the manifold determinations of perception; an understanding, which, by its very consciousness of objects, should give rise to the existence of these objects; such an understanding would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of manifold determinations. But this act of synthesis is essential to human understanding, which thinks, but does not perceive. It is, indeed, the supreme principle of human understanding. Nor can we form the least conception of any other possible understanding, whether of one that itself perceives, or of one that is dependent upon sensibility for its perception, but not upon a sensibility that stands under the conditions of space and time.

18. Objective unity of Self-consciousness.

The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the determinations given in a perception are united in a conception of the object. It is, accordingly, called objective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of the inner sense, through which the complex of perception is given empirically to be combined into an object. Whether I shall be empirically conscious of certain determinations as simultaneous, or as successive, depends upon circumstances, or empirical conditions. Hence, the empirical unity of consciousness,
through the association of the elements of perception, is itself a phenomenon, and is perfectly contingent. But the pure form of perception in time, as merely perception in general, stands under the original unity of consciousness just because the various determinations given in it are necessarily related to an "I think." It therefore stands under that original unity by means of the pure synthesis of understanding, which is the \textit{a priori} ground of the empirical synthesis. Only the original unity of apperception is objective; the empirical unity, with which we are not here concerned, and which besides is only derived from the other, under given conditions \textit{in concreto}, is merely subjective. To one man, for instance, a certain word suggests one thing, to another a different thing. In what is empirical, the unity of consciousness does not hold necessarily and universally of that which is given.

19. \textit{The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the objective unity of the Conceptions they contain.}

141 A judgment is simply the way in which given ideas are brought to the \textit{objective} unity of apperception. This is the force of the copula "is," which just marks the distinction between the objective unity and the subjective unity of given ideas. It indicates their relation to the original apperception, and their \textit{necessary} unity. This holds good even if the judgment is itself empirical and therefore contingent. I do not mean, that, in the proposition, "Bodies are heavy," the idea of \textit{heavy} is \textit{necessarily} connected with the idea of \textit{body} in empirical perception, but that they are connected with each other in the synthesis of perceptions through the \textit{necessary}
unity of apperception. That is to say, the two ideas are connected with each other in conformity with the principles by which ideas are objectively determined and become knowledge. Now, those principles are all derived from the supreme principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. Through this principle alone, ideas are related in the way of judgment, and become objectively valid. Thus we get a sufficient test of the distinction between the relation of ideas in a judgment, and a relation of the same ideas that is only of subjective validity, as, for instance, a relation depending upon the laws of association. In the latter case, all that I could say would be, that if I lift a body, I have a sensation of weight, but not, that the body is heavy. To say that the body is heavy, means, that the two ideas of heavy and body are connected together in the object, whatever the state of the subject may be, and not merely that they are contiguous in my observation, repeat it as often as I please.

143 20. All sensuous Perceptions stand under the Categories as conditions under which alone their various determinations can come together in one Consciousness.

The various determinations given in a sensuous perception stand under the original synthetic unity of apperception, because in no other way could there possibly be any unity of perception (17). But that act of understanding, by which the determinations given in consciousness, whether these are perceptions or conceptions, are brought under a single apperception, is the logical function of the judgment (19). Hence, all the elements given in an empirical perception are determined
by one of the logical functions of judgment, and thus brought into one consciousness. But the categories are just the functions of judgment, in so far as these are applied in determination of the various elements of a given perception (13). Therefore, the various determinations in a given perception necessarily stand under the categories.

22. The Category has no other application in Knowledge than to Objects of Experience.

To think an object is not the same thing as to know it. Knowledge involves two elements: firstly, the conception or category, by which an object in general is thought; secondly, the perception by which it is given. If no perception could be given, corresponding to the conception, I should no doubt be able to think an object so far as its form was concerned, but as there would be no object in which that form was realized, I could not possibly have knowledge of any actual thing. So far as I could know, there would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought might be applied. Now, the Æsthetic has shown to us that all the perception that we can have is sensuous; hence the thought of an object in general, by means of a pure conception of understanding, can become knowledge, only by being brought into relation with objects of sense. Sensuous perception is either the pure perception of space and time, or the empirical perception of that which is directly presented through sensation as actually in space and time. By the determination of space and time themselves, we can obtain that a priori knowledge of objects which mathematics supplies. But this knowledge is only of the form of
phenomena, and it is still doubtful if actual things must be perceived in this form. Mathematical conceptions, therefore, can be called knowledge, only if it is presupposed that there are actual things which cannot be presented to us except under the form of that pure sensuous perception. Now, *things in space and time* are given to us only through empirical observation, that is, in perceptions that are accompanied by sensation. Hence, the pure conceptions of understanding, even if they are applied to *a priori* perceptions, as in mathematics, do not yield a knowledge of things. Before there can be any knowledge, the pure perceptions, and the conceptions of understanding through the medium of pure perceptions, must be applied to empirical perceptions. The categories, therefore, give us no knowledge of actual things, even with the aid of perception, except in so far as they are capable of being applied to *empirical perception*. In other words, they are merely conditions of the possibility of *empirical knowledge*. Now, such knowledge is called *experience*. Hence the categories have a share in the knowledge of those things only that are objects of possible experience.

The above proposition is of the greatest importance, for it marks out the limits of the pure conceptions of understanding in their application to objects, just as Transcendental Ästhetic marked out the limits of the pure forms of sensuous perception. Space and time are but the conditions under which objects that are relative to our senses are capable of being presented to us, and therefore they apply only within the limits of experience.
Beyond those limits they have no meaning whatever, for they are only in the senses, and have no reality apart from them. The pure conceptions of understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to objects of perception of any kind, whether that perception is like or unlike ours, if only it is sensuous, and not intellectual. But this extension of conception beyond our sensuous perception does not help us in the least. For, the conceptions are in that case quite empty, and we are therefore unable even to say that there are any objects corresponding to them. They are mere forms of thought without objective reality, for we have no perception at hand, and therefore no object, to which the synthetic unity of apperception, which is the sole content of those forms of thought, could be applied. Only our sensuous and empirical perception can give to them meaning and reality.

If I suppose an object of a non-sensuous perception to be given, I can, no doubt, think of it as having all the predicates implied in my presupposition. I can say that the object has none of the determinations proper to sensuous perception: that it is not extended or in space, that its duration is not time, that there is in it no change or succession of states in time, etc. But no real knowledge of an object is gained by merely indicating how it is not perceived, so long as I cannot tell what is the content of its perception. I cannot in that way understand even the possibility of an object to which my pure conception could apply, for I am unable to bring forward a perception corresponding to such an object, and can say only that my perception can never bring me into contact with it. But what most concerns us here, is,
that to a thing of that nature, not even a single category could be applied. I could not say, for instance, that such a thing is a substance, that is, a thing that can exist as subject, but never as mere predicate. For, how could I apply the conception of substance, when, in the absence of all empirical perception, I should not even know that anything corresponding to my idea could exist at all?

24. *The application of the Categories to objects of sense.*

Understanding is capable of applying its pure conceptions to any object of perception, whether the perception is the same as ours or not, if only it is sensuous. But what this shows is that those conceptions are but mere *forms of thought*, which in themselves yield no knowledge of a determinate object. As we have seen, the synthesis, or combination of various elements implied in these forms of thought, is relative merely to the unity of apperception, and only in relation to that unity does it make possible any *a priori* knowledge, or rather that knowledge which rests upon understanding. It is, therefore, not only transcendental, but also purely intellectual. But there lies in us a certain form of *a priori* sensuous perception, which is bound up with our sensibility, or the receptive side of our consciousness. Hence understanding, by its spontaneity, is capable of determining the inner sense, by bringing the various elements given in pure perception into conformity with the synthetic unity of apperception. Thus it can think synthetic unity of the apperception of the elements implied in *a priori sensuous perception* as the condition under which all objects of human percep-
tion must necessarily stand. In this way the categories, which in themselves are mere forms of thought, obtain objective reality, or application to objects that can be given to us in perception. These objects, however, are merely phenomena, for only to phenomena do the a priori forms of perception apply.

This synthesis of the units of sensuous perception, which is possible and necessary a priori, may be called figural synthesis (synthesis speciosa), to distinguish it from that intellectual synthesis (synthesis intellectualis), which is thought in the mere category as applicable to all the determinations of a perception. Both are transcendental, not merely because they precede a priori other knowledge, but because they make other a priori knowledge possible.

But the figural synthesis, when it is considered merely in relation to the original synthetic unity of apperception, that is, to the transcendental unity which is thought in the categories, must be called, in distinction from the purely intellectual combination, the transcendental synthesis of imagination. Imagination is the faculty of setting before the mind in perception an object that is not itself present. Now, all our perception is sensuous, and hence imagination can give a perception corresponding to the conceptions of understanding, only under the subjective condition of time. Imagination therefore pertains to sensibility. At the same time its synthesis is the expression of spontaneous activity; for, unlike sense, imagination is not simply capable of being determined, but it is itself determining; and hence it can a priori determine sense in its form, in accordance with the unity of apperception. Imagination, then, is in one point of
view the faculty of determining the sensibility \textit{a priori}; and its synthesis of the elements of pure perception, conforming as it does to the categories, must be called the transcendental synthesis of imagination. This synthesis is the result of an action of understanding on the sensibility, or it is the first application, and so the condition of all other applications, of understanding to objects that we are capable of perceiving. The figural synthesis is distinguished from the intellectual synthesis simply in this, that the latter is due purely to understanding in isolation from imagination. In so far as imagination is a spontaneous activity, I sometimes call it \textit{productive} imagination, to distinguish it from \textit{reproductive} imagination, the synthesis of which is entirely dependent upon empirical laws of association. As this latter synthesis in no way helps to explain how \textit{a priori} knowledge is possible, it belongs to psychology, not to transcendental philosophy.

26. Transcendental Deduction of the Categories as employed in Experience.

In the \textit{metaphysical deduction} it has been proved that the categories have their origin \textit{a priori}, because they perfectly agree with the universal logical functions of thought. In the \textit{transcendental deduction} (20, 21), we have seen how the categories make possible the \textit{a priori} knowledge of objects of perception in general. We have now to explain how, by means of the categories, we are capable of knowing \textit{a priori} objects of which we are conscious only when our senses are actually affected. What we propose to explain is not how there can be an \textit{a priori} knowledge of sensible objects as regards the form of perception, but how there can be an \textit{a priori} know-
knowledge of the laws by which the combination of objects is effected, or, as we may say, what are the laws imposed upon nature, without which there would be no nature at all.

The first thing to be observed is that by *synthesis of apprehension* is meant the putting together of various determinations in an empirical perception, an act without which there could be no observation or empirical consciousness of a phenomenal object.

In space and time we have *a priori* forms of outer as well as inner perception; and to these the synthesis of apprehension must always conform, because in no other way can apprehension take place at all. But space and time are more than mere forms of sensuous perception: they are themselves perceptions that contain a complex of elements, and these elements are conceived to be determined *a priori* to unity (see Transcendental Æsthetic). *Along with* these perceptions (not *in* them) there is presupposed *a priori*, as condition of all synthesis of apprehension, a *unity of synthesis* of the various determinations of inner and outer perception; and this, again, implies that whatever can be perceived as in space and time must submit to *combination*. This synthetic unity can only be the combination, in conformity with the categories, of the various elements of any given perception in an original consciousness, in so far as the combination is applied to our *sensuous perception*. Hence, all synthesis, including even that through which sensible observation is possible, stands under the categories. And, as experience is knowledge by means of connected observations, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and therefore hold *a priori* of all objects of experience.
I observe a house, for instance, by the apprehension of various determinations given in empirical perception. The necessary unity of space, and of external sensuous perception in general, is presupposed, and I draw as it were an outline of the house, in conformity with this synthetic unity of its determinations in space. But, if I abstract from the form of space, the very same synthetic unity has its seat in understanding, and is the category of quantity, or the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in any perception whatever. To this category, therefore, the synthesis of apprehension—that is, the observation—must completely conform.

Categories are conceptions which a priori prescribe laws to phenomena, and therefore to nature as the sum total of all phenomena (natura materialiter spectata). Now, the categories are not derived from nature, nor do they adapt themselves to nature as their model, for in that case they would be merely empirical. How, then, one asks, can it be shown that nature must adapt itself to them? How can the categories determine a priori the combination of the complex phenomena of nature, instead of going to nature to find out how phenomena are combined? Here is the solution of the problem.

It is no more wonderful that the laws of phenomena in nature must agree with understanding and its a priori form, or faculty of combining any complex given to it, than that phenomena themselves must agree with the form of a priori sensuous perception. Just as phenomena have no existence at all, apart from a subject that has senses, so there exist no laws in phenomena, apart from a subject that has understanding. Things in themselves would of course have laws of their own, even if they did
not come within the knowledge of the subject through his understanding. But phenomena are merely the manner in which things appear in consciousness, and give no knowledge of what things may be in themselves. As mere appearances they are subject to no law of connection but that which is imposed by the connective faculty. Now, it is imagination that connects the various units of sensuous perception, and imagination is dependent upon understanding for the unity of its intellectual synthesis, and upon sensibility for the complexity of apprehension. But nothing can come under observation without a synthesis of apprehension, and this empirical synthesis is dependent upon the transcendental synthesis, and therefore upon the categories. Hence, all that can be observed, or can come to empirical consciousness, that is, all phenomena of nature, must depend for combination upon the categories. In the categories, therefore, nature as a system of necessary laws (natura formaliter spectata) has its ground and origin. Pure understanding, however, cannot by mere categories prescribe a priori any laws to phenomena other than those universal laws of nature that apply to all objects in space and time. Special laws, as relating only to what is empirically determined, cannot be completely derived from the categories, although they must all, without exception, stand under the categories. To learn what are the special laws of nature, we must go to experience; but it is none the less true that only the a priori laws imposed by understanding tell us what is necessary for any experience whatever, and what is capable of being known as an object of experience.
27. Result of the Deduction of the Categories.

We cannot think an object without categories; we cannot know an object so thought without perceptions that correspond to categories. Now, all our perceptions are sensuous, and therefore all our knowledge of objects that are presented in perception is empirical. But empirical knowledge is experience. Hence there can be no a priori knowledge, except of objects that are capable of entering into experience.

But although such knowledge is limited to objects of experience, it is not therefore altogether derived from experience. For pure perceptions as well as pure conceptions are elements in knowledge, and both are found in us a priori. There are only two ways in which we can account for a necessary coincidence of the data of experience with the conceptions which we form of its objects: either that experience must make the conceptions possible, or the conceptions must make experience possible. The former supposition is inconsistent with the nature of the categories, not to speak of pure sensuous perception; for the categories, as a priori conceptions, are independent of experience, and to derive them from experience would be a sort of generatio aequivoca. The alternative supposition, which involves what may be called an epigenesis of pure reason, must therefore be adopted, and we must hold that the categories, as proceeding from understanding, contain the grounds of the possibility of any experience whatever.

Short Statement of the Deduction.

What has been shown in the deduction of the categories is that the pure conceptions of understanding, on
which all theoretical \textit{a priori} knowledge is based, are only principles that make experience possible. In other words, they are principles for the general determination of phenomena in space and time, a determination that ultimately flows from the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception as the form of understanding in relation to space and time, the original forms of sensibility.

BOOK II.—THE ANALYTIC OF JUDGMENTS.

Transcendental Judgment.

If understanding is called the \textit{faculty} of rules, judgment will be the \textit{faculty} of \textit{subsumption} under rules, that is, the faculty of deciding whether something stands under a given rule or not (\textit{casus datae legis}). Now pure general logic does not, and indeed cannot, lay down rules for the application of judgment. For, as it abstracts from all the \textit{content} of knowledge, its sole business is to analyze the pure form of knowledge, as expressed in conceptions, judgments, and inferences, and from this analysis to derive formal rules for the general use of understanding. The business of transcendental logic, on the other hand, is to lay down definite rules which may enable judgment to make a correct and certain use of the conceptions of understanding. For transcendental philosophy has the peculiarity that it not only brings to light the rules, or rather the universal condition of rules, implied in the pure conceptions of understanding, but it is able also to indicate \textit{a priori} the case to which each rule should be
applied. The reason of its superiority in this respect over all other theoretical sciences, except mathematics, is that the conceptions with which it deals relate to objects *a priori*.

The transcendental doctrine of judgment consists of two chapters. The first treats of the sensuous condition without which no pure conceptions of understanding can be used. This is called the schematism of understanding. The second deals with the synthetic judgments, which arise *a priori* when the pure conceptions of understanding are brought into use under that condition, and which underlie all other *a priori* knowledge. It treats, in other words, of the principles of pure understanding.

**176 Chapter I.—The Schematism of the Categories.**

In all subsumption, the object of which we are conscious must be *homogeneous* with the conception under which it is brought; in other words, the conception must contain some determination that is also present in the object subsumed under it. This in fact is what we mean when we say that an object is contained under a conception. The empirical conception of a *plate*, for instance, is homogeneous with the pure geometrical conception of a *circle*, because the roundness which is thought as a determination of the plate is presented as a perception in the circle.

Now, a pure conception, or category, is quite heterogeneous from an empirical perception, or indeed from any sensuous perception, and hence no pure conception can ever be found realized in a perception. No one will say that the category of cause can be made
visible to sense, or can be presented in a particular perception as a property of it. How then can a perception be subsumed under a pure conception? How can a category be applied in determination of an object of sense? It is because this very natural and very important question demands an answer that a transcendental doctrine of judgment is necessary. It must be shown how pure conceptions of understanding can possibly be applied to phenomena. In other sciences it is not necessary to show that conceptions are applicable to objects, because the general conception of the object is not in the same way distinct and heterogeneous from the object as presented in concreto.

Manifestly there must be some third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the object of sense, and which thus makes the application of the one to the other possible. This mediating idea must be pure, or free from any empirical element, and yet it must be at once intellectual and sensuous. Such an idea is the transcendental schema.

The category contains the pure synthetic unity of any elements of which we can be conscious as different. Time, as the formal condition of the various determinations of inner sense, and therefore of the connections of all our ideas, contains a priori in pure perception a variety of differences. Now, a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous with the category which gives unity to it, that it is universal, and rests upon an a priori rule. But, on its other side, that determination is to a certain extent homogeneous with the object of sense, since time is present in every object of which we can be empirically conscious. By means of the transcendental
determination of time or schema, the category may therefore be applied to phenomena, or, what is the same thing, the phenomenon may be subsumed under the category.

In itself a schema is merely a product of imagination; but, as in producing it imagination does not seek to set before itself an individual object of perception, but to produce unity in the general determination of sensibility, we must distinguish between the schema and the image. If I set down five points one after the other, thus . . . . . I have before me an image of the number five. But if I think simply of number—of any number at all, be it five or a hundred—my thought is rather of the method by which a certain sum, say a thousand, may be presented in an image, in conformity with a certain conception, than itself an image. It would, in fact, be very hard to compare the image of so large a number as a thousand with the conception of it. Now, the consciousness of a universal process of imagination, by which an image is provided for a conception, is what I call the schema of a conception.

In point of fact, schemata, and not images, lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. No image of a triangle can ever be adequate to the general conception of triangle. The conception includes all triangles—right-angled, obtuse-angled, etc.; and, hence, the image which I can set before myself can never reach to the universality of the conception, but occupies only a part of its sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere but in thought: it is simply a rule for the synthesis of imagination, in the determination of pure figures in space. Much less can a single object of experience, or an image of a single object, reach to the
universality of an empirical conception. The direct relation of an empirical conception is to the schema of imagination, or the rule by which a perception is determined in conformity with that conception. The conception of a dog, for instance, is a rule for the guidance of imagination in tracing out the figure of a certain four-footed animal; but it cannot be restricted to any single determinate figure that experience can supply, nor can it even be presented in concreto in any possible image that I am capable of imagining. This schematism of our understanding, in its application to phenomena and to their pure form, is an art hidden away in the depths of the human soul, the secret of which we need not hope to drag forth to the light of day. This much may be said: that the image is a product of the empirical faculty of productive imagination; while the schema of sensuous conceptions, as, for instance, of figures in space, is a product, and as it were a monogram, of pure a priori imagination, which makes the consciousness of an image possible at all. An image is necessarily connected with a conception through the schema, and is in no case quite congruent with the conception. But what distinguishes the schema of a pure conception of understanding as such, is that it cannot be presented in an image at all, but is simply the pure synthesis, which conforms to a rule of unity expressed in the category. Such a schema is a transcendental product of imagination. It is a determination of the inner sense according to conditions of its form of time in view of all ideas, a determination which is necessary, if ideas are to be brought together a priori in one conception, in conformity with the unity of apperception.
The pure image of all magnitudes (quantas) that are presented in outer sense is space; the pure image of all objects of sense, inner as well as outer, is time. But quantity (quantitas), as a conception of understanding, has as its schema number, or the idea of the successive addition of homogeneous unit to homogeneous unit. Number is, therefore, the unity of synthesis implied in putting together any homogeneous units of perception whatever, a unity which results from the generation of time itself in the apprehension of the perception.

The category of reality is the conception of that which corresponds to any sensation whatever, and therefore of that, the very idea of which is that it has being in time; the category of negation is the conception of that, the very idea of which is that it has no being in time. The opposition of reality and negation therefore rests upon the distinction between a time as filled and the same time as empty. And, as time is merely the form of perception, that which in the phenomenon corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter, or reality, of all objects as actual things. Now, every sensation has a degree or magnitude by which it is capable of filling the same time more or less, or, in other words, of occupying the inner sense, with more or less completeness, down to the vanishing point (= 0 = negatio). Hence, there is a relation and connection, or rather a transition from reality to negation, which makes us capable of setting every reality before ourselves as a quantum. The schema of reality, as the quantity of something so far as it fills a time, is just this continuous and uniform generation of reality in time, by the gradual descent from a sensation that has a certain degree in time to its disappearance, or,
what is the same thing, the gradual ascent from the negation of sensation to its definite degree.

The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time, or the idea of the real as presupposed in the empirical determination of time, and as persisting while all else changes. Time does not itself pass away, but the changeable in time passes away in its particular being. What corresponds in the phenomenon to time, which is in itself unchangeable and permanent, is the unchangeable in existence, or substance; and only in reference to substance can the succession and the co-existence of phenomena be determined in time.

The schema of cause, and of the causality of a thing in general, is the real which is supposed never to exist without being followed by something else. It consists, therefore, in the succession of various determinations, in so far as that succession is subject to a rule.

The schema of community (reciprocal action), or of the reciprocal causality of substances as regards their accidents, is the co-existence in conformity with a universal rule of the determinations of one substance with those of another.

The schema of possibility is the harmony of the synthesis of different ideas with conditions of time in general. Opposites, for instance, cannot exist in the same thing at the same time, but only the one after the other. The schema of possibility therefore determines how a thing is capable of being known at any time.

The schema of actuality is existence in a determinate time.

The schema of necessity is the existence of an object at all times.
From all this it is plain that the schema of every one of the categories is in some way relative to time. The schema of quantity is the generation or synthesis of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object; the schema of quality, the synthesis of sensation, as implied in observation, with the consciousness of time, or, in other words, it is the filling up of time; the schema of relation, the relation of different perceptions to one another at all times, or in conformity with a rule for the determination of time; lastly, the schema of modality, in its three forms, time itself as the correlative of the determination whether and how an object belongs to time. The schemata are, therefore, just *a priori* determinations of time in conformity with rules. Following the order of the categories, we find that these rules, which apply to all possible objects of experience, relate to the *series of time*, the *content of time*, the *order of time*, and the *comprehension of time*.

We thus see that the schematism of understanding, through the transcendental synthesis of imagination, is neither more nor less than the way in which the various determinations of perception are reduced to unity in the inner sense, and so indirectly to the unity of apperception, the function that corresponds to the receptivity of inner sense. The schemata are, therefore, the true and only conditions under which the categories obtain *significance*, by being brought into relation with objects. In the end, therefore, the categories have no other application than to objects of a possible experience. They merely serve to bind phenomena together under universal rules of synthesis, by means of a necessary *a priori* unity that has its source in the necessary combination of all conscious-
ness in the original unity of apperception. Thus it is that the categories make phenomena fit for a thorough-going connection in one experience.

Within this whole of possible experience all our knowledge lies, and in the universal relation to possible experience consists that transcendental truth which precedes empirical truth and makes it possible.

But no one can fail to see that, although only the schemata of sensibility can realize the categories, they none the less restrict them. For the schemata limit the categories by conditions that lie outside of understanding and in sensibility. The schema is in harmony with the category, but it is properly merely the sensuous appearance or sensuous conception of an object. Now, it is naturally supposed that the sphere of a conception previously restricted is enlarged when the restriction is taken away. Hence it may be thought that the categories in their purity, or apart from all conditions of sensibility, hold true of things as they really are; while the schemata present them only as they appear. On this view the categories will have a much wider meaning than the schemata, and will be quite independent of them. And this is so far true that, even apart from all sensuous conditions the categories are not meaningless, for they still have the logical meaning of the unity of our ideas of objects. But no conception has in itself objective meaning, because, apart from the conditions of sensibility, there is no object to which it can be applied. Substance, for instance, viewed apart from the sensuous determination of permanence, simply means, that which can be thought only as subject, never as the predicate of anything else. But such an idea has no meaning for us, because it tells
us nothing whatever about the actual nature of the thing that is thought to be an ultimate subject. Without schemata, therefore, the categories are only functions of understanding for conceptions, and give no knowledge of objects. Meaning comes to them from sensibility, and sensibility realizes understanding only by restricting it.

Chapter II.—Principles of Pure Understanding. 148

In the preceding chapter, we have considered the transcendentental faculty of judgment with reference only to the universal conditions, under which it is justified in employing the categories for the production of synthetic judgments. We have now to set forth, in systematic order, the judgments which understanding, under that critical provision, actually produces a priori. The table of categories will no doubt be a safe and natural guide. Accordingly we find that all the principles of pure understanding are—

1. Axioms of Perception.
2. Anticipations of Observation.
3. Analogies of Experience.

1. Axioms of Perception.

The principle of these is: All perceptions are extensive magnitudes.

Proof.

By an extensive magnitude, I mean a magnitude in which the idea of the parts necessarily precedes and makes possible the idea of the whole. I cannot have
the idea of a line, however small it may be, without drawing it in thought; only by producing its parts one after the other, beginning from a certain point, do I mark out the line as a perception. Similarly with every portion of time, even the smallest. I am conscious of time only in the successive advance from one moment to another, and it is by the addition of all the parts that a definite quantity of time is at last generated. Now, either space or time is present in every phenomenon as its pure element; and as this pure element can be known in apprehension only by a successive synthesis of part with part, every perception is an extensive magnitude. No phenomenon, therefore, can be perceived at all without being perceived as an aggregate or collection of previously given parts, a characteristic which does not hold good of every sort of magnitude, but only of those magnitudes, which, from their very nature, are apprehended and presented in consciousness as extensive.

On this successive synthesis of productive imagination in the generation of figures, Geometry, as the mathematics of extension, is based. The axioms of geometry express the conditions of sensuous perception a priori, without which no schema of any pure conception of an external object is possible; as, for instance, that between any two points only one straight line can be drawn; that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, etc. Such axioms as these properly apply only to magnitudes (quanta) as such.

As to quantity (quantitas), that is, the answer to the question how large a thing is, there are, strictly speaking, no axioms, although several of the propositions referring...
to it are synthetic and immediately certain (*indemonstrabilia*). The propositions, that if equals be added to equals the wholes are equal, and that if equals be taken from equals the remainders are equal, are analytic propositions; for I am directly conscious that the quantity generated in the one case is identical with the quantity generated in the other; these propositions, therefore, have no title to be called axioms, which must needs be *a priori* synthetic propositions. There are, indeed, simple numerical propositions which are synthetic; but, unlike the synthetic propositions of geometry, they are not universal, and therefore even they cannot be called axioms, but only numerical formulæ. That $7 + 5 = 12$ is not an analytic proposition. For neither the idea of 7, nor that of 5, nor the idea of the combination of the two, yields the number 12. But, while it is synthetic, the proposition $7 + 5 = 12$ is merely individual. The synthesis of the homogeneous can here take place only in one way, although no doubt the numbers may afterwards be *employed* universally. If I say that a triangle may be constructed out of three lines, any two of which are together greater than the third, I have before my mind the mere function of productive imagination, which may draw the lines greater or smaller, and bring them together in all sorts of angles at will. On the other hand, the number 7 is possible only in one way, and the number 12 can be produced only by the synthesis of 5 with it. If mere numerical formulæ like this are to be called axioms, the number of axioms will be infinite.

This transcendental principle of the mathematics of nature greatly enlarges our *a priori* knowledge. It shows, as nothing else can show, that mathematics in all its
precision is applicable to objects of experience and this, so far from being self-evident, has been the occasion of much controversy. Phenomena are not things in themselves. Empirical perception is possible only through the pure perception of space and of time; and, therefore, whatever geometry says of pure perception is beyond dispute true also of empirical perception. All attempts to evade this conclusion, by showing that objects of sense need not conform to the rules of geometrical construction—for instance, the rule of the infinite divisibility of lines and angles—must be at once set aside. Were such a contention true, the objective truth of geometry, and therefore of all mathematics, would be overthrown, and it would be impossible to say why and how far mathematics should be applied to phenomena at all. The synthesis of spaces and times, as the essential forms of all perception, is that which makes the apprehension of a phenomenon even possible, and hence it is the condition of all external experience, and so of all knowledge of external objects. Whatever pure mathematics proves to be true of space and time must necessarily hold good of all external objects. All objections to the truth of applied mathematics are but the chicanery of an ill-advised reason, which wrongly seeks to free objects of sense from the formal condition of our sensibility, and to treat them as if they were things in themselves apprehended by understanding. If phenomena were really things in themselves, we could know nothing whatever of them a priori; and as no synthetic judgments can be based upon pure conceptions of space, geometry, as the science of the properties of space, would itself be impossible.
2. Anticipations of Observation.

The principle of these is: In all phenomena the real, which is an object of sensation, has intensive magnitude or degree.

Proof.

If it should turn out that in all sensations as such, however they may differ from one another, there is something that can be known a priori; this would, in a very special sense, deserve to be called an anticipation. For by this name we should call attention to the remarkable fact that it is possible to say something a priori about the nature of empirical objects, that is, about that very element in them which is due to experience.

If no heed is paid to the succession of different sensations, apprehension by means of mere sensation is found to occupy only a moment. Here there is no successive synthesis, advancing from the consciousness of the parts to the consciousness of the whole, and therefore that in the phenomenon which is called sensation has no extensive magnitude. The absence of sensation from the moment that it fills would therefore carry with it the consciousness of that moment as empty = 0. Now that which in empirical perception corresponds to sensation is reality (realitas phaenomenon); that which corresponds to the absence of sensation is negation = 0. But every sensation is capable of diminution, so that it can decrease and gradually disappear. Between reality in the phenomenon and negation, there is, therefore, a continuous series of many possible intermediate sensations, the difference between any two of which is always less than the difference between the given sensation and zero or
complete negation. That is to say, the real in the phenomenon always has a quantity, but of this quantity there is no consciousness in apprehension, because apprehension, so far as it is due to the inner sensation, takes place in one moment, and does not consist in a successive synthesis of different sensations, and therefore does not advance from the parts to the whole. Hence the real has magnitude, but not extensive magnitude.

Now, a magnitude that is apprehended only as unity, plurality being conceived in it as simply approximation to negation = 0, I call an intensive magnitude. Every reality in a phenomenon has therefore intensive magnitude or degree. This reality may be regarded as a cause, either of sensation or of some other reality in the phenomenon, for instance, a change. The degree of reality is then called momentum, as when we speak of the momentum of gravity, to indicate a quantity, the apprehension of which is not successive but instantaneous. I make this remark merely in passing, for this is not the place to treat of causality.

Every sensation, then, and consequently every reality in a phenomenon, however small it may be, has an intensive magnitude or degree that can always become less, and between reality and negation there is a continuous series of possible realities, and of possible smaller perceptions. The colour red, for instance, has a degree which, however small it may be, is never the smallest possible; and so with heat, the momentum of gravity, etc.

The property of magnitudes, by which no part in them is the smallest possible, or no part is simple, is called their continuity. Space and time are quanta continua, because
no part of them can be presented that is not enclosed between limits (points or moments), and therefore each part of space is itself a space, each part of time is itself a time. Space consists only of spaces, time of times. Points and moments are but limits, that is, mere places of limitation in space and time, and as such always presuppose the perceptions which they are to limit or determine. Mere places are not constituent parts, which can be given prior to space or time, and out of which space and time can be made up. Such magnitudes may also be called fluent, because the synthesis of productive imagination, by which they are generated, is a progression in time, the continuity of which is usually designated by the term flux or flowing.

All phenomena are continuous magnitudes, and that in two ways: as pure perceptions, they are continuous extensive magnitudes, and as perceptions of sense containing sensation, and therefore reality, they are continuous intensive magnitudes. When the synthesis of determinations is interrupted, we have an aggregate of various objects of sense, not a single phenomenon as a quantum. Such an aggregate is produced, not by continuing without break the productive synthesis with which we begin, but by continually renewing a synthesis that is continually coming to an end.

As all phenomena, whether they are viewed extensively or intensively, are continuous magnitudes, the continuity of all change, or transition of a thing from one state into another, might readily be proved here, and indeed proved mathematically. But the causality of a change, as presupposing empirical principles, does not come within the province of transcendental philosophy. Understanding
can give us no hint *a priori* that there can be a cause, which is capable of changing the state of things, that is, determining them to the opposite of a given state. It is not simply that we cannot understand *a priori* how this can take place—for there are many other instances of a similar failure in *a priori* knowledge,—but that only certain determinations of objects are capable of change at all, and what these determinations are we can learn only from experience, although no doubt the cause must lie in that which is unchangeable. The only data that we have here before us, are the pure conceptions implied in all possible experience, which contain nothing empirical; nor can we avail ourselves of the primary facts of experience which lie at the foundation of pure physics without destroying the unity of our system.

At the same time, there is no difficulty in showing that the principle of understanding now under consideration is of great value in enabling us to anticipate perceptions of sense, and even to some extent to supply their place, by guarding us against all false inferences that might be drawn from their absence.

If all reality in perception has a degree, between which and negation there is an infinite series of ever smaller degrees, and if each sense must have a definite degree of receptivity for sensations, it is evident that no perception, and therefore no experience, can prove, directly or indirectly, by any possible ingenuity of reasoning, that a phenomenon is absolutely destitute of reality. That is to say, there is no way of proving from experience that there is empty space or empty time. For, in the first place, the complete absence of reality from a perception of sense can never be observed; and, in the second place,
the absence of all reality can never be inferred from any variation in the degree of reality of a phenomenon, nor ought it ever to be brought forward in explanation of that variation. For, although the whole perception of a certain definite space or time is real through and through, so that no part of it is empty; yet, as every reality has a degree, which may diminish by infinite degrees down to nothing (the void), while the extensive magnitude of the phenomenon remains unchanged, there must be an infinity of degrees with which space or time may be filled; hence the intensive magnitude may be greater or less in different phenomena, although the extensive magnitude of the perception remains the same.

The quality of sensation—colour, taste, etc.—is always merely empirical, and cannot be known a priori. But the real that corresponds to sensations in general, and is opposed to negation = 0, stands merely for that the very conception of which implies being, and it has, therefore, no other meaning than the synthesis in empirical consciousness generally. In the inner sense, that empirical consciousness can be raised from 0 to any higher degree, so that the extensive magnitude of a perception may be greater or less, even when the intensive magnitude remains the same. Thus, the degree of sensation excited by an illuminated surface, may be as great as that produced by a number of less illuminated surfaces, the aggregate extent of which is twice as large. In considering the intensive magnitude of a phenomenon, we may, therefore, abstract entirely from its extensive magnitude, and think only of the sensation, filling a single moment, as generated by a synthesis that advances uniformly from 0 to the given empirical consciousness. Thus, while all
sensations as such are given a posteriori, it can be known a priori that to all belongs the property of having a degree. It is remarkable that of quantity in general only a single quality—the quality of continuity, can be known a priori, but that of quality, or the reality of phenomena, nothing more than the intensive quantity, or the possession of degree, can be known a priori, while all else has to be learned from experience.

3. Analogies of Experience.

The principle of these is: Experience is possible only through the consciousness of a necessary connection of perceptions of sense.

Proof.

The three modi of time are permanence, succession, and co-existence. All the relations of phenomena in time will therefore be expressed in three rules, which precede all experience and make it possible at all. These rules state all the conditions under which phenomena can possibly exist, in conformity with their unity in time.

The principle of all three analogies rests upon the necessary unity of apperception in all empirical consciousness, or perceptions of sense, at every moment of time. And as the unity of apperception is the a priori condition of all perception, that principle is based upon the synthetic unity of all phenomena as regards their relation in time. The original apperception is related to the inner sense, which contains all possible objects of consciousness, or, more exactly, it is related a priori to the form of inner sense, as the manner in which the manifold determinations of empirical consciousness are ordered in time. Now, in
original apperception all those determinations are to be united, as regards their relations in time; for nothing can enter into my knowledge, or be mine, nothing can be for me an object, that does not stand under the a priori transcendental unity of apperception. This synthetic unity in the temporal relation of all perceptions is, therefore, determined a priori, and is expressed in the law, that all empirical determinations in time must stand under universal rules of determination in time. The Analogies of Experience must therefore be rules of this kind.

These Analogies have the peculiarity, that they are not concerned with the synthesis of empirical perception, implied in the consciousness of objects of sense, but only with the existence of such objects, and the relations to one another by which their existence is determined. Now, a phenomenon may be so determined a priori, that the rule of its synthesis yields at once the perception which is presented to us in every empirical instance of it; or, in other words, the rule may not only tell us the character of the synthesis, but may set the object before us as a perception. But the existence of phenomena cannot thus be known a priori. We may indeed in this way come to know that something exists, but we cannot definitely know what it is, nor can we anticipate how it will differ from other objects, when it is empirically perceived.

The two principles already discussed, which I called mathematical, to indicate that they justify the application of mathematics to objects of sense, showed merely how phenomena were possible, and how their perceptive form, as well as the real of sense perception, could be generated in conformity with rules of a mathe-
mational synthesis. Both principles, therefore, entitle us to estimate phenomena numerically and quantitatively. The degree of sensation of sunlight, for instance, may be determined \textit{a priori}, or constructed, by putting together, say, 200,000 illuminations of the moon. Those principles may therefore be called constitutive.

It is quite different with the principles that show how the existence of phenomena comes under \textit{a priori} rules. Existence cannot be constructed; all that can be done is to state the rules that determine the relations of existence, and these rules yield only \textit{regulative} principles. Here, therefore, there can be neither axioms nor anticipations. If in observation something is presented as related in time to something else, as yet unknown, it is impossible to tell \textit{what} that something else may be, or what may be its \textit{magnitude}; all that we can tell is how the two perceptions, to exist at all, must be connected with each other. . . . . . An analogy of experience is, therefore, merely a rule which states the conditions under which observations of sense may be reduced to the unity of experience. Incompetent to tell us the conditions of observation, so far as its empirical element is concerned, it is not a principle \textit{constitutive} of objects of sense or phenomena, but is merely \textit{regulative}. In like manner, the postulates of empirical thought are regulative principles. The certitude is as great for the regulative as for the mathematical or constitutive principles, for both are \textit{a priori}, but the kind of evidence is different.

In regard to the general method of proof in philosophy, it must be observed that a \textit{demonstration} is an apodictic proof which rests upon direct perception. But, in the
case of discursive knowledge, even those judgments which are based upon \textit{a priori} conceptions, and are therefore apodictic, cannot be proved by a direct appeal to perception. It is only mathematics that admits of demonstrative evidence, for mathematics alone derives its knowledge, not from conceptions, but from the construction of conceptions—that is, from the perception which corresponds to certain conceptions and can be presented \textit{a priori}. Even the solution of an algebraic equation is a process of construction, though not of geometrical construction; for, it consists in presenting conceptions in perception by means of symbols, and especially conceptions of the relation of quantities. Although, therefore, in its method algebra is not heuristic, it is able to guard against error in its results by placing all the conceptions that it employs directly before the eyes. But, while mathematics views the universal \textit{in concreto}—that is, in pure perception, where every error becomes immediately visible—philosophical knowledge has to dispense with this advantage, and to consider the universal \textit{in abstracto}, or through the medium of conceptions.

It is therefore contrary to the true spirit of philosophy, and especially of pure philosophy, to boast of its dogmatic procedure, and to bedeck itself with the orders and the titles of mathematics. Such empty boasts can only retard the progress of philosophy, and prevent it from detecting the illusion into which reason falls when it is unaware of its true limits.

Apodictic propositions may be distinguished as either \textit{dogmata} or \textit{mathemata}. By a \textit{dogma} is meant a synthetic proposition which is directly derived from conceptions; by a \textit{mathema}, one that is obtained by the construction.
of a conception. Of these two classes of \textit{a priori} synthetic propositions, popular language permits us to apply the term dogma only to philosophical knowledge, for we should hardly call a proposition in arithmetic or geometry a dogma. The ordinary use of words thus confirms the distinction we have drawn between judgments that are derived from conceptions, and judgments that rest upon the construction of conceptions.

Now, it is impossible to find in the whole domain of pure speculative reason a single synthetic judgment that is directly derived from conceptions. For, reason is unable to obtain from its pure ideas any synthetic judgment which holds true objectively. It is true that, by means of the conceptions of understanding, reason is able to show that there are certain principles which rest upon a solid foundation; but these principles it does not directly derive from conceptions, but only indirectly, by showing the relation of the conceptions in question to something that is perfectly contingent—namely, \textit{possible experience}. If something is presupposed as an object of possible experience, no doubt those principles are apodictically certain; but, in themselves, or directly, they can never be known \textit{a priori}. Thus, no one, simply from the conceptions contained in it, can see what is the foundation of the proposition, that whatever happens has its cause. Such a proposition can certainly be shown readily enough to be apodictic, if it is applied only within the field of experience; but it cannot be a dogma. It must be called a \textit{principle}, and not a \textit{theorem}, because it has the peculiar property, that it is the condition of that by which it is proved—namely, experience, and must always be presupposed as essential to experience.
Now, if in the speculative use of pure reason there are no dogmata, all dogmatic methods, whether they are borrowed from the mathematician or are peculiar to the individual thinker, are self-condemned. For they only serve to conceal defects and errors, and to give rise to philosophical illusion, instead of securing the true aim of philosophy, which is to exhibit every step of reason in the clearest possible light. Yet the method of philosophy, though it is not dogmatic, may always be systematic. For our reason is itself subjectively a system, though, if we regard it merely as a source of pure conceptions, it is not a system of knowledge, but only a system by which our investigations may be carried on: in other words, it supplies the principles of unity for knowledge, and must look to experience to supply the materials to be determined in accordance with these principles.

A. First Analogy.

Principle of the Permanence of Substance.

In all the changes of phenomena substance is permanent, and its quantum in nature neither increases nor diminishes.

Proof.

Our apprehension of the various determinations of a phenomenon is always successive, and therefore is always changing. Hence there is nothing in apprehension, taken by itself, that enables us to say whether those determinations are, as an object of experience, co-existent or successive. An object of experience is possible only if there is something that always is, something permanent and persistent, all change and co-existence being
nothing but so many modes of time in which that permanent something exists. Only in the permanent can there possibly be the relations of simultaneity and succession, which are the sole relations in time. The permanent is therefore the substratum of the empirical consciousness of time itself, and only in it is any determination of time possible at all. Permanence is time considered quite generally, as the constant correlate of all change and all concomitance of actual objects of experience. For, change does not affect time itself but only phenomena in time; just as co-existence is plainly not a mode of time itself, the parts of time not being together, but following one another. If it is said, that time itself comes into being part by part, we must suppose that there is another time in which it successively comes to be. Only through the permanent does existence in a number of successive moments acquire a magnitude, which we call duration. In mere succession, taken by itself, existence is always vanishing and appearing, and never has even the smallest magnitude. Apart from the permanent, there is therefore no relation of time. Now, time cannot be perceived by itself; hence the permanent is the substratum of all the determinations of phenomena in time, and therefore the condition without which there could be no synthetic unity in our perceptions, that is, in experience. Thus we learn that all existence and all change in time must be regarded as simply a modus of the existence of that which does not change but persists. In all phenomena the permanent is therefore the object itself, that is, the substance (phaenomenon), while all that changes, or can change, pertains merely to the manner in which substance or substances exist, and therefore to the determinations of substance.
The determinations of a substance are called *accidents*. They are always real, because they are just the manner in which the substance exists, whereas negations are merely determinations which affirm that a substance does not exist in a certain manner. If we wish to say, that what is real in a substance has a special sort of existence, as, for instance, that motion is the manner in which matter exists, we are wont to speak of this mode of existence as *inherence*, to distinguish it from the existence of the substance, which is called *subsistence*. But this is apt to lead to much misapprehension, and it is more precise and more correct to say, that an accident is simply the manner in which the existence of a substance is positively determined. At the same time, the conditions under which understanding in its logical use operates, gives a kind of independence to that in the existence of a substance which can change while the substance remains unchanged, and this changing element we are led to view as standing in relation to the really permanent and radical element. It is for this reason that the category of substance is put among the categories of relation; for, although strictly speaking it does not itself contain a relation, it yet is the condition of relations.

The conception of *change* can be properly understood only by reference to the idea of permanence. Coming to be and ceasing to be are not changes of that which comes to be or ceases to be. Change is a mode of existence that follows upon another mode of existence of the very same object. All that changes is *permanent*, and only its *state alters*. As this alteration affects only the determinations, which can cease to be or begin to be, we may say, in words that sound somewhat paradoxical,
that only the permanent changes, while the changeable is subject to no change, but only to an *alternation*, in which certain determinations cease to be as others begin to be.

Change, then, can be observed only in substances. An absolute beginning or cessation can by no possibility be observed, but only a determination of that which is permanent; because only by reference to that which is permanent can there be any consciousness of the transition from one state into another, and from not being to being. And these states can be known empirically only as alternating determinations of that which is permanent. If we suppose something absolutely to begin to be, we must also suppose that there was a point of time in which that something was not. But with what are we to connect this point of time, if not with something that already is? For, an empty time, if we suppose such to precede the point of time in question, is not a possible object of perception; and if we connect what is supposed absolutely to begin to be with things that existed before it, and continue to exist up to the moment of its origination, that which is supposed absolutely to begin to be must be really a determination of the permanent that existed before it. So, also, that which absolutely ceases to be requires us to presuppose the empirical consciousness of a time in which there was nothing to observe.

Substances, then, are the substrates of all determinations of phenomena in time. If some substances could come into being, and others cease to be, even the sole condition, under which the empirical unity of time is possible, would be taken away. We should in that case be compelled to suppose, that phenomena were in two
distinct times, and that existence flowed away in two parallel streams. But this is absurd, for there is only one time, and different times are not side by side, but follow one another.

Permanence is therefore a necessary condition, without which phenomena cannot be determined as things or objects in a possible experience. The permanent is the substance, or the real, in a phenomenon, which, as the substratum of all change, always remains the same. And as substance can be subject to no change in existence, its quantum in nature can neither increase nor diminish.

\[B.- Second Analogy.\]

**Principle of Causal Succession.**

All changes take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect.

\[Proof.\]

The apprehension of the various determinations of a phenomenon is always successive. The ideas of the parts follow one another in consciousness. Whether the parts follow one another in the object also, is a different thing. Now, anything whatever of which we are conscious, anything of which we have an idea, we may certainly call an object; but it is not so easy to say what is meant when the term object is applied to a phenomenon. In this case by an object must be understood, not a mere idea, but only that in the idea which stands for an object. But in so far as by an object we mean merely our own ideas as objects of consciousness, there is no distinction between actual objects of sense and the
apprehension or reception of them in the synthesis of imagination. So far we must therefore say that the various determinations of phenomena are always produced in the mind successively. Were phenomena things in themselves, no man could tell how the various determinations, as they arise one after the other in consciousness, might be connected in the object. As we cannot go outside of our own consciousness, there is no possible way of knowing how things may be in themselves, apart from the ideas through which we are affected by them. But, although phenomena are not things in themselves, and yet are the only things that can be presented to us as knowledge, it is necessary to explain what there is in phenomena themselves that can connect their various determinations in time, while yet the consciousness of those determinations is in apprehension always successive. Thus, for instance, the apprehension of the various determinations contained in the perception of a house is successive. But no one would think of saying that the determinations of the house itself are successive. Now, when I ask how an object is to be conceived from the transcendental point of view, I find that the house is not a thing in itself, but only a phenomenon, that is, it is the consciousness of something, the transcendental object of which is unknown. The question therefore is, what is meant by the connection of various determinations in the phenomenon itself, that phenomenon being yet no thing in itself. Here that which lies in the successive apprehension is considered as mere modes of my consciousness, while the phenomenon which is given to me, although it is nothing but a complex of these modes, is yet regarded as their object, and the con-
ception which I derive from them is held to harmonize necessarily with that object. It soon becomes evident that, as truth consists in the agreement of knowledge with its object, the only question here must be in regard to the formal conditions of empirical truth. The phenomenon as an object can be opposed to apprehension as a series of states of consciousness, only on the ground that it is a unique mode of apprehension, which stands under a rule that necessitates the connection of its various determinations in a certain way. That in the phenomenon which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension, is the object.

Let us now go on to our special problem. There can be no empirical observation that something has occurred, that is, that something, or some state, has come to be which before was not, unless there has previously been observed something that does not contain this state in itself. For, an actual thing following upon an empty time, an absolute beginning preceded by nothing, can no more be apprehended than empty time itself. Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception that follows upon another perception. But, as this is true in all synthesis of apprehension, even in such a synthesis as that of the determinations of a house already instanced, there is nothing in the mere succession of perceptions to distinguish the apprehension of an event from any other apprehension. But I note further, that when I am conscious of a phenomenon as containing an event, the perception of the antecedent state A cannot follow the perception of the consequent state B, but, on the contrary, B, in my apprehension, always follows A, while A never follows B but can only precede it. I see, for
instance, a ship moving down stream. I first observe it higher up the stream, and then lower down, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of the phenomenon I should first observe the ship lower down the stream and then higher up. The order in which the perceptions follow one another in my apprehension is here determined, and to that order my apprehension is tied down. In the former example of the house, my apprehension might begin with a perception of the roof and end with the basement, but it might just as well begin from below and end above, or again the units of my empirical observation might be apprehended from right to left or from left to right. In that series of observations there was therefore no fixed order that made it necessary for my apprehension to begin at a certain moment in the empirical combination of the various elements of perception. But, in the observation of any event, there always is a rule that makes the order in which the elements of perception follow one another in my apprehension a necessary order.

In this case, therefore, the subjective succession of apprehension must be derived from the objective succession of the phenomena. Were it not so, there would be nothing whatever to determine the order of succession in my apprehension, and to distinguish one sort of phenomenon from another. Viewed by itself a mere succession of apprehension is quite arbitrary, and tells us nothing about the connection of the elements of perception in the object. The objective connection must therefore consist in the order in which the elements of perception follow each other, the order being this, that the apprehension of one event follows the apprehension
of another event in conformity with a rule. Thus only am I justified in saying, that there is succession in the phe-
nomenon, and not merely in my apprehension, or, in other words, that I cannot possibly have the apprehension in any other order.

In conformity with this rule, there must lie in that which precedes any event, the condition for a rule by which the event always and necessarily follows; but I cannot say, conversely, that I can go back from the event and apprehend what precedes it. No pheno-
menon goes back from a given point of time to an antecedent point of time, but it yet is related to some antecedent point of time; on the other hand, the progression from a given time to the precise time that follows is necessary. Now something certainly follows, and this I must necessarily refer to something else, which precedes it and upon which it follows necessarily or in conformity with a rule. Accordingly, the event, as that which is conditioned, points back with certainty to some condition, and this condition is what determines the event.

When therefore we have experience of any event, we always presuppose that something has gone before, on which the event follows according to a rule. Other-
wise I should not say that the object follows, for I am not justified in saying that there is succession in an object merely because there is a succession in my apprehension, but only because there is a rule that determines the succession of my apprehension by relation to what precedes. It is therefore always by reference to such a rule that I make my subjective synthesis or synthesis of apprehension objective, and under this
presupposition, and this presupposition only, is even the experience of an event possible at all.

No doubt this seems to contradict the whole view of the course of thought that the facts have always been held to warrant. The accepted doctrine is, that, from the repeated observation and comparison of many cases in which certain events follow certain antecedents, we are first led to the discovery of a rule according to which the events invariably follow those antecedents, and then by reflection on the rule, to the general conception of cause. But on that showing, the conception of cause would be merely empirical, and the rule based upon it, that every event has a cause, would be just as contingent as the experience from which it was derived. Having no a priori foundation, but resting merely on induction, it would have no genuine universality, but only a purely supposititious universality and necessity. The truth is, that here the same principle applies as in the case of other pure a priori elements, for instance, space and time: the principle that we can derive a clear conception from experience, only because we have ourselves put it into experience, and, indeed, have thereby made experience possible at all. No doubt we cannot have a logically clear idea of cause, as a rule that determines the series of events, until we have made use of it in experience, but it is none the less true, that a tacit reference to that rule, as a condition of the synthetic unity of phenomena in time, was the foundation of experience itself, and therefore preceded it a priori.

No experience whatever is even possible without understanding, and the first thing that understanding does, is not to make the conception of special objects
clear, but to make the very consciousness of an object possible. Now, this it effects by conferring upon phenomena and their existence order in time, assigning *a priori* to each of them as consequent a determinate position in time relatively to what precedes. Were such position in time not assigned to phenomena, they would not harmonize with time itself, all the parts of which have their position determined *a priori*. Now, the determinate position of phenomena cannot be learned from the relation of phenomena to absolute time, for absolute time cannot be observed; on the contrary, it is the phenomena that must determine for one another their position in time, making the order in time in which each occurs necessary. That which follows or occurs, must follow in conformity with a universal rule, on that which was contained in a preceding state. Thus arises a series of phenomena, which, by the action of understanding, necessarily assumes in the series of possible perceptions the very same order and unbroken connection which are found *a priori* in time itself, as the form of inner perception in which all perceptions must have their position.

The perception of an event is therefore a possible experience, which becomes an actual experience, when I regard a phenomenon as determined to its position in time, and therefore as an object that can always be found in the connection of perceptions in accordance with a rule. This rule, by which a thing is determined conformably with the succession of time, is, that in what precedes is to be found the condition under which an event always or necessarily follows.

The proof of this proposition rests entirely upon the
following grounds. All empirical knowledge implies the synthesis by imagination of various determinations. This synthesis is always successive, or, in other words, the various determinations always follow one another in consciousness. In this synthesis of imagination, however, there is no fixed order of succession, for the series of ideas may be taken just as well backwards as forwards. But, if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension, in which there is a consciousness of the various determinations contained in a given phenomenon, the order is determined in the object, or, more exactly, there is in our apprehension an order of successive synthesis that determines an object, and in conformity with that order something must necessarily precede, and if it exists, something else must necessarily follow. If, therefore, in my observation I am to obtain the knowledge of an event, that is, of something that actually takes place, my observation must carry with it an empirical judgment, in which the succession is thought as so determined that the event in question is preceded by something else, which it follows necessarily or according to a rule. Were this not so, were I to determine the antecedent as existing, without being forced to recognize the event as following, I should be compelled to regard the succession as a mere subjective play of my imagination, or, if I still supposed it to be objective, I must call it a mere dream. Hence that relation of phenomena, that is of possible perceptions, in which the consequent is necessarily determined in its existence in time by some antecedent in accordance with a rule—the relation, in a word, of cause and effect—is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments with regard to the series of percep-
tions, and therefore the condition of experience. The principle of causality thus applies to all objects of experience that stand under the conditions of succession, just because it is itself the ground of the very possibility of such experience.

C.—Third Analogy.

Principle of Community.

All substances, in so far as they can be observed to co-exist in space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity.

Proof.

Things are co-existent which exist at one and the same time. But how do we know that they exist at one and the same time? Only if in the synthesis of apprehension the order in which the various determinations arise in consciousness is indifferent, or can go either from A through B, C, D, to E, or conversely from E to A. Were the determinations actually to follow one another in time, that is, in an order that began with A and ended with E, it would be impossible for apprehension to start from E and go backwards to A; for A would in that case belong to a time that was past, and therefore could no longer be an object of apprehension.

Now, suppose that a number of substances could be observed, each of which was so completely isolated from the rest that none acted upon any other or was itself acted upon; then I say, that those objects could not possibly be observed to co-exist, and that there is no way in which by empirical synthesis we could pass from the existence of one to the existence of another. If the objects are assumed to be separated by a space that
is quite empty, no doubt the existence of each might be presented in turn in a series of observations; but this would not enable us to say, whether the different phenomena themselves followed one another or existed at the same time.

If, therefore, our supposed substances are to be known as empirically co-existent, it must be by something more than its mere existence that A determines the position in time of B, and, conversely, B the position in time of A. Now, only that which is the cause of a thing or of its determinations, can determine the position of that thing in time. And, as a substance does not itself begin to be in time, but only its determinations, every substance must contain in itself at once the causality of certain determinations in another substance, and the effects of the causality of that other substance. In other words, if substances are to to be known in experience as co-existing, they must, directly or indirectly, stand with one another in a relation of dynamical community. Now, we must regard as necessary to the objects of experience, that without which the experience of these objects would itself be impossible. It is, therefore, necessary that all substances, in so far as they are co-existent phenomenal should stand with one another in thoroughgoing community of reciprocity.

The word community is here used in the sense of dynamical community (commercium), without which even local community (communio spatii) could never be empirically known. Any one may easily gather from his own experience, that only continuous influences in all points of space can lead our senses from one object to another. The light which plays between our eye and the heavenly
bodies produces a mediate community between us and them, and shows us that they co-exist. Nor could we change our position empirically, that is, observe the change in our position, if matter were not everywhere, and if the parts of a material object did not manifest their simultaneous existence by means of their influence on one another. It is in this indirect way that we learn the co-existence of all material objects, even the most distant. Without community there could be only a number of detached observations; the chain of empirical ideas constituting experience would be continually beginning with a new object, having absolutely no connection with that which preceded it, and standing with it in no relation of time. This does not prove that there is no empty space; empty space there may perhaps be, to which perception cannot reach, and where there is, therefore, no empirical knowledge of co-existent objects; but such a space is certainly not a possible object of experience.

A word by way of further explanation may be useful. All phenomena, of which we can possibly be conscious in experience, must in our mind stand in the community of apperception. And so far as we can be conscious of objects as co-existing, we must be conscious that, by reciprocally determining their position in time, they constitute a whole. If this subjective community is to rest upon an objective ground, or to hold of phenomena as substances, it must be because the observation of one object is the necessary condition of the observation of another, and _vice versa_. Otherwise we must say, that the succession which belongs to all observation viewed as apprehension holds also of objects, and that objects
cannot be known as co-existing. But if objects can be known in experience as co-existing, there must be a reciprocal influence, or real community (commercium) of substances. Through this commercium phenomena, in so far as they are external to one another and yet stand in connection, are members of a systematic whole (compositum reale) and are related in many ways within that whole.

The three dynamical relations, from which all others flow, are therefore the relations of inherence, consecution, and composition.

These are the three Analogies of Experience. They are simply the principles by which the existence of phenomena in time is determined, in conformity with the three possible modes of time. There is, firstly, the relation to time itself as a magnitude, the magnitude of existence, that is, duration; secondly, the relation in time as a series, the parts of which follow one another; lastly, the relation likewise in time as a sum of all existence, the members of which are co-existent. This unity of determination in time is dynamical through and through, that is, time is not regarded as that in which experience directly determines to each existence its own place; this indeed is impossible, because it is not possible to observe an absolute time, in which phenomena might be held together. The unity is due to a rule of understanding, through which only the existence of phenomena can obtain synthetic unity in conformity with relations of time, and which determines to each object its place in time, and that too a priori, and as holding for all and every time.

Nature, in the empirical sense of the word, is the
connected system of phenomena as conforming in their existence to necessary rules or laws. There are therefore certain laws, and these *a priori*, that make nature possible at all. Empirical laws can be found out and established only by means of experience, and even they are subject to those primary laws that make experience possible. Our analogies, therefore, properly exhibit the unity of nature in the connected system of phenomena under certain exponents, and these exponents express nothing but the relation of time, as embracing all existence within itself, to the unity of apperception, a unity that is possible only in the synthesis conformed to rules. Taken together they affirm, that all phenomena belong, and must belong, to one system of nature, inasmuch as, apart from this *a priori* unity, there could be no unity of experience, and therefore no determination of objects in experience.

4. Postulates of all Empirical Thought.

1. That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience, or conforms to pure perception and pure conception, is *possible*.

2. That which is bound up with the material conditions of experience, or with sensation, is *actual*.

3. That which, in its connection with the actual, is determined in accordance with the universal conditions of experience, is *necessary*, or necessarily exists.

Explanation.

The categories of modality have this peculiarity, that they do not in the least enlarge the conception to which they are attached as predicates, but merely express its
relation to the faculty of knowledge. Granting the conception of a thing to be quite complete, I may yet ask whether the object is possible or actual, and if actual, whether it is also necessary. Such determinations are not conceived to belong to the object itself; the only point is how the object, together with its determinations, is related to understanding in its empirical use, to empirical judgment and to reason as applied to experience.

267 (1) The first postulate demands that the conception of things should agree with the formal conditions of any experience whatever. Now this objective form of experience includes all synthesis that is essential to the knowledge of objects. A conception may imply synthesis, but if the synthesis does not belong to experience, either as being derived from it, or as forming its a priori condition, the conception must be held as empty, and as not related to any object. There is, for instance, no contradiction in the conception of a figure that is enclosed by two straight lines, for the conception of two straight lines, and the conception of two such lines meeting, do not involve the negation of a figure: the impossibility arises, not from the conception in itself, but from the conditions of space and of the determination of space, which prevent the construction of such a figure. But these conditions have an objective reality of their own, or apply only to possible things, because they contain in themselves the a priori form of experience in general.

270 Setting aside everything the possibility of which can be learned only from actual experience, let us limit ourselves to the question whether anything is possible through a priori conceptions. Now, I maintain that nothing can be determined as possible through such conceptions alone,
but only in so far as they are merely formal and objective conditions of experience in general.

At first sight it no doubt seems as if the possibility of a triangle could be known from the mere conception of it; the conception certainly is independent of experience, and we can as a matter of fact give to it an object, that is, we can construct the triangle completely a priori. But as the triangle so constructed is merely the form of an object, it would remain a mere product of imagination, and we could not tell whether any object corresponding to it was possible, if we could not show that such a figure is thought under no conditions but those on which all objects of experience rest. It is true that we are able to know and to characterize the possibility of things even prior to experience; but this we can do, only because we are able to determine completely a priori the formal relations under which any object whatever can be known; and even then we can determine the possibility of things only relatively to experience and within the limits of experience.

(2) The postulate which relates to the knowledge of things as actual demands perceptions of sense, and therefore sensations of which we are conscious. True, it is not necessary that we should be directly conscious through sense of the object that is to be known, but we must be aware of its connection with some actual perception, in accordance with those analogies of experience which exhibit the conditions of all real connection in experience. That which is characteristic of actuality is found solely in the perception of sense that gives to a conception its matter. At the same time, we may know even before perception that a thing actually exists, and there-
fore is in a sense \textit{a priori}, if we can but show that it is inseparably related to certain perceptions, in accordance with the principles or analogies that determine the empirical connection of all perceptions. Thus from observation of the attraction of iron filings, we know that a magnetic matter pervades all bodies, although our organs of sense are so constituted that we cannot directly perceive it. For, by the laws of sensibility and the context of our perceptions, we should have a direct perception of that matter in experience were our senses only fine enough. Our knowledge of the existence of things, therefore, extends as far as perception, or valid inferences from perception, will carry us. But if we do not start from experience, and proceed in accordance with the laws of the empirical connection of phenomena, we shall in vain try to guess or to discover the existence of anything whatever.

The third postulate refers to material necessity or necessity in existence, not to merely formal and logical necessity in the connection of conceptions. Now, the existence of an object of sense cannot be known completely \textit{a priori}, but only comparatively \textit{a priori}, or relatively to something else the existence of which is already known; hence necessity of existence can never be derived from conceptions, but only from the connection of an object through general laws of experience with what has been perceived. There is no existence, however, that can be known to be necessary, on condition that other phenomena have been presented, except the existence of effects as following from given causes in conformity with laws of causality. It is, therefore, not the existence of things or substances that we can know to
be necessary, but only the existence of their state; and the existence of their state we can know to be necessary only from its connection, in accordance with empirical laws of causality, with other states given in perception. From this it follows that the criterion of necessity lies entirely in the law of possible experience, the law that whatever happens is determined \textit{a priori} in the object through its cause. We cannot know any \textit{effects} in nature to be necessary except those effects the causes of which are given to us, and hence the criterion of necessity in existence does not apply beyond the field of possible experience. Nor does it apply even within experience to the existence of things as substances, because substances can never be regarded as empirical effects, or something that happens and begins to be. Necessity applies only to the relations of phenomena as standing under the dynamical law of causality, and to the possibility that is based upon it of concluding \textit{a priori} from a given mode of existence (the cause) to another mode of existence (the effect).

\textit{General Remark on the Principles of Judgment.}

288 It is very remarkable that there is nothing in a category, taken by itself, that enables us to say whether a real thing corresponding to it is possible, and that a pure conception of understanding can be shown to have objective reality only if a perception is brought forward to which it can apply.

291 But what is still more remarkable is that the categories cannot be shown to be conditions of the possibility of things, and therefore to have \textit{objective reality}, without the
aid not only of perceptions, but even of *external perceptions*. Take, for instance, the pure conceptions of relation. Here we find (1) that, in order to show that there is something permanent, which corresponds to the conception of substance, and thus to prove the objective reality of the conception, we must have the perception of that which is in *space*, in other words, the perception of matter; for only space has in it anything permanent, whereas time, and therefore all that exists in the inner sense, is in perpetual flux. (2) The perception which corresponds to the conception of *causality* is *change*. Now, to have a real consciousness of *change*, we must have the perception of motion, or change of place, and indeed it is only by reference to motion that we can realize what *change* means. No pure understanding can comprehend how *change* is possible, for in itself *change* combines determinations that contradict one another when they are predicated of the same thing. How, in the very same thing, there should follow from a given state another state that is its opposite, is not only beyond the power of reason to comprehend without a special instance, but without perception it cannot be made intelligible to it at all. The only perception which fulfils this requirement is that of the motion of a point in space, for, by its presence in different places, the point presents us with a series of reciprocally exclusive determinations, and thus enables us to realize the meaning of *change*. Even in the case of *inner changes*, we have to figure time, the form of inner sense, as a line, and the inner changes themselves as the generation of that line, that is, as motion. Thus it is by means of external perception that we make intelligible to ourselves the various
successive states in which we ourselves exist. The true explanation of this is that no change can possibly be an object of experience apart from the consciousness of something that is permanent, and that in inner sense nothing that is permanent can be found. (3) Nor can the possibility of the category of community be conceived by reason alone, and hence its objective reality can be seen to be possible only by reference to perception, and indeed only by reference to external perception in space. How can we think it to be possible that there should be anything in the existence of one substance to affect reciprocally the existence of other substances, and that, therefore, because there is something in the former, there must be something also in the latter which could not be understood from the existence of the latter when it is considered merely by itself? This is what community demands, and yet it is inconceivable, if things subsist by themselves, or are completely isolated from one another. The answer is that we can make the possibility of the community of substances, that is, of objects of experience, intelligible to ourselves only by representing them in space, and, therefore, in external perception. For space by its very nature contains in itself a priori formal external relations, and these are conditions of the possibility of the real relations of action and reaction, and therefore of community. Similarly it might readily be shown that the possibility of things as quanta, and therefore the objective reality of the category of quantity, requires external perception, and that only by means of external perception can we have experience even of anything in inner sense as a quantum.

The net result of this whole section is this:—All
principles of pure understanding are nothing but *a priori* principles of the possibility of experience; and all *a priori* synthetic propositions relate only to experience, and indeed from that relation they derive their possibility.

**Chapter III.—Distinction of Phenomena and Noumena.**

295 We have seen that, whatever understanding produces from itself, it holds in trust solely in the interest of experience. The principles of pure understanding, whether as mathematical they are *a priori* constitutive principles, or as dynamical merely regulative principles, contain nothing but what may be called the pure schema for a possible experience. For experience derives its unity entirely from the synthetic unity which understanding imparts, originally and spontaneously, to the synthesis of imagination in relation to apperception; and phenomena, as the data for a possible knowledge, must therefore stand *a priori* in relation to that synthetic unity and in harmony with it.

297 Now the proposition that understanding can never make a transcendental use, but only an empirical use, of any of its *a priori* principles, is seen to have very important consequences, so soon as it is thoroughly understood. A conception is employed transcendently when it occurs in a proposition regarding things *as such* or *in themselves*; it is employed empirically when the proposition relates merely to *phenomena*, or objects of a possible experience. Only the empirical use is admissible. Every conception requires, firstly, the logical form of conception or thought, and, secondly, the possi-
bility of an object being empirically given to which it may be applied. Where no such object can be given, the conception is empty and meaningless, containing nothing but the logical function which is necessary in order to form a conception out of any data that may be given. Now, the only way in which an object can be presented is in perception. And this perception must be empirical; for, although pure perception is possible a priori before the presentation of an object, yet, as it is a mere form, it can by itself have no object to which it may apply, and therefore it can have no objective value ascribed to it. Hence all conceptions, and with them all principles, even when they are possible a priori, are none the less relative to empirical perceptions as the data for a possible experience. Apart from this relation they have no objective validity, but are a mere play of imagination or of understanding.

That this limitation applies to all the categories, and to all the principles derived from them, is evident, if only from this, that we cannot give a real definition of even a single one of them, or in other words, make the possibility of their object intelligible, without directly referring to the conditions of sensibility, and therefore to the form of phenomena. The categories are thus necessarily limited to phenomena as their sole object, and, if this limitation is taken away, all meaning or objective relation vanishes from them, and no possible instance of an object can be adduced to make the conception comprehensible.

There is therefore no way of avoiding the conclusion that the pure conceptions of understanding can never be employed transcendentally, but only empirically, and that
the principles of pure understanding can apply only to objects of sense, as conforming to the universal conditions of a possible experience, and never to things as such, or apart from the manner in which we are capable of perceiving them.

The Transcendental Analytic has brought us to this important conclusion, that understanding can never do more than supply by anticipation the form for a possible experience; and, as nothing but a phenomenon can be an object of experience, it has taught us that understanding cannot possibly transcend the limits of sensibility, beyond which no objects are presented to us. The principles of pure understanding are merely exponents of phenomena, and for the proud name of Ontology, as a science that claims to supply in a systematic doctrine *a priori* synthetic knowledge of things as such, must be substituted the more modest claims of an Analytic of Pure Understanding.

If from empirical knowledge is taken away all that thought contributes in its categories, there is no longer any knowledge of an object. By mere perception nothing whatever is thought, and the mere fact that I am conscious of an affection of my sensibility does not entitle me to say that I am conscious of my affection as related to any object. On the other hand, even if all perception is taken away, there still remains the form of thought, or the manner in which the various elements of a possible perception are capable of being combined in relation to an object. The categories have therefore in this sense a wider reach than perceptions of sense, that they think objects in general, without looking to the particular manner in which they may be presented. But
although they are so far independent of sensibility, they
do not determine a larger sphere of objects; for we are
not entitled to say that non-sensuous objects can be
presented, unless we can show that a sort of perception
is possible that is not sensuous. Now this we cannot
possibly do.

A conception which cannot be known in any way to
have objective reality may be called problematic, if it is
not self-contradictory, and if it is bound up with the
knowledge gained through certain conceptions the range
of which it serves to limit. Now the conception of a
noumenon, that is, of a thing that cannot be an object of
sense, but is thought, by pure understanding alone, as a
thing in itself, is certainly not self-contradictory; for we
cannot know with certainty that sensibility is the only
possible mode of perception. Moreover, the conception
of a noumenon is necessary to prevent sensuous percep-
tion from claiming to extend to things in themselves, and
to set a limit to the objective validity of sensuous know-
ledge. In the end, however, we are unable to understand
how such noumena are possible at all, and the realm
beyond the sphere of phenomena is for us empty.
We have indeed an understanding that problematically
stretches beyond the sphere of phenomena, but we have
no perception in which objects beyond the field of sensi-
bility can be presented, nor can we conceive how such
a perception is even possible. Hence understanding
cannot be employed assertorically beyond the world of
phenomena. The conception of a noumenon is, there-
fore, merely the conception of a limit, a conception which
is only of negative use, and but serves to check the
presumption of sensibility. But although it is unable to
establish anything positive beyond the sphere of phenomena, the idea of a noumenon is not a mere arbitrary fiction, but is connected in the closest way with the limitation of the sensibility to phenomena.

The positive division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a sensible and intelligible world, is therefore quite inadmissible. Certainly, the distinction of conceptions as sensuous and intellectual is legitimate. But, as intellectual conceptions do not determine any object for themselves, they can have no objective validity. If abstraction is made from sense, how shall it be made intelligible, that the categories, 256 which are then the only means of determining noumena, have any meaning whatever? The mere unity of thought is not the same thing as the determination of an object; for knowledge also requires that the object to which that unity can be applied, should be capable of being presented in a perception. At the same time, if the conception of a noumenon is interpreted in a problematic sense, it is not only admissible but indispensable, serving as it does to define the limits of sensibility. In that sense, however, a noumenon is not a special kind of object for our understanding, namely, an intelligible object; on the contrary it is problematic whether there is any understanding that could have such an object actually before it. Such an understanding would not know its object discursively by means of categories, but intuitively in a non-sensuous perception; and how this is possible we cannot form even the faintest conception. Still, in the conception of a noumenon our understanding gets a sort of negative extension; for in calling things in themselves noumena, and viewing them as not objects of sense
it rather limits the sensibility than is limited by sensibility. At the same time, understanding cannot limit sensibility without also setting limits to itself, for it has instantly to add, that things in themselves cannot be known by means of categories, and all that remains is to think them under a name that indicates something unknown.

There are, therefore, no principles through which the conception of pure, merely intelligible objects could ever be applied, for we cannot imagine any way in which such objects could be presented to us. The problematic thought, which leaves a place open for intelligible objects, serves only, as a sort of empty space, to limit the empirical principles, without containing within it or indicating any object of knowledge that lies outside the sphere of those principles.
INTRODUCTION.

1. Transcendental Illusion.

We have here nothing to do with optical illusion, or with empirical illusion of any kind, which occurs in the empirical use of correct rules of understanding, and arises from the misleading influence of imagination upon judgment. What we propose to consider is transcendental illusion, which is due to the use of principles that have no bearing upon experience, and therefore cannot be tested by experience. Contrary to all the warnings of criticism, this illusion tempts us to apply the categories beyond experience, and cheats us with the dream of an extension of pure understanding beyond the limits of experience. Principles which are applied entirely within the limits of possible experience we shall call immanent; those which seek to transcend these limits we shall call transcendent. In calling a principle transcendent, I do not mean to indicate simply the transcendental use, or, as we should rather call it, misuse of the categories. This is merely a defect in judgment, when it has not been chastened by criticism, and therefore does not pay due heed to the limits within which alone pure understanding has full sway. A principle is said to be transcendent, when it positively
asserts our right to break down all such barriers, and to take possession of an entirely new realm, into which it can enter only if all limits to knowledge have been taken away. *Transcendental* and *transcendent* are therefore not the same thing. The principles of pure understanding, as we have seen above, can be employed only empirically, never transcendentally, inasmuch as they do not extend beyond the limits of experience. But a principle which denies those limits, or even commands us to transcend them, must be called *transcendent*. Now, if our Critique succeeds in exposing the illusion of these pretended principles, the principles which are employed only empirically may be called, in contrast to the former, *immanent* principles of pure understanding.

The logical illusion of a sophistical syllogism consists in an imitation of the form of reason, and arises solely from a want of attention to the rules of logic. It therefore vanishes the moment our attention is aroused. Transcendental illusion, on the other hand, does not disappear, even when it has been brought under the light of transcendental criticism, and when its fallacy has been clearly detected; as is the case, for instance, in the proposition, that the world must have a beginning in time. The explanation of this is, that in our reason, considered as simply a faculty of human knowledge, there lie fundamental rules and maxims of its use, which have all the appearance of objective principles. Hence we commonly mistake the subjective necessity, which is essential to the connection by understanding of our conceptions, for an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves.
Transcendental Dialectic must therefore be satisfied with bringing to light the illusion in transcendent judgments, and guarding us against its deceptive influence; but it can never put an end to the illusion and cause it to disappear, as in the case of logical illusion. For, the illusion is here natural and unavoidable, resting as it does upon subjective principles which we cannot help supposing to be objective. So closely is this illusion interwoven with the operations of human reason that even after it has been detected in its work of deception, it never fails to fascinate the reason and to lead to momentary errors, which need to be corrected again and again.

2. Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusion.

In the Analytic it has been shown that understanding is the faculty of rules; and now we distinguish reason from understanding by calling it the faculty of principles. By a principle is usually meant any sort of knowledge that can be employed as a principle, even if in itself, and from the point of view of its origin, it is not a principle at all. Every general proposition, which can stand in a syllogism as its major premise, is in this sense called a principle, even if it has been derived by induction from experience.

Strictly speaking, however, only that knowledge is a principle in which I know the particular in the universal by means of conceptions. Now, if we consider the universal a priori propositions of pure understanding in themselves and according to their origin, they are very far from yielding knowledge by means of conceptions.
For they would not be even possible \textit{a priori}, if we could not refer to pure perception, or to the universal conditions of a possible experience. Understanding cannot possibly derive synthetic knowledge from conceptions, and such knowledge is what I mean when I speak of principles in the strict sense of the term.

If, then, understanding is the faculty of reducing phenomena to the unity of rules, reason is the faculty of bringing the rules of understanding under principles. Reason never goes directly to experience or to any object, but seeks by means of conceptions to give \textit{a priori} unity to understanding and its various knowledge. This unity, which may be called the unity of reason, is quite different in kind from that which understanding is capable of producing.

The question arises, then, whether pure reason in itself contains \textit{a priori} synthetic principles and rules, and, if so, what those principles are.

From the formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms we may readily learn the ground upon which the transcendental principle of pure reason in its synthetic knowledge must rest.

Firstly, in the process of inference reason does not bring perceptions directly under rules, as understanding does with its categories, but deals with conceptions and judgments. No doubt pure reason also relates to objects of perception, but its direct relation is not to perceptions, but only to understanding and its judgments. It is understanding only that applies directly to perceptions of sense, and by its judgments determines them as objects. The unity of reason therefore differs essentially from the unity of a possible experience as due to understanding.
The proposition that whatever happens has a cause, is not a principle known and prescribed by reason. It makes the unity of experience possible, and borrows nothing from reason, which could never have prescribed such a synthetic unity from mere conceptions, that is, independently of all relation to possible experience.

Secondly, reason in its logical use seeks to reach a premise which contains the universal condition of the judgment that constitutes the conclusion of the syllogism, and the syllogism is itself simply a judgment in which that condition is subsumed under a universal rule contained in the major premise. Now, as reason may again seek for a universal condition of that rule, or, in other words, may go as far as it can in search of the condition of a condition, by means of a pro-syllogism, it is plain that the peculiar principle of reason in its logical use is to find for every conditioned knowledge of understanding the unconditioned, and so to complete the unity of knowledge.

This logical maxim, however, can be regarded as a principle of pure reason only if we assume that when the conditioned is given the whole series of conditions in subordination to one another, and therefore the unconditioned, is actually realized, the object being seen in itself and in the whole of its relations.

Now, such a principle of pure reason is manifestly synthetic; for while it is no doubt true that the conditioned, is related analytically to some condition, it is not possible to derive the unconditioned from it by analysis. From that principle must also proceed various other synthetic propositions, of which pure understanding knows nothing. These propositions will be transcendent,
so far as phenomena are concerned; that is to say, it will be impossible ever to make an adequate use in experience of the supreme principle of pure reason. That principle will therefore be essentially different from all the principles of understanding, which are always immanent and have no object but to make experience possible. We must therefore inquire, whether the principle that the series of conditions extends as far as the unconditioned has any objective truth, and how the answer to this question affects our view of the empirical use of understanding; or whether it has no objective truth, but is simply a logical rule, telling us to get as near to completeness as we possibly can in the ascent to ever higher conditions, and so to bring our knowledge to the highest unity of which our reason is capable.

Section II.—Transcendental Ideas.

In the Transcendental Analytic we have seen how, from the mere logical form of our knowledge, there arise pure a priori conceptions, which yield the consciousness of objects antecedently to all experience, or rather point to the synthetic unity that alone makes an empirical knowledge of objects possible. By conceiving the form of judgments as supplying conceptions for the synthesis of perceptions, we were led to the discovery of the categories, which we found to be the guide of understanding in the whole of its empirical use. We may therefore expect that from the form of syllogisms, as applied to the synthetic unity of perceptions in conformity with the
categories, will arise a special class of *a priori* conceptions, which may be called pure conceptions of reason or *transcendental ideas*, and which will determine how understanding is to be employed within the realm of experience as a whole in conformity with principles.

A transcendental conception of reason is, therefore, just the conception of the *totality of conditions* of anything that is given as conditioned. Now, the *unconditioned* alone makes a totality of conditions possible, while conversely the totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned; hence a pure conception of reason may be defined, generally, as a conception of the unconditioned, in so far as it contains a ground for the synthesis of the conditioned.

There are as many pure conceptions of reason as understanding has functions of relation in its categories. Hence we have, firstly, the unconditioned of the *categorical* synthesis in a subject; secondly, the unconditioned of the *hypothetical* synthesis of the members of a series; thirdly, the unconditioned of the *disjunctive* synthesis of the parts in a system.

*Transcendental ideas*, then, are problematic conceptions of pure reason, which regard all empirical knowledge as determined through an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fictions, but spring from the very nature of reason itself, and therefore stand in a necessary relation to the whole use of understanding. And, lastly, they are transcendent, inasmuch as they overleap the limits of all experience, in which no object can be presented that is adequate to the transcendental idea.

It must not be supposed, however, that because transcendental conceptions of reason are *only ideas*, they are
therefore superfluous and useless. For, although ideas cannot determine an object, they may lie at the basis of understanding as an unseen canon, for its extended and consistent use. Adding nothing to what we know of an object by means of the conceptions of understanding, they yet may guide understanding to clearer and wider knowledge; not to mention that they may, perhaps, make the transition possible from the sphere of nature to the sphere of morality.

Section III.—System of Transcendental Ideas.

All transcendental ideas can be brought under three heads: the first, containing the absolute or unconditioned unity of the thinking subject; the second, the absolute unity of the series of conditions of phenomena; the third, the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought whatever.

The thinking subject is the object of psychology, the sum-total of all phenomena (the world) is the object of cosmology, and the being that contains the supreme condition of all that can be thought (the Being of all beings) is the object of theology. Pure reason therefore supplies the idea for a transcendental doctrine of the soul (psychologia rationalis), the idea for a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis), and, lastly, the idea for a transcendental knowledge of God (theologia transcendentalis.)

It is readily seen, that the sole aim of pure reason is absolute totality of synthesis on the side of the conditions, and that it has nothing to do with absolute completeness on the side of the conditioned. For the presupposition that
the series of conditions should be complete is satisfied, if reason can only present to the understanding a priori a condition that is itself complete and unconditioned, leaving it to understanding to descend from the condition to the conditioned.

It is obvious also, that those three ideas display a certain connection and unity among themselves, by means of which pure reason is able to reduce its knowledge to system. To advance from the knowledge of oneself (the soul) to a knowledge of the world, and through it to a knowledge of the Supreme Being, is a progression so natural, that it suggests the logical advance of reason from premises to conclusion.

We may say that the object of a purely transcendental idea is something of which we can form no conception, although the idea itself has arisen with absolute necessity from the primary laws of reason. In fact it is impossible for understanding to have the conception of an object that should be adequate to the demands of reason, for this would mean that we should have a conception that could be exhibited and brought to perception in a possible experience. But it is better, because less misleading, to say, that we can have no knowledge of the object which corresponds to an idea, although we may have a problematic conception of it.

Now, at least the transcendental or subjective reality of the ideas of reason is reached by a necessary inference.
There are, accordingly, inferences the premises of which contain nothing empirical, and in these we reason from something that we know to something else that we cannot comprehend, but to which by an unavoidable illusion we ascribe objective reality. In their actual result those inferences are sophistical rather than rational; at the same time they are not mere arbitrary fictions, but spring from the very nature of reason, and in that sense are well entitled to be called rational. They are sophistications of pure reason itself, which even the wisest man cannot shake off. After much effort he may avoid positive error, but he need not hope to be perfectly free from an illusion that will never cease to mock and bewilder him.

Corresponding to the three ideas, there are three kinds of dialectical inference. In the first, I reason from the transcendental conception of the subject, which is perfectly simple, to the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I have no conception at all. This dialectical illusion I shall call the transcendental paralogism. The second kind of dialectical inference is to the transcendental conception of an absolute totality in the series of conditions to any given phenomenon. Here I reason, that, as my conception of the unconditioned synthetic unity of the series is always self-contradictory, the opposite unity, which is equally inconceivable, must be regarded as true. The attitude of reason in this form of dialectical inference I shall call the antinomy of reason. In the third and last kind of sophistical inference of reason, I conclude from the totality of conditions demanded by the thought of objects as a whole, in so far as these can be given, to the absolute synthetic unity of all
conditions of the possibility of things in general; in other words, I reason from things that I cannot know through the mere transcendental conception of them to a Being of all beings that I know still less, since the transcendental conception throws no light upon its existence or its unconditioned necessity. This sort of dialectical inference I shall call the ideal of pure reason.

A *logical* paralogism is an inference invalid in form, the invalidity of which is quite independent of its content. A transcendental paralogism is an inference also invalid in form, but its formal invalidity has a transcendental source. The wrong conclusion will here be due to the very nature of human reason, and will carry with it an unavoidable though not an inexplicable illusion.

There is one conception, that we must now put along with the transcendental conceptions contained in the table of categories, but without in any way changing or adding to that table. This is the conception, or, if it is preferred, the judgment, "*I think.*" It is easy to see, that "*I think*" is the common vehicle of all conceptions, and therefore of transcendental as well as empirical conceptions. As the vehicle of transcendental conceptions it is itself transcendental, but it cannot claim a special place in the list of these transcendental conceptions, because it merely serves to indicate that all thought belongs to consciousness. And although it is pure, or free from all empirical elements or impressions of sense, it yet serves to distinguish between two different kinds of objects, from the different ways in which they are related to conscious-
ness. *I*, as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am called soul, while that which is an object of outer sense is called body. Accordingly, the very term *I* designates the thinking being which is the object of psychology. Psychology, therefore, may be called the rational science of soul, if it seeks to know nothing about the soul but what can be inferred, independently of all experience, from the conception *I* as present in all thought; that is, if no attempt is made to determine the *I in concreto* as a particular object of experience.

Now, the *rational* doctrine of the soul necessarily attempts to do this; for, if the smallest empirical element of my thought, or any particular perception of my own state, should mingle with the principles of the science, it would no longer be a rational, but would be merely an *empirical* doctrine of the soul. We have before us, then, what claims to be a science, built upon the single proposition, "*I think,*" and this is the proper place to try its solidity, or want of solidity, by the principles of a transcendental philosophy. It is not a valid objection to rational psychology to say, that, as the proposition "*I think,*" expresses the perception of oneself as revealed in experience, the doctrine built upon that perception can never be purely rational, but must be founded in part upon an empirical principle. For this inner perception is but the mere apperception, "*I think,*" which is the condition of all transcendental conceptions, and means, *I* think substance, cause, etc. The determination of the constitution and possibility of inner experience in general, or the general relation of one perception to another, apart from the particular distinction and empirical determination of perception, cannot be regarded as empirical
knowledge, but only as the knowledge of what any empirical object must be. Now the investigation into the possibility of experience in general is undoubtedly a transcendental investigation, though the addition of even the smallest ingredient of sense, were it only the feeling of pleasure or pain, to the pure idea of self-consciousness, would at once convert a rational into an empirical psychology.

"I think," is therefore the text of rational psychology, and from this single proposition the whole system must be derived. It is easy to see, that, if this thought is to be used as determining the self as an object, it can bring to it only transcendental predicates, for any empirical predicate whatever must destroy the purity of a rational science, and make it dependent upon experience.

The categories will naturally be our guiding-thread, but as there is here given to us a thing, the I as a thinking being, we shall begin with the category of substance, which is predicated of the I as a thing in itself. The topic of the rational doctrine of soul, from which all else that may be contained in it is derived, is therefore as follows:

1. The soul is substance.
2. As to quality, simple.
3. As to the various times in which it exists, numerically identical, that is, unity (not plurality).
4. In relation to possible objects in space.

Corresponding to these elements, the transcendental doctrine of the soul contains four paralogisms. That doctrine is therefore wrongly held to be a science of pure reason concerning the nature of our thinking self. It has
no foundation but the simple idea \( I \), which is so completely empty of all content, that it cannot be called even a conception, but merely a consciousness that accompanies all conceptions. This \( I \), or he, or it, this thing that thinks, is nothing but the idea of a transcendental subject of thought = \( x \), which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and which, apart from them, cannot be conceived at all. We turn round and round it in a perpetual circle, for we can make no judgment about it without making use of the idea of it in our judgment. Nor can this inconvenience be avoided, for consciousness in itself is not so much the distinct idea of a particular object, as a general form of all the ideas through which knowledge of objects is to be obtained, and indeed the only form of which I can say, that without it I can think nothing whatever.

Now, as the proposition, "I think," taken problematically, contains the form of every judgment of understanding, and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is clear that the inferences from it must rest upon a purely transcendental use of understanding, in which all aid from experience is rejected. After what has already been shown, we cannot have much faith in the success of such an undertaking. We shall therefore follow the pure doctrine of soul with a critical eye through all its predicaments.

But, before doing so, a general remark may be made, which will help to bring out the real character of those inferences. I do not know an object by simply thinking it, but only by determining a given perception relatively to the unity of consciousness in which all thought consists. To know myself as an object, it is therefore not enough
simply to be conscious of myself as thinking, but I must
be conscious of the perception of myself as determined
relatively to the function of thought. Now, none of the
407 modi of self-consciousness in thinking are by themselves
conceptions of objects or categories: they are merely
logical functions, which can give me no knowledge of
myself as an object, because they can give no knowledge
of an object at all. To know myself as an object of my
own inner perception, I must be conscious of the self as
object, and not simply as determining subject; in other
words, I must be conscious of the various determinations
of myself, in so far as these can be brought together in
conformity with the unity of apperception, which is the
universal condition of all combination in thought.

(1) There is no doubt that in any judgment I am the
determining subject of the relation in which the judgment
consists. The proposition that I, I that think, am the
subject in every act of thought, and cannot possibly be
regarded as a predicate pertaining to thought, is not only
a necessary but even an identical proposition. But this
does not mean that I am conscious of myself as an object
in such a way that I can determine myself as a self-
subsistent being or substance. The latter proposition goes
a very long way indeed beyond the former, and demands
for its proof data that will certainly never be found in the
I as simply thinking, and perhaps will never be found in
it at all, in so far as it is considered as thinking.

(2) That the I of apperception, and therefore the I in
each act of thought, is one, and cannot be resolved into a
plurality of subjects, or is a logically simple subject, is
implied in the very conception of thinking, and may be
408 derived from it by mere analysis. But this does not
mean that the thinking I is a simple substance, which would be a synthetic proposition. The conception of substance is always relative to perceptions, and as these in us can only be sensuous, they lie quite beyond the field of understanding and its thinking. But it is precisely of thought, as distinguished from perception, that we are speaking, when we say that the I in thinking is simple. Now, in all other cases, it is a very difficult thing to tell what in any given perception is substance, and it is still more difficult to say whether the substance can be simple, as, for instance, whether matter is made up of simple parts. It would therefore be a very remarkable thing indeed, if the poorest of all our ideas should by a sort of revelation enable us to say at once that the I is a simple substance.

(3) The proposition, that in the various determinations of my consciousness I am identical with myself, is likewise implied in the conceptions themselves, and is therefore an analytical proposition. But this identity of the subject in all the determinations of which I can be conscious is not the same thing as a perception in which the self is presented as an object which can be recognized as self-identical. The mere consciousness of the identity of the subject in all its determinations does not mean the identity of the person, if by that is meant, the consciousness of the identity of one's own substance as a thinking being in all changes of its state. No mere analysis of the proposition, "I think," can prove identity in this latter sense; for that we should require synthetic judgments derived from an actual perception of the self.

(4) That I distinguish my own existence as a thinking
being from things outside of me, one of which is my own body, is also an analytic proposition; for by other I mean other than me, or distinct from me. But this does not enable me to know whether I could be conscious of myself at all, were things not given to me in perception as outside of me, and whether I could exist merely as a thinking being without being also a sensuous being.

The analysis, then, of my consciousness of self as the subject that thinks, does not enable me to take a single step towards the knowledge of myself as an object. To suppose so is simply to confuse the logical analysis of thinking in general with the metaphysical determination of an object.

The truth is, that it would be a great stumbling-block, and, indeed, the only thing that our Critique could have reason to fear, if it could be shown a priori, that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances; that, as a necessary consequence, personality is inseparable from them; and that they are conscious of their own existence as separate and distinct from all matter. Were it possible in this way to take a step beyond the world of sense, and to enter the world of noumena, who should then deny to us the right to go forward in this new region, to settle in it, and, if we were under a lucky star, to take complete possession of it? For, the proposition, that every thinking being is by its very nature a simple substance, is an a priori synthetic proposition; firstly, because it goes beyond the conception with which it starts, and adds to the act of thinking in general the mode of existence; and, secondly, because it adds to that conception the new predicate of simplicity, which cannot be given in any experience. Hence a priori
synthetic propositions would be possible and admissible, not simply, as we have contended, in relation to objects of a possible experience, and indeed as principles of the possibility of experience, but even as determinations of things in general and of things in themselves. This would make an end of our whole Critique, and bring us back to the old dogmatism. The danger, however, is not so great as it seems, as may be seen when we look at the matter more closely.

The whole procedure of rational psychology is vitiated by a paralogism, which may be exhibited in the following syllogism:

That which can be thought only as subject, must exist as subject, and is therefore substance.

A thinking being from its very nature can be thought only as subject.

Therefore, a thinking being can exist only as subject, that is, as substance.

Now, in the major premise of this syllogism, by "that which can be thought" is meant a being in every relation in which it can be thought, and therefore in relation to possible perception. But, in the minor premise, the only being spoken of is a "thinking being," or one that is conscious of itself as subject, simply from its relation to thought and to the unity of consciousness, but not at all from its relation to a perception by which it is presented to thought as an object. The conclusion is, therefore, reached per sophisma figurae dictionis.

That we are perfectly right in resolving this famous argument into a paralogism will be at once evident, if we call to mind what has already been pointed out. The conception of a thing that can exist by itself as a subject,
but cannot exist as a mere predicate, does not carry with it objective reality. We cannot possibly know that there is an object corresponding to the conception, because we cannot understand how an object of that sort could exist at all. If by the term "substance" is meant an object that can be presented to us, we must say that the indispensable condition of the objective reality of our conception is, that it should be presented to us in a permanent perception. Now, in inner perception there is nothing permanent, for the I is merely the consciousness of my thinking. So long, therefore, as we limit ourselves to mere thinking, we are without the necessary condition for the application of the conception of substance to the self as a thinking being; we are unable, in other words, to say that the self is an independent subject. And along with the objective reality of the conception of substance completely disappears the simplicity of substance, leaving only the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thinking in general, a unity which exists whether the subject is composite or simple.

Rational psychology is, therefore, not a doctrine which enables us to add anything to our knowledge of self; it is merely a discipline, which sets impassable limits to speculative reason in this field, and prevents us, on the one hand, from throwing ourselves into the arms of a soulless materialism, and on the other hand, from giving ourselves up to a mystic spiritualism that has lost its hold of actual life. The refusal of reason to answer our curious questions as to a life beyond the present, we ought to interpret as a hint to apply our self-knowledge to fruitful practical ends, and to turn away from fruitless and transcendent speculations.
The claim of rational psychology to take rank as a science, rests upon a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which is the supreme condition of the categories, is simply confused with a perception of the subject as object, and hence we suppose that we may apply to the subject the category of substance. But the unity of consciousness is merely the unity implied in all thinking, and by means of this unity no object is given, nor can the category of substance, which always presupposes a given perception, be applied to it. There is therefore no knowledge of the subject as an object. The subject no doubt thinks the categories, but that is no reason for saying that it can have a conception of itself as an object of the categories. It cannot think the categories without presupposing its own pure self-consciousness, and therefore self-consciousness cannot be brought under the categories. If the subject, in which the consciousness of time has its origin, cannot determine by means of that consciousness its own existence in time, no more can it determine itself as a mere thinking being by means of the categories.

The result of our investigation, then, is, that the dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from the confusion of an idea of reason—the idea of a pure intelligence—with the perfectly undetermined conception of a thinking being in general. Abstracting from all actual experience, I first think of myself as the subject of a possible experience, and then I infer that I can be conscious of my own existence even apart from experience and the empirical conditions of experience. But this is to confuse the possible abstraction of my own existence as empirically determined, with the conscious-
ness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self. Thus arises the belief, that I have an actual knowledge of what is substantial in me as a transcendental subject, when in truth I have in my thought merely the unity of consciousness as the form of knowledge that is presupposed in all determination of objects.

432 Chapter II.—The Antinomy of Pure Reason. 405

433 The second class of dialectical arguments, in analogy with the hypothetical syllogism, has for its content the unconditioned unity of objective conditions in the phenomenal world. The transcendental paralogism produced merely a one-sided illusion, in regard to the idea of the subject of our thought; nor is there, in that connection, anything whatever in the conceptions of reason to suggest that the opposite may be true. It is quite otherwise with the objective synthesis of phenomena, where reason thinks to establish its principle of unconditioned unity with the greatest ease, until it finds, as it soon does, that in trying to do so it becomes involved in contradictions, which force it to give up all pretensions to a rational cosmology. This is a new experience for human reason, for here it falls of itself into a perfectly natural and unavoidable Antithetic, which is not due to artificial refinements or logical tricks.

All those transcendental ideas which relate to absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena, I shall call cosmical conceptions. I call them cosmical, partly because the conception of the world as a whole, which is itself only an idea, rests upon that unconditioned totality, and partly because they are concerned only with the synthesis
of phenomena, and therefore with objects of experience.

On the other hand, absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions of all possible things gives rise to an ideal of pure reason, and this idea, although it is no doubt related to the conception of the world as a whole, is yet quite distinct from it. Just as the paralogisms of pure reason were the source of a dialectical psychology, so the antinomy of pure reason will set before our eyes the transcendental principles on which a pure or rational cosmology is supposed to rest.

Section I.—System of Cosmological Ideas.

It must be observed, firstly, that reason does not of itself give rise to any conception, but simply seeks to free a conception of understanding from the unavoidable limitation of a possible experience and to extend it beyond the limits of experience, though still without losing its connection with experience. Demanding absolute totality on the side of the conditions, it converts the category into a transcendental idea, and tries to give absolute completeness to the empirical synthesis, by carrying it up to the unconditioned. The principle by which reason is here guided, is, that if the conditioned is given, the whole sum of conditions required to account for the conditioned, and therefore the absolutely unconditioned, is likewise given. But, secondly, the only categories which can be so employed, are those which in their synthesis constitute a series of conditions subordinated to one another, not those in which the conditions are co-ordinate. This synthesis, as starting from the side of the conditions, and going back step by step to the more
remote conditions may be called *regressive*, to distinguish it from a *progressive* synthesis, which would start from the nearest consequent on the side of the conditioned and gradually advance to more remote consequents. The former proceeds *in antecedentia*, the latter *in consequentia*.

442 When we have rejected the categories which do not conform to these requirements, we find that there are but four cosmological ideas, corresponding to the four titles of the categories, that necessarily imply a series in the synthesis of phenomena.

1. Absolute completeness in the *composition* of the given whole of all phenomena.

2. Absolute completeness in the *division* of a given whole in the world of a phenomenon as such.

3. Absolute completeness in the *origination* of phenomena.

4. Absolute completeness, as regards *dependence of existence*, of the changeable in the phenomenal world.

Section II.—*Antithetic of Pure Reason.*

By the term *Antithetic* we may denote, not the dogmatic assertion of the opposite of a thesis, but the conflict between two propositions, each of which seems to be true, but neither of which has any more claim to our assent than the other. When we are not content to apply our reason to objects of experience, and in subordination to the principles of understanding, but venture
to go beyond the limits of experience, there arise certain *pseudo-rational* propositions, which experience can neither confirm nor overthrow. Each of these propositions is not only in itself free from contradiction, but it can appeal to the very nature of reason in support of its truth, although, unfortunately, the opposite proposition can make out just as good a claim to be regarded as necessarily true.

The antinomies follow in the order of the transcendental ideas as given above.

**The Antinomy of Pure Reason.**

**First Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas.**

**Thesis.**

The world has a beginning in time, and is enclosed within limits of space.

**Proof.**

Assume that the world has no beginning in time. Then, up to every given point of time an eternity must have elapsed, and hence an infinite series of states of things must have passed away one after the other, and come to an end in the world. Now, the infinity of a series just consists in this, that the series can never be completed in a successive

**Antithesis.**

The world has no beginning in time, and no limits in space, but is infinite as regards both time and space.

**Proof.**

Assume that the world has a beginning. Then, as nothing can begin to be which has not been preceded by a time in which the thing that begins was not, we must hold that there was a time antecedent to that in which the world began to be, that is, an empty time. But, nothing whatever can come into being in an empty time,
synthesis. Hence an infinite series of states cannot have passed away in the world, and therefore a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence. This was the first thing to be proved.

As to the second point, again assume the opposite. Then, the world must present itself to us as an infinite whole of coexistent things. Now, if a magnitude is not presented in a perception as within certain limits, there is no other way in which we can think its dimensions, than by the synthesis of its parts; and the magnitude as a whole we can think only by the repeated addition of unity to itself until the synthesis is complete. Hence, in order to think the world, which fills all space, as a whole, we must suppose the successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world to have been completed. But this is the same as saying that an infinite time must have elapsed during the summation of the totality of coexisting things. Now this is impossible. Hence an infinite for no part of an empty time has in it any condition of existence rather than of non-existence, which distinguishes it from any other part; and this is true, whether we suppose things to originate of themselves, or to be produced by some other cause. Hence, although many series of things may begin in the world, the world itself can have no beginning, and is therefore infinite as regards time.

As to the second point, let us begin by assuming the opposite, namely, that the world is finite and limited as to space. Then, the world must exist in an empty space which has no limits. Things must therefore not only be related in space, but they must also be related to space. But the world is an absolute whole, outside of which no object of perception, and, therefore, no correlate of the world, can be found. The relation of the world to empty space would therefore be the relation of it to no object. But such a relation, and therefore the limitation of the world by empty space,
aggregate of actual things cannot present itself to us as a whole, and therefore not as a whole all the parts of which coexist. The world is therefore not infinitely extended in space, but is enclosed within spatial limits. And this was the second thing to be proved.

Second Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas.

**Thesis.**

Every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts, and nothing whatever exists but the simple, or that which is composed out of the simple.

**Proof.**

Assume that composite substances are not made up of simple parts. Then, if we think all composition to be away, no composite part will be left. And, by hypothesis, there is no simple part. Hence, nothing at all will remain, and therefore no substance. Either, then, it is impossible to think all composition to be away, or even after composition is thought is nothing at all. Hence the world cannot be limited as regards space, or, the world is infinite in its extension.

**Antithesis.**

No composite thing in the world is made up of simple parts, nor does anything simple exist anywhere in the world.

**Proof.**

Assume that a composite thing or substance is made up of simple parts. Then, as no external relation, and therefore no composition out of substances, is possible except in space, the composite thing must be made up of exactly the same number of parts as the space which it occupies. Now, space is not made up from simple parts, but consists of spaces. Every part of the composite
to be away, there must be something left, which exists without composition, that is, the simple. In the former case, the composite cannot be made up of substances, for composition is merely an accidental relation of substances, which may be taken away without at all affecting their existence as permanent realities. But, by hypothesis, substances do exist, and hence we must adopt the other supposition, that the composite substances in the world consist of simple parts.

It directly follows, that all the things in the world are simple; that composition is merely an external state of those things; and that, although we can never take elementary substances out of their state of composition and isolate them, reason must think of them as the primary subjects, which exist as simple beings antecedently to all composition. thing must therefore occupy a space. But the absolutely primary parts of every composite thing are simple. Hence each of those simple parts occupies a space. Now, as every real thing, which occupies a space, contains within itself a number of parts that are outside of one another, and is therefore composite; and as this real composite thing is not made up of accidents, since these could not, apart from substance, be outside of one another; we must conclude, that simple substance is composite, which is absurd.

The second proposition of the antithesis, that nowhere in the world does there exist anything simple, is only intended to mean, that the existence of the absolutely simple cannot be shown from any experience or perception, external or internal; and that, as the absolutely simple is therefore a mere idea, the objective reality of which can never be presented in experience, it is without all application and object in the explanation of phenomena. Let it be even admitted that
an object might be found in experience corresponding to that idea, or, in other words, that we might have an empirical perception of an object which contained no parts that are outside of one another and combined to a unity. Yet we could not legitimately infer the impossibility of finding any difference of parts in the object from the fact that we are not conscious of such difference. But nothing less than this will establish absolute simplicity, and hence absolute simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception, no matter what its nature may be. As, therefore, an absolutely simple object can never be presented in any possible experience, and as the world of sense must be regarded as the sum total of all possible experience, it follows that there is nothing in the world that is absolutely simple.

Third Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas.

**THESIS.**

Causality in conformity with laws of nature is not the only causality, from which

**ANTITHESIS.**

There is no freedom, but all that comes to be in the world takes place entirely
all the phenomena of the world can be derived. To explain those phenomena it is necessary to suppose that there is also a free causality.

Proof.

Assume that the only causality is that in conformity with laws of nature. Then, all that comes to be presupposes an antecedent state upon which it follows according to an inviolable rule. Now, that antecedent state must itself be something that comes to be, or arises in a time in which it previously was not; for if it had always existed, its effect also must always have existed, and would not have just come to be. The causality of the cause through which something comes to be must therefore itself be an event, which again, according to the law of nature, presupposes an antecedent state and its causality, and this again a still earlier state, and so on. If therefore all that comes to be must conform to the law of nature, there is never an absolute beginning, but only a relative beginning, and in accordance with laws of nature.

Proof.

Assume that there is freedom, in the transcendental sense, as a special kind of causality by which the sequence of events in the world may be explained; in other words, that there is a faculty of absolutely bringing into existence a certain state, and therefore a series of consequences of that state. Then, not only must this spontaneity originate the series, but it must first determine itself to originate it, and its act must take place without any antecedent to determine it in accordance with fixed laws. But every beginning of an act presupposes a state in which the cause has not yet begun to act, and a dynamically first beginning of the act presupposes a state of that cause which has no causal connection with the preceding state, and in no way follows from it. Transcendental freedom is therefore opposed to the law of
hence there can be no completeness in the ascending series of causes. Now, the law of nature just consists in this, that nothing can come to be without a cause sufficient to determine it a priori. The proposition, that all causality is possible merely by laws of nature, is therefore self-contradictory, if it is taken in its unlimited universality; and hence that sort of causality cannot be the only one.

We must, then, admit that there is another sort of causality, a causality by means of which something may come to be, the cause of which is not itself determined according to necessary laws by another cause antecedent to it. This will be an absolutely spontaneous causality, bringing into existence by itself a series of phenomena which arise in conformity with laws of nature. Hence, without transcendental freedom it is impossible ever to have completeness, on the side of causes, even in the series of phenomena which follow one another in the course of nature.
Fourth Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas.

**Thesis.**

There exists an absolutely necessary being, which belongs to the world either as a part or as the cause of it.

**Proof.**

The world of sense is not simply the sum total of all phenomena, but it contains a series of changes. Were there no such changes, we should have no consciousness even of a series of time as a condition of the possibility of the world of sense. But every change stands under a condition, which precedes it in time, and makes it necessary. Now, everything that is presented as conditioned, presupposes for its existence a complete series of conditions, ending in the perfectly unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. Something absolutely necessary must therefore exist, if there exist a change as its consequence. And this necessary existence must itself belong to the world of sense. For if it were outside that world, we should have to say,

**Antithesis.**

There nowhere exists an absolutely necessary being, either in the world, or outside of the world as its cause.

**Proof.**

Assume that the world itself is a necessary being, or that a necessary being exists in it. Then, either there is a beginning in the series of its changes that is absolutely necessary, and therefore without a cause, or the series itself, having no beginning, is as a whole absolutely necessary and unconditioned, though it is contingent and conditioned in all its parts. Now, the former supposition contradicts the dynamical law of the determination of all phenomena in time; and the latter supposition contradicts itself, because the existence of a series cannot be necessary as a whole, if no single member of the series is necessary.

Assume, on the other hand, that there is an absolutely necessary cause of the world, which is outside of the world.
that the series of changes in the world derived their beginning from a necessary cause which did not itself belong to the world of sense. Now, this is impossible. For, as the beginning of a series in time can be determined by that only which is in a time antecedent to the series, the highest condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in a time when the series as yet was not. Hence the causality of the necessary cause of the changes, and therefore also the cause itself, must belong to time and to phenomena in time, and cannot be thought as separated from that sum total of all phenomena which constitutes the world of sense. Something absolutely necessary is therefore contained in the world itself, whether that something is the whole series of changes in the world or a part of that series.

Then, to that cause, as the highest member in the series of the causes of changes in the world, would originally be due the beginning of the existence of those changes as a series. But the cause must itself begin to act, and its causality would therefore belong to time, and so to the sum total of phenomena; or, in other words, that cause, as belonging to the world, would not itself be outside of the world. But this is contrary to our hypothesis. Hence, neither in the world, nor as a cause outside of the world, though in causal connection with it, does there exist any absolutely necessary being.

504 Section IV.—Necessity of a Solution of the Transcendental Problems of Pure Reason.

505 Transcendental philosophy cannot admit, that any question which concerns an object presented to the pure reason of man is unanswerable by the reason that
suggested it. It is vain to allege our unavoidable ignorance and the unfathomable depth of the problem, as a reason for avoiding the obligation of giving a thorough and complete answer. The very conception which enables us to ask the question, must also give us the means of answering it, because the object to which it refers has no existence except in the conception.

It is, however, only in connection with the cosmological ideas that questions arise in transcendental philosophy, which put upon us the obligation to answer them. For here the object must be presented in experience, and the only question is whether it can conform to the idea. If the problem, for instance, is whether the soul, as that which presents itself in our consciousness as thinking, is in its own nature a simple substance; or, whether there is an absolutely necessary cause of all things; the object is transcendental, and therefore itself unknown; and hence we have to inquire, whether there is any object whatever, corresponding to our idea. In this case, therefore, we may confess that the object is unknown to us, without saying that it cannot possibly exist. Only the cosmological ideas have the peculiarity, that they can presuppose their object and the empirical synthesis essential to the conception of it. The sole question which they raise, is, whether the empirical synthesis can be carried so far as to comprehend an absolute totality of conditions. Now, as there is here no question of a thing in itself, but only of a thing as an object of possible experience, the answer to the transcendental problem of cosmology cannot be found in anything outside of the idea. We are not asking what is the nature of any object in itself; we are not even asking
what can be presented *in concreto* according to the conditions of experience; but our whole question is in regard to what is contained in the idea itself, to which the empirical synthesis will be found merely to approximate, and the answer must be derived entirely from the idea. Reason cannot evade a solution of the problem by putting all the responsibility upon the unknown object, for the idea is a pure creation of reason itself.

*Section VII.—Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem.*

The whole antinomy of pure reason rests upon this dialectical argument:

*If the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions is given.*

But objects of sense are given as conditioned.

Therefore, the whole series of conditions of objects of sense is given.

The sophistical character of the argument will be more readily seen, if we first correct and define some of the conceptions contained in it.

Now, in the *first* place, it is plain and undeniable, that, if the conditioned is given, a regress in the series of all its conditions is *demanded* of us. The very conception of the conditioned implies that something is referred to a condition, and, if that condition is itself conditioned, to a more remote condition, and so on through all the members of the series. The proposition, therefore, that if the conditioned is given we must seek for the whole series of conditions, is analytical, and can have nothing to fear from a transcendental criticism.
In the second place, if the conditioned as well as its condition are things in themselves, not only is the regress to the condition demanded, if the conditioned is given, but it is actually given along with the conditioned. And, as this holds of all members of the series, the complete series of conditions, and therefore the unconditioned, is given at the same time, or, rather, it is presupposed in virtue of the fact that the conditioned, which is possible only through it, is given. The synthesis of the conditioned with its condition is here a mere synthesis of understanding, which assumes to present things as they are, without first asking whether and how we can have a knowledge of them. But, if I have to do with phenomena, which, as existing only for consciousness, are not given at all unless they are empirically known, I cannot in the same sense say, that if the conditioned is given, all its conditions are also given, and hence I can in no way infer the absolute totality of the series of conditions. For phenomena in our apprehension are themselves nothing but an empirical synthesis in space and time, and are therefore given only in that synthesis. It does not follow, because the conditioned as a phenomenon is given, that the synthesis which constitutes its empirical condition, is given along with or presupposed in it; for the synthesis exists only in the regress and in no sense apart from it. What we can say, in such a case, is, that a regress, or continuous empirical synthesis, on the side of the conditions, is enjoined and demanded, and that the conditions given in that regress cannot be wanting.

It is evident, then, that in the major premise of the cosmological argument, the conditioned is taken in the
transcendental sense of a pure category; while in the
minor premise, it is taken in the empirical sense of a
conception of understanding that is applied to mere
phenomena. Here therefore we have an instance of
the dialectical fallacy called sophisma figurae dictionis.
The fallacy, however, is not artificial; it is by a per-
fectly natural illusion that reason in the major premise
assumes blindly, that if something is given as con-
ditioned, its conditions and their series must all be
present. In fact the assumption is just the logical
postulate, that every conclusion must have complete
premises. Moreover, the connection of the conditioned
with its condition is naturally thought to be inde-
pendent of any succession in time, and both are
assumed to be given together. Nor is it less natural,
in the minor premise, to regard phenomena as things
in themselves and as objects given to pure under-
standing, than to take the conditioned in the sense of a
pure conception in the major premise, where abstraction
has been made from all the conditions of perception
without which objects cannot be given at all. Yet this
overlooks an important distinction between these con-
ceptions. The synthesis of the conditioned with its con-
dition, and indeed with the whole series of its conditions,
as expressed in the major premise, carries with it no
limitation through time and no idea of succession. But
the empirical synthesis and the series of conditions in
phenomena, as subsumed in the minor premise, is
necessarily successive, the members of the series being
given as following one another in time. Here, therefore,
we cannot presuppose absolute totality of the synthesis
and of the series presented in it. In the former case all
the members of the series are given in themselves irrespective of any condition of time; but in the latter case they are possible only by means of a successive synthesis, and can be given as a whole only if that synthesis can actually be completed. If, then, we are to settle the dispute between the two parties to the satisfaction of both, we must be able to show that they are really quarrelling about nothing, and that a certain transcendental illusion has mocked them with a reality where none is to be found.

If we regard the two propositions (a) that the world is infinite in extension, and (b) that the world is finite in extension, as contradictory opposites, we assume that the world, or the whole series of phenomena, is a thing in itself. For, whether the regress in the series of its phenomena is denied to be infinite, or denied to be finite, in both cases the world is supposed to be absolutely real. But if I challenge this supposition, or rather this transcendental illusion, and deny that the world is a thing in itself, the contradictory opposition of the two statements is converted into a dialectical opposition. As the world does not exist at all as a thing in itself, that is, independently of the regressive series of my ideas, it cannot be said to be in itself either an infinite whole or a finite whole. Apart from the empirical regress in the series of phenomena, the world has no existence whatever. If, therefore, that series is always conditioned, and as a consequence is never given as complete, the world cannot be an unconditioned whole, and therefore cannot exist as an unconditioned whole that is either infinite in magnitude or finite in magnitude.

What has been said of the first cosmological idea is
equally true of the other three. The series of conditions exists only in the regressive synthesis itself, not in an object of sense given as an independent thing prior to all regress. Hence I must say that the number of parts in a given phenomenon is neither finite nor infinite. A phenomenon has no existence in itself, and its parts are only given in and through the regress of the decomposing synthesis; and this regress, being never absolutely complete, cannot be said to be either finite or infinite. The same thing holds of the series of causes that proceed in an ascending series, and of the series that proceeds from conditioned existence to unconditioned necessary existence. Neither series can be regarded as in itself either finite or infinite in its totality; for, as a series of subordinated ideas consists only in the dynamical regress itself, it cannot possibly exist in itself before that regress as a self-subsistent series of things in themselves.

Thus the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas disappears. It is purely dialectical, or a conflict due to an illusion. The idea of absolute totality, which has no proper meaning except as a condition of things in themselves, is wrongly applied to phenomena, which exist only in our consciousness, and, if they form a series, only in a successive regress, but which have no other existence whatever. From this antinomy, however, we may gain, not indeed a dogmatic, but a critical and doctrinal advantage. It supplies an indirect proof of the transcendental ideality of phenomena, which ought to convince anyone who may not have been quite satisfied with the direct proof in the Transcendental Æsthetic. The new proof would consist in the following dilemma:
If the world is a self-existent whole, it is either finite or infinite.
But it is neither finite nor infinite (as is shown in the Antithesis and Thesis respectively).

Therefore the world (the sum total of all phenomena) is not a self-existent whole.
Phenomena have, therefore, no existence apart from our consciousness of them; and this is what we mean when we speak of their transcendental ideality.

Section VIII.—Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in the Cosmological Ideas.

By the cosmological principle of totality, a maximum in the series of conditions of the objects of sense is not given, but is only demanded. Still, that principle is true if it is taken in the proper sense. No doubt it is not an axiom, requiring us to think totality as actually present in the object, but it is a problem for understanding, and therefore for the subject of understanding, calling upon him to begin and to follow out the regress in the series of conditions for that which is given as conditioned, in conformity with the completeness contained in the idea. In the presentation of sensible objects as in space and time, every condition which we are capable of reaching is found to be itself conditioned. If phenomena were things in themselves, we might perhaps find in them something unconditioned; but, as a matter of fact, they are merely empirical objects, and as such can appear only under the forms of space and time, the condition of all our perceptions. The principle of reason is therefore merely a rule, which demands a regress in the series of
conditions of given phenomena, and will not permit us to assume that we have reached anything absolutely unconditioned. It is not a principle of the possibility of experience and of the empirical knowledge of objects of sense, and hence it cannot be ranked with the fundamental judgments of understanding; for every experience is of an object, which, as conforming to the conditions of perception, is enclosed within limits. Nor is it a constitutive principle of reason, which enlarges our conception of the world of sense beyond all possible experience, but only a principle that tells us to continue and enlarge our experience as far as we possibly can. Refusing to admit that any given empirical limit is absolute, the principle of reason serves as a rule which postulates what must take place, if we make the regress, but does not anticipate what is present, before any regress is made, in the object as it is in itself. I call it, therefore, a regulative principle of reason, to indicate that it is not a constitutive cosmological principle, that is, a principle that determines objects of sense as things in themselves having an absolute totality in the series of their conditions. That there is no such constitutive principle, I indicate by calling the principle of reason regulative, and in this way trying to prevent what otherwise would be inevitable, the transcendental subreption which attributes objective reality to an idea that serves merely as a rule.

Section IX.—Empirical use of the Regulative Principle of Reason.

We have seen that no transcendental use can be made of pure conceptions, whether these belong to under-
standing or to reason; that absolute totality in the series of conditions in the world of sense rests entirely upon a transcendental use of reason, in which absolute completeness is demanded from that which is presupposed as a thing in itself; and that such completeness cannot be found in the world of sense. It is therefore vain to ask whether the series of conditions is in itself absolutely limited or absolutely unlimited; the only question is, how far we ought to go back in our empirical regress in search of the conditions of experience, in order that, guided by the rule of reason, we may find an answer which is conformable to the nature of the object in question.

Now, it has been clearly enough shown that the principle of reason is not a constitutive principle of objects in themselves, but is merely a rule for the continuation and extension of a possible experience. If we keep this steadily before our eyes, the conflict of reason with itself is at an end. For our critical solution not only does away with the illusion in which the contradiction has its origin, but it reveals the true sense in which reason is in harmony with itself. Thus the misapprehension which was the sole cause of the conflict has been removed, and a dialectical principle has been converted into a doctrinal principle.

1. Solution of the First Antinomy.

For the solution of the first cosmological problem, we have simply to determine, whether, in the regress to the unconditioned extension of the world in time and space, there is a regress to infinity, or merely a regress that is capable of being continued indefinitely (in infinitum).
The perfectly general idea of the series of all past states of the world, as well as of all the things which co-exist in space, is merely the thought of a possible empirical regress, the extent of which has not yet been determined. Only through this idea can there arise the conception of such a series of conditions of a given perception. Now, the world as a whole exists for me only as a conception, never as a perception. Hence I cannot reason from the quantity of the world to the quantity of the regress, and determine the latter by the former; on the contrary, I can form a conception of the quantity of the world only by finding out the quantity of the empirical regress. Of the empirical regress, however, I can never say more than that I must always advance empirically from every given member of the series of conditions to a higher and more remote member. But in this way the quantity of phenomena as a whole cannot be absolutely determined, and hence I cannot say that the regress proceeds to infinity. To say that it proceeds to infinity would be to anticipate members of the regress that have not yet been reached, and to represent their number as so great that no empirical regress could ever reach them; it would in fact be to determine the quantity of the world (although only negatively) prior to the regress, which is impossible. The first or negative answer to the first cosmological problem therefore is, that the world has no first beginning in time, and no extreme limit in space.

The affirmative answer directly follows, that the regress in the series of phenomena as a determination of the quantity of the world proceeds in indefinitum. This is the same as saying that the world of sense has no
550 absolute quantity. Every beginning is in time, and every limit of that which is extended is in space. But space and time belong only to the world of sense. Hence, while phenomena in the world are conditionally limited, the world itself is neither conditionally nor unconditionally limited. Similarly, as the world cannot be given as complete, and as even the series of conditions for that which is given as conditioned cannot be given as complete, the conception of the quantity of the world is given only in the regress, and not in a collective perception prior to it. But that regress consists simply in the act of determining the quantity, not in a determinate conception, and hence it does not yield the conception of a quantity that could be called infinite when measured by a certain standard. The regress, therefore, does not proceed to the infinite, as if the infinite could be presented, but only to an indefinite distance, and it is only in the regress that any quantity of experience is actually given.

2. Solution of the Second Antinomy.

If I divide a whole that is presented to me in a perception, I proceed from something conditioned to the conditions which make it possible. The division into parts (subdivisio or decompositio) is a regress in the series of those conditions. The series could be presented as an absolute totality, only if the regress could finally reach perfectly simple parts. But if all the parts in a continuously progressive decomposition are themselves again divisible, the division or regress from the conditioned to its conditions proceeds in infinitum; for all the parts or conditions, being contained in the conditioned itself,
which is completely presented in a perception that is enclosed between its limits, are presented along with the conditioned. The regress in this case, therefore, cannot be called merely a regress in indefinitum, whereas in the first cosmological idea that was the only kind of regress that could be allowed, inasmuch as it was necessary to proceed from the conditioned to conditions outside of it, which were not presented along with the conditioned, but were added to it only in the empirical regress. At the same time, it is not permissible to say of a whole which is divisible to infinity, that it is made up of an infinite number of parts. For, although all the parts are contained in the perception of the whole, the whole division is not so contained, but it consists only in the continuous decomposition or regress itself, and the series has no existence at all prior to the regress. As this regress is infinite, the members or parts reached in it are certainly all contained in the given whole viewed as an aggregate. But the whole series of the stages in division is not contained in the given whole; for these constitute a successive infinite, which is never complete, and therefore never reaches an infinite multitude of parts, nor can its parts be combined into a whole.

This general statement may easily be applied to space. Every space perceived within its limits is a whole, the parts of which, as obtained by decomposition, are always themselves spaces. A space is, therefore, infinitely divisible.

From this a second application of the statement follows quite naturally. The divisibility of an external object or body, which is enclosed within its limits, depends upon the divisibility of the space that is the
condition of the perception of the body as an extended whole. The body is, therefore, infinitely divisible, without, however, being made up of an infinite number of parts.

556 Transition from the Mathematical to the Dynamical
Antinomies.

So far we have assumed that the conditions belonging to the conditioned are themselves in space and time. Now this assumption, which is always made by common sense, was the real source of the apparent conflict of reason with itself. For it forced us to hold that all dialectical conceptions in regard to totality in the series of conditions for that which is given as conditioned were of exactly the same character. The condition was, therefore, in all cases connected with the conditioned as a member of the same series, and was homogeneous with it. Hence the regress in the series of conditions was never thought as complete, or, if it was thought as complete, a member of the series, which was really conditioned, was falsely supposed to be the first member of the series, and, therefore, to be unconditioned. If the object, or conditioned, was not considered merely according to its magnitude, at least the series of conditions of that object was so considered. Thus arose a difficulty, which could be got rid of in no other way than by cutting the knot, that is, by recognizing that reason made the series either too long or too short for understanding, so that understanding could never be coincident with the idea of reason.

But, in all this we have been overlooking an essential distinction that obtains between the objects, that is, the
conceptions of understanding, which reason tries to raise to ideas. Two of the classes of categories contained in the table given above imply a mathematical, the other two a dynamical synthesis of phenomena. That distinction becomes important, now that we have come to consider how far the dynamical conceptions of understanding are adequate to the idea of reason, and opens up an entirely new mode of escape from the suit in which reason is involved. In the former suit the case was dismissed, because both parties raised a false issue. But in the dynamical antinomies, it seems as if reason might be able to establish its claims, for the judge has himself supplied the proofs which were wanting, and which had been overlooked by both parties. It is, therefore, possible that the suit may be adjusted to the satisfaction of both sides, a thing that was impossible in the case of the mathematical antinomies.

The conditions even in the dynamical ideas are no doubt all homogeneous, in so far as we look merely at the extension of the series, and ask whether it conforms to the idea, or whether the idea is too large or too small for it. But the conception of understanding, on which the idea rests, may contain merely a synthesis of the homogeneous—which is certainly the case in the composition or division of every magnitude—or it may contain also a synthesis of the heterogeneous. This latter sort of synthesis is at least conceivable in the case of the dynamical synthesis, whether it takes the form of causal connection or of the connection of the necessary with the contingent.

As, in the mathematical connection of the series of phenomena, every condition is itself a part of the
series, no condition can be allowed to enter that is not sensuous. But, in the dynamical series of sensuous conditions, a heterogeneous condition, or one that is not a part of the series, is not inadmissible. Such a condition as being purely intelligible, would lie outside of the series. Supposing it to be possible, the claims of reason would be sufficiently satisfied by the unconditioned being placed above phenomena, while yet the series of phenomena would not cease to be conditioned, nor would it be cut short in defiance of the principles of understanding.

If the dynamical ideas admit of a condition of phenomena lying outside of the series of sensuous conditions, a condition which is not itself a phenomenon, we reach quite a different conclusion from that to which we were brought in the case of the mathematical antinomies. In these we were forced to say, that both of the contradictory dialectical assertions were false. But, while the dynamical series is necessarily conditioned throughout in so far as it is a series of phenomena, it yet is connected with a condition, which, though it is empirically unconditioned, is non-sensuous. Thus satisfaction is given, on the one hand to understanding, and on the other hand to reason. We are rid of the dialectical arguments, which in one way or the other sought unconditioned totality in mere phenomena, and we see that the propositions of reason may both be true when taken in their proper sense. This we could not possibly show in the case of the cosmological ideas that refer only to a mathematically unconditioned unity, for in them no condition of the series of phenomena could be found, which was not itself a phenomenon and therefore one of the members of the series.
3. Solution of the Third Antinomy.

There are only two ways in which we can conceive events to be due to a cause: either the causality is natural, or it springs from freedom. By natural causality is meant, that connection of one state with another that precedes it in the world of sense, in which the second state follows the first in conformity with a rule. Now, the causality of phenomena rests upon conditions of time, and the preceding state cannot always have existed, for, if it had, the effect produced by it would not only now have come into being. Hence the causality of the cause of something that happens or comes into being must itself have come into being, and by the principle of understanding requires another cause to account for it.

By freedom, again, in the cosmological sense, is meant, the power of bringing a state into existence spontaneously. The causality of this state will therefore not itself stand under another cause, which determines it in time in conformity with the law of nature. Taken in this sense, freedom is a transcendental idea; for, in the first place, it contains in it nothing borrowed from experience, and, in the second place, its object cannot be presented as determined in any experience. That whatever comes to be must have a cause, is a universal law, without which there can be no experience at all. As the causality of this cause comes to be or originates, it must itself have a cause. Thus the whole field of experience, however far it may extend, contains nothing but what is natural. But, as in this way no absolute totality of conditions in the way of causality can be obtained, reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity, which can begin to act.
purely of itself, without being determined to activity by another cause, as the law of natural causality demands.

563 Now, if phenomena were things in themselves, and space and time forms of the existence of things in themselves, the conditions would always be members of exactly the same series as the conditioned. Here, therefore, as in the other transcendental ideas, the antinomy would arise, that the series must inevitably be too large or too small for understanding. But it is characteristic of the dynamical conceptions of reason, that they do not consider an object with regard to its magnitude, but only with regard to its existence. In this case, therefore, we may abstract from the magnitude of the series of conditions and direct our attention solely to the dynamical relations of condition and conditioned. Thus we at once come upon the difficulty, whether freedom is possible at all, and if it is, whether it can exist along with the universality of the natural law of causality. Can we affirm, disjunctively, that every effect in the world must arise either from nature or from freedom, or must we say, that in different relations the same event is due both to nature and to freedom? That every event in the world of sense is connected with a preceding event according to an unchangeable law of nature, has, in the Transcendental Analytic, been shown to be a fundamental principle which admits of no exception. The only question now is, whether, assuming that principle, the same effect may not only be determined in accordance with nature, but may also depend upon freedom, or whether freedom is completely excluded by that inviolable rule. Here the common but false presupposition of the absolute reality
of phenomena shows its baleful influence and confuses our reason. If phenomena are things in themselves, freedom cannot be saved. For, nature will then be the complete and adequate cause of every event, and the condition of an event will be contained only in the series of phenomena that with its effect is necessary according to the law of nature. If, however, phenomena are not taken to be more than they really are; if they are regarded, not as things in themselves, but simply as objects connected with one another in our consciousness in conformity with empirical laws; then they must themselves have their source in that which is not a phenomenon. Such an intelligible cause is not determined in its causality by phenomena, although the effects of its causality are presented to us as phenomena, and can therefore be regarded as determined by other phenomena. The intelligible cause, together with its causality, is itself outside of the series, while yet its effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions. The effect can therefore be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause, and may at the same time be viewed on its phenomenal side as following from phenomena, according to the necessity of nature.

Possibility of Causality through Freedom. The only question here is this: granting that in the whole series of events there is to be found nothing but the necessity of nature, is it yet possible to regard the very same event, which on one side is merely an effect of nature, as on the other side an effect of freedom, or is there between these two sorts of causality a direct contradiction?
Among the causes in the phenomenal world there certainly can be nothing that absolutely and from itself could cause a series to begin to be. Every act that produces an event is, as a phenomenon, itself an event or result, which presupposes another state to serve as cause. Everything that comes to be is therefore merely a continuation of the series, and nothing that begins of itself can enter into the series. Hence all the modes in which natural causes act in the succession of time are themselves effects, for which there must again be causes in the series of time. It is vain to seek in the causal connection of phenomena for an original act by which something may come to be that before was not.

But, granting that the cause of a phenomenal effect is itself a phenomenon, is it necessary that the causality of its cause should be entirely empirical? May it not be that while every phenomenal effect must be connected with its cause in accordance with laws of empirical causality, this empirical causality, without the least rupture of its connection with natural causes, is itself an effect of a causality that is not empirical but intelligible? May the empirical causality not be due to the activity of a cause, which in its relation to phenomena is original, and which therefore, in so far as this faculty is concerned, is not phenomenal but intelligible; although as a link in the chain of nature it must be regarded as also belonging entirely to the world of sense?

Let us see how this would apply to experience. Man is one of the phenomena of the world of sense, and in so far one of the natural causes, the causality of which must stand under empirical laws. Like all other things in nature, he must have an empirical character. This
character we learn from an observation of the powers and faculties which he exhibits in the production of effects. In lifeless nature, or in the mere animal, we find no reason for thinking that there is any faculty but that which is sensuously conditioned. But man, who knows all the rest of nature solely as an object of sense, is aware of himself also by mere apperception, and that in acts and inner determinations, which he is quite unable to regard as due to impressions of sense. On the one side, he is no doubt for himself a phenomenon, but, inasmuch as his actions cannot be ascribed to the recep-

575 tivity of sense, he is, on the other side, a purely intel-

ligible object with respect to certain of his faculties. These faculties we call understanding and reason; and reason in particular we distinguish in quite a peculiar and especial way from all forces that are empirically condi-

ditioned, because it contemplates its objects purely in the light of ideas, and determines understanding in accord-

ance with them.

That our reason actually has causality, or that we at

least suppose it to have causality, is evident from the

imperatives which we impose upon ourselves as rules for

our own conduct. The ought expresses a kind of neces-

sity and connection with conditions which we shall look

for in vain in all the rest of nature. Understanding can

know only what is, has been, or will be. It is impossible

for anything to exist for understanding otherwise than as

a matter of fact it does exist in those three relations of

time; nay, if we fix our eyes simply upon the course of

nature, the ought has no meaning whatever. It is as

absurd to ask what nature ought to be, as to ask what sort

of properties a circle ought to have. The only question
we can properly ask is, what comes to pass in nature? just as we can only ask, what actually are the properties of a triangle?

Now, this *ought* expresses a possible activity, the ground of which is a bare conception, whereas a mere natural activity must always have a phenomenal ground. No doubt an act that ought to be, must be possible under conditions of nature; but these have no influence in determining the will itself, but only in determining the effect and what follows from it in the phenomenon. No matter how many natural influences, how many sensuous impulses may be brought to bear upon my will, they cannot give rise to the *ought*. The volition which is due to such influences is always conditioned and by no means necessary, and the *ought* of reason confronts such a volition with a limit and ideal, nay, forbids or authorizes it. Whether the object willed is sensuous pleasure, or even the good which is the object of pure reason, reason refuses to yield to the influence of that which is given empirically, and to follow the order of things as they present themselves in the phenomenal world. With perfect spontaneity it makes for itself an order of its own in accordance with ideas, into which it fits the empirical conditions, and guided by the idea of this order it declares actions which have not yet taken place, and which perhaps never will take place, to be necessary. Thus reason assumes that it has in itself the power of originating actions; for otherwise it would not expect to find in experience the influence of its ideas.

Now let us pause here for a moment, and assume that it is at least possible for reason to have causality with respect to phenomena. Reason though it be, it must yet
manifest an empirical character. For, every cause presupposes a rule in conformity with which certain phenomena follow as effects, and every rule requires uniformity in the way of effects. It is upon such uniformity, in fact, that the conception of cause as the faculty of producing an effect is based. This uniformity of effect, as learned from simply observing phenomenon, may be called the empirical character of a cause, and this empirical character is unchangeable, although the effects appear in changeable forms according as the accompanying and partly limiting conditions vary.

Thus the will of every man has an empirical character, which is simply a certain causality of his reason, in so far as that causality manifests, in its effects in the phenomenal world, a rule from which we may infer the kind and degree of the motives from which his actions have been done, and so estimate the subjective principle of his will. This empirical character must itself be gathered from our observation of the effects of his causality in the phenomenal world, and from the rule with which experience supplies us. It is therefore solely from a consideration of the man's empirical character and of the other causes that co-operate with it in conformity with the order of nature, that we are able to determine his actions on their phenomenal side; and if we could trace all the manifestations of his will to their source, we could tell with certainty what his actions in every case must be, and show that they necessarily followed from the given condition. So long, therefore, as we look only at a man's empirical character, we cannot find any trace of freedom. Yet this is the only thing that comes before us, if we simply observe man, and
investigate the motives of his actions from the point of view of anthropology.

But if we change our point of view, and consider the very same actions in their relation to reason,—by which I do not mean speculative reason, which merely explains how the actions have come to be, but reason only in so far as it is the cause that produces them—if, in a word, we view a man's actions in their relation to reason as practical, we find that they come under an entirely different rule and order from the order of nature. We find, it may be, that nothing ought to have taken place, which as a matter of fact has taken place in conformity with the course of nature, and could not but take place under the given empirical conditions. But sometimes we find, or at least believe that we find, that the ideas of reason have actually proved their causality with reference to the actions of man as phenomena, and that those actions have taken place, not because they were determined by empirical causes, but because they were determined by grounds of reason.

Now, if we could say that reason has causality in regard to phenomena, should we be entitled to say that reason acts freely, although the action is determined with absolute precision and necessity in its empirical character, or as a mode of sense? The empirical character, it must be observed, will in that case be itself determined in the intelligible character or manner of thinking. The intelligible character, however, we do not directly know, and hence we have to indicate its nature by means of phenomena, which properly give us a knowledge only of objects of sense, and therefore only of the empirical character. Now, the action, in so far as our manner of
thinking is to be called its cause, is not a result that follows according to empirical laws from that manner of thinking; that is, it is not preceded by the conditions of pure reason, but only by the effects of pure reason as they appear in the inner sense. Pure reason, as a faculty that is merely intelligible, is not subject to the form of time, and therefore it is not subject to the conditions belonging to the succession of time. The causality of reason in the intelligible character does not arise or begin to be at a certain time in order to produce an effect. If it did, it would itself be subject to the natural law of phenomena, in conformity with which causal series are determined in time, and its causality would then be natural and not free. What we must say is, that if reason can have causality with regard to phenomena, it is a faculty by means of which the sensuous condition of an empirical series of effects first begins to be. For the condition which lies in reason is not sensuous, and therefore does not itself begin to be. In that case we should find what we missed in all empirical series, that the condition of a successive series of events might itself be empirically unconditioned. For the condition would lie outside of the series in the intelligible character, and would therefore be subject to no sensuous condition, and to no determination of time through preceding causes.

It must be observed that we have had no intention of proving that there actually is freedom, and that it is one of the faculties which are the cause of the phenomena of our world of sense. Freedom has here been viewed simply as a transcendental idea, which leads reason to think that it can absolutely bring into existence the series of conditions in the phenomenal world by means of the
sensuously unconditioned, and thus involves it in an antinomy with its own laws—the laws which it lays down for the understanding in its empirical work. The only thing that we have been able to show, or that we have tried to show, is that this antinomy has its source in a mere illusion, and that nature at least does not contradict the causality of freedom.

4. Solution of the Fourth Antinomy.

In what immediately precedes we have considered the changes of the world of sense in their dynamical series—a series each member of which stands under another as its cause. We shall now take this series of states as our guide in the search for an existence that may serve as the supreme condition of all that changes; that is, in our search for the necessary being. Here we have to deal, not with an unconditioned causality, but with the unconditioned existence of substance itself. What we have before us is therefore really a series of conceptions, and not a series of perceptions, in which one perception is the condition of the other.

Now, it is easy to see that, as every object in the totality of phenomena is changeable, and therefore is conditioned in its existence, no member of the series of dependent existence can possibly be unconditioned; in other words, we cannot regard the existence of any member of the series as absolutely necessary. Hence, if phenomena were things in themselves, and if as a consequence their condition always belonged to one and the same series of perceptions, their would be no possibility of introducing a necessary being as condition of the existence of phenomena in the world of sense.
But there is a peculiar distinction between the dynamical and the mathematical regress. The mathematical regress has to do only with the composition of parts into a whole, or the division of a whole into parts; and as in this case the conditions must always be regarded as parts of the series, and therefore as homogeneous, they cannot but be phenomena. But in the dynamical regress we are concerned, not with the possibility of an unconditioned whole formed out of given parts, or of an unconditioned part for a given whole, but with the derivation of a state from its cause, or of the contingent existence of substance itself from its necessary existence. Here, therefore, there is no reason why the condition should enter into the same empirical series with that which is conditioned.

Thus a way of escape from the apparent antinomy now under consideration is opened up to us. Both of the conflicting propositions may be true if they are taken in different senses. All things in the world of sense may be contingent, and therefore have only an empirically conditioned existence, while yet there may be a condition of the whole series that is not empirical; that is, there may be an unconditionally necessary being. For, this necessary being, as the intelligible condition of the series, could not belong to it as a member, not even as the highest member of it, nor would it make any member of the series empirically unconditioned, or in any way interfere with the empirically conditioned existence of all the members, which form the world of sense as a whole. Thus the manner in which an unconditioned existence is here conceived as the condition of phenomena is different from the manner in which, in the last chapter, we sought to explain the empirically unconditioned causality of free-
dom. For there the thing itself (substantia phaenomenon) was as a cause conceived to belong to the series of conditions, and only its causality was regarded as intelligible. Here, on the other hand, the necessary being must be conceived as entirely outside of the series of the sensible world (as ens extramundanum), and as purely intelligible. In no other way, indeed, can we regard it as free from the law of contingency and dependence to which all phenomena are subject.

The regulative principle of reason in the present case may therefore be stated in this way. Everything in the world of sense has an empirically conditioned existence, and no property of a sensible object has unconditioned necessity. We are entitled to expect that in a possible experience there will be found an empirical condition for every member of the series of conditions, and the search for such conditions we ought always to follow up as far as we can. Nothing can justify us in referring any particular mode of existence to a condition outside of the empirical series, or even in regarding a particular mode of existence within the empirical series as absolutely independent and self-subsistent. At the same time there is no reason to deny that the whole series may be dependent upon an intelligible being, which is free from every empirical condition, and is itself the condition of the possibility of all phenomena.

593 Concluding Remark on the whole Antinomy of Pure Reason.

So long as reason in its conceptions is seeking simply the totality of conditions in the world of sense, and
trying to find satisfaction in that direction, our ideas are *cosmological*, though at the same time transcendent. But the moment the unconditioned, in which we are mainly interested, is conceived as lying entirely outside of the world of sense, and therefore beyond all possible experience, our ideas become transcendent. For then they are not merely ideas which reason employs in seeking to complete experience—an end which must always be pursued, though it can never be fully attained; rather they are ideas that entirely separate themselves from experience, and create for themselves objects, for which experience supplies no material, and which cannot rest their claim to objective reality upon the completion of the empirical series, but only upon pure *a priori* conceptions. Nevertheless, the cosmological idea which gave rise to the fourth antinomy urges us to take this step. Finding that phenomena are always conditioned modes of existence, and have no support in themselves, we are driven to look about for something different from all phenomena, and therefore for an intelligible object which is entirely free from contingency. Thus the very first step which we take beyond the world of sense compels us to enter upon an inquiry into the nature of the absolutely necessary being, and to derive from our conceptions of it our conceptions of all things in their purely intelligible nature. This inquiry is the subject of the next chapter.
BOOK II.—THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON.

Section I.—The Ideal in General.

We have seen above that no object can be known by means of the pure conceptions of understanding, if these are isolated from all conditions of sensibility; for the conditions of objective reality are then absent, and nothing is left but the mere form of thought. On the other hand pure conceptions can be presented in concreto if they are brought into connection with phenomena, for in phenomena they obtain the appropriate material by which they become conceptions of experience. A conception of experience, in fact, is simply a conception of understanding in concreto. Now, ideas are even further removed from objective reality than categories, for, as no phenomenon can be found to which they might apply, they cannot be presented in concreto at all. They demand a certain completeness which is beyond the reach of all possible empirical knowledge, and reason has in them merely a systematic unity, to which it brings the unity that is possible in experience as near as possible, though it can never hope to bring experience into complete harmony with its ideas.

But what I call the ideal seems to be still further removed from objective reality than even the idea. By the ideal I mean the idea, not merely in concreto, but in individuo; I mean, in other words, an individual thing that is determinable or even determined simply by the idea.

Reason, in its ideal, aims at absolutely complete deter-
mination in accordance with *a priori* rules. Hence it sets before itself an object which it conceives as capable of thoroughgoing determination in conformity with its own principles. The conditions, however, that are required for such a determination cannot be found in experience, and thus the conception is itself transcendent.

*Section II.—The Transcendental Ideal.*

601 The proposition, that *all existence is completely determined*, means, that to know a thing completely, it is necessary to know all that can possibly exist, and to determine the thing in question, either affirmatively or negatively, by reference to our ideal. The absolutely complete determination of a thing is therefore a mere idea, which can never be *presented in its totality in concreto*.

This idea has its source entirely in reason, which prescribes the rule by which understanding must be guided in seeking completeness of knowledge.

The idea of the *totality of all possible existence* will be found to exclude a number of predicates. It excludes, to wit, all those predicates that are derived from other predicates already given, as well as those that cannot stand along with them; and thus it leaves us with a conception that is determined absolutely *a priori*, that is, with the conception of an individual object which is completely determined by the mere idea of it. This is what is meant by an *ideal of pure reason*.

603 Now, a negation cannot be definitely thought, except in contrast to the affirmation that is its opposite. A man born blind has no idea of darkness, because he has no idea of light. All conceptions of negations are therefore
derivative, and positive realities contain all the data, and so to speak, the matter or transcendental content, for the possibility and the complete determination of all things.

This transcendental substratum for the complete determination of things, which is presupposed by our reason, is simply the idea of a totality of reality (omnitudo realitatis). All true negations are therefore merely limitations of that unlimited totality of reality which reason presupposes.

It is by supposing a thing in itself to possess this totality of reality that we conceive of it as completely determined. Moreover, the conception of this thing in itself as an ens realissimum is the conception of an individual being, for, in determining it, we are forced to assign to it one out of every possible pair of contradictory predicates, namely, that predicate which expresses positive being. Thus it is a transcendental ideal which necessarily compels us to conceive of all that exists as completely determined, and to this ideal, as constituting the supreme and the complete material condition of their possibility, all objects must be referred in so far as their content is concerned. Nor is human reason capable of having any other genuine ideal, for in no other way can a conception, which in itself is general, be completely determined from itself, and recognized to be the idea of an individual thing.

Now, it is self-evident that reason can think of things as necessarily completely determined, without presupposing the existence of a being conforming to its ideal. It is enough that the idea of that being should be presupposed. In its ideal reason finds the prototype of which all things are but imperfect copies or ectypes.
and from which they derive the material of their possibility. To this ideal things approximate more or less, but they must always remain at an infinite distance from it.

All things, then, with the synthesis of various determinations which form their content, are regarded as deriving their possibility solely from that which contains all reality within itself and alone is originally possible. The predicates by which all other modes of being are distinguished from the truly real being, are all negative, and negations are merely limitations of a higher reality, and ultimately of the highest reality of all, from which only their content is derived. The manifold determinations of things are therefore simply various ways of limiting the conception of the highest reality, which is their common substratum, just as all geometrical figures are merely the various ways in which infinite space is capable of being limited. Hence the object which reason sets before itself as an ideal is also called the original Being (ens originarium); as having no being higher than itself, it is called the supreme Being (ens summum); and it is also named the Being of all beings (ens entium), to indicate that all other beings are conditioned and subject to it. But all this does not entitle us to say that there is an actual object which is so related objectively to other things, but only that there is an idea which is so related to our conceptions of things. Whether a Being of such transcendent perfection actually exists we are left in complete ignorance.

Again, we cannot say that an original being consists of a number of derivative beings, for each of these
presupposes the original being, and therefore cannot constitute it. The ideal of the original being must therefore be conceived as simple.

The derivation of all other possibility from the original being cannot properly be said to be a limitation of its supreme reality, and as it were a division of it into parts; for the original being would in that case be a mere aggregate of derivative beings, and this we have just seen to be impossible, although in our first rough sketch we represented the matter in that way.

The supreme reality we must conceive, not as the sum of all things, but as the necessary condition of their possibility. The manifold determination of things must be regarded, not as a limitation of the original being itself, but as its complete product, to which will belong our whole sensibility, and all the reality in the phenomenal world, which cannot enter as an ingredient into the idea of the Supreme Being.

If we follow out this idea and hypostatise it, we shall be able to determine the original being, simply from our conception of the supreme reality, as one, simple, all sufficient, eternal, etc.; in a word, we shall be able to determine it in its unconditioned completeness through all predicaments. Now this is the conception of God, in its transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason is the object of a transcendental theology.

By such a use of the transcendental idea, however, theology oversteps limits set to it by its very nature. Reason only demands the conception of all reality as essential to the complete determination of things; it does not require us to suppose that all this reality should be given objectively, and should itself constitute a thing.
It is by a mere fiction that we combine the manifold content of our idea into an ideal, and realize it in a particular being. We have no right to assume without question that such a substantiation of the ideal is even possible; nor can it be said that any of the consequences that flow from such an ideal have the least bearing upon the complete determination of things in general, although it was only for the sake of that determination that the idea was put forward.

How, then, does it come that reason derives the whole possibility of things from one single possibility, namely, that of the highest reality, and why does it assume that this reality must be contained in a particular original being? The answer will readily present itself if we look back to what has been shown in the Transcendental Analytic. There we found that objects of sense are possible only in relation to our thought, which supplies the a priori element or empirical form that is implied in them. But unless the matter were given, that is, the real element in the phenomenal object which corresponds to sensation, the object could not be thought at all, nor could we comprehend how it should be possible. Now an object of sense can be completely determined, only if we are able to compare it with all possible determinations of phenomena, and predicate these of it either affirmatively or negatively. But that which constitutes the thing itself, or the real element in the phenomenon, must be given, and unless it is given the object cannot be thought at all. Now the real element of all phenomena is given in the one all-embracing experience; and hence the matter which makes all objects of sense possible must be presupposed as given in one comprehensive whole, and only
by the limitation of this whole are empirical objects possible, distinguishable from one another, and capable of complete determination. As a matter of fact, no other objects can be given to us but objects of sense, and these nowhere but in the context of a possible experience. Hence there is for us no object which does not presuppose the comprehensive whole of all empirical reality as the condition of its possibility. It is therefore a natural illusion which leads us to suppose that a principle which properly holds only of things that are presented as objects of our senses, is applicable to all things without exception. We simply drop the limitation to phenomena, and imagine that the empirical principle of our conceptions of the possibility of phenomenal objects is a transcendental principle of the possibility of things as such.

And the reason why we afterwards hypostatise this idea of a comprehensive whole of all reality is, that we change dialectically the distributive unity, implied in the empirical use of understanding, into the collective unity of a whole of experience, and think of this whole of phenomena as an individual thing, which contains all reality within itself. Our next step is, by means of the transcendental subreption already mentioned, to confuse this individual thing, which includes in itself all empirical reality, with the conception of a thing that constitutes the supreme condition of the possibility of all things, and supplies the real conditions for their complete determination.
Section III.—Arguments of Speculative Reason for the Existence of a Supreme Being.

614 The natural course of human reason in seeking to prove the existence of a Supreme Being is as follows. First of all reason persuades itself that some necessary being must exist. This being it regards as having unconditioned existence. Then it looks out for that which can be conceived as independent of all conditions, and this it finds in that which is itself the sufficient condition of all other things, that is, in that which contains all reality. Now, as the unlimited All is absolute unity, and carries with it the conception of a single, supreme being, reason concludes that a Supreme Being must necessarily exist as the original condition of all things.

Let us suppose that every step in this argument is valid. Grant, in the first place, that from any given existence, were it only my own, I may legitimately infer the existence of an unconditionally necessary being. Grant, secondly, that I must regard a being which contains all reality and therefore all conditions, as unconditionally necessary, and that the conception of this being harmonizes with the idea of absolute necessity. Admitting all this, we yet are not entitled to say that there is anything contradictory of absolute necessity in the conception of a limited being, which does not possess the highest reality. For, while it is no doubt true that from the conception of a limited being we cannot derive the idea of the unconditioned, which by its very nature implies a totality of conditions, yet it by no means follows that a limited being must in its existence be conditioned.

On the contrary, there is nothing to hinder us from
supposing that all limited beings may be unconditionally necessary, although no doubt their necessity cannot be inferred merely from the general conception which we have of them. The argument given above cannot, therefore, help us in the least to determine the nature of a necessary being, and in fact it leads to nothing at all.

But although that argument, resting as it does upon the internal insufficiency of the contingent, is undoubtedly transcendental, it yet is so simple and natural that it never fails to commend itself even to the most ordinary mind, the moment its bearing is understood. We see things change, arise and perish; hence they, or at least their state, must have a cause. But for every cause that can be presented in experience, we are forced to seek a new cause. Now, where should we more naturally expect to find the first cause than in the supreme cause, that is, in the Being which originally contains within itself the sufficient explanation of every possible effect, and which besides is so easily conceived through the single mark of all-comprehensive completeness? This supreme cause is then held to be absolutely necessary, because it is absolutely necessary for us to ascend to it in thought, while yet we see no reason for going beyond it. Hence, even among nations that are in a state of the blindest polytheism, some gleams of monotheism are visible, to which they have been brought, not by reflection and deep speculation, but simply by following the path that gradually and naturally opened up before them.

There are only three ways in which the existence of God may be sought to be proved on the basis of speculative reason. The first is the physico-theological proof, the second is the cosmological, and the third the ontological.
This is the order in which the three proofs come before reason as it gradually widens its vision. We shall, however, examine them in the reverse order, for, as we shall immediately see, while experience gives the first impulse to reason, it is the \textit{transcendental conception} only which leads the way, and sets before reason the goal of all its efforts. I shall therefore begin with an examination of the transcendental proof, and then pass on to consider how far that proof may be strengthened by the addition of empirical elements.

\textit{Section IV. \textemdash The Ontological Proof.}

From what has been said it is obvious that the conception of an absolutely necessary being is a pure conception of reason. It is a mere idea, the objective reality of which is by no means proved by the fact that reason requires it. All that we can say is that the idea of an absolutely necessary being points to a certain ideal completeness, but as this completeness is unattainable, the idea really limits the sphere of understanding instead of extending its knowledge to new objects.

People have at all times spoken of an absolutely necessary being, but they have begun by seeking to prove its existence without first asking whether and how a thing of that sort could even be conceived. It is certainly easy enough to give a verbal definition of it, as something the non-existence of which is impossible. But this throws no light upon the conditions which force us to regard the non-existence of a thing as absolutely unthinkable. Now it is just these conditions that we really wish to know. We wish to know whether under the conception
of a necessary being we are thinking anything at all or not. To speak of the "unconditioned," and thus to take away all the conditions by means of which understanding is able to regard anything as necessary, does not help us to understand, whether in the conception of an unconditionally necessary being we are thinking of a real being, or, as may perhaps be the case, of nothing at all.

It has commonly been supposed that this conception, now so familiar to us, but originally hit upon by accident, might be justified by bringing forward a number of examples, and that thus all further inquiry into its intelligibility was rendered superfluous. Every geometrical proposition, it was said, as, for instance, that a triangle has three angles, is absolutely necessary; and people talked as if such examples entitled them to say that they had a perfectly clear conception of what they meant by an object that lay entirely beyond the sphere of human understanding.

The examples brought forward were, however, all without exception taken from judgments, not from things and their existence. But the unconditioned necessity of a judgment is not the same thing as an absolute necessity of a thing. The absolute necessity of a judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing predicated, that is, of the predicate in the judgment. The proposition just cited does not say that three angles are absolutely necessary, but only that, if a triangle exists, that is, is presented in perception, it must contain three angles. But this mere logical necessity has proved a fruitful source of illusion. People have framed a priori the conception of a thing that seems to include existence within its content, and have then assumed that, because existence
belongs necessarily to the object as conceived, it must also belong necessarily to the thing itself. Thus it is inferred that there is an absolutely necessary being, because the existence of that being is thought in a conception that has been arbitrarily assumed, and assumed under the supposition that there is an actual object corresponding to it.

If in an identical judgment I retain the subject after rejecting the predicate, a contradiction arises, and hence I say that the predicate belongs to the subject necessarily. But if I reject the subject as well as the predicate, there is no contradiction, for nothing is left to which a contradiction could apply. To assume that there is a triangle, and yet to deny that it has three angles, is contradictory, but there is no contradiction in denying both the triangle and its three angles. It is exactly the same with the conception of an absolutely necessary being. If the existence of that being is denied, the thing itself with all its predicates is at the same time denied. How can this be shown to involve a contradiction? The contradiction cannot come from without, for the thing is not said to be necessary because of its relation to anything external; nor can it come from within, for, in denying the reality of the thing itself, the reality of all that it contains is at the same time denied. "God is almighty" is a necessary judgment. The predicate "almighty" cannot be denied, so long as the subject "God" is affirmed, for the conception of God, that is, of an infinite being, is identical with the conception of a Being that is "almighty." But if you say, "There is no God," neither the predicate "almighty" nor any other predicate remains: in the denial of the subject every possible predicate is denied,
and there is therefore not the least contradiction in saying that God does not exist.

624 At this point, however, I am told that there is one conception, although only one, the object of which cannot without contradiction be denied to exist. The conception is that of an absolutely necessary Being. This Being, it is said, possesses all reality, and such a Being, as I am willing to admit, we are justified in assuming to be possible. Now that which comprehends all reality, the objector goes on, must also comprehend existence. Hence existence is in this case involved in the conception of a thing as possible. If, therefore, the thing is denied to exist, even its internal possibility is denied, and this is self-contradictory.

Now I simply ask, whether the proposition, that this or that thing exists, is an analytic or a synthetic proposition. If it is analytic, nothing is added to the thought of a thing by predicking existence of it. Either the thought in you must itself be the thing, or you have simply assumed existence to be implied in mere possibility, and then derived existence from internal possibility, which is nothing but a wretched tautology. It does not mend matters to use the word "reality" in speaking of the conception of a thing, and the word "existence" in speaking of the conception of the predicate. Call all that is assumed "reality," and in the conception of the subject the thing with all its predicates is already assumed to be actual, and this assumption is simply repeated in the predicate. Admit, on the other hand, as every rational being must admit, that every proposition which affirms existence is synthetic, and how can it be any longer maintained that the predicate of existence cannot
be denied without contradiction? That is the privilege of analytic propositions only, and is bound up with their very nature.

The illusion which arises from confusing a logical predicate with a real predicate, that is, with one that determines an actual thing, stubbornly resists almost all attempts to correct it. As logic abstracts from all content, anything at all may serve as a logical predicate; nay, the subject may even be predicated of itself. But a determination is a real predicate, which adds something to the conception of the subject and enlarges it. Hence it must not be assumed in the conception of the subject.

*Being* is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something that is capable of being added to the conception of a thing. It is merely the ungrounded assertion of a thing or of certain determinations as an object of thought. In logic *being* is simply the copula of a judgment. The proposition, *God is omnipotent*, contains two conceptions, the objects of which are respectively *God* and *omnipotence*; and the word *is* adds no new predicate, but is merely a sign that the predicate omnipotent is asserted in relation to the subject *God*. If, then, I take the term *God*, which is the subject, to comprehend the whole of the predicates, including the predicate *omnipotent*, and say, *God is*, or *There is a God*, I do not enlarge the conception of God by a new predicate, but I merely bring the subject in itself with all its predicates, in other words, the object, into relation with my conception. The content of the object and of my conception must be exactly the same, and hence I add nothing to my conception, which expresses merely the possibility of the object, by simply placing its object
before me in thought, and saying that it is. The real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars do not contain a cent more than a hundred possible dollars. The one signifies the conception, the other the object as it is set over against the conception; but if the object contained more than the conception, the conception would not express the whole object, and would therefore be an inadequate conception. No doubt there is in my purse a hundred dollars more if I actually possess them, than if I have merely the conception, that is, have merely the possibility of them. As real, the object is not simply contained in my conception analytically, but it is added to it synthetically, the conception as such being merely a determination of my own state. But the hundred dollars do not become more than a hundred whether they exist outside of my conception or not.

No matter therefore what or how many are the predicates by which I think a thing, no matter if I should think it even in the completeness of its determinations, I add absolutely nothing to it by saying that it is. To think of a Being of the highest reality, a Being in whom no reality is wanting, in no way settles the question, whether that Being does or does not exist. For, although my conception of the possible real content of a thing may want nothing, it may be only a conception, and relatively to my whole state of thinking, this may be wanting, that I have no knowledge whether the object of my conception is also possible a posteriori. And here we come upon the true source of the difficulty. Were it an object of sense that was in question, we should never think of identifying the existence of the
thing with the mere conception of it. In that case we at once see that the conception of a thing signifies merely the agreement of the object with the universal conditions of all possible empirical knowledge; whereas, by the existence of a thing we mean that the object is thought as contained in the context of experience as a whole.

The conception of the object is not in the least enlarged by its connection with the context of experience as a whole, but our thought is enriched by the possibility of another perception. It is therefore not surprising that, if we try to think existence simply by means of the pure category, we cannot mention a single mark which distinguishes existence from mere possibility. The conception of a Supreme Being is in many respects a most valuable idea, but, just because it is only an idea, it is quite incapable by itself of extending our knowledge of actual existence. It cannot even enable us to say that something may possibly exist apart from the idea. Leibnitz is therefore very far from having shown a priori, as he fondly supposed he had shown, that so sublime an ideal Being is even possible.

The labour and energy spent upon the famous ontological or Cartesian proof from mere conceptions of the existence of a Supreme Being are therefore thrown away, and a man has no more chance of extending his knowledge by means of mere ideas than a merchant can better his position by adding a few noughts to his cash account.

Section V.—The Cosmological Proof.

The cosmological proof, like the ontological, affirms the connection of absolute necessity with the highest
reality; but, instead of reasoning from the highest reality to necessity of existence, it reasons from the unconditioned necessity of some being or other as given to the unlimited reality of that being. It thus enters upon a line of reasoning which at least seems to be natural, whether it is to be called rational or sophistical, and which has a certain persuasive force with the speculative not less than with the common intellect. This proof, which is called by Leibnitz the argument *a contingentia mundi*, we shall now state and examine.

It runs thus:

If anything exists, an absolutely necessary Being exists.

Now, at least, I myself exist.

Therefore, an absolutely necessary Being exists.

The minor premise of this syllogism contains the statement of a particular experience; the major premise, the inference from any experience at all to the existence of something that is necessary. The proof therefore properly starts from experience, and thus it does not proceed completely *a priori* or ontologically. For that reason, and also because the object of all possible experience is called the world, it is known as the *cosmological* proof. And as it makes abstraction from all the special properties of objects of experience which make our world different from any other possible world, this argument is distinguished also from the physico-theological method of proof, which reasons from the peculiar nature of the world of sense as it is presented to our observation.
The proof then goes on as follows. There is only one way in which the necessary being can be determined, or, in other words, it must have one out of each possible pair of opposite predicates. Hence the conception of the necessary being must completely determine it. Now there is only a single conception possible, which completely determines a thing \textit{a priori}, namely, the conception of the \textit{ens realissimum}. Therefore, the conception of the absolutely real being is the only one under which a necessary being can be thought, that is, a Supreme Being necessarily exists.

In this cosmological argument so many sophistical propositions are brought together, that it seems as if speculative reason had exhausted its dialectical skill in producing the greatest possible transcendental illusion. I shall at present simply mention in their order the sophisms by which an old argument has been clothed in a new form and an appeal made to the agreement of two witnesses, experience and reason, when in reality the only witness is pure reason, which assumes a different dress and voice, and pretends to be a second witness. To make quite sure of its stability this proof takes its stand upon experience, and therefore affects to be different from the ontological proof, which puts its entire trust in pure \textit{a priori} conceptions. But the only use the cosmological proof makes of experience is to enable it to make the first step, and to reach the conclusion that some sort of necessary being exists. Experience, however, cannot tell us what may be the nature of this necessary being, and hence reason is forced to make a perfectly new start, and to seek by an examination of mere conceptions to find out what must be the attri-
butes of such a being; in other words, it asks which among all possible things contains in itself the conditions essential to absolute necessity. The required conditions, as it comes to believe, are found simply and solely in the conception of an absolutely real being, and accordingly it infers that this is the absolutely necessary being. It is plain, however, that in this reasoning it is assumed, that the conception of a being of the highest reality perfectly coincides with the conception of absolute necessity of existence, and that we can therefore reason from the one to the other. Now this was also the assumption of the ontological argument; so that a principle is assumed and made the basis of the cosmological proof which it was the express object of that proof to avoid using. Absolute necessity is existence that follows from mere conceptions. If it is said, that the conception of the ens realissimum is a conception, and indeed the only one, which is appropriate and adequate to necessary existence, it must also be admitted, that the one can be inferred from the other. Plainly, therefore, it is the ontological argument from mere conceptions which gives to the so-called cosmological proof all its force. The appeal to experience is quite idle, serving at the most to suggest the conception of absolute necessity, but not to connect that conception with any object in particular. The moment we try to effect the connection, we are forced to leave experience altogether, and to search among pure conceptions for one which contains in itself the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely necessary Being. But if in this way we could be sure that such a Being is possible at all, its existence would at the same time be established; for the argument amounts to this, that of all
possible beings there is only one which carries with it absolute necessity; in other words, that there is only one Being which exists with absolute necessity.

The second path, then, upon which speculative reason enters in its effort to reach the existence of the Supreme Being, is not only equally deceptive with the first, but it has the additional fault of leading to an *ignoratio elenchi*. It undertakes to lead us by a new way, but after a short circuit it brings us back to the very path that it had induced us to abandon.

I have said that in this cosmological proof there lies hidden a whole nest of dialectical assumptions, which transcendental criticism has no difficulty in detecting and exposing. I shall content myself with simply enumerating them, leaving it to the reader who is familiar with our method to find out for himself wherein their fallacy consists.

We find in it (1) the transcendental principle of reasoning from the contingent to its cause. This principle is no doubt applicable within the world of sense, but beyond that world it has no meaning whatever. No synthetic proposition like that of causality can be derived from the purely intellectual conception of the contingent. The principle of causality has no meaning, and no criterion for its employment, except in relation to the world of sense; whereas, in the cosmological argument, it is used for the very purpose of taking us beyond the world of sense.

There is (2) the inference to a first cause from the impossibility of an infinite series of causes being presented one after the other in the world of sense. This is an inference which reason does not permit us to employ
as a principle even within experience, much less to extend it beyond experience, where there is no chain of causes at all.

Also (3) the false self-satisfaction of reason that the series is complete merely because all the conditions of the series have finally been eliminated. It is overlooked that there can in that case be no necessity, and it is simply assumed that the conception is complete because there is no longer anything to serve as an object of conception.

And (4) the confusion of the logical possibility of the conception of reality as a complete whole, a conception which no doubt is self-consistent, with the transcendental possibility of that reality. For the latter there is needed a principle that shows the practicability of such a synthesis, and a principle of that kind can apply only to the field of possible experience.

642 Source of the Dialectical Illusion in all Transcendental Proofs.

Both of these proofs are transcendental, or attempts to prove the existence of God independently of empirical principles. What, then, in these transcendental proofs is the cause of the dialectical and yet natural illusion, by which the conception of necessity is connected with the conception of the highest reality, and by which that which is only an idea is realized and hypostatized?

644 If I am forced to think something to be necessary as a condition of the existence of things in general, and if yet I am unable to think of a single thing which is in itself necessary, it inevitably follows that necessity and con-
tingency can have no meaning as applied to things themselves. Were it otherwise, a contradiction would arise. Hence neither of these two principles can be objective. But this does not hinder them from being subjective principles of reason, one of which calls upon us to seek for something that is necessary as a condition of all that is presented as existing, and to be content with nothing short of a complete a priori explanation; while the other warns us that we need never hope to obtain a complete explanation, or, in other words, that we must not suppose anything empirical to be unconditioned and to admit of no further derivation. Taken in this sense, the two principles, as merely heuristic and regulative, concern only the formal interest of reason, and are quite consistent with each other. The one says that in our speculations on nature we should proceed as if there were a necessary first cause of all that belongs to existence; for here our object is simply to bring our knowledge to systematic unity, an object that may be attained if we only keep before our minds the idea of a supreme cause as a point towards which we should direct our efforts. The other warns us not to regard any single determination relating to the existence of things as an ultimate cause, that is, as absolutely necessary, but always to view it as conditioned, and therefore to keep the way ever open for further derivation. But if all that is observed to belong to things must be viewed as only conditionally necessary, nothing that is presented to us empirically can be regarded as absolutely necessary.

From this it follows that we must conceive that which is absolutely necessary to be outside of the world. Serving simply as a principle for producing the greatest possible
unity in phenomena through the idea of a supreme cause, it can never be realized in the world, because the second rule bids us look upon all empirical causes of the unity of phenomena as derived.

6.47 The ideal of the Supreme Being is therefore nothing but a regulative principle of reason, telling us to view all connection in the world as if it proceeded from an all-sufficient necessary cause. We can base upon it a rule for the systematic unity which is necessary in the explanation of the world according to universal laws, but it does not entitle us to assert that there is an existence necessary in itself. At the same time it is impossible to avoid the transcendental subreption by which this formal principle is imagined to be constitutive, and the unity of the world hypostatized. It is the same here as with space. Space is merely a principle of sensibility, but as it originally makes possible all the figures which are merely different limitations of itself, it is held to be something absolutely necessary and self-subsistent, and to be an object given in itself a priori. Similarly, the systematic unity of nature cannot be shown to be a principle of the empirical use of our reason, except in so far as we presuppose the idea of an absolutely real being as the supreme cause. Accordingly, this idea is supposed to be an actual object, and this object, because it is the supreme condition of existence, is regarded as necessary. Thus a regulative principle is changed into a constitutive principle. That such a substitution has actually been made is evident from this, that if I consider that Supreme Being, which relatively to the world is absolutely or unconditionally necessary, as a thing existing by itself, I cannot conceive what such necessity means. The conception of necessity,
therefore, is one which lies in my reason merely as a formal condition of thought, not as a material and hypostatic condition of existence.

Section VI.—The Physico-theological Proof.

If, then, neither the conception of things in general, nor the experience of any existence in general, can yield what we require, it only remains to try whether a determinate experience of the things that are presented to us in the world, and of their constitution and order, may not enable us to establish the existence of a Supreme Being. Such a proof we should call the physico-theological. Should this also fail, no satisfactory proof can be given, on the basis of speculative reason, of the existence of a Being corresponding to our transcendental idea.

After what has already been said, it is soon seen that an easy and conclusive answer to this last problem may be expected. For how can any experience ever be adequate to an idea? It is just the peculiarity of an idea of reason that no experience can coincide with it. The transcendental idea of a necessary and all-sufficient Original Being is so transcendently great, and is raised so far above all that is empirical and conditioned, that we can never find in experience material enough to realize it in its completeness. We are therefore forced to grope about among things conditioned, seeking in vain for an unconditioned, of which no law of empirical synthesis can give us an example or even the least indication.

The physico-theological proof must always be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest and simplest proof of all, and never fails to commend itself to the popular mind.
It imparts life to the study of nature, as it was itself suggested by that study, and receives new vigour from it. But although this line of argument must be admitted to be both reasonable and useful, it cannot be shown to have any claim to demonstrative certainty. On the contrary, it must be maintained that the physico-theological argument in proof of the existence of a Supreme Being cannot stand alone, but has to fall back upon the ontological argument, which it simply serves to introduce, in order to make up for its own deficiency. The ontological is therefore the only possible argument.

The main steps in the physico-theological argument are these: (1) There are in the world everywhere distinct marks of adaptation to a definite end, an adaptation which has been carried out with great wisdom, and which is traceable in a whole indescribably complex in content as well as unlimited in extent. (2) This adaptation does not at all belong to the nature of things that exist in the world, but is extraneous and accidental. That is to say, different things could not all conduce to a single end through such an infinite variety of means, were they not specially selected and adapted to that end by a rational principle acting from certain preconceived ideas. (3) There must therefore exist a single wise and sublime cause, or more than one, and this cause cannot be identified with the blind, all-powerful productiveness of nature, but must be an intelligent and free cause. (4) The unity exhibited in the mutual relation of the parts of the world is that of a skilfully constructed edifice; and hence the unity of the cause of the world is certain so far as our observation extends, and by all the principles of analogy is probable even beyond its range.
According to this argument, the adaptation and harmony of so many forms of nature proves contingency merely in the form of the world, but not in its matter or substance. To prove the latter, it would be necessary to show that the things of the world would not be capable of such order and harmony, if they were not in their substance the product of supreme wisdom. But to prove this, we should have to take a totally different line of argument from that which appeals to the analogy of human art.

All that the argument from design can possibly prove is an architect of the world, who is very much limited by the adaptability of the material in which he works: it cannot prove a creator of the world, to whose idea everything is subject. The argument is therefore very far from being sufficient to prove what it set out to prove, namely, the existence of an all-sufficient Original Being. To establish the contingency of matter itself, we would need to have recourse to a transcendental argument, and this is the very thing which, in the argument from design, we have been trying to avoid.

The physico-theological argument therefore reasons from the contingent character of the order and adaptation everywhere observable in the world to the existence of a cause adequate to its production. But as this cause must be conceived as something perfectly definite, it can only be the conception of a Being who possesses all power, wisdom, etc., in a word, all that perfection which is characteristic of an all-sufficient Being.

Now, I think no one will be bold enough to say that he can tell how the greatness of the world which is presented for his observation is related, either in content or extent, to omnipotence; how the order of the world is related to
supreme wisdom, and the unity of the world to the absolute unity of its Author. Hence the physico-theological argument cannot give us a definite conception of the Supreme Cause of the world, and is therefore insufficient as the principle of a theology, which is itself to serve as the basis of religion.

657 The truth is that, when it has led us to the point of admiring the greatness of the wisdom, power, etc., of the Author of the world, the argument from experience cannot take us any further. Accordingly, we abandon it altogether, and go on to reason from the contingency which we had inferred at the very beginning from the order and design of the world. From this contingency we advance, by means solely of transcendental conceptions, to the existence of something absolutely necessary. And, finally, from the conception of the absolute necessity of the first cause, we proceed to the thoroughly determined or determining conception of that cause, that is, to an all-comprehensive reality. Thus the physico-theological proof, foiled in its attempt to prove the existence of a Supreme Being, suddenly falls back upon the cosmological proof; and as the cosmological is simply the ontological proof in disguise, the argument from design really fulfils its aim by means of pure reason only, although it began by disclaiming all connection with pure reason, and professed to make use of nothing that was not clearly proved by experience.

658 The physico-theological proof of the existence of an Original or Supreme Being, therefore, rests upon the cosmological proof, and the cosmological upon the ontological. And as no other path is open to speculative reason but these three, the ontological proof from pure
conceptions of reason is the only one possible, even if we admit that any proof of a proposition, which goes so far beyond understanding as employed in experience, is possible at all.

Section VII.—Criticism of all Speculative Theology.

Reason in its purely speculative use is quite incapable of proving the existence of a Supreme Being. At the same time it is of very great value in this way, that it is able to correct our knowledge of that Being, should it be possible to obtain a knowledge of it in any other way, to bring it into harmony with itself and with all the aims of our intelligence, and to purify it of all that is inconsistent with the conception of an Original Being, and of all admixture of empirical limitations.

The Supreme Being is for purely speculative reason a mere ideal, but still a perfectly faultless ideal, which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge. And if it should turn out that there is a moral theology, which is able to supply what is deficient in speculative theology, we should then find that transcendental theology is no longer merely problematic, but is indispensable in the determination of the conception of a Supreme Being, and in the continual criticism of reason, which is so often deluded by sense and is not always in harmony even with its own ideas. Necessity, infinity, unity, existence apart from the world (not as a soul of the world), eternity as free from conditions of time, omnipresence as unaffected by conditions of space, etc., are purely transcendental predicates, the purified conception of which, essential as it is to every theology, can be derived only from a transcendental theology.
THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALITY.
Section I.—Transition from ordinary Moral Conceptions to the Philosophical Conception of Morality.

Nothing in the whole world, or even outside of the world, can possibly be regarded as good without limitation except a good will. No doubt it is a good and desirable thing to have intelligence, sagacity, judgment, and other intellectual gifts, by whatever name they may be called; it is also good and desirable in many respects to possess by nature such qualities as courage, resolution, and perseverance; but all these gifts of nature may be in the highest degree pernicious and hurtful, if the will which directs them, or what is called the character, is not itself good. The same thing applies to gifts of fortune. Power, wealth, honour, even good health, and that general well-being and contentment with one's lot which we call happiness, give rise to pride and not infrequently to insolence, if a man's will is not good; nor can a reflective and impartial spectator ever look with satisfaction upon the unbroken prosperity of a man who is destitute of the ornament of a pure and good will.

A good will would therefore seem to be the indispensable condition without which no one is even worthy to be happy.

A man's will is good, not because the consequences which flow from it are good, nor because it is capable of
attaining the end which it seeks, but it is good in itself, or because it wills the good. By a good will is not meant mere well-wishing; it consists in a resolute employment of all the means within one's reach, and its intrinsic value is in no way increased by success or lessened by failure.

This idea of the absolute value of mere will seems so extraordinary that, although it is endorsed even by the popular judgment, we must subject it to careful scrutiny.

If nature had meant to provide simply for the maintenance, the well-being, in a word the happiness, of beings which have reason and will, it must be confessed that, in making use of their reason, it has hit upon a very poor way of attaining its end. As a matter of fact the very worst way a man of refinement and culture can take to secure enjoyment and happiness is to make use of his reason for that purpose. Hence there is apt to arise in his mind a certain degree of misology, or hatred of reason. Finding that the arts which minister to luxury, and even the sciences, instead of bringing him happiness, only lay a heavier yoke on his neck, he at length comes to envy, rather than to despise, men of less refinement, who follow more closely the promptings of their natural impulses, and pay little heed to what reason tells them to do or to leave undone. It must at least be admitted, that one may deny reason to have much or indeed any value in the production of happiness and contentment, without taking a morose or ungrateful view of the goodness with which the world is governed. Such a judgment really means that life has another and a much nobler end than happiness, and that the true vocation of reason is to secure that end.
The true object of reason then, in so far as it is practical, or capable of influencing the will, must be to produce a will which is good in itself, and not merely good as a means to something else. This will is not the only or the whole good, but it is the highest good, and the condition of all other good, even of the desire for happiness itself. It is therefore not inconsistent with the wisdom of nature that the cultivation of reason which is essential to the furtherance of its first and unconditioned object, the production of a good will, should, in this life at least, in many ways limit, or even make impossible, the attainment of happiness, which is its second and conditioned object.

To bring to clear consciousness the conception of a will which is good in itself, a conception already familiar to the popular mind, let us examine the conception of duty, which involves the idea of a good will as manifested under certain subjective limitations and hindrances.

I pass over actions which are admittedly violations of duty, for these, however useful they may be in the attainment of this or that end, manifestly do not proceed from duty. I set aside also those actions which are not actually inconsistent with duty, but which yet are done under the impulse of some natural inclination, although not a direct inclination to do these particular actions; for in these it is easy to determine whether the action that is consistent with duty, is done from duty or with some selfish object in view. There remains the only really difficult case, that in which we have a direct inclination to do a certain action, which is itself in conformity with duty. The preservation of one's own life, for instance, is a duty; but, as everyone has a natural
inclination to preserve his life, the anxious care which most men usually devote to this object, has no intrinsic value, nor the maxim from which they act any moral import. They preserve their life in accordance with duty, but not because of duty. But, suppose adversity and hopeless sorrow to have taken away all desire for life; suppose that the wretched man would welcome death as a release, and yet takes means to prolong his life simply from a sense of duty; then his maxim has a genuine moral import.

But, secondly, an action that is done from duty gets its moral value, not from the object which it is intended to secure, but from the maxim by which it is determined. Accordingly, the action has the same moral value whether the object is attained or not, if only the principle by which the will is determined to act is independent of every object of sensuous desire. What was said above makes it clear, that it is not the object aimed at, or, in other words, the consequences which flow from an action when these are made the end and motive of the will, that can give to the action an unconditioned and moral value. In what, then, can the moral value of an action consist, if it does not lie in the will itself, as directed to the attainment of a certain object? It can lie only in the principle of the will, no matter whether the object sought can be attained by the action or not. For the will stands as it were at the parting of the ways, between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori material motive. As so standing it must be determined by something, and, as no action which is done from duty can be determined by a material principle, it can be determined only by the formal principle of all volition.
From the two propositions just set forth a third directly follows, which may be thus stated: *Duty is the obligation to act from reverence for law.* Now, I may have a natural *inclination* for the object that I expect to follow from my action, but I can never have *reverence* for that which is not a spontaneous activity of my will, but merely an effect of it; neither can I have reverence for any natural inclination, whether it is my own or another's. If it is my own, I can at most only approve of it; if it is manifested by another, I may regard it as conducive to my own interest, and hence I may in certain cases even be said to have a love for it. But the only thing which I can reverence or which can lay me under an obligation to act, is the law which is connected with my will, not as a consequence, but as a principle; a principle which is not dependent upon natural inclination, but overmasters it, or at least allows it to have no influence whatever in determining my course of action. Now if an action which is done out of regard for duty sets entirely aside the influence of natural inclination and along with it every object of the will, nothing else is left by which the will can be determined but objectively the *law* itself, and subjectively *pure reverence* for the law as a principle of action. Thus there arises the maxim, to obey the moral law even at the sacrifice of all my natural inclinations.

The **supreme good** which we call moral can therefore be nothing but the *idea of the law* in itself, in so far as it is this idea which determines the will, and not any consequences that are expected to follow. Only a **rational** being can have such an idea, and hence a man who acts from the idea of the law is already morally good, no
matter whether the consequences which he expects from his action follow or not.

Now what must be the nature of a law, the idea of which is to determine the will, even apart from the effects expected to follow, and which is therefore itself entitled to be called good absolutely and without qualification? As the will must not be moved to act from any desire for the results expected to follow from obedience to a certain law, the only principle of the will which remains is that of the conformity of actions to universal law. In all cases I must act in such a way that I can at the same time will that my maxim should become a universal law. This is what is meant by conformity to law pure and simple; and this is the principle which serves, and must serve, to determine the will, if the idea of duty is not to be regarded as empty and chimerical. As a matter of fact the judgments which we are wont to pass upon conduct perfectly agree with this principle, and in making them we always have it before our eyes.

May I, for instance, under the pressure of circumstances, make a promise which I have no intention of keeping? The question is not, whether it is prudent to make a false promise, but whether it is morally right. To enable me to answer this question shortly and conclusively, the best way is for me to ask myself whether it would satisfy me that the maxim to extricate myself from embarrassment by giving a false promise should have the force of a universal law, applying to others as well as to myself. And I see at once, that, while I can certainly will the lie, I cannot will that lying should be a universal law. If lying were universal, there would, properly speaking, be no promises whatever. I might
say that I intended to do a certain thing at some future time, but nobody would believe me, or if he did at the moment trust to my promise, he would afterwards pay me back in my own coin. My maxim thus proves itself to be self-destructive, so soon as it is taken as a universal law.

253 Duty, then, consists in the obligation to act from pure reverence for the moral law. To this motive all others must give way, for it is the condition of a will which is good in itself, and which has a value with which nothing else is comparable.

There is, however, in man a strong feeling of antagonism to the commands of duty, although his reason tells him that those commands are worthy of the highest reverence. For man not only possesses reason, but he has certain natural wants and inclinations, the complete satisfaction of which he calls happiness. These natural inclinations clamorously demand to have their seemingly reasonable claims respected; but reason issues its commands inflexibly, refusing to promise anything to the natural desires, and treating their claims with a sort of neglect and contempt. From this there arises a natural dialectic, that is, a disposition to explain away the strict laws of duty, to cast doubt upon their validity, or at least, upon their purity and stringency, and in this way to make them yield to the demands of the natural inclinations.

Thus men are forced to go beyond the narrow circle of ideas within which their reason ordinarily moves, and to take a step into the field of moral philosophy, not indeed from any perception of speculative difficulties, but simply on practical grounds. The practical reason of
men cannot be long exercised any more than the theoretical, without falling insensibly into a dialectic, which compels it to call in the aid of philosophy; and in the one case as in the other, rest can be found only in a thorough criticism of human reason.

254 Section II.—Transition from Popular Moral Philosophy to the Metaphysic of Morality.

So far, we have drawn our conception of duty from the manner in which men employ it in the ordinary exercise of their practical reason. The conception of duty, however, we must not suppose to be therefore derived from experience. On the contrary, we hear frequent complaints, the justice of which we cannot but admit, that no one can point to a single instance in which an action has undoubtedly been done purely from a regard for duty; that there are certainly many actions which are not opposed to duty, but none which are indisputably done from duty and therefore have a moral value. Nothing indeed can secure us against the complete loss of our ideas of duty, and maintain in the soul a well-grounded respect for the moral law, but the clear conviction, that reason issues its commands on its own authority, without caring in the least whether the actions of men have, as a matter of fact, been done purely from ideas of duty. For reason commands inflexibly that certain actions should be done, which perhaps never have been done; actions, the very possibility of which may seem doubtful to one who bases everything upon experience. Perfect disinterestedness in friendship, for instance, is demanded of every man, although there may never have been a
sincere friend; for pure friendship is bound up with the idea of duty as duty, and belongs to the very idea of a reason which determines the will on a priori grounds, prior to all experience.

It is, moreover, beyond dispute, that unless we are to deny to morality all truth and all reference to a possible object, the moral law has so wide an application that it is binding, not merely upon man, but upon all rational beings, and not merely under certain contingent conditions, and with certain limitations, but absolutely and necessarily. And it is plain, that no experience could ever lead us to suppose that laws of this apodictic character are even possible.

There is, therefore, no genuine supreme principle of morality, which is not independent of all experience, and based entirely upon pure reason. If, then, we are to have a philosophy of morality at all, as distinguished from a popular moral philosophy, we may take it for granted without further investigation, that moral conceptions, together with the principles which flow from them, are given a priori and must be presented in their generality (in abstracto).

Such a metaphysic of morality, which must be entirely free from all admixture of empirical psychology, theology, physics and hyperphysics, and above all from all occult or, as we may call them, hypophysical qualities, is not only indispensable as a foundation for a sound theory of duties, but it is also of the highest importance in the practical realization of moral precepts. For the pure idea of duty, unmixed with any foreign ingredient of sensuous desire, in a word, the idea of the moral law, influences the heart of man much more powerfully
through his reason, which in this way only becomes conscious that it can of itself be practical, than do all the motives which have their source in experience. Conscious of its own dignity, the moral law treats all sensuous desires with contempt, and is able to master them one by one.

From what has been said it is evident, that all moral conceptions have their seat and origin in reason entirely \textit{a priori}, and are apprehended by the ordinary reason of men as well as by reason in its purely speculative activity. We have also seen that it is of the greatest importance, not only in the construction by speculative reason of a theory of morality, but also with a view to the practical conduct of life, to derive the conceptions and laws of morality from pure reason, to present them pure and unmixed, and to mark out the sphere of this whole practical or pure knowledge of reason. Nor is it permissible, in seeking to determine the whole faculty of pure practical reason, to make its principles dependent upon the peculiar nature of human reason, as we were allowed to do, and sometimes were even forced to do, in speculative philosophy; for moral laws must apply to every rational being, and must therefore be derived from the very conception of a rational being as such.

To show the need of advancing not only from the common moral judgments of men to the philosophical, but from a popular philosophy, which merely gropes its way by the help of examples, to a metaphysic of morality, we must begin at the point where the practical faculty of reason supplies general rules of action, and exhibit clearly the steps by which it attains to the conception of duty.

Everything in nature acts in conformity with law.
Only a rational being has the faculty of acting in conformity with the *idea* of law, or from principles; only a rational being, in other words, has a will. And as without reason actions cannot proceed from laws, will is simply practical reason. If the will is infallibly determined by reason, the actions of a rational being are subjectively as well as objectively necessary; that is, will must be regarded as a faculty of choosing *that only* which reason, independently of natural inclination, declares to be practically necessary or good. On the other hand, if the will is not invariably determined by reason alone, but is subject to certain subjective conditions or motives, which are not always in harmony with the objective conditions; if the will, as actually is the case with man, is not in perfect conformity with reason; actions which are recognized to be objectively necessary, are subjectively contingent. The determination of such a will according to objective laws is therefore called *obligation*. That is to say, if the will of a rational being is not absolutely good, we conceive of it as capable of being determined by objective laws of reason, but not as by its very nature necessarily obeying them.

The idea that a certain principle is objective, and binding upon the will, is a command of reason, and the statement of the command in a formula is an *imperative*.

All imperatives are expressed by the word *ought*, to indicate that the will upon which they are binding is not by its subjective constitution necessarily determined in conformity with the objective law of reason. An imperative says, that the doing, or leaving undone of a certain thing would be good, but it addresses a will which does not always do a thing simply because it is good. Now,
that is practically *good* which determines the will by ideas of reason, in other words, that which determines it, not by subjective influences, but by principles which are objective, or apply to all rational beings as such. *Good* and *pleasure* are quite distinct. Pleasure results from the influence of purely subjective causes upon the will of the subject, and these vary with the susceptibility of this or that individual, while a principle of reason is valid for all.

A perfectly good will would, like the will of man, stand under objective laws, laws of the good, but it could not be said to be under an *obligation* to act in conformity with those laws. Such a will by its subjective constitution could be determined only by the idea of the good. In reference to the Divine will, or any other holy will, imperatives have no meaning; for here the will is by its very nature necessarily in harmony with the law, and therefore *ought* has no application to it. Imperatives are formulae, which express merely the relation of objective laws of volition in general to the imperfect will of this or that rational being, as for instance, the will of man.

Now, all imperatives command either *hypothetically* or *categorically*. A hypothetical imperative states that a certain thing must be done, if something else which is willed, or at least might be willed, is to be attained. The categorical imperative declares that an act is in itself or objectively necessary, without any reference to another end.

Every practical law represents a possible action as good, and therefore as obligatory for a subject that is capable of being determined to act by reason. Hence all imperatives are formulæ for the determination of an
action which is obligatory according to the principle of a will that is in some sense good. If the action is good only because it is a means to something else, the imperative is hypothetical; if the action is conceived to be good in itself, the imperative, as the necessary principle of a will that in itself conforms to reason, is categorical.

An imperative, then, states what possible action of mine would be good. It supplies the practical rule for a will which does not at once do an act simply because it is good, either because the subject does not know it to be good, or because, knowing it to be good, he is influenced by maxims which are opposed to the objective principles of a practical reason.

The hypothetical imperative says only that an action is good relatively to a certain possible end or to a certain actual end. In the former case it is problematic, in the latter case assertoric. The categorical imperative, which affirms that an action is in itself or objectively necessary without regard to an end, that is, without regard to any other end than itself, is an apodictic practical principle.

Whatever is within the power of a rational being may be conceived to be capable of being willed by some rational being, and hence the principles which determine what actions are necessary in the attainment of certain possible ends, are infinite in number.

Yet there is one thing which we may assume that all finite rational beings actually make their end, and there is therefore one object which may safely be regarded, not simply as something that they may seek, but as something that by a necessity of their nature they actually do seek. This object is happiness. The hypothetical imperative, which affirms the practical necessity of an
action as the means of attaining happiness, is *assertoric*. We must not think of happiness as simply a possible and problematic end, but as an end that we may with confidence presuppose *a priori* to be sought by everyone, belonging as it does to the very nature of man. Now skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-being may be called *prudence*, taking the word in its more restricted sense. An imperative, therefore, which relates merely to the choice of means to one's own happiness, that is, a maxim of prudence, must be hypothetical; it commands an action, not absolutely, but only as a means to another end.

Lastly, there is an imperative which directly commands an action, without presupposing as its condition that some other end is to be attained by means of that action. This imperative is *categorical*. It has to do, not with the matter of an action and the result expected to follow from it, but simply with the form and principle from which the action itself proceeds. The action is essentially good if the motive of the agent is good, let the consequences be what they may. This imperative may be called the imperative of *morality*.

How are all these imperatives possible? The question is not, How is an action which an imperative commands actually realized? but, How can we think of the will as placed under obligation by each of those imperatives? Very little need be said to show how an imperative of skill is possible. He who wills the end, wills also the means in his power which are indispensable to the attainment of the end. Looking simply at the act of will, we must say that this proposition is analytic. If a certain object is to follow as an effect from my volition, my causality must be
conceived as active in the production of the effect, or as employing the means by which the effect will take place. The imperative, therefore, simply states that in the conception of the willing of this end there is directly implied the conception of actions necessary to this end. No doubt certain synthetic propositions are required to determine the particular means by which a given end may be attained, but these have nothing to do with the principle or act of the will, but merely state how the object may actually be realized.

Were it as easy to give a definite conception of happiness as of a particular end, the imperatives of prudence would be of exactly the same nature as the imperatives of skill, and would therefore be analytic. For, we should be able to say, that he who wills the end wills also the only means in his power for the attainment of the end. But, unfortunately, the conception of happiness is so indefinite, that, although every man desires to obtain it, he is unable to give a definite and self-consistent statement of what he actually desires and wills. The truth is, that, strictly speaking, the imperatives of prudence are not commands at all. They do not say that actions are objective or necessary, and hence they must be regarded as counsels (consilia), not as commands (praecpta) of reason. Still, the imperative of prudence would be an analytic proposition, if the means to happiness could only be known with certainty. For the only difference in the two cases is that in the imperative of skill the end is merely possible, in the imperative of prudence it is actually given; and as in both all that is commanded is the means to an end which is assumed to be willed, the imperative which commands that he who wills the end should also will the means, is in
both cases analytic. There is therefore no real difficulty in seeing how an imperative of prudence is possible.

The only question which is difficult of solution, is, how the imperative of morality is possible. Here the imperative is not hypothetical, and hence we cannot derive its objective necessity from any presupposition. Nor must it for a moment be forgotten, that an imperative of this sort cannot be established by instances taken from experience. We must therefore find out by careful investigation, whether imperatives which seem to be categorical may not be simply hypothetical imperatives in disguise.

One thing is plain at the very outset, namely, that only a categorical imperative can have the dignity of a practical \textit{law}, and that the other imperatives, while they may no doubt be called \textit{principles} of the will, cannot be called laws. An action which is necessary merely as a means to an arbitrary end, may be regarded as itself contingent, and if the end is abandoned, the maxim which prescribes the action has no longer any force. An unconditioned command, on the other hand, does not permit the will to choose the opposite, and therefore it carries with it the necessity which is essential to a law.

It is, however, very hard to see how there can be a categorical imperative or law of morality at all. Such a law is an \textit{a priori} synthetic proposition, and we cannot expect that there will be less difficulty in showing how a proposition of that sort is possible in the sphere of morality than we have found it to be in the sphere of knowledge.

In attempting to solve this problem, we shall first of all inquire, whether the mere conception of a categorical
imperative may not perhaps supply us with a formula, which contains the only proposition that can possibly be a categorical imperative. The more difficult question, how such an absolute command is possible at all, will require a special investigation, which must be postponed to the last section.

If I take the mere conception of a hypothetical imperative, I cannot tell what it may contain until the condition under which it applies is presented to me. But I can tell at once from the very conception of a categorical imperative what it must contain. Viewed apart from the law, the imperative simply affirms that the maxim, or subjective principle of action, must conform to the objective principle or law. Now the law contains no condition to which it is restricted, and hence nothing remains but the statement, that the maxim ought to conform to the universality of the law as such. It is only this conformity to law that the imperative can be said to represent as necessary.

There is therefore but one categorical imperative, which may be thus stated: Act in conformity with that maxim, and that maxim only, which you can at the same time will to be a universal law.

Now, if from this single imperative, as from their principle, all imperatives of duty can be derived, we shall at least be able to indicate what we mean by the categorical imperative and what the conception of it implies, although we shall not be able to say whether the conception of duty may not itself be empty.

The universality of the law which governs the succession of events, is what we mean by nature, in the most general sense, that is, the existence of things, in so far as their
existence is determined in conformity with universal laws. The universal imperative of duty might therefore be put in this way: *Act as if the maxim from which you act were to become through your will a universal law of nature.*

272 If we attend to what goes on in ourselves in every transgression of a duty, we find, that we do not will that our maxim should become a universal law. We find it in fact impossible to do so, and we really will that the opposite of our maxim should remain a universal law, at the same time that we assume the liberty of making an exception in favour of natural inclination in our own case, or perhaps only for this particular occasion. Hence, if we looked at all cases from the same point of view, that is, from the point of view of reason, we should see that there was here a contradiction in our will. The contradiction is, that a certain principle is admitted to be necessary objectively or as a universal law, and yet is held not to be universal subjectively, but to admit of exceptions. What we do is, to consider our action at one time from the point of view of a will that is in perfect conformity with reason, and at another time from the point of view of a will that is under the influence of natural inclination. There is, therefore, here no real contradiction, but merely an antagonism of inclination to the command of reason. The universality of the principle is changed into a mere generality, in order that the practical principle of reason may meet the maxim half way. Not only is this limitation condemned by our own impartial judgment, but it proves that we actually recognize the validity of the categorical imperative, and merely allow ourselves to make a few exceptions in our
own favour which we try to consider as of no importance, or as a necessary concession to circumstances.

This much at least we have learned, that if the idea of duty is to have any meaning and to lay down the laws of our actions, it must be expressed in categorical and not in hypothetical imperatives. We have also obtained a clear and distinct conception (a very important thing), of what is implied in a categorical imperative which contains the principle of duty for all cases, granting such an imperative to be possible at all. But we have not yet been able to prove a priori, that there actually is such an imperative; that there is a practical law which commands absolutely on its own authority, and is independent of all sensuous impulses; and that duty consists in obedience to this law.

In seeking to reach this point, it is of the greatest importance to observe, that the reality of this principle cannot possibly be derived from the peculiar constitution of human nature. For by duty is meant the practically unconditioned necessity of an act, and hence we can show that duty is a law for the will of all human beings, only by showing that it is applicable to all rational beings, or rather to all rational beings to whom an imperative applies at all.

The question, then, is this: Is it a necessary law for all rational beings, that they must always estimate the value of their actions by asking whether they can will that their maxims should serve as universal laws? If there is such a law, it must be possible to prove entirely a priori, that it is bound up with the very idea of the will of a rational being. To show that there is such a connection we must, however reluctantly, take a step into the realm of metaphysics: not, however, into the realm of speculative
philosophy, but into the metaphysic of morality. For we have here to deal with objective practical laws, and therefore with the relation of the will to itself, in so far as it is determined purely by reason. All relation of the will to what is empirical is excluded as a matter of course, for if reason determines the relation entirely by itself, it must necessarily do so \textit{a priori}.

Will is conceived of as a faculty of determining itself to action \textit{in accordance with the idea of certain laws}. Such a faculty can belong only to a rational being. Now that which serves as an objective principle for the self-determination of the will is an \textit{end}, and if this end is given purely by reason, it must hold for all rational beings. On the other hand, that which is merely the condition of the possibility of an action the effect of which is the end, is called the \textit{means}. The subjective ground of desire is natural inclination, the objective ground of volition is a motive; hence there is a distinction between subjective ends, which depend upon natural inclination, and objective ends, which are connected with motives that hold for every rational being. Practical principles that abstract from all subjective ends are \textit{formal}; those that presuppose subjective ends, and therefore natural inclinations, are \textit{material}. The ends which a rational being arbitrarily sets before himself as material ends to be produced by his actions, are all merely relative; for that which gives to them their value is simply their relation to the peculiar susceptibility of the subject. They can therefore yield no universal and necessary principles, or practical laws, applicable to all rational beings, and binding upon every will. Upon such relative ends, therefore, only hypothetical imperatives can be based.
Suppose, however, that there is something the existence of which has in itself an absolute value, something which, as an end in itself, can be a ground of definite laws; then, there would lie in that, and only in that, the ground of a possible categorical imperative or practical law.

Now, I say, that man, and indeed every rational being as such, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be made use of by this or that will, and therefore man in all his actions, whether these are directed towards himself or towards other rational beings, must always be regarded as an end. No object of natural desire has more than a conditioned value; for if the natural desires, and the wants to which they give rise, did not exist, the object to which they are directed would have no value at all. So far are the natural desires and wants from having an absolute value, so far are they from being sought simply for themselves, that every rational being must wish to be entirely free from their influence. The value of every object which human action is the means of obtaining, is, therefore, always conditioned. And even beings whose existence depends upon nature, not upon our will, if they are without reason, have only the relative value of means, and are therefore called things. Rational beings, on the other hand, are called persons, because their very nature shows them to be ends in themselves, that is, something which cannot be made use of simply as a means. A person being thus an object of respect, a certain limit is placed upon arbitrary will. Persons are not purely subjective ends, whose existence has a value for us as the effect of our actions, but they are objective ends, or things whose existence is an end
in itself, for which no other end can be substituted. If all value were conditioned, and therefore contingent, it would be impossible to show that there is any supreme practical principle whatever.

If, then, there is a supreme practical principle, a principle which in relation to the human will is a categorical imperative, it must be an objective principle of the will, and must be able to serve as a universal practical law. For, such a principle must be derived from the idea of that which is necessarily an end for every one because it is an end in itself. Its foundation is this, that rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives of his own existence in this way, and so far this is a subjective principle of human action. But in this way also every other rational being conceives of his own existence, and for the very same reason; hence the principle is also objective, and from it, as the highest practical ground, all laws of the will must be capable of being derived. The practical imperative will therefore be this: Act so as to use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always as an end, never as merely a means.

The principle, that humanity and every rational nature is an end in itself, is not borrowed from experience. For, in the first place, because of its universality it applies to all rational beings, and no experience can apply so widely. In the second place, it does not regard humanity subjectively, as an end of man, that is, as an object which the subject of himself actually makes his end, but as an objective end, which ought to be regarded as a law that constitutes the supreme limiting condition of all subjective ends, and which must therefore have its source in pure
reason. The objective ground of all practical laws consists in the rule and the form of universality, which makes them capable of serving as laws, but their subjective ground consists in the end to which they are directed. Now, by the second principle, every rational being, as an end in himself, is the subject of all ends. From this follows the third practical principle of the will, which is the supreme condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, namely, the idea of the will of every rational being as a will which lays down universal laws of action.

This formula implies, that a will which is itself the supreme lawgiver cannot possibly act from interest of any sort in the law, although no doubt a will may stand under the law, and may yet be attached to it by the bond of interest.

At the point we have now reached, it does not seem surprising that all previous attempts to find out the principle of morality should have ended in failure. It was seen that man is bound under law by duty, but it did not strike anyone, that the universal system of laws to which he is subject are laws which he imposes upon himself, and that he is only under obligation to act in conformity with his own will, a will which by the purpose of nature prescribes universal laws. Now so long as man is thought to be merely subject to law, no matter what the law may be, he must be regarded as stimulated or constrained to obey the law from interest of some kind; for as the law does not proceed from his own will, there must be something external to his will which compels him to act in conformity with it. This perfectly necessary conclusion frustrated every attempt to find a
supreme principle of duty. Duty was never established, but merely the necessity of acting from some form of interest, private or public. The imperative was therefore necessarily always conditioned, and could not possibly have the force of a moral command. The supreme principle of morality I shall therefore call the principle of the *autonomy* of the will, to distinguish it from all other principles, which I call principles of *heteronomy*.

The conception that every rational being in all the maxims of his will must regard himself as prescribing universal laws, by reference to which himself and all his actions are to be judged, leads to a cognate and very fruitful conception, that of a *kingdom of ends*.

By *kingdom*, I mean the systematic combination of different rational beings through the medium of common laws. Now, laws determine certain ends as universal, and hence, if abstraction is made from the individual differences of rational beings, and from all that is peculiar to their private ends, we get the idea of a complete totality of ends combined in a system; in other words, we are able to conceive of a kingdom of ends, which conforms to the principles formulated above.

All rational beings stand under the law, that each should treat himself and others, *never simply as means*, but always as *at the same time ends in themselves*. Thus there arises a systematic combination of rational beings through the medium of common objective laws. This may well be called a kingdom of ends, because the object of those laws is just to relate all rational beings to one another as ends and means. Of course this kingdom of ends is merely an ideal.

Morality, then, consists in the relation of all action to
the system of laws which alone makes possible a kingdom of ends. These laws must belong to the nature of every rational being, and must proceed from his own will. The principle of the will, therefore, is, that no action should be done from any other maxim than one which is consistent with a universal law. This may be expressed in the formula: Act so that the will may regard itself as in its maxims laying down universal laws. Now, if the maxims of rational beings are not by their very nature in harmony with this objective principle, the principle of a universal system of laws, the necessity of acting in conformity with that principle is called practical obligation or duty. No doubt duty does not apply to the sovereign will in the kingdom of ends, but it applies to every member of it, and to all in equal measure. Autonomy is thus the foundation of the moral value of man and of every other rational being.

The three ways in which the principle of morality has been formulated are at bottom simply different statements of the same law, and each implies the other two.

An absolutely good will, then, the principle of which must be a categorical imperative, will be undetermined as regards all objects, and will contain merely the form of volition in general, a form which rests upon the autonomy of the will. The one law which the will of every rational being imposes upon itself, and imposes without reference to any natural impulse or any interest, is, that the maxims of every good will must be capable of being made a universal law.

How such an a priori synthetic practical proposition is possible, and why it is necessary, is a problem which it is not the task of a metaphysic of morality to solve. We
have not even affirmed it to be true, much less have we attempted to prove its truth. To prove that practical reason is capable of being employed synthetically, and that morality is not a mere fiction of the brain, requires us to enter upon a criticism of the faculty of practical reason itself. In the next section we shall state the main points which must be proved in a Critique of Practical Reason, so far as is necessary for our present purpose.

294 Section III.—Transition from the Metaphysic of Morality to the Critique of Practical Reason.

The Idea of Freedom as the Key to the Autonomy of the Will.

The will is the causality of living beings in so far as they are rational. Freedom is that causality in so far as it can be regarded as efficient without being determined to activity by any cause other than itself. Natural necessity is the property of all non-rational beings to be determined to activity by some cause external to themselves.

The definition of freedom just given is negative, and therefore it does not tell us what freedom is in itself; but it prepares the way for a positive conception of a more specific and more fruitful character. The conception of causality carries with it the conception of determination by law (Gesetz), for the effect is conceived as determined (gesetzt) by the cause. Hence freedom must not be regarded as lawless (gesetzlos), but simply as independent of laws of nature. A free cause does conform to unchangeable laws, but these laws are peculiar to itself; and, indeed, apart from law a free will has no meaning
whatever. A necessary law of nature, as we have seen, implies the heteronomy of efficient causes; for no effect is possible at all, unless its cause is itself determined to activity by something else. What, therefore, can freedom possibly be but autonomy, that is, the property of the will to be a law to itself? Now, to say that the will in all its actions is a law to itself, is simply to say that its principle is, to act from no other maxim than that the object of which is itself as a universal law. But this is just the formula of the categorical imperative and the principle of morality. Hence a free will is the same thing as a will that conforms to moral laws.

If, then, we start from the presupposition of freedom of the will, we can derive morality and the principle of morality simply from an analysis of the conception of freedom. Yet the principle of morality, namely, that an absolutely good will is a will the maxim of which can always be taken as itself a universal law, is a synthetic proposition. For by no possibility can we derive this property of the maxim from an analysis of the conception of an absolutely good will. The transition from the conception of freedom to the conception of morality can be made only if there is a third proposition which connects the other two in a synthetic unity. The positive conception of freedom yields this third proposition, and not the conception of nature, in which a thing is related causally only to something else. What this third proposition is to which freedom points, and of which we have an a priori idea, can be made clear only after some preliminary investigation.
Freedom is a property of all Rational Beings.

It cannot in any way be proved that the will of man is free, unless it can be shown that the will of all rational beings is free. For morality is a law for us only in so far as we are rational beings, and therefore it must apply to all rational beings. But morality is possible only for a free being, and hence it must be proved that freedom also belongs to the will of all rational beings. Now I say, that a being who cannot act except under the idea of freedom, must for that very reason be regarded as free so far as his actions are concerned. In other words, even if it cannot be proved by speculative reason that his will is free, all the laws that are inseparably bound up with freedom must be viewed by him as laws of his will. And I say, further, that we must necessarily attribute to every rational being that has a will the idea of freedom, because every such being always acts under that idea. A rational being we must conceive as having a reason that is practical, that is, a reason that has causality with regard to its objects. Now, it is impossible to conceive of a reason which should be consciously biassed in its judgments by some influence from without, for the subject would in that case regard its judgments as determined, not by reason, but by a natural impulse. Reason must therefore regard itself as the author of its principles of action, and as independent of all external influences. Hence, as practical reason, or as the will of a rational being, it must be regarded by itself as free. The will of a rational being, in other words, can be his own will only if he acts under the idea of freedom, and therefore this idea must in the practical sphere be ascribed to all rational beings.
The Interest connected with Moral Ideas.

We have at last succeeded in reducing the true conception of morality to the idea of freedom. This, however, does not prove that man actually is free, but only that, without presupposing freedom, we cannot conceive of ourselves as rational beings, who are conscious of causality with respect to our actions, that is, as endowed with will. We have also found that on the same ground all beings endowed with reason and will must determine themselves to action under the idea of their freedom.

From the presupposition of the idea of freedom there also followed the consciousness of a law of action, the law that our subjective principles of action, or maxims, must always be of such a character that they have the validity of objective or universal principles, and can be taken as universal laws imposed upon our will by ourselves. But why, it may be asked, should I subject myself to this principle simply as a rational being, and why, therefore, should all other beings who are endowed with reason come under the same principle? Admitting that I am not forced to do so by interest—which indeed would make a categorical imperative impossible—yet I must take an interest in that principle and see how I come to subject myself to it.

It looks as if we had, strictly speaking, shown merely that in the idea of freedom the moral law must be presupposed in order to explain the principle of the autonomy of the will, without being able to prove the reality and objectivity of the moral law itself.

It must be frankly admitted, that there is here a sort of circle from which it seems impossible to escape. We
assume that as efficient causes we are free, in order to explain how in the kingdom of ends we can be under moral laws; and then we think of ourselves as subject to moral laws, because we have ascribed to ourselves freedom of will. Freedom of will and self-legislation of will are both autonomy, and, therefore, they are conceptions which imply each other; but, for that very reason, the one cannot be employed to explain or to account for the other.

How is a Categorical Imperative possible?

As an intelligence, a rational being views himself as a member of the intelligible world, and it is only as an efficient cause belonging to this world that he speaks of his own causality as will. On the other hand, he is conscious of himself as also a part of the world of sense, and in this connection his actions appear as mere phenomena which that causality underlies. Yet he cannot trace back his actions as phenomena to the causality of his will, because of that causality he has no knowledge; and he is thus forced to view them as if they were determined merely by other phenomena, that is, by natural desires and inclinations. Were a man a member only of the intelligible world, all his actions would be in perfect agreement with the autonomy of the will; were he merely a part of the world of sense, they would have to be regarded as completely subject to the natural law of desire and inclination, and to the heteronomy of nature. The former would rest upon the supreme principle of morality, the latter upon that of happiness. But it must be observed that the intelligible world is the condition of the world of sense, and, therefore, of the laws of that world.
And as the will belongs altogether to the intelligible world, it is the intelligible world that prescribes the laws which the will directly obeys. As an intelligence, I am therefore subject to the law of the intelligible world, that is, to reason, notwithstanding the fact that I belong on the other side of my nature to the world of sense. Now, as subject to reason, which in the idea of freedom contains the law of the intelligible world, I am conscious of being subject to the autonomy of the will. The laws of the intelligible world I must therefore regard as imperatives, and the actions conformable to this principle as duties.

The explanation of the possibility of categorical imperatives, then, is, that the idea of freedom makes me a member of the intelligible world. Were I a member of no other world, all my actions would as a matter of fact always conform to the autonomy of the will. But as I perceive myself to be also a member of the world of sense, I can say only, that my actions ought to conform to the autonomy of the will. The categorical ought is thus an a priori synthetic proposition. To my will as affected by sensuous desires, there is added synthetically the idea of my will as belonging to the intelligible world, and therefore as pure and self-determining. The will as rational is therefore the supreme condition of the will as sensuous. The method of explanation here employed is similar to that by which the categories were deduced. For the a priori synthetic propositions, which make all knowledge of nature possible, depend, as we have seen, upon the addition to perceptions of sense of the pure conceptions of understanding, which, in themselves, are nothing but the form of law in general.
Limits of Practical Philosophy.

Freedom is only an idea of reason, and therefore its objective reality is doubtful. Thus there arises a dialectic of practical reason. The freedom ascribed to the will seems to stand in contradiction with the necessity of nature. It is, therefore, incumbent upon speculative philosophy at least to show that we think of man in one sense and relation when we call him free, and in another sense and relation when we view him as a part of nature, and as subject to its laws. But this duty is incumbent upon speculative philosophy only in so far as it has to clear the way for practical philosophy.

In thinking itself into the intelligible world, practical reason does not transcend its proper limits, as it would do if it tried to know itself directly by means of perception. In so thinking itself, reason merely conceives of itself negatively as not belonging to the world of sense, without giving any laws to itself in determination of the will. There is but a single point in which it is positive, namely, in the thought that freedom, though it is a negative determination, is yet bound up with a positive faculty, and, indeed, with a causality of reason which is called will. In other words, will is the faculty of so acting that the principle of action should conform to the essential nature of a rational motive, that is, to the condition that the maxim of action should have the universal validity of a law. Were reason, however, to derive an object of will, that is, a motive, from the intelligible world, it would transcend its proper limits, and would make a pretence of knowing something of which it knew nothing. The conception of an intelligible world is therefore merely a
point of view beyond the world of sense, at which reason sees itself compelled to take its stand in order to think itself as practical. This conception would not be possible at all if the sensuous desires were sufficient to determine the action of man. It is necessary, because otherwise man would not be conscious of himself as an intelligence, and, therefore, not as a rational cause acting through reason or operating freely. This thought undoubtedly involves the idea of an order and a system of laws other than the order and laws of nature, which concern only the world of sense. Hence it makes necessary the conception of an intelligible world, a world which comprehends the totality of rational beings as things in themselves. Yet it in no way entitles us to think of that world otherwise than in its formal condition, that is, to conceive of the maxims of the will as conformable to universal laws.

Reason would, therefore, completely transcend its proper limits, if it should undertake to explain how pure reason can be practical, or, what is the same thing, to explain how freedom is possible.

We can explain nothing but that which we can reduce to laws, the object of which can be presented in a possible experience. Freedom, however, is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can in no way be presented in accordance with laws of nature, and, therefore, not in any possible experience. It has merely the necessity of a presupposition of reason, made by a being who believes himself to be conscious of a will, that is, of a faculty distinct from mere desire. The most that we can do is to defend freedom by removing the objections of those who claim to have a deeper insight into the nature of things than we can pretend to have, and who, therefore,
declare that freedom is impossible. It would no doubt be a contradiction to say that in its causality the will is entirely separated from all the laws of the sensible world. But the contradiction disappears, if we say, that behind phenomena there are things in themselves, which, though they are hidden from us, are the condition of phenomena; and that the laws of action of things in themselves naturally are not the same as the laws under which their phenomenal manifestations stand.

While, therefore, it is true that we cannot comprehend the practical unconditioned necessity of the moral imperative, it is also true that we can comprehend its incomprehensibility; and this is all that can fairly be demanded of a philosophy which seeks to reach the principles which determine the limits of human reason.
THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON.
Chapter I.—The Principles of Pure Practical Reason.

1. Definition.

Practical principles are propositions, which contain a general determination of the will, a determination that has under it various practical rules. They are subjective principles, or maxims, if the condition is regarded by the subject as holding only for his own will; they are objective principles, or practical laws, if the condition is seen to be objective, or to hold for the will of every rational being.

Remark.

A man may make it his maxim to avenge every injury that is done to him, while yet he sees that this is not a practical law, but is merely a maxim of his own. But tell him, that he ought never to make a deceitful promise, and he recognizes that here the rule concerns only his will, and holds whether the special ends he may have in view can be attained by obeying the rule or not. And if this rule is practically right, it is a categorical imperative, and therefore a law. Hence practical laws concern the will
only, and not at all the consequences which may follow in the world of sense through its causality.

2. *Theorem 1.*

All practical principles that presuppose an *object* or matter of desire as motive of the will, are empirical, and such principles cannot yield practical laws.

By the matter of desire I mean an object which it is desired to realize. Now, if the desire for this object precedes the practical rule, and is the condition of its being made a principle, I affirm, in the *first* place, that the principle must be empirical. For the motive of the will is in that case the idea of an object, which is so related to the subject, that the faculty of desire is determined to activity by it. But this means, that the subject expects to receive *pleasure* from the realization of the object. This pleasure must therefore be presupposed as the condition without which the will would not be determined to activity. Now, it is impossible to know *a priori* whether an object will bring pleasure or pain, or neither. The motive must therefore be altogether empirical, and so also must be the material principle which is based upon it.

In the *second* place, a principle that rests entirely upon the subjective condition of a peculiar sensibility to pleasure or pain, may indeed serve as a *maxim* for the sensitive subject, but it cannot be a *law* even for him. Such a principle can therefore never yield a practical law.
3. Theorem 2.

All material practical principles are, as such, of one and the same kind, and are reducible to the general principle of self-love or individual happiness.

Pleasure in the idea of the existence of a thing, in so far as it is to determine the desire for that thing, rests upon the sensibility of the subject, because it is dependent upon the existence of the thing desired. Pleasure therefore belongs to sense or feeling, not to understanding; for understanding implies a relation of the idea to an object through conceptions, not to the subject by means of feelings. Hence pleasure is practical only in so far as the feeling of pleasure, which the subject expects to experience in the realization of the thing, determines the faculty of desire. Now the consciousness on the part of a rational being of agreeable feeling as continuing unbroken through the whole of his life, is happiness, and the principle which makes happiness the highest motive of the will, is the principle of self-love. Therefore all material principles, which assign as the motive of the will the pleasure or pain expected from the realization of some object, are all of the same kind, inasmuch as they all belong to the principle of self-love or individual happiness.

Corollary.

All material practical rules assume that the lower faculty of desire determines the will, and if there were no purely formal laws sufficient to determine the will, there would be no higher faculty of desire at all.
Remark 1.

It is a matter for surprise that men of intelligence should imagine that a real distinction may be drawn between the lower and the higher faculty of desire, on the ground that some ideas which are associated with the feeling of pleasure have their source in sense and others in understanding. For however the ideas themselves may differ from one another, and whether they proceed from understanding or even from reason, as distinguished from sense, the feeling of pleasure, which is the real motive by which the will is determined to act, is always the same in kind, not only because it can be known only empirically, but because in every desire the same vital energy is always expressed. The only difference between pleasures is therefore one of degree. However understanding and reason may be employed in furthering individual happiness, the principle itself contains no other motives than those which act upon the will through the lower faculty of desire. We are therefore forced to say, either that there is no higher faculty of desire at all, or that pure reason is of itself practical, that is, is able to determine the will by the mere form of the practical rule, independently of all feeling, and therefore of all ideas of pleasure and pain.

Remark 2.

Even if all finite rational beings were perfectly agreed in regard to the objects that are fitted to bring pleasure or pain, and also in regard to the means of attaining those objects, the principle of self-love could not claim to be a practical law. For the motive would not even then cease
to be subjective and empirical, nor would it possess the necessity which every law implies, namely, the objective necessity based upon \textit{a priori} grounds.

4. \textit{Theorem 3.}

If a rational being is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws, he must think of them as determining the will, not by their matter, but simply by their form.

The matter of a practical principle is the object of will. This object either determines the will, or it does not. In the former case, the rule of the will is subjected to an empirical condition; in other words, the idea which determines the will is dependent upon a certain feeling of pleasure or pain; and hence there can be no practical law. But, if all matter is removed from the law, that is, every object that is capable of determining the will, nothing is left but the mere form of a universal system of law. Either, therefore, a rational being cannot think of his subjective practical principles or maxims as universal laws; or it is the mere form of his maxims which makes them practical laws, and enables them to belong to a system of universal laws.

\textit{Remark.}

Any man of common sense can at once see without being told, what form of maxim is fitted to serve as a universal law, and what is not. Suppose, for instance, that my maxim is to make as much money as I can. A man at his death has left in my hands property in trust for others, but he has not left in writing anything to show that I received the money. Can I interpret my maxim
in this way, that every one may deny having received a deposit, if there is nothing to show that he has received it? It is at once obvious, that such a principle, the moment it is stated in the form of a law, becomes self-contradictory; for if it were a universal principle of action, no one would ever leave his money in trust. What is recognized as a practical law must be universally applicable; in fact, this is an identical, and therefore a self-evident proposition. If my will is to stand under a practical law, I cannot regard my natural inclination—in the present case my avarice—as a motive that harmonizes with a universal practical law. So far is such a principle from being in harmony with a universal system of laws, that it destroys itself when it is stated in the form of a universal law.

5. Problem I.

Granting that the mere form of universal law is the only form of a maxim that is sufficient to determine a will; the problem is, to find out what must be the nature of a will that is determined purely by that form.

The mere form of the law can be apprehended only by reason, and hence it is not an object of sense, nor can it belong to phenomena. The idea which is to determine the will is essentially different from the principles by which events follow one another in nature in accordance with the law of causality, for each of these events is determined by that which is itself a phenomenon. Now, if nothing else can serve as a law to the will but the mere form of universal law, the will must be entirely independent of the law which governs phenomena in their relation to one another, namely, the law of natural causality. But inde-
pendence of natural law is *freedom*, in the strictest or transcendental sense of the word. Therefore, a will for which only the mere form of universal law can serve as the form of its maxim, must be a free will.

6. Problem II.

Granting that a will is free; the problem is to find the law which alone is fitted to determine it necessarily.

The matter of the practical law, or the object of the maxim, can be given only in experience. Now a free will must be independent of all empirical or sensuous conditions, and yet it must be capable of being determined to activity. Such a will must find its principle of determination in the law itself, abstracted from all the matter of the law. But apart from its matter, the law contains nothing but the form of law in general. Therefore, the form of law in general, in so far as it is contained in a maxim, is the only thing capable of determining a free will.

**Remark.**

Freedom and unconditioned practical law mutually refer to each other. I do not here ask, whether in their actual nature they are different, or whether, on the contrary, an unconditioned law is merely pure practical reason as conscious of itself, and therefore identical with the positive conception of freedom. My question is, whether our *knowledge* of that which is unconditionally practical, starts from the idea of freedom or from the idea of a practical law. Now the idea of freedom cannot be primary. For, as our first conception of freedom is
negative, we cannot be directly conscious of it; nor again, can it be derived from experience, for experience gives us a knowledge only of the law of phenomena, or the mechanism of nature, and nature is just the opposite of freedom. It is therefore of the moral law that we are primarily and directly conscious. This law we apprehend by thinking of maxims of the will in their form. Thus reason presents the moral law as a principle of action, which no sensuous condition can outweigh, nay, as a principle which is completely independent of all sensuous conditions. The consciousness of the moral law, therefore, leads inevitably to the conception of freedom. To prevent misunderstanding it must be observed, that while freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law, the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. The idea of freedom is certainly not self-contradictory; but, if reason did not first give us a distinct idea of the moral law, we should not feel justified in supposing that there was such a thing as freedom at all.


Act so that the maxims of your will may be in perfect harmony with a universal system of laws.

Remark.

The consciousness of this law may be called a fact of reason. For it is impossible to derive it from any datum known by reason antecedently to it, as, for instance, the consciousness of freedom. It forces itself upon us as an a priori synthetic proposition, which is independent of any perception, either pure or empirical. If we were
permitted to presuppose freedom of will, it would no doubt be an analytic proposition; but the presupposition of freedom as a positive conception could only be justified by an intellectual perception, and we have no ground to assume such a perception. To apprehend this law in its true nature, however, it must be carefully observed, that it is not given in the sense that it can be verified in experience, but only in the sense that it is the one fact of pure reason. It is therefore in relation to this fact that reason proclaims itself to be the source of law (sic volo, sic jubeo).

**Corollary.**

Pure reason is practical purely of itself, and gives to man a universal law, which is called the moral law.

**Remark.**

The principle of morality prescribes a universal law, which is independent of all subjective differences, and which serves as the supreme formal ground for the determination of the will. For this very reason, that principle is a law for all rational beings which have a will. Hence it is not restricted to man, but holds for all finite beings who have reason and will, and includes even the Infinite Being, as the Supreme Intelligence. In the case of finite beings, the law takes the form of an imperative; for while we may presuppose in them a pure will, we cannot presuppose that, with their sensuous wants and desires, they are possessed of a holy will, that is, a will which is incapable of maxims that contradict the moral law. The Supreme Intelligence, on the other hand, is
incapable of any maxim which is not also an objective law, and the conception of holiness which must therefore be attributed to that Being, places Him, not indeed above all practical law, but above all laws that restrict His will, and therefore above obligation and duty. Yet holiness of will is for finite beings a practical conception, serving as the necessary ideal to which they can approximate indefinitely. This ideal the pure moral law, which is therefore itself called holy, rightly insists upon holding ever before their eyes. To be assured of the infinite progress of one's maxims and of their unchangeability as the cause of a continuous advance constitutes virtue; and this is the utmost that the practical reason of finite beings can bring about. Virtue, at least as a faculty acquired naturally, can never be complete, for we cannot have demonstrative certainty of possessing it, and nothing can be more hazardous than an appeal to one's private conviction of his own virtue.

8. Theorem 4.

Autonomy of will is the sole principle of all moral laws, and of the duties which are in conformity with them. Heteronomy of will, on the other hand, not only supplies no basis for obligation, but it is contradictory of the principle of obligation and of the morality of the will. The single principle of morality thus consists in independence of all matter of the law, that is, of every object of desire, and in the determination of the will through the mere universal form of law, of which a maxim must be capable. This independence of all matter is freedom in the negative sense, just as the self-legislation of pure practical reason is freedom in the positive sense. Hence
the moral law simply expresses the autonomy of pure practical reason, that is, of freedom. Autonomy is therefore the formal condition of all maxims, and apart from this condition there can be no harmony of the will with the supreme practical law. If the matter of volition, which is just the object of desire as connected with the law, should enter into the practical law as the condition of its possibility, there will be a heteronomy of the will; for the will must then follow some natural impulse or desire, and must therefore be dependent upon the law of nature. Plainly the will in that case does not give law to itself, but merely prescribes the rational course to be taken in following certain pathological laws. Our maxims cannot contain in themselves the form of universal law, and therefore they not only cannot be the basis of obligation, but they contradict the principle of a pure practical reason. Even, therefore, if the action which proceeds from them should be in harmony with moral law, they are opposed to a truly moral disposition.

Remark.

Suppose that the matter of my maxim is my own happiness. This is an object which every finite being seeks, but the rule which prescribes it can be an objective practical law, only if in one's own happiness is included the happiness of others. Hence the law, to further the happiness of others, does not originate from the presupposition, that everyone makes his own happiness the object of his choice, but only from this, that the form of universality, which reason demands as the condition under which a maxim of self-love obtains the objective validity of a law, should
determine the will. It is not the securing of the happiness of others that really determines the pure will, but the pure form of law, which limits the maxim as based upon mere desire, by imparting to it the universality of a law and bringing it into conformity with pure practical reason. Only by this limitation, and not by the addition of an external impulse, can there arise the conception of the obligation to extend the maxim of self-love so as to include the happiness of others.

45  **I.—Deduction of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason.**

As the result of this Analytic, we learn that pure reason can be practical, or, in other words, is capable of determining the will independently of all that is empirical. This, indeed, is established not by an inference, but by a fact. For reason actually proves itself to be practical by the fact of autonomy in the fundamental principle of morality, by which it determines the will to activity. Another thing that we have learned is, that this fact is inseparably bound up with the consciousness of freedom of will, and, indeed, is identical with it. For a rational being is conscious that in his will, or as he is in himself, he belongs in the sphere of action to an intelligible order of things, although he is also aware that, in so far as he belongs to the world of sense, his will, like other efficient causes, is necessarily subject to the laws of causality.

There is, therefore, a remarkable contrast between the analytical part of the Critique of pure practical reason and the analytical part of the Critique of pure speculative reason. In the latter, not fundamental principles, but
the pure perceptions of space and time, constitute the primary data by reference to which *a priori* knowledge was shown to be possible, and possible only for objects of sense. Speculative reason with perfect right denied that there could be any positive knowledge of objects which lie beyond the sphere of experience, and, therefore, it denied all knowledge of things as noumena. At the same time it at least showed, that the conception of noumena, as a conception, is not only possible but necessary. It proved, for instance, that there is nothing inconsistent with the principles and limitations of pure theoretical reason in the idea of freedom, taken in its negative sense. Speculative reason, however, did not extend our knowledge by presenting noumena to us as definite objects, but on the contrary showed that we are shut out from all knowledge of them.

Nor does the moral law *present* things to our consciousness as noumena, but it puts us in possession of a fact which nothing in the whole sensible world, nothing that comes within the range of theoretical reason in its widest use, can possibly explain. This fact points to a purely intelligible world, and even so far determines its character positively, that we know something of it, namely, a law.

This law gives to the world of sense, or rather to the sensuous nature of rational beings, the form of an intelligible world or supersensible nature, without in any way interfering with the mechanism of the world of sense. Now, nature, in the most general sense of the word, means the existence of things under laws. The sensuous nature of rational beings, viewed generally, is the existence of such beings under empirically conditioned laws. Relatively
to reason, this is *heteronomy*. But the supersensible nature of rational beings is their existence under laws which are independent of all empirical conditions. These laws, therefore, belong to the *autonomy* of pure reason. Now, laws which are of such a character that a knowledge of them is presupposed as the condition of the existence of things, are practical laws. The supersensible nature of rational beings is, therefore, just their nature as under the autonomy of pure practical reason. But the law of this autonomy is the moral law, which is therefore the fundamental law of a supersensible nature and of a purely intelligible world. The counterpart of this intelligible world ought to exist in the world of sense, but without interfering with its laws. The intelligible world is known only by reason, and might be called the *archetypal* world (*natura archetypa*); the world of sense, in so far as the idea of the intelligible world is capable of determining the will and producing an effect upon it, we might call the *ectypal* world (*natura ectypa*). For, in point of fact the moral law transfers us in idea into a realm of nature in which pure reason, if it were accompanied by adequate physical power, would produce the highest good, and determines our will to give to the world of sense the form of a system of rational beings.

Now, in nature as it actually presents itself to our experience, the will, free as it is in itself, is not determined to maxims which by themselves could be the foundation of a system of universal laws, or which are even in harmony with such a system. On the contrary, the maxims of the will rest upon private inclinations, which no doubt constitute a system of pathological or physical laws, but not such a system as would be possible were our will
determined by pure practical laws. Yet our reason makes us conscious of a law to which all our maxims are subject, just as if an ordered system of nature must be produced by our will. This law must therefore be the idea of a system of nature, which is not presented in experience, but which yet is possible through freedom; a supersensible system of nature, to which we ascribe objective reality, at least in relation to action, because we regard it as the object which as pure rational beings we ought to will.

There is therefore a distinction between the laws of a nature to which the will is subject, and the laws of a nature which is subject to the will. In the one case, the object must be the cause of the idea which determines the will; in the other, the will must be regarded as the cause of the object; or, in other words, the causality of the will must be determined entirely by pure reason. In this latter connection, therefore, reason must be called pure practical reason.

So much by way of exposition of the supreme principle of practical reason. The deduction of that principle, that is, the justification of its objective and universal validity, and the proof that such an a priori synthetic proposition is possible, we cannot expect to find so easy as the deduction of the principles of pure theoretical understanding.

The objective reality of the moral law cannot be established by any appeal of theoretical reason either to speculation or to experience, and even if its claim to demonstrative certainty were renounced, it could not be proved a posteriori by means of experience. Yet it rests upon a solid foundation of its own.

No deduction of the principle of morality is possible in either of those ways, but it turns out that the true method
of deduction is just the reverse of what we might have expected. It is the moral law which serves as the principle of deduction of a faculty which cannot be known theoretically or proved by experience, but which speculative reason is forced to admit as at least possible. For the moral law does not itself stand in need of any deduction, yet it proves not simply the possibility but the actuality of freedom in beings who recognize it to be binding upon themselves. In fact the moral law is a law of a free cause, and therefore a law which makes a supersensible system of nature possible; just as the metaphysical law of events in the world of sense was a law of the causality of a sensible system of nature. The moral law therefore does what speculative philosophy fails to do: it determines the law for a causality of which the latter could give only a negative conception, and this for the first time gives objective reality to the conception of a free cause.

The moral law proves its own reality even to the satisfaction of the Critique of Speculative Reason, by adding to the merely negative conception of a free cause, the possibility of which had to be assumed without being understood, the positive conception of a reason which directly determines the will. Thus the moral law is able to give objective, though only practical, reality to the ideas of reason; and therefore practical reason makes immanent the use of ideas, which for speculative reason were transcendental.

The determination of the causality of beings in the world of sense, from the very nature of the case, can never be unconditioned. Yet, for every series of conditions there must necessarily be something that is uncondi-
ditioned, and therefore there must be a causality which is completely self-determined. The possibility of freedom, as a faculty of absolute spontaneity, was not a postulate, but an analytic proposition of pure speculative reason. But it is utterly impossible to find in experience any particular instance of an action that conforms to the idea of freedom. Hence speculative reason could only defend the thought of a free cause from attack, by showing that a being who belongs on the one side to the world of sense, may yet on the other side be considered as a noumenon.

It therefore maintained that there is nothing contradictory in the supposition, that all the actions of a free being may be physically conditioned in so far as they are regarded as phenomena, while yet in so far as in acting it belongs to the intelligible world, its causality is physically unconditioned. The conception of freedom thus turned out to be a regulative principle of reason. True, no knowledge of the nature of the object, of which free causality was affirmed, was thus obtained, but an obstacle which hindered us from admitting its existence was removed. For, on the one hand, it was possible, in the explanation of events in the world, and therefore in the explanation of the actions of rational beings, to allow that the mechanism of natural necessity might be followed back ad infinitum from conditioned to condition; while, on the other hand, the place which speculative reason leaves empty was kept open, namely, the realm of the intelligible, and to this realm the unconditioned was transferred. But this thought could not be realized; in other words, it could not be converted into the knowledge of a being acting freely, nor indeed could it be shown that the knowledge of such a being was even possible. Pure practical
reason, however, fills up the place left empty by speculative reason with a determinate law of causality in an intelligible world, namely, the moral law. Speculative reason in this way gains nothing in the way of insight, but it acquires *certainty* in regard to the problematic conception of freedom, inasmuch as this conception obtains undoubted *objective reality*, though no doubt only practical reality. We cannot even say, that the conception of causality in this way obtains any extension beyond the limits of the world of sense, for that conception has meaning and application only in relation to phenomena, and serves simply to connect them with one another. To justify the application of the conception of causality beyond phenomena, it would be necessary to show, how the logical relation of reason and consequent may be employed synthetically in a mode of perception that is not sensuous; in other words, it would have to be explained how a *noumenal cause* is possible. But this cannot be done, nor has practical reason any motive for trying to do it. It is sufficient for practical purposes to show that the causality of man as a sensuous being can be *determined by pure reason*, and that pure reason is therefore practical.

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II. Extension of Practical as compared with Speculative Reason.

58  Besides the theoretical relation in which it stands to objects, understanding has also a relation to the faculty of desire, and is therefore called will. And as pure understanding, which in this connection is called reason, is practical through the mere idea of law, in its relation to desire it is rightly called pure will. The objective reality
of a pure will, or, what is the same thing, of a pure practical reason, may be said to be presented *a priori* in the moral law as a fact; for we may call a determination of the will which is bound up with its very nature a fact, without meaning to imply that it rests upon empirical principles. Now, the conception of a will carries with it the conception of causality; and therefore the conception of a pure will implies the conception of a free causality. By a free causality is meant, a causality which cannot be determined by laws of nature, and which therefore cannot be proved to be real by empirical perception. Its objective reality can however be justified *a priori* through the pure practical law. Now, the conception of a being who has free will is that of a *noumenal cause*. That this conception is not self-contradictory is plain, if we consider, that the conception of cause has its source entirely in pure understanding, and that it has been proved to have objective reality in the Deduction of the Categories. Being in its origin independent of all sensuous conditions, the conception of cause is not in itself limited to phenomena, nor is there anything to hinder it from being applied to things which are objects of pure understanding. We have, however, only a sensuous perception to which we can apply it; and hence a noumenal cause, though it can be *thought*, remains for theoretical reason an empty conception. But it is not necessary to seek for a *theoretical knowledge* of the nature of a being that has a *pure* will; it is enough to show that there is such a being, and that I may therefore combine the conception of causality with the conception of freedom. This combination I am certainly entitled to make, for the conception of causality is not of empirical origin, and here I do not claim the
right to make any other than a practical use of it; in other words, to employ it in relation to the moral law by which its reality is determined.

Moreover, the objective reality of a pure conception of understanding in the sphere of the supersensible, when it has once been introduced, imparts objective validity to all the other categories, although only in so far as these stand in necessary connection with the moral law, through which the pure will is determined.

Chapter II.—The Object of Pure Practical Reason.

To determine whether a thing is an object of pure practical reason or not, it is by no means necessary to ask whether we are physically able to produce it. The only question is, whether we ought to will an act, if we had the power to bring the object into existence to which the act is directed. The moral possibility must therefore precede the act, for it is the law of the will, and not the object, which is to determine the act.

The only objects of a practical reason are good and evil. The one is a necessary object of desire, the other of aversion, and both rest upon a principle of reason.

Now, as pleasure and pain cannot be connected a priori with the idea of an object, those who make a feeling of pleasure the basis of their moral judgments, must call that good which is the means to what is agreeable, and that evil which is the cause of what is disagreeable and painful. The practical maxims which follow from this conception of the good, cannot contain as the object of the will anything that is
good in itself, but only that which is good relatively to something else.

64 **W**eal and **w**oe are terms which always designate merely a relation to our own state of feeling, as agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or painful. We desire an object as weal or avoid it as woe only in so far as it is related to our sensibility, and to the feeling of pleasure or pain which the object produces in us. **G**ood and **e**vil, on the other hand, always imply a relation to the **will**, in so far as it is determined by a law of reason to make something an object for itself. In this connection the will is never determined directly by the idea of the object, but is a faculty of making a rule the motive of its action. In the proper sense of the word, therefore, good and evil are not related to the state of sensation of the person, but to his **action**. If there is anything absolutely good or evil, or anything that is regarded as such, it cannot be the object of the action, but only the mode of action, the maxim of the will, and therefore the agent himself.

66 Now, if there be a principle which is thought as in itself capable of determining the will, independently of all relation to possible objects of desire, it is an *a priori* practical law, and pure reason must then be regarded as of itself practical. In that case the law directly determines the will, and the act conforming to it is *in itself* good. Hence a will, the maxim of which is always in harmony with law, is absolutely or *in every respect* good, and the **supreme condition** of all good. But if, on the contrary, there is something which precedes the maxim of the will and determines desire, something which presupposes an object fitted to produce pleasure or pain; and if therefore the maxim, to seek the pleasant and avoid the painful, deter-
mines our actions; then our actions are good only relatively, or as means to another end, and our maxims can never be laws, although no doubt they are practical precepts of reason.

Now, the conceptions of good and evil, as consequences of the *a priori* determination of the will, presuppose a pure practical principle, and therefore a causality of pure reason. Hence they are in all cases *modi* of the single category of causality, in so far as that category is determined through the conception of a law of freedom which reason gives to itself. Thus reason proves itself to be practical. But, although actions are, on the one hand, under the law of freedom, and therefore belong only to intelligence; they are, on the other hand, as events in the world of sense, also under the law of phenomena. Practical reason can therefore determine itself only in relation to phenomena. And as its determinations must conform to the categories of understanding, they cannot be employed theoretically, with the object of bringing the various elements of sensuous perception *a priori* under one consciousness, but only for the purpose of subjecting *a priori* the various *desires* to the unity of consciousness, as implied in a practical reason, or pure will, which issues its commands through the moral law.

*The Type of Pure Practical Judgment.*

Prior to the conceptions of good and evil the will has no object. But these conceptions themselves stand under a practical rule of reason, which, in the case of pure reason, determines the will *a priori* in respect of its object. Now, to decide whether an action, that stands under
a rule is one that is possible for us in the world of sense or not, is the business of practical judgment, the function of which is to apply to an action in concreto that which in the rule is stated universally or in abstracto. But there is no perception, and therefore no schema, which can serve as the middle term by means of which the law of freedom, and therefore the conception of the unconditionally good, can be applied in concreto. Hence the moral law can be applied to objects of nature only through understanding and not through imagination. Understanding, however, can supply no schema of sensibility for an idea of reason, but only a law. Yet this law can be exhibited in concreto in objects of sense, and may therefore take the form of a law of nature. It thus serves as the instrument of practical judgment, and may therefore be called the type of the moral law.

The rule which judgment applies, in subordination to the laws of pure practical reason, is this: Ask yourself whether you could regard the act which you have in view as possible by your own will, if it were to occur in conformity with a law of nature. As a matter of fact this is the rule by which everyone decides whether an action is morally good or bad.

It is therefore permissible to take the nature of the world of sense as the type of an intelligible nature, so long as I merely conceive of the latter as under the form of law, and do not transfer to it my perceptions and what is dependent upon them. For all laws are as laws the same in kind, no matter what may be the source from which they spring.
Chapter III.—The Motives of Pure Practical Reason.

What is essential to the moral value of every action is, that the moral law should directly determine the will. It is not enough that the will should be determined in harmony with the moral law. If feeling of any sort has to be presupposed before the will can be determined, the will is not determined because of the law, and therefore the action is not moral but simply legal. By the word "motive" we must understand that which determines the will of a being, whose reason is not by its very nature necessarily in harmony with the objective law. Hence, firstly, we cannot speak of a motive in connection with the divine will; and, secondly, the only motive of the human will, and indeed of every finite rational being, must be the moral law. The objective ground must therefore always be at the same time the only and the sufficient subjective ground of determination of an action. On any other supposition, only the letter of the law, and not its spirit, would be fulfilled.

How a law can of itself directly determine the will, is for human reason an insoluble problem, for it is identical with the problem, how a free will is possible. What we are called upon to show a priori, is, not how the moral law of itself can supply a motive, but what influence it has, or rather must have, upon the mind in so far as it does supply a motive.

The essential thing in all determination of the will by the moral law, is, that the will as free should not only be determined without the co-operation of sensuous desires, but that it should even oppose such desires, and restrain
all natural inclinations that might prevent the realization of the law. So far the influence of the moral law is merely negative, and its character as a motive can be known only a priori. For every natural inclination and sensuous desire is based upon feeling, and the negative influence of the law in opposing the natural inclinations itself takes the form of feeling. Hence we know a priori, that the moral law in determining the will by thwarting all our inclinations, must produce in us a feeling that may be called pain. This is the first instance we have found, and perhaps it is the only instance, in which we can tell from a priori conceptions, what is the relation of knowledge to the feeling of pleasure or pain. All natural inclinations without exception arise from self-regard, the two forms of which are self-love and self-esteem. Self-love, which is natural and belongs to us prior to the moral law, pure practical reason simply restrains, by bringing it into conformity with the law. It is then called rational self-love. But self-esteem it completely destroys, for no man can show the least title to respect, except in so far as his acts conform to the moral law. The moral law, however, is in itself positive, or, in other words, it is the form of an intellectual causality, that is, of a free causality. In so far as it counteracts the subjective antagonism of the natural inclinations, and weakens self-esteem, the moral law is an object of reverence; and in so far as it completely destroys self-esteem, it is an object of the highest reverence. Thus it gives rise to a positive feeling, which is not of empirical origin, but is known a priori. Reverence for the moral law is therefore a feeling which has an intellectual source, and it is the only feeling which can be known completely a priori, and which can be perceived to be necessary.
Not only, therefore, is the moral law the formal condition of action through pure practical reason; not only is it a material, though merely objective, condition of the determination of those objects of action which we call good and evil; but it is also the subjective condition or motive of action, inasmuch as it has an influence upon the morality of the subject, and produces in him a feeling that conduces to the influence of the law upon his will. It is true that the sensuous feeling which is implied in all our inclinations is the condition of the feeling of reverence, but the cause which determines it lies in pure practical reason. The feeling of reverence, therefore, is in its origin not pathological but practical. Nor is reverence for law an external motive to morality, but it is morality itself, regarded subjectively as a motive. As an effect upon feeling, it presupposes that the subject of it has a sensuous nature, and is therefore finite. Hence we cannot say that a Supreme Being feels reverence for law, nor can we say that even a free finite being, who was devoid of sensibility, would have such a feeling; for in neither case is there any natural impulse which stands in opposition to practical reason.

Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason.

To get rid of the apparent contradiction between the mechanism of nature and freedom in the same act, we must bear in mind what has been said, or what is implied, in the Critique of Pure Reason. The natural necessity which is contradictory of freedom attaches only to the determinations of a thing that stands under conditions of time. Hence it applies only to the agent in his
phenomenal aspect. In regard to actions the ground of which lies in what belongs to the past and is no longer within his power, the agent is certainly not free. But he is conscious of himself as also a thing in himself, and from this point of view he looks upon his own existence as not standing under conditions of time, but as capable of being determined only by laws which have their source in reason. Nothing in his existence can in this connection be said to be antecedent to the determination of his will. Every action that he does, or, more generally, every change in the determinations of inner sense, and indeed the whole series of such changes, he regards, in so far as he is conscious of his existence as an intelligence, as the result of his noumenal causality, never as determining that causality. From this point of view a rational being can say with truth, that every wrong act done by him he could have left undone, although as a phenomenon the act is sufficiently determined and must inevitably take place. For the act, together with all in the past that determines it, belongs to the one continuous phenomenal manifestation of the character which he has made for himself. Looking upon himself in this way as a cause that is independent of sensibility, he ascribes to himself the causality of the whole phenomenal manifestation of his being.

There is another difficulty in regard to the combination of freedom and the mechanism of nature in a being that belongs to the world of sense. Let it be granted, it may be said, that the subject as an intelligence is free in the performance of a certain act, although as a subject belonging to the world of sense, he is conditioned by the mechanism of nature. Yet if God—the universal Original
Being—is admitted to exist, He must be regarded as the cause of the existence of every substance. The actions of man must therefore be due to a power which lies entirely outside of himself. For his actions must be referred to a Supreme Being, who is distinct from himself, and upon this Being, his existence, as well as all that is referred to his causality, must be absolutely dependent.

A short solution of this difficulty is not far to seek. Existence in time is a purely sensuous mode of consciousness, which belongs only to thinking beings as they are in the world, but does not hold of them as they are in themselves. By the creation of thinking beings we must therefore mean the creation of things in themselves. The idea of creation has no meaning, in so far as we are speaking of the sensuous mode of apprehending existence or causality, but can refer only to noumena. To speak of beings in the world of sense as being created, is to speak of them as if they were noumena. Now, it would be a contradiction to say that God is the creator of phenomenal objects. It is equally a contradiction to say that, as creator, He is the cause of actions which take place in the world of sense, and are therefore phenomenal objects, though it be admitted that He is the cause of the existence of acting beings in their character as noumena. Let us assume, then, that existence in time holds only of phenomena, not of things in themselves. Now, if freedom is not incompatible with the natural mechanism of actions regarded as phenomena, it cannot be incompatible with the fact that the beings who perform the actions are creatures. For creation has to do only with their existence as intelligences, not with their sensible existence, and therefore it cannot be regarded as
the ground of phenomena. It would be altogether different if beings in the world existed as things in themselves in time, for then the creator of a substance would at the same time be the author of the whole mechanism of this substance.

Chapter I.—General Consideration.

Pure reason is always dialectical, whether it is viewed in its speculative or in its practical use. In both cases it seeks to comprehend the absolute totality of conditions for that which is presented as conditioned, and such a totality cannot possibly be found anywhere but in things in themselves. But all our conceptions of things have to be brought into relation with perceptions, which in man are always sensuous, and hence objects cannot be known as things in themselves, but only as phenomena. It is impossible to find the unconditioned in the series of the conditioning and the conditioned, and an unavoidable illusion arises from the application to phenomena of the rational idea of the totality of conditions. The deceptive character of this illusion would not indeed be observed, if it did not betray itself by the self-contradiction into which reason falls, when it seeks to apply the principle in question, namely, that the conditioned presupposes the unconditioned. Thus necessity is laid upon reason, to trace back this illusion to its source, and this is a task which can be accomplished only by a thorough criticism of the whole faculty of pure
The antinomy of pure reason, which makes itself apparent in its dialectic, thus turns out to be the most beneficial error into which human reason could possibly have fallen. For it forces us to look about for the clue by which we may escape from the labyrinth into which we have wandered, and this clue, when it has been found, unexpectedly leads us to a point where a higher and an unchangeable order of things lies before us. In this higher realm we find that we already exist, and in it we are called upon to continue our existence, guiding ourselves by certain definite precepts which the highest reason lays upon us.

How the natural dialectic of pure speculative reason can be explained, and how the error arising from a perfectly natural illusion may be guarded against, has been fully shown in the Critique of Pure Reason. But reason in its practical use tails into as great a difficulty. It seeks to find the unconditioned for the practically conditioned, which depends upon the natural wants and inclinations, although the unconditioned is not to be conceived as determining the will, but simply as the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason. This object is the highest good.

In regard to the dialectic of pure practical reason, which is connected with its determination of the idea of the highest good, a preliminary remark has to be made. The moral law must of itself be capable of determining a pure will. But this law is merely formal, or prescribes only the form of that maxim which can be a universal law, and hence it abstracts from all matter, that is, from every object of volition. Accordingly, while it is true that the highest good is always the whole object of a pure practical reason,
or a pure will, it is not to be regarded as determining the will. The moral law must alone determine the pure will, and its sole object is to produce, or help to produce, such a will. For, as we have seen in the Analytic, the supposition that the will is determined, prior to the moral law, by some object called a good, and that from it the supreme principle of action may be derived, invariably gives rise to heteronomy and destroys the moral principle.

Chapter II.—The Summum Bonum.

The conception highest contains two distinct ideas, which must be carefully distinguished, if we are to avoid needless perplexities. The highest may mean either the supreme (supremum), or the complete (consummatum). The supreme is a condition which is itself unconditioned or is not subordinate to anything else (originarium). The complete, again, is a whole which is not part of a larger whole of the same kind (perfectissimum). Now virtue, or the worthiness to be happy, as we have seen in the Analytic, is the supreme condition of all that we can regard as desirable, and therefore the supreme condition of all our search for happiness. Virtue is therefore the supreme good. But it is not the whole or complete good which finite rational beings desire to obtain. The complete good includes happiness, and that not merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes it his end, but even in the judgment of unbiassed reason, which regards the production of happiness in the world as an end in itself. If we suppose, for the sake of illustration, that there exists a rational Being who has all
power, it cannot be in accordance with the whole will of such a being, that his creatures should be unable to secure the happiness which their nature demands and of which their obedience to the moral law makes them worthy. The highest good of a possible world must therefore consist in the union of virtue and happiness in the same person, that is, in happiness exactly proportioned to morality. By the highest good is here meant, therefore, the whole or complete good. In this complete good virtue is always, as a condition, the supreme good, having no condition higher than itself; while happiness is no doubt always agreeable to the person who possesses it, but it is not good simply in itself, and in all respects: it is good only under the condition that a man's conduct is in conformity with the moral law.

119 I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason.

In the highest good which is practical for us, that is, which is to be realized through our will, virtue and happiness are conceived as necessarily united, so that the one cannot be apprehended by practical reason as separated from the other. Now the connection of virtue and happiness must be known either by analysis or by synthesis. But it has been shown not to be known analytically, and hence it must be synthetic, and synthetic in the way of cause and effect. For we have here to do with a practical good, that is, with a good which is possible only by means of action. Either, therefore, the desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxims of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. The former
is absolutely impossible; for, as the Analytic has shown, maxims which make the desire for happiness the motive of the will, are not moral at all, and cannot possibly be the foundation of virtue. The latter is also impossible; for the causal connection in the world of events which follow from the determination of the will, does not conform to the moral disposition of the will, but depends upon a knowledge of the laws of nature and upon the physical power to make use of them for certain ends. Hence the most scrupulous adherence to the laws of morality cannot be expected to bring happiness into connection with virtue, and to lead to the attainment of the highest good.

II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy.

The solution of this antinomy is of the same nature as the solution of the antinomy of pure speculative reason. The first of the two propositions, namely, that virtue is the result of the search for happiness, is absolutely false. The second proposition, however, is not absolutely false, but is untrue only if virtue is regarded as a form of causality in the world of sense. In that case it is assumed that a rational being can exist only as a sensuous being, and the proposition is therefore conditionally false. Not only can I think of my existence as a noumenon in the world of intelligence, but in the moral law I have a purely intellectual principle which is capable of determining my causality as manifested in the world of sense. There is, therefore, nothing impossible in the idea that a moral disposition should necessarily be the cause of happiness, not indeed directly, but indirectly, or through the medium of an intelligent Author of nature. Yet, though happiness
might thus be an effect of virtue in the world of sense, the connection of virtue and happiness in a system of nature, which is merely an object of the senses, cannot be other than contingent, and therefore it cannot be established in the way required in the conception of the highest good.

In spite of the apparent self-contradiction of practical reason, the highest good is necessarily the ultimate end and the true object of a moral will. For the highest good is practically possible, and the maxims of the will, which are related to it on the side of their matter, have objective reality. This reality was at first brought into doubt by an antinomy in regard to the connection of morality and happiness in accordance with a universal law; but the antinomy arose simply from the false assumption that things in themselves are related to phenomena in the same way as phenomena are related to one another.

IV. The Immortality of the Soul.

The object of a will that is capable of being determined by the moral law, is the production in the world of the highest good. Now, the supreme condition of the highest good is the perfect harmony of the disposition with the moral law. Such a harmony must be possible, not less than the object of the will, for it is implied in the command to promote that object. Perfect harmony of the will with the moral law is holiness, a perfection of which no rational being existing in the world of sense is capable at any moment of his life. Yet holiness is demanded as practically necessary, and it can be found only in an infinite progress towards perfect harmony with the moral law. Pure practical reason therefore
forces us to assume such a practical progress towards perfection as the real object of our will.

Now, this infinite progress is possible only if we presuppose that the existence of a rational being is prolonged to infinity, and that he retains his personality for all time. This is what we mean by the immortality of the soul. The highest good is therefore practically possible, only if we presuppose the immortality of the soul. Thus immortality is inseparably bound up with the moral law. It is a postulate of pure practical reason, that is, a proposition that cannot be proved theoretically, but depends upon an a priori practical law of unconditioned validity.

A finite rational being is capable only of an infinite progress from lower to higher stages of moral perfection. The Infinite Being, who is free from the limits of time, sees in this series, which for us has no end, a whole that is in harmony with the moral law. Holiness He demands inexorably as a duty in order to assign to everyone his exact share in the highest good; and this holiness lies completely before Him in a single intellectual perception of rational beings. Created beings can hope to share in the highest good only in so far as they are conscious of having stood the test of the moral law. If in the past they have advanced from lower to higher degrees of morality, and have thus proved the strength of their resolution, they may hope to make unbroken progress in the future as long as they live here, and even beyond the present life. They can never hope in this life, or, indeed, at any imaginable point of time in the future life, to be in perfect harmony with the will of God, but they may hope for this harmony in the infinite duration of their existence as it is surveyed by God alone.
V. The Existence of God.

The moral law leads us to postulate not only the immortality of the soul, but the existence of God. For it shows us how happiness in proportion to morality, which is the second element of the highest good, is possible, and to postulate it for reasons as perfectly disinterested as in the former case. This second postulate of the existence of God rests upon the necessity of presupposing the existence of a cause adequate to the effect which has to be explained.

Happiness is the state of a rational being existing in the world who experiences through the whole of his life whatever he desires and wills. It, therefore, presupposes that nature is in harmony with his whole end, as well as with the essential principles by which his will is determined. Now, the moral law, being a law of free beings, commands us to act from motives that are entirely independent of nature and of the harmony of nature with our desires. But a rational agent in the world is not the cause of the world and of nature itself. There is no reason whatever, in the case of a being who is a part of the world and is dependent upon it, why the moral law should imply a necessary connection between happiness and morality proportionate to happiness. For the will of such a being is not the cause of nature, and therefore he has no power to bring nature into complete harmony with his principles of action. At the same time, in the practical problem of pure reason, that is, in the necessary pursuit of the highest good, such a connection is postulated as necessary. He ought to seek to promote the highest good, and therefore the highest good must be possible.
He must therefore postulate the existence of a cause of nature as a whole, which is distinct from nature, and which is able to connect happiness and morality in exact harmony with each other. Now, this supreme cause must be the ground of the harmony of nature, not simply with a law of the will of a rational being, but also with the consciousness of this law in so far as it is made the supreme principle of the agent's will. That cause must therefore be in harmony not merely with the form of morality, but with morality as willed by a rational being, that is, with his moral character. The highest good is thus capable of being realized in the world, only if there exists a supreme cause of nature whose causality is in harmony with the moral character of the agent. Now, a being that is capable of acting from the consciousness of law is a rational being, an intelligence, and the causality of that being, proceeding as it does from the consciousness of law, is a will. There is therefore implied, in the idea of the highest good, a being who is the supreme cause of nature, and who is the cause or author of nature through his intelligence and will, that is, God. If, therefore, we are entitled to postulate the highest derivative good, or the best world, we must also postulate the actual existence of the highest original good, that is, the existence of God. Now, it is our duty to promote the highest good, and hence it is not only allowable, but it is necessarily bound up with the very idea of duty, that we should presuppose the possibility of this highest good. And as this possibility can be established only under condition that God exists, the presupposition of the highest good is inseparably connected with duty, or, in other words, it is morally necessary to hold the existence of God.
VI. The Postulates of Pure Practical Reason.

The postulates of pure practical reason are not theoretical dogmas, but presuppositions which are practically necessary. They do not enlarge our speculative knowledge, but give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general, and justify it in the use of conceptions which it could not otherwise venture to regard as even possible.

These postulates are immortality, freedom (in the positive sense, as the causality of a being who belongs to the intelligible world), and the existence of God. The first rests upon the practically necessary condition, that existence should continue long enough to permit of the complete realization of the moral law. The second arises from the necessary presupposition of man’s independence of the world of sense, and his capability of determining his will in conformity with the law of an intelligible world, that is, the law of freedom. The third depends upon the necessity of presupposing a supreme, self-existent good, that is, the existence of God, as the condition under which the highest good may be realized in such an intelligible world.

Our reverence for the moral law necessarily compels us to seek for the realization of the highest good, and hence the reality of the highest good must be presupposed. By means of the postulates of practical reason, we are brought to conceptions, which speculative reason no doubt set up as problems to be solved, but which it was itself unable to solve. The first conception is that of immortality. This conception involved speculative reason in paralogisms; for it could find no trace of the
permanence required for the conversion of the psychological conception of an ultimate subject into the real consciousness of a substance. Practical reason supplies what is required, by the postulate of a duration adequate to the complete realization of the moral law in the highest good. It leads, secondly, to the cosmological idea of an intelligible world and the consciousness of our existence in that world. This idea involved speculative reason in an antinomy, for the solution of which it had to fall back upon a problematic conception, the objective reality of which it could not prove. But practical reason, by means of the postulate of freedom, shows that idea to have objective reality. Lastly, practical reason brings us to the conception of a Supreme Being. This conception speculative reason was able to think, but it could not show it to be more than a transcendental ideal. Practical reason, on the other hand, gives meaning to this idea, by showing that a Supreme Being is the supreme principle of the highest good in an intelligible world, and is endowed with the sovereign power of prescribing moral laws in that world.

Is our knowledge, then, actually enlarged by practical reason? Is that which for speculative reason is transcendental for practical reason immanent? Undoubtedly it is, but only in relation to action. Practical reason cannot give us a theoretical knowledge of our own soul, of the intelligible world, or of a Supreme Being, as these are in themselves. All that it can do is to unite the conception of them in the practical conception of the highest good, which is the object of our will, and to unite them entirely a priori through pure reason. This union is effected only through the medium of the moral law, and
merely in relation to that which it commands with a view to the highest good. For we cannot understand how freedom is possible, or how a free cause would appear to us if it were theoretically and positively known; all that we can say is, that a free cause is postulated by the moral law and for the sake of the moral law. The same remark applies to the other ideas. No human intelligence can ever understand how immortality and the existence of God are possible; but, on the other hand, no sophistry will ever destroy the faith of even the most unreflective man in their reality.

VII. Possibility of an extension of Pure Practical Reason without a corresponding extension of Pure Speculative Reason.

It is true that the three ideas of freedom, immortality, and God, are not knowledge, but at least they are thoughts the objects of which are not impossible. They are necessary conditions of the possibility of that which an apodictic practical law commands us to make our object, and in this sense they have objective reality. They indicate that they have objects, although we cannot learn from them how they are related to these objects. We can make no synthetical judgments in regard to them, nor can we determine theoretically how they are to be applied, and hence we cannot be said to have any knowledge of them. Reason cannot make a theoretical use of them, which is the same as saying that they are not known by speculative reason. But, while the ideas of practical reason do not enlarge our theoretical knowledge, the sphere of reason itself is in this sense enlarged,
that by means of practical postulates we learn that there are objects corresponding to those ideas. Conceptions which before were problematic thus obtain objective reality. No extension of our knowledge of supersensible objects has taken place, but there has been an extension of theoretical reason and of our knowledge of the supersensible in general, in so far as reason has been forced to admit that there are such objects, though nothing definite is known in regard to them. Even for this relative extension of its sphere reason is indebted entirely to its pure practical faculty.

If these ideas of God, an intelligible world or kingdom of God, and immortality, are further determined by predicates borrowed from the nature of man, it does not follow that we have fallen into an anthropomorphism, which makes pure ideas of reason sensuous, or that in claiming a knowledge of supersensible objects our idea becomes transcendent. For the predicates of which we make use are those of intelligence and will, and these we conceive of as related to each other simply in the way that the idea of the moral law demands. Hence we make only a pure practical use of them. Abstraction is made from all the predicates which are connected with these conceptions psychologically, and are learned from the observation of our faculties of understanding and will. Of a Supreme Being, for instance, we cannot say, as we can say of man, that His understanding is discursive, and therefore deals directly only with conceptions, not with perceptions; that His perceptions follow one another in time; that His will is always dependent for satisfaction upon the existence of the object to which it is directed, etc. Now, when abstraction has been made
from such predicates as these, the only predicates that are left are those which belong to the idea of a pure intelligence, in other words, those that are implied in the mere thought of a moral law. Thus we have indeed a knowledge of God, but only in a practical relation. If we try to extend our knowledge to a theoretical relation, we get the idea of an intelligence which does not think but perceives, and a will which is directed to objects upon the existence of which its own satisfaction does not in the least depend. But these are all attributes of which we can form no conception that enables us to have a knowledge of a Supreme Intelligence; and from this we learn, that they can never be made use of in a theory of supersensible beings, but must be limited in their use to the practice of the moral law.

VIII. Faith as a Need of Pure Reason.

A need of pure practical reason arises from the duty of making the highest good the object of will, and seeking to promote it with all one's power. The possibility of this highest good has therefore to be presupposed, as well as the conditions without which it would not be possible, namely, God, freedom, and immortality. The duty of promoting the highest good is in itself apodictically certain, and is entirely independent of the other presuppositions. The idea of duty thus stands in need of no support from any theory of the inner nature of things, the hidden purpose of the world's history, or the existence of a Supreme Ruler, to show that it is binding upon us in the most absolute sense, and that we ought to act in conformity with it. But the influence upon the agent of the moral
law, that is, the disposition which it produces in him to promote the highest good that can be practically realized by us, presupposes at the very least that the highest good is possible. If it were not possible, we should be trying to realize practically what could not be realized, and to give effect to an idea that was empty and without any object. Thus the principle which determines a moral judgment is no doubt subjective in relation to us; but, inasmuch as it is also the means by which an object that is practically necessary may be promoted, it is also the foundation of all beliefs which possess moral certitude. That principle, therefore, takes the form of a faith or conviction of pure practical reason.
THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT.
THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT.

INTRODUCTION.

I. Division of Philosophy.

The object of philosophy is to search for the principles by which reason may obtain a true knowledge of things. Now, we may conceive of objects either from the theoretical or from the practical point of view, and hence the ordinary division of philosophy into theoretical and practical is perfectly correct. But, in making this division, we must be sure that the conceptions upon which the distinction of principles rests are themselves distinct.

There are two, and only two, classes of conception by reference to which a distinction may be made in the principles of philosophy. These are conceptions of nature and the conception of freedom. The former are the condition of theoretical knowledge in conformity with a priori principles; the latter in itself supplies merely a negative principle of theoretical knowledge, but it is the source of principles which enlarge the sphere of the will, and which are therefore called practical. Philosophy has thus two main divisions, theoretical philosophy or the philosophy of nature, and practical or moral philosophy. But these terms have hitherto been grossly misapplied, both in the division of the principles of philosophy and in the division of philosophy itself. For it has been as-
sumed that there is no distinction between what is called "practical" in the sphere of nature, and what is "practical" relatively to the idea of freedom. Now, this confusion between two perfectly distinct conceptions has made the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical unmeaning, inasmuch as the same principle is assumed to apply to both spheres.

The will as a faculty of desire is simply one of the many causes in the world of nature, namely, that cause which acts from conceptions. All that is possible or necessary through will is said to be practically possible or practically necessary, and with this is contrasted that which is physically possible or necessary, that is, whatever is the effect of a cause which acts, not by means of conceptions, but by the mechanism of lifeless matter, or by animal instinct. But this in no way settles the question, whether it is a conception of nature, or an idea of freedom, which gives the rule when the will acts as a cause.

The distinction, however, is of the greatest consequence. For, if a conception of nature determines the will, the principles are technically practical; whereas, if the will is determined by the idea of freedom, the principles are morally practical. And as the divisions of a science of reason are determined by the nature of the principles on which each rests, the former will belong to theoretical philosophy or the science of nature, the latter to practical philosophy or the science of morality.

All technically practical rules of art and skill, or of that practical sagacity which gives us a command over men and enables us to influence their wills, so far as their principles rest on conceptions, must be regarded as corollaries of theoretical philosophy. . . . Only as
I

standing under the conception of freedom is the will free from nature, and hence the laws of freedom together with their consequences alone constitute practical philosophy. The practical arts of surveying, housekeeping, farming, statesmanship, dietetics, etc., and even the precepts by which happiness may be attained, are merely technically practical rules. Only those rules which rest on the idea of freedom are morally practical. For such rules are laws which do not, like those of nature, rest upon sensuous conditions, but, on the contrary, upon a supersensible principle; and hence they form a separate branch of philosophy, which is properly called practical philosophy.

II. The Realm of Philosophy.

The term field simply indicates the general relation of an object to our faculty of knowledge, no matter whether the conception of that object makes knowledge of it possible or not. That part of a field in which knowledge is possible, is a solid ground or territory (territorium) for conceptions and their appropriate faculty. That part of the territory, again, for which laws are prescribed in conceptions, is the domain or realm (ditio) of these conceptions and their correspondent faculty. Empirical conceptions have, therefore, nature, as the sum of sensible objects, for their territory; but that territory is for them not a realm but merely a dwelling-place (domicilium), for although they are under law they are not themselves the source of law, and hence the rules based upon them are empirical or contingent.

Although understanding and reason operate on the same territory of experience, their laws are distinct, and
do not interfere with each other. The conceptions that are applicable to nature have as little influence on the law of freedom as the latter on the former. It is true that in the sensible world each realm is perpetually limited by the other, but in their laws they are quite independent. The reason why they do not constitute one realm is that the conception of nature has a meaning only in relation to objects of perception or phenomena, not in relation to things in themselves; while, on the other hand, the object of freedom is intelligible as a thing in itself, but cannot be given in a perception. There can, therefore, be no theoretical knowledge of either realm as a thing in itself, or supersensible object.

The whole unlimited field of the supersensible thus lies entirely beyond our knowledge, and affords no solid ground, and therefore no realm, either for understanding or for reason. This field we must indeed occupy with ideas in the interest of theoretical as well as of practical reason, but we can produce no other warrant for our occupation of it than a practical one, and so far as theoretical knowledge is concerned the supersensible therefore remains as far beyond our reach as ever.

Between the sensible realm of nature and the supersensible realm of freedom a gulf is fixed, which is as impassable by theoretical reason as if they formed two separate worlds. Yet it lies in the very idea of freedom to realize in the world of sense the end presented in its laws, and hence nature, in its formal aspect as conformable to law, must at least be capable of harmonizing with that end. There must, then, be a principle which unites the supersensible substrate of nature with the supersensible, that is involved practically in the conception
of freedom. And although that principle does not lead to a knowledge of the supersensible, and hence has no realm peculiarly its own, it yet enables the mind to make the transition from the theoretical to the practical point of view.

III. The Critique of Judgment as connecting link between the two divisions of Philosophy.

183 There are three absolutely irreducible faculties of the mind, namely, knowledge, feeling, and desire. The laws which govern the theoretical knowledge of nature as a phenomenon, understanding supplies in its pure a priori conceptions. The laws to which desire must conform, are prescribed a priori by reason in the conception of freedom. Between knowledge and desire stands the feeling of pleasure or pain, just as judgment mediates between understanding and reason. We must, therefore, suppose that judgment has an a priori principle of its own, which is distinct from the principles of understanding and reason. And as pleasure or pain is necessarily associated with desire, either preceding it as in the lower desires or following it when desire is determined by relation to the moral law, we must further suppose that judgment makes possible the transition from mere knowledge or the realm of nature to the realm of freedom, as, in its logical use, it makes possible the transition from understanding to reason.

IV. Judgment as a Faculty of a priori Laws.

Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal,
that is, the rule, principle, or law, is given, the judgment which subsumes the particular under it is determinant. But if only the particular is given, for which the universal has to be found, the judgment is merely reflective.

The determinant judgment subsumes particulars under the universal transcendental laws supplied by the understanding, and has no need to seek for a law of its own by means of which the particulars of nature may be brought under the universal. But nature has many forms, which may be regarded as modifications of the universal transcendental conceptions, and the former are unaffected by the latter, which are but the general conditions, without which nature as a sensible object would not be possible at all. There must, therefore, be laws for those forms also, and such laws, as being empirical, may be contingent so far as our intelligence is concerned, and may yet be regarded as following necessarily from a principle, which is the condition of the unity of the multifarious forms of nature, though it is unknown to us. The reflective judgment, which is compelled to ascend from the particular to the universal, therefore requires a principle of its own; and that principle it cannot borrow from experience, because its function is just to unite all empirical principles under higher ones, and so to make their systematic connection possible.

The principle of judgment as reflective must therefore be conceived as if it were a unity imposed on nature by an intelligence different from ours, with a view to the reduction of our knowledge of nature to a system of particular laws. We cannot, however, assert that there actually is an intelligence of this kind, for judgment does not give a law to nature but only to itself.
Now a conception which contains the ground of the actuality of an object is an end, and by the agreement of a thing with a character which is only possible in accordance with ends, we mean that its form implies purpose. The principle of judgment, in its relation to the forms of things which come under empirical laws in general, is thus the idea that in all its manifold variety nature is purposive. That is to say, nature is conceived as if the unity of its manifold empirical laws were due to an intelligence.

V. The Principle that the Form of Nature implies Purpose is a Transcendental Principle of Judgment.

A transcendental principle of judgment is one which enables us to think a priori the universal condition without which things could not be objects of our knowledge at all. A metaphysical principle, on the other hand, is one through which we think a priori the condition without which objects, the conception of which must be given empirically, cannot be further determined a priori. Thus the principle, that the changes of empirical substances must have a cause, is transcendental; but if we say that their changes must have an external cause, the principle is metaphysical. In the former case, such merely ontological predicates, or pure conceptions, as substance are employed; in the latter case, the empirical conception of a body as a movable thing in space is required, although when this has once been obtained, the predicate of motion under the influence of external causes may be deduced quite a priori. Now, the principle that nature is purposive, is a transcendental principle. For the conception of objects, so far as
they are thought as standing under this principle, is merely the pure conception of objects of possible experience in general, and therefore contains nothing empirical. But the principle that actions are purposive, which is implied in the idea of the determination of a free will, is a metaphysical principle, because the conception of desire must be given empirically. At the same time neither principle is empirical, but both are *a priori*, for the predicate may be connected with the empirical conception that forms the subject of the judgment completely *a priori*, and without any new experience.

The conception that nature is purposive is a transcendental principle. This is sufficiently obvious from the *a priori* maxims of judgment which are employed in scientific inquiries into the specific laws of nature. Such maxims are continually applied as occasion demands, in the shape of axioms of metaphysical wisdom: "Nature takes the shortest way (*lex parsimoniae*)"; "Nature makes no leaps (*lex continui in natura*)"; "Nature has many laws, but few principles (*principia praeter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda*)", etc.

To attempt an explanation of the origin of these propositions psychologically, is to go straight against their sense. For they do not tell us what happens, that is, by what rule our faculties operate or how we actually judge, but they prescribe how we should judge; and a logical necessity of this sort is inexplicable if those principles are merely empirical. The idea that nature is purposive, is therefore a transcendental principle and requires a transcendental deduction.

That which is at once seen to be necessary by the principles which make experience possible, are the
universal laws, without which nature, as an object of sense, is not conceivable at all; and these laws rest on the categories in their application to the formal a priori conditions of all experience that we can possibly have.

In relation to these laws judgment is determinant, its sole function being to subsume particulars under the laws given to it. Thus understanding says, that every change has a cause, or it lays down a universal law of nature. Transcendental judgment, on the other hand, merely presents the a priori condition on which subsumption under the conception placed before it by understanding takes place, namely, succession in the determinations of one and the same thing. The law of causality is therefore known to be an absolutely necessary condition of nature as an object of possible experience. But the objects of empirical knowledge are determined in many other ways than by the formal condition of time; at any rate we may say a priori that they are at least capable of being determined in many other ways. Hence the specific forms of nature may be causes, not only in virtue of their common character as belonging to nature in general, but in an infinite variety of ways; and each species of cause must have its own necessary rule or law, although the nature and limits of our knowledge may prevent us from comprehending the necessity of the rule. We must, therefore, suppose the empirical laws of nature to be possibly infinitely various, and to be for us contingent or incapable of being known a priori. So far as these empirical laws are concerned, nature, as a possible unity of experience or a system of laws, must accordingly be regarded as contingent. Yet we must presuppose and assume such a unity, for otherwise the thoroughgoing
connection of empirical knowledge in a whole of experience would be impossible. The universal laws of nature no doubt enable us to connect things in a system, so far as they are viewed as belonging to nature in the most general sense of the term, but not to connect them in their specific character as particular modes of nature. Judgment must therefore assume a priori, as a principle required for its own use, that what in the empirical laws of nature is from our human point of view contingent, yet involves a unity in the connection of the multifarious laws of nature, that are capable of being experienced, a unity which can certainly be thought although it cannot be comprehended by us. Now, a unity which is demanded by our intelligence, but which is known as in itself contingent, necessarily presents itself to us as the idea that objects are purposive. Hence judgment, in relation to things that may stand under empirical laws not yet discovered, is merely reflective, and is compelled to think of nature as in its special laws purposive as regards our knowledge, a principle which is expressed in such maxims of judgment as those that were cited above. This transcendental conception of purpose in nature is neither a conception of nature nor of freedom, for it attributes nothing to nature as an object, but merely represents the way in which we must necessarily proceed in reflecting on natural objects, with a view to a thoroughly connected experience. It is, therefore, a maxim or subjective principle of judgment.
193 VI. The Feeling of Pleasure connected with the Conception that Nature is Purposive.

The reduction of the special laws of nature to unity of principle is an end which understanding necessarily seeks to secure. With the attainment of that end there arises a feeling of pleasure which is determined by a ground a priori for everyone, and indeed from the mere adaptation of the object to our faculty of knowledge. . . . The discovery that two or more heterogeneous laws of nature may be combined in a common principle gives rise to a very marked pleasure, and often to a feeling of wonder that even familiarity does not destroy.

195 VII. The æsthetic Consciousness of Purpose in Nature.

The æsthetic character of an idea is determined solely by its relation to the subject; its logical validity has reference to the object as capable of being known. In the apprehension of a sensible object both relations are implied. In the presentation of objects as outside of me, their spacial quality is merely a subjective element of my perception, and they are accordingly thought of simply as phenomena. But space is also an integral element in the knowledge of phenomena. Sensation, again, while no doubt it is a purely subjective element in the perception of objects as without us, yet affords the matter (reale) of that which is given as existing, and hence it is essential to the knowledge of those objects. But the feeling of pleasure or pain, which accompanies our knowledge of sensible objects, does not enter as an ingredient into knowledge at all, for it contributes nothing to the knowledge of
an object, though it may be the result of that knowledge. That an object of perception should be purposive, is therefore no property of the object. Such an object is therefore said to display purpose only if a feeling of pleasure is immediately connected with the idea of it. Here therefore we have the æsthetic consciousness of purpose in nature. . . . . When imagination, as the faculty of a priori perception, is found to be in harmony with understanding, and a feeling of pleasure is awakened by its exercise, the object must be regarded as adapted to the reflective judgment. . . . . The object is then said to be beautiful, and the faculty which judges it to be so is called Taste.

The sensibility to pleasure arising from reflection on the forms of things, whether of nature or of art, indicates not only an adaptation of objects to reflective judgment, an adaptation which is in conformity with the conception of nature in the subject, but it also implies, conversely, an adaptation of the subject in virtue of the conception of freedom to the form or even formlessness of objects. Hence the æsthetic judgment is related to the emotion of the sublime as well as to the feeling of the beautiful. The Critique of Æsthetic Judgment has therefore two main divisions.

VIII. Logical Idea of Purpose in Nature.

An object of experience may be viewed as purposive only relatively to the subject that is conscious of it, in other words, the idea that it is purposive may rest upon the mere harmony of the form of the object with our faculty of knowledge, a form which is directly apprehended without the intermediation of any conception. But the
object may also be regarded as in itself purposive, if the form of the thing, as given in a conception which precedes it and is its condition, agrees with the possibility of the thing itself. The former rests upon the pleasure immediately felt in mere reflection upon the form of an object; the latter requires us to have a definite knowledge of an object through a conception; and as this knowledge is quite independent of any feeling of pleasure in the contemplation of the object, it presupposes a judgment of understanding. If the conception of an object is given, the work of judgment lies in the presentation (exhibitio) of a perception corresponding to it. And we may either, as in art, endeavour to realize in perception a conception set up by our own imagination as an end, or we may make use of our conception of an end in judging of certain natural objects, as, for instance, in judging of organized bodies. In the latter case, not merely the form of the thing implies purpose, but the thing itself as a product is regarded as a natural end. Now, although the subjective consciousness of purpose does not imply any conception of an object, we may still, by analogy with the conception of an end, attribute to nature as it were a regard for our faculty of knowledge; hence we may look upon natural beauty as the presentation of the conception of a formal or subjective purpose, and we may regard natural end as the presentation of the conception of a real or objective purpose. The former is the object of aesthetic judgment or Taste, the latter is the object of certain logical judgments, which understanding and reason make by means of conceptions. The Critique of Judgment has accordingly two parts, dealing respectively with aesthetic judgment and teleological judgment.
IX. Connection of Understanding and Reason through Judgment.

Understanding prescribes the \textit{a priori} laws which make experience or a theoretical knowledge of nature as an object of sense possible. Reason prescribes the \textit{a priori} laws of freedom, and being itself a supersensible cause in the subject, it gives rise to an unconditionally practical knowledge. The realm of nature, which is under the laws of understanding, and the realm of freedom which conforms to the laws of reason, are entirely removed from all mutual influence by the great gulf which sunders the supersensible from the phenomenal world. The idea of freedom adds nothing to the theoretical knowledge of nature, nor does the conception of nature affect the practical laws of freedom. So far, therefore, there is no possibility of throwing a bridge from the one realm to the other. But while it belongs to the very idea of a free cause to be independent of nature, and while the sensible cannot determine that which in the subject is supersensible; yet the converse is not impossible in a certain sense, and in fact is implied in the very conception of a free cause, the effect of which ought to be an event in the world. The word \textit{cause}, when applied to the supersensible, signifies merely the \textit{ground} which determines the causality of things to an effect in accordance with the laws of nature; and while the possibility of causality in this sense cannot be understood, it can be conclusively shown that it is not self-contradictory, as some have maintained it to be. The effect of freedom is the ultimate end which ought to exist as a phenomenon in the world of sense, and the condition of its possible realization is presupposed as
existing in the nature of man as a sensible being. Judgment, as presupposing this \textit{a priori} condition, independently of the practical, supplies us with the conception of purpose in nature, a conception which mediates between nature and freedom, and makes possible the transition from the conception of conformity to law to the conception of an ultimate end.

The fact that understanding prescribes \textit{a priori} laws to nature, shows that nature is known merely as a phenomenon, and at the same time points to a supersensible substrate of nature. This, however, leaves the nature of this substrate quite \textit{undetermined}. But judgment, by means of its \textit{a priori} principle for estimating nature according to possible particular laws, brings the supersensible substrate, both in us and without us, \textit{within reach of determination} by our intellect. Reason, again, through its practical \textit{a priori} law actually \textit{determines} it; and thus judgment enables us to make the transition from the realm of nature to that of freedom.

As to the higher faculties of the mind, that is, those which contain an autonomy, understanding contains the \textit{constitutive} principles of knowledge; judgment those for the \textit{feeling of pleasure or pain}; reason those relative to \textit{desire}. The conception supplied by judgment of purpose in nature is one of the conceptions of nature, but it is merely a regulative principle of knowledge. The \textit{aesthetic} judgment, as concerned with certain objects of nature or art, which are the occasion of that principle being applied, is a constitutive principle in relation to the feeling of pleasure or pain. The spontaneity of the faculties of knowledge, from the harmonious operation of which that pleasure arises, by intensifying
the susceptibility of the mind for the moral feeling, makes the conception of purpose in nature the fit connecting link between the conception of nature and the idea of freedom as manifested in its effects, inasmuch as these imply the sensibility of the mind to moral feeling.

The following table exhibits all the higher faculties in their systematic connection:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculties of the Mind</th>
<th>Faculties of Knowledge</th>
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<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feeling of Pleasure or Pain</td>
<td>Judgment</td>
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<td>Desire</td>
<td>Reason</td>
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<td><em>A priori</em> Principles</td>
<td>Application to</td>
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<td>Subordination to Law</td>
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<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Art</td>
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<td>Ultimate End</td>
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THE CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT.

Section I.—Analytic of Teleological Judgment.

62. Formal Objective Purpose.

Geometrical figures drawn on a principle often show a remarkable objective adaptation to the purpose for which they are employed, namely, the solution of several problems by a single method, or of one problem in an infinite variety of ways. The adaptation is here evidently objective and intellectual, not subjective and æsthetic. But, although such figures are adapted to the end in view, namely, the production of a variety of geometrical forms, they are regarded as possible independently of the particular use made of them, and hence their adaptation to that end is not the condition of their very existence in thought. . . . . This intellectual adaptation to an end is therefore no doubt objective, and not like æsthetic adaptation subjective; but it is not real, but merely formal. It can be conceived as adaptation in general without the conception of end being presupposed, and hence it is not an instance of teleology.

It is quite different when a number of things are presented as without me and enclosed within well-defined limits, as, for example, trees, flowers, and walks disposed in regular order in a garden; for these are actually existing things which must be known empirically, and not merely
an idea of my own which is determined *a priori* according to a principle. The adaptation in this case is empirical or real, and presupposes the conception of an end.

63. *Relative as contrasted with Internal Purpose.*

Experience leads our judgment to the conception of an objective material purpose, that is, to the conception of an end in nature, only if we find ourselves compelled to presuppose the activity of a cause that is determined to action by conceptions as the necessary condition of the existence of a given effect. This may occur either when the effect is regarded as itself a product of art, or when it is regarded merely as material for the art of other possible natural beings; in other words, it is either an end, or a means for the ends of other causes. Purpose in the latter case is called utility in relation to man, advantage when we are speaking of other creatures, and is merely relative; while purpose in the former case is an internal purpose exhibited in a natural being.

A sandy soil is most advantageous for the growth of pine trees. Now, when the sea withdrew from the land on our northern shores, it left behind it large tracts of sand, on which pine forests have grown up. Shall we then say that the original deposit of these tracts of sand is evidence of an end of nature, simply because it is of advantage to pine trees? Manifestly if this is an end of nature, the sand also must be regarded as a relative end, for which the withdrawal of the sea was a means. So also if cattle, sheep, horses, etc., are to exist, grass must cover the earth. . . . The objective purpose here supposed is therefore not exhibited by things themselves, but is merely relative or contingent.
From this it is quite plain, that purpose can be regarded as an external natural end, only on condition that the existence of that for which something else is immediately or remotely advantageous, is in itself an end of nature. But this can never appear from a mere contemplation of nature, and therefore relative purpose, although it points hypothetically to natural ends, does not of itself justify an absolute teleological judgment.

The Properties of Things which are Natural Ends.

To see that a thing is really a natural end, or cannot be explained in a mechanical way, its form must be incapable of explanation by the ordinary laws of nature that are known and applied by the understanding to objects of sense; in other words, it must be of such a nature that it cannot be known in experience even as an effect, except on presupposition of conceptions of reason. Simply to know what are the conditions required for the production of such a natural object, reason must perceive its form to be necessary. Now, the very fact that in the present case the form of the object is not necessary but accidental, so far as the ordinary laws of nature are concerned, is itself a ground for regarding that form as possible only through reason. And as reason or will is the faculty of acting from ends, an object which is regarded as possible only through reason must be conceived as an end.

To know a thing, however, not only as an end, but as a natural end, more than this is required. A thing exists as a natural end only if it is, in a double sense, its own cause and its own effect. This may be illustrated by an example. In the first place, a tree produces another
tree according to a well-known natural law. The tree so produced is of the same species; hence a tree, being continually self-produced, is, on the one hand, its own effect, and, on the other hand, its own cause, and by such continual self-production it perpetuates itself as a *species*. In the second place, a tree is self-productive, even as an *individual*. This no doubt is what we call growth, but it must be observed that growth is quite different from any mere increase in size according to mechanical laws. The matter which the tree incorporates, it previously works up into a specifically peculiar quality, which is not due to any natural mechanism outside of it; and thus it develops itself by means of a material, which, as assimilated, is its own product. No doubt the tree, so far as the constituents obtained from external nature are concerned, must be regarded as an educt; but, on the other hand, it displays a power of separating, recombining and shaping this raw material, which is far beyond the reach of human art. In the third place, each part of the tree is self-productive, so that the preservation of one part is dependent on the preservation of all the rest. A bud inoculated on the twig of another tree produces a plant of its own kind, and so also a scion engrafted on a foreign stem. We may, therefore, regard each twig or leaf of the same tree as engrafted or inoculated on it, or as an independent tree, externally attached to another and parasitically nourished by it. And while the leaves are a product of the tree, the tree is in turn dependent for its growth upon their effect on the stem, for if it is repeatedly denuded of its leaves it dies.
65. Things which are Natural Ends are Organized Beings.

Causal connection as thought by the understanding always constitutes a regressive series of causes and effects. . . . This sort of causal connection we call that of efficient causes (nexus effectivus). But another kind of causal connection is conceivable, which rests upon the conception of ends. Here the series, if it can be called a series, may be taken either backwards or forwards, and hence that which has been named effect is with equal propriety termed the cause of that of which it is the effect. . . . Such a causal connection we name that of final cause (nexus finalis).

For a thing to be a natural end, in the first place, its parts must be possible only in relation to the whole. As an end the thing itself is comprehended under a conception or idea, which must determine a priori all that is to be contained in it. This, however, does not distinguish a natural product from an artificial product, in which the cause is an intelligent being, distinct from the material parts that are brought together and combined in accordance with the idea of a whole that is possible only by means of them.

Hence, in the second place, a natural product must in itself or in its inner possibility imply relation to an end; in other words, it must be possible as a natural end irrespective of any intelligent cause external to it. Accordingly, the parts of such a natural product, which combine in the unity of a whole, must be reciprocally cause and effect of each other's form. Only in this way can the idea of the whole determine conversely the form
and combination of all the parts, not indeed as cause—for then we should have an artificial product—but as the ground on which the thing is known, by the subject judging of it, in the systematic unity of the form and the combination of all its parts.

A body is therefore a natural end, only if all its parts mutually depend upon each other both as to their form and their combination, and are thus themselves the cause of the whole; while, conversely, the idea of the whole may be regarded as the cause of the body in accordance with a principle. In such a body, accordingly, the conjunction of efficient causes is at the same time regarded as an effect through final causes.

In a natural product, each part not only exists by means of the other parts, but is conceived as existing for the sake of the others and of the whole, that is, as an instrument or organ; and not only so, but its parts are all organs reciprocally producing one another, which is never the case with artificial instruments. Only a product of this kind is called a natural end, and it receives this name just because it is an organized and self-organizing being.

Organized beings are the only things in nature which, in themselves and apart altogether from their relation to other things, can be conceived to exist only as ends. The conception of an end of nature, as distinguished from a practical end, first obtains objective reality from a consideration of such beings; and apart from them, the teleological consideration of nature as a special principle of judgment would have no justification whatever.
66. **The Principle by which Organized Beings are judged to be internally purposive.**

The principle that is applied when a thing is judged to be internally purposive, a principle which is at the same time a definition, is this: *An organized product of nature is one in which all the parts are reciprocally end and means.* Nothing in an organized being is useless, or without purpose, and nothing in it can be ascribed to blind natural mechanism.

This principle finds its occasion in the methodical observation of experience, but, as it affirms the idea of purpose to be of universal necessity, it cannot be derived from experience, but must be *a priori.* At the same time, as ends exist only as an idea in the judging subject, not in any efficient cause, it is merely a regulative principle, or a *maxim*, for judging of the internal purpose exhibited in organized beings.

67. **The Teleological Judgment in regard to Nature as a System of Ends.**

As has been shown above, *external* purpose does not justify us in saying that things can be known to exist only as ends of nature, or in employing the principle of final cause to account for the purpose which may seem to be implied in their effects. . . . . Now, if there is no reason for regarding a thing as in itself end, the external relation can be only hypothetically judged to imply purpose.

To regard a thing as a natural end on account of its internal form, is a very different thing from holding the existence of that thing to be an end of nature. The latter assertion is justifiable only if it can be shown, not
merely that we have the conception of a possible end, but that we have a knowledge of the ultimate end (scopus) of nature. But this requires the relation of such knowledge to something which is supersensible and far transcends all our teleological knowledge of nature, for the end of nature must be sought beyond nature. The internal form of a simple blade of grass is sufficient to show that for our human faculty of judgment its origin is possible only according to the rule of ends. But if we change our point of view, and look merely at its external adaptation for the use of other natural beings, we get no categorical end, but, finding always a new condition of such adaptation, we are led to the idea of the unconditioned existence of a thing as ultimate end, and so entirely beyond the physico-teleological consideration of the world. So conceived the thing is not even a natural end, for it is no longer regarded as a natural product.

Only organized matter, as in its specific form a product of nature, necessarily demands the application of the conception of natural end. But this conception, when once obtained, necessarily leads to the idea of the whole of nature as a system of ends, and to this idea all natural mechanism must be subordinated in accordance with principles of reason.

It is manifest that this is not a principle of the determinant, but only of the reflective judgment; that it is regulative and not constitutive; and that it supplies us with a guiding conception, by means of which natural objects already determined may be considered according to a new law and order, and our knowledge of them extended by means of the principle of final cause. But this principle in no way interferes with the principle of
mechanical causality already applied to them, nor does it entitle us to regard anything whatever as a purposive end of nature.

After the teleological judgment by natural ends as applied to organized beings has brought us to the idea of a great system of ends of nature, even the beauty of nature, that is, the harmony of nature with the free play of our faculties of knowledge in apprehending and judging of its appearance, may be regarded as a sort of objective purpose exhibited by nature in a systematic whole of which man is a member.

Section II.—Dialectic of Teleological Judgment.

70. Antinomy of Judgment.

In dealing with nature as a totality of sensible objects, reason may either take its stand upon the a priori laws prescribed to nature by understanding, or upon laws which are capable of indefinite addition as experience is gradually extended. In applying the former sort of laws, that is, the universal laws of material nature, judgment needs no special principle of reflection; for an objective principle is given to it by understanding, and it is, therefore, merely determinant. But so multifarious and diverse are the particular laws which have to be learned from experience, that judgment must here supply its own principle, if it is to conduct its investigations into the phenomena of nature in an orderly way. Without such a guiding-thread there is not the least hope that our empirical knowledge may form a thoroughly connected and orderly system, and may reduce the empirical laws of nature to unity. Now, in a contingent unity of
this kind it may very well happen, that judgment in its reflection proceeds from either of those principles. It may simply apply the \textit{a priori} laws of understanding, or it may start from the special principle, by means of which reason, on occasion of particular experiences, seeks to form a judgment upon corporeal nature and its laws. Hence it comes, that these two maxims seem to be mutually exclusive, and that a dialectic arises which leads judgment into error in its application of the principle of reflection.

The \textit{first maxim} of judgment is the \textit{position}: All production of material things and the forms of material things must be judged to be possible according to purely mechanical laws.

The \textit{second maxim} is the \textit{counterposition}: Some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible according to purely mechanical laws, but require quite a different law of causality, namely, that of final cause.

Now, if these regulative principles in the investigation of nature are converted into constitutive principles, which are supposed to determine the possibility of objects themselves, they will run thus:

\textit{Position}: All production of material things is possible according to purely mechanical laws.

\textit{Counterposition}: Some production of material things is not possible according to purely mechanical laws.

If we take the last pair of propositions as objective principles of the determinant judgment, each is contradictory of the other, and hence one of them must be false. We shall then no doubt have an antinomy, but it will be an antinomy not of judgment but of reason. Reason, however, can prove neither the one
proposition nor the other, for there can be no *a priori* principle which determines the possibility of things so far as the purely empirical laws of nature are concerned.

The first two propositions, on the other hand, if they are regarded simply as maxims of reflective judgment, are not really contradictory. For, to say that all events in the material world, and, therefore, all the forms which are products of nature, must be judged to be possible on purely mechanical laws, is not to say that *they are possible in this way alone*, or apart from any other sort of causality. All that is implied is, that we ought in all cases *reflectively to judge* them by the principle of natural mechanism, and to make this principle the foundation of all our investigations, and apply it as far as we can, since without it there can, properly speaking, be no knowledge of nature at all. But this in no way prevents us, if occasion is given for it, from following the guiding-thread of the second principle in our reflection upon certain natural forms, and even by instigation of these upon the whole of nature, the principle, namely, of final cause, which is quite distinct from that employed in the explanation of natural mechanism. The value of reflection of the kind indicated in the first maxim is not in any way denied, but on the contrary we are told to follow it as far as we can. Nor is it said, that those forms are not possible at all on the principle of natural mechanism: all that is said is, that by following this path *human reason* will never be able to discover any ground of the specific character of natural ends, although it will certainly gain increased knowledge of natural laws. Thus it is left undetermined, whether in the inner ground of nature, which to us is unknown, conjunction by physical mechanism and conjunction by
ends may not themselves be connected together in the same thing by one principle. We must conclude, however, that our reason is not in a position to unite the two principles, and that it is not the determinant but the reflective judgment which compels us to explain the possibility of certain forms of nature by means of a different principle from that of natural mechanism.

76. Remark.

Without conceptions of understanding, for which an objective reality must be presented, theoretical reason can make no objective or synthetical judgments. In itself it contains no constitutive principle whatever, but merely regulative principles. . . . . Now the very nature of our intelligence compels us to distinguish between the possible and the actual. Such a distinction would not be made, did not our knowledge involve the exercise of two heterogeneous faculties,—understanding for conceptions and sensible perception for objects corresponding to conceptions. Were our intelligence perceptive, its objects would always be actual. . . . . The distinction of things into possible and actual is therefore a subjective distinction, which is valid for human reason merely because we can always think something that has no reality, or suppose something of which we have no conception to be given as an object. That possible things may not be actual, and, as a consequence, that actuality cannot be deduced from possibility, is certainly true when we are speaking of human reason, though it does not follow that such a distinction applies to things themselves. That it has no such application is indeed plain from the irrepressible tendency of reason to suppose some
unconditionally necessary existence, or original ground, in which the distinction of possible and actual no longer holds good.

The conception of an absolutely necessary being is thus an indispensable idea of reason, but it is an idea which remains for human intelligence a problem that it cannot solve. It arises from the peculiar nature of our faculties of knowledge, and therefore it does not hold true objectively but merely subjectively. We cannot say that such an idea is essential to every intelligence, for we have no right to assume that in all thinking beings there are two conditions of knowledge, so different in their nature as thought and perception, and therefore we have no right to suppose that in all thinking beings the conditions of possibility and actuality are different. An intelligence for whom this distinction did not exist, might say: All objects that I know are, that is, exist; and such a being could never suppose some objects to be possible that have no existence, and therefore to be contingent when they do exist, nor could it, in contrast to those objects, think of others as necessary.

Just as theoretical reason must assume as an idea the unconditioned necessity of the original ground of nature, so practical reason presupposes its own unconditioned causality, or freedom, which is implied in the consciousness of its own moral commands. Here the objective necessity of an act, as being a duty, is opposed to the necessity which it would have as an event, if its ground lay in nature and not in freedom, that is, in the causality of reason. The morally necessary act is regarded as physically quite contingent, since that which ought necessarily to take place, often does not take place. It
is evidently owing to the subjective constitution of our practical faculty, that moral laws must be represented as commands, and the acts conforming to them as duties; and that reason expresses this necessity not in the form that something is or happens, but in the form that it ought to be. This would not be the case were reason considered as a cause which acts quite independently of sensibility, that is, independently of the subjective condition of its application to objects of nature, and therefore as a cause in an intelligible world that is completely in accordance with moral laws. For in such a world there would be no distinction between being and doing, between a practical law of that which is possible through us, and the theoretical law of that which is actual through us. A purely intelligible world, then, would be one in which whatever is possible is at the same time actual, just because it is good. But even freedom, which is the formal condition of an intelligible world, is for us a transcendent conception, and is therefore incapable of serving as a constitutive principle for determining an object and its objective reality. Yet, although our nature is partly sensuous, freedom, in so far as it involves the idea of conformity to reason, is for us, and all other rational beings that have a connection with the world of sense, a universal regulative principle. This principle does not objectively determine the nature of freedom, but it commands everyone to act in accordance with the idea of freedom, and that as absolutely as if it were a constitutive principle.

Let us see the bearing of these considerations on the topic immediately in hand. Between natural mechanism and the technic of nature, that is, its teleological connec-
tion, there would be for us no distinction, were it not that our intelligence is compelled by its very nature to advance from the universal to the particular. There can, therefore, be no knowledge of the adaptation of the particular to an end, and consequently no determinant judgments, unless judgment has a universal law under which it may subsume the particular. Now, the particular, as such, has a certain contingency with respect to the universal; and yet reason demands conformity with law in the reduction of particular laws of nature to unity. Conformity with law in the case of the contingent is called purpose, and from such a universal, particular laws, so far as they imply a contingent element, cannot be derived a priori. Hence the conception that natural products are purposive, necessary as it is for our judgment, does not enable us to determine the objects themselves. It is a subjective or regulative principle of reason, although for human judgment it has the same validity as if it were an objective or constitutive principle.

77. The conception of Natural End as due to the peculiar character of our Intelligence.

There are certain peculiarities of even our higher faculty of knowledge which it is very natural to transfer as objective predicates to things. But they really belong only to ideas, for no possible object of experience can be presented which corresponds to them. This holds good even of the conception of a natural end, which as a predicate can exist nowhere but in the idea. But, as the effect corresponding to this idea, that is, the product itself, is a real object in nature, the conception
of nature as a being acting from an end seems to make the idea of a natural end a constitutive principle. In this respect the idea of a natural end is different from all other ideas.

The difference, however, lies in the fact that this idea is not a principle of reason for the understanding, but only for the judgment, and is therefore merely the application of an intelligence in general to possible objects of experience. For here judgment is not determinant but merely reflective, and hence although the object is given in experience, judgment cannot determine it by the idea, but can only reflect on it.

It is therefore a peculiarity of human intelligence that in its judgment upon natural things it assumes the form of reflection. Now this suggests the idea of an intelligence different from ours and presupposed in it, just as in the Critique of Pure Reason it was by supposing the possibility of a perception different from ours, that we were able to see that our perception is by its very nature limited to phenomena. It is, then, by reference to this supposed intelligence that we are able to say: Certain natural products, from the very nature of our intelligence, must be considered by us as if they could not exist at all unless they had been produced purposely, or from conceived ends. But we cannot venture to say that there actually is a particular cause which acts from such ends, or that an intelligence higher than ours may not find in the mere mechanism of nature, as a sort of causality conceivable apart from intelligence, a sufficient explanation of the possibility of such natural products.

We must therefore expect to find that there is a certain
contingency in the nature of our intelligence as related to
its faculty of judgment, and if we can show wherein this
contingency consists, we shall learn how our intelligence
differs from other possible intelligences.

It is not difficult to see that the contingency lies in the
particular, which it is the function of judgment to bring
under the universal that is supplied in the conceptions of
understanding. For the universal of our understanding
does not determine the particular, and it is contingent in
how many ways different things which agree in a common
mark may present themselves to our observation. Knowledge involves perception as well as conception. Now, a perfectly spontaneous faculty of perception would be a faculty of knowledge different from sensibility, and quite independent of it; in other words, an intelligence in the most general sense of the term. Thus we are able to conceive of a perceptive intelligence, but only negatively or simply as not discursive; in other words, we can think of an intelligence which does not advance from the universal to the individual through the particular. For such an intelligence there would not be that contingency in the adaptation of particular laws of nature to understanding, which makes it so difficult for us to reduce the multifarious forms of nature to the unity of knowledge.

In order, then, to think at least the possibility of such
an adaptation of natural things to our faculty of judgment,
we must at the same time conceive of another intelligence,
by reference to which, and apart from any end attributed
to it, we may represent as necessary that harmony of
natural laws with our faculty of judgment, which for our
intelligence can be thought only through the medium of
ends.
It is the nature of our intelligence to proceed in knowledge from an *analytical universal*, or a conception, to the particular as given in empirical perception. The multiplicity of the latter thus remains undetermined, until judgment has determined it by bringing the perception under the conception. We may, however, conceive of an intelligence different in kind from ours, an intelligence which is perceptive and not discursive, and which therefore proceeds from a *synthetic universal* to the particular, that is, from a perceived whole to the parts. For such an intelligence, the connection of the parts which form a determinate whole would not be, or appear, contingent as it is for us. . . . . But, from the peculiar character of our intelligence, a real whole in nature is regarded only as the effect of the combined motive forces of the parts. We may, however, instead of viewing the whole as dependent on the parts, after the manner of our discursive intelligence, take a perceptive or archetypal intelligence as our standard, and seek to comprehend the dependence of the parts on the whole, both in their specific nature and in their interconnection. And as it is a contradiction in terms to say that for a discursive intelligence the connection of the parts necessarily presupposes the whole, it must be the *idea* of the whole that for such an intelligence explains the form of the whole and the connection of its parts. Now, such a whole is an effect or *product*, the *idea* of which is treated as the *cause* that makes it possible, and such a product is called an end. It therefore arises solely from the peculiar character of our intelligence, that we regard certain natural products as due to a different sort of causality from that of the material laws of nature, namely, that of ends and final
This principle, therefore, does not determine the manner in which things themselves, even when they are regarded as phenomena, are capable of being produced, but merely the manner in which our intelligence can alone judge them to be produced. And this is the reason why in our scientific investigations we are dissatisfied with any explanation of natural products by final causes. In such investigations our sole object is to judge of natural products, so far as we are capable of doing so in consistency with the nature of our judgment, that is, our reflective judgment, not to determine them by judgment as things in themselves. The correctness of the view here taken does not require us to show that an *intellectus archetypus* may possibly exist; it is enough that the idea is not self-contradictory, and that a perceptive or archetypal intelligence is the natural counterpart of a discursive intelligence like ours (*intellectus ectypus*), which by its very nature is contingent and dependent upon the presentation of particulars.

If we think of a material whole as in its form a product of the parts, with their forces and power of combining themselves with one another, we get the conception of a mechanical mode of production. But we do not in this way obtain any conception of a whole as end, such as we are compelled to suppose an organized being to be,—a whole, the inner possibility of which is utterly inconceivable apart from the idea of it, and on which depends the very nature and mode of operation of the parts. It does not follow, as we have just seen, that the mechanical production of such a body is impossible; for to say so would be to say, that *no intelligence* could possibly think
the different parts as combined in a unity, unless the idea of the unity was at the same time the cause of the whole; unless, in other words, the production was purposeful. For the unity which is the necessary ground of the form of natural products would then be merely that of space; and space is not a real ground of products, but simply their formal condition, although no doubt it has this in common with the real ground, that no part of it can be determined except in relation to the whole. Now, it is at least possible to regard the material world as a mere phenomenon, and to conceive of its substrate as a thing in itself, to which an intellectual perception corresponds. Thus we get the idea of a supersensible and real ground of the world of nature to which we ourselves belong, although that ground is not for us an object of knowledge. Accordingly, we may apply mechanical laws in explanation of that which in the sensible world is necessary, but the harmony and unity of the particular laws and forms of nature—which relatively to the mechanism of nature must be regarded as contingent—we must view as an object of reason to which teleological laws are applicable. Nature thus comes to be judged on two distinct principles, the mechanical and the teleological, but these in no way conflict with each other.

From this point of view we can see, what even in other ways might readily be guessed, but in no other way could be proved and maintained with certainty, that the principle of a mechanical derivation of those natural products which exhibit purpose is quite consistent with the teleological principle, but by no means enables us to dispense with it. In the investigation of a thing that we
are forced to regard as a natural end, that is, an organized being, we may try all the known and yet to be discovered laws of mechanical production, and may even hope to make good progress in that direction, but we need never hope to get rid, in our explanation of natural products, of the quite different principle of causation by ends. No human intelligence, and indeed no finite intelligence, however it may surpass ours in degree, need expect to comprehend the production of even a blade of grass by purely mechanical causes. The teleological connection of causes and effects is absolutely indispensable in judging of the possibility of such an object. There is indeed no adequate reason for regarding external phenomena as such from a teleological point of view; the reason for it must be sought in the supersensible substrate of phenomena. But, as we are shut out from any possible view of that substrate, it is impossible for us to find in nature grounds for an explanation of nature, and we are compelled by the constitution of our intellectual faculty to seek for the supreme ground of teleological connections in an original Intelligence which is the cause of the world.

APPENDIX ON METHOD.


Theoretical reflective judgment is quite justified in supposing, on the ground of a physical teleology, that there is an intelligent cause of the world. Now, in our own moral consciousness, and still more in the general conception of a rational being who is endowed with free causality, there is implied a moral teleology. But as the
relation to ends, together with the laws connected with them, is determined *a priori* in ourselves, and therefore is known to be necessary, this internal conformity to law does not require for its explanation the supposition of an intelligent cause outside of ourselves. At the same time moral teleology has to do with man as a being in the world, and therefore with man as connected with other things in the world. For, in the conception of ourselves as beings under moral law, we find the standard by reference to which those other things are judged either to be ends, or to be objects subordinate to ourselves as the ultimate end. Moral teleology, then, has to do with the relation of our own causality to ends, and even to an ultimate end necessarily set up by us as our goal in the world, as well as with the possibility of realizing that end, the external world being what it is. Hence the question necessarily arises, whether reason compels us to seek, in a supreme intelligence outside of the world, for a principle which shall explain to us even the purpose in nature relatively to the law of morality within us. There is therefore a moral teleology, which is concerned, on the one hand with the *nomothetic* of freedom, and on the other hand with that of nature.

If we suppose certain things, or even certain forms of things, to be contingent, and therefore to depend upon something else which is their cause, we may seek for this supreme cause, or unconditioned ground of the conditioned, either in the physical or in the teleological order. That is to say, we may either ask, what is the supreme productive cause of those things, or what is their supreme and absolutely unconditioned end, that is, the ultimate end of that cause in its production of those things, or
even of all things. In the latter case it is plainly implied that the cause in question is capable of setting an end before itself, that is, is an intelligence, or at least must be thought of as acting in accordance with the laws of an intelligence.

From the teleological point of view, it is a fundamental proposition admitted by every one, that there can be no ultimate end at all presupposed by reason a priori, unless that end is man as under moral laws. A world consisting of mere lifeless things, or even containing living but unintelligent beings, would have no meaning or value, because there would be in it no intelligent being to appreciate its value. Again, suppose that in the world there are intelligent beings, whose reason enables them to value existing things for the pleasure they bring, but who have not themselves any power of imparting a value to things by means of freedom; then, there will indeed be relative ends, but there will be no absolute or ultimate end, for the existence in the world of such intelligent beings can never have an end. Moral laws, however, are of this peculiar character, that they prescribe for reason something as an end apart from all conditions, and therefore exactly as the conception of an ultimate end requires. The existence of a reason which can be for itself the supreme law in the relation of ends, in other words the existence of rational beings under moral laws, can alone be conceived as the ultimate end of the existence of a world. On any other supposition its existence does not imply a cause acting from any end, or it implies ends but no ultimate end.

The moral law, as the formal condition in reason of the use of our freedom, lays its commands on us
entirely on its own authority, without appealing to any material condition as an end; but it nevertheless determines for us, and indeed a priori, an ultimate end as the goal to which our efforts ought to be directed; and that end is the highest good possible in the world through freedom.

The subjective condition which entitles man to set before himself an ultimate end subordinate to the moral law is happiness. Hence the highest physical good possible in the world is happiness, and this end we must seek to advance, as far as in us lies, but always under the objective condition of the harmony of man with the law of morality as worthiness to be happy.

But it is impossible, in consistency with all the faculties of our intelligence, to regard the two requisites of the ultimate end presented to us through the moral law as connected by merely natural causes, and yet as conforming to the idea of that ultimate end. If, therefore, nature is the only cause which is connected with freedom as a means, the conception of the practical necessity of the ultimate end through the application of our powers, does not harmonize with the theoretical conception of the physical possibility of the realization of that end.

Accordingly, we must suppose a moral cause or author of the world, in order to set before ourselves an ultimate end that is conformable with the moral law; and in so far as the latter is necessary, in the same degree, and on the same ground, the former also must necessarily be admitted; it must, in other words, be admitted that there is a God.
88. Limitation of the Moral Proof.

The ultimate end, as merely a conception of our practical reason, is not an inference from data of experience for the theoretical explanation of nature, nor can it be applied in the knowledge of nature. Its only possible use is for practical reason in relation to moral laws; and the ultimate end of creation is that constitution of the world which harmonizes with the only end which we can definitely present to ourselves as conforming to law, namely, the ultimate end of our pure practical reason, in so far as it is the nature of reason to be practical. Now, we have in the moral law, which enjoins on us practically the application of our powers to the realization of the ultimate end, a ground for supposing the possibility and practicability of that end, and therefore also a ground for supposing a nature of things harmonious with it. Hence we have a moral ground for representing in the world an ultimate end of creation.

So far we have not advanced from moral teleology to theology; that is, to the existence of a moral author of the world, but have merely concluded to an ultimate end of creation determined in that way. But, in order to account for this creation, that is, for the existence of things that are adapted to an ultimate end, in the first place an intelligent being, and in the second place not only an intelligent but a moral being or author of the world, that is, a God, must be admitted to exist. But this conclusion is of the peculiar character, that it holds good merely for the judgment according to conceptions of practical reason, and as such for the reflective not the determinant judgment. It is true that in us morally
practical reason is essentially different in its principles from technically practical reason. But we cannot assume that in the Supreme Cause of the world, conceived of as an intelligence, the same contrast exists, and that a peculiar kind of causality is required for the ultimate end, different in its character from that which is required merely for ends of nature. We cannot assume, therefore, that in an ultimate end we have a reason for admitting not merely a moral ground or ultimate end of creation as an effect, but also a moral being as the original ground of creation. But we may certainly say, that, according to the constitution of our reason, we cannot make intelligible to ourselves the possibility of an adaptation relative to the moral law, and to its object as it is in this ultimate end, apart from an author and ruler of the world, who is also a moral lawgiver.

Physical teleology sufficiently proves for theoretical reflective judgment an intelligent cause of the world; moral teleology proves it for the practical judgment, through the conception of an ultimate end, which must be attributed to creation when we view it in relation to action. It is true that the objective reality of the idea of God, as the moral author of the world, cannot be shown from a consideration of physical ends alone. But, it is a maxim of pure reason to secure unity of principles, so far as that is possible; and hence the knowledge of physical ends, when it is brought into relation with the knowledge of the moral end, greatly aids us in connecting the practical reality of the idea of God with its theoretical reality as already existing for judgment.

To prevent a very natural misunderstanding two remarks must be made. which should be carefully borne in
mind. In the first place, we can *think* the attributes of the Supreme Being only by analogy. How, indeed, could we investigate directly the nature of a Being to whom nothing similar is given in experience? Secondly, the attributes by which we think the Supreme Being do not enable us to *know* Him as He is, nor can we theoretically predicate them of Him. To contemplate that Being as he is *in Himself* speculative reason must assume the form of the determinant judgment, and this is contrary to its very nature.
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